Economic Development in Counterinsurgency

Building a Stable Second Pillar

by

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A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty

In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements

14 February 2012
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Biography

Lieutenant Colonel Patrick H. Donley is a United States Air Force security forces officer assigned to the Air War College, Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL. He graduated from the United States Air Force Academy, Colorado, in 1991 with a Bachelor of Science degree in Political Science, the University of Denver, Colorado, in 1999 with a Master of Arts degree in International Studies, and the London School of Economics and Political Science, United Kingdom, with a Doctor of Philosophy degree in International Relations in 2003. He has held various positions within the Security Forces career field including twice commanding at the squadron level. He has also served two tours at the United States Air Force Academy where he was an Assistant Professor and Deputy Department Head of the Military & Strategic Studies Department. From May 2009 to May 2010, he deployed to Kabul, Afghanistan as an advisor to the Afghan Minister of Rural Rehabilitation and Development and as the rural development liaison to the Commander, International Security and Assistance Force.
Abstract

To be victorious against an insurgency, counterinsurgents must build host-nation government legitimacy within the population by providing effective security, responsive governance, and sufficient economic development. When the United States (US) decides that it is in its interest to assist other nations battle insurgencies, it should consider how best to accomplish these three objectives. Within the security mission, US Army and Marine Corps leaders have codified the US approach in a an official publication, but US economic development experts have not yet put forth a similar strategy to guide development activities or inform their security and governance counterparts.

To fill the gap, this paper lays out five key economic development principles that should be used to form the basis of any development COIN strategy: host-nation government legitimacy, mission synchronization, simultaneous tactical and operational development, HN capacity building, and responsiveness to local input. It also proposes the use of a four-phase development model composed of Shape, Stabilize, Build, and Transition phases to increase the probability that economic development in COIN will have its intended effect with regard to building government legitimacy and increasing security and governance cooperation.

COIN is a difficult task, the success of which relies on a number of complex factors that often fall outside the counterinsurgents’ control. While these development principles and corresponding model do not guarantee success, they do increase the probability of a favorable outcome if employed consistently.
Introduction

The future of United States (US) participation in counterinsurgencies (COIN) is uncertain, but not so the probability that future adversaries will avoid US conventional military dominance by using asymmetric, unconventional methods. As COIN theorist David Kilcullen warns, “Any smart future enemy will likely sidestep our unprecedented superiority in traditional, force-on-force, state-on-state warfare. And so insurgency… will be our enemies’ weapon of choice until we prove we can master it.”1 Unfortunately, because no two insurgencies are exactly alike, mastering COIN will be a perpetual endeavor.

At its core, a counterinsurgency is a battle for government legitimacy in the minds of its people.2 Writing in 1963, David Galula summarized the insurgent aim: “If the insurgent manages to dissociate the population from the counterinsurgent, to control it physically, to get its active support, he will win the war because, in the final analysis, the exercise of political power depends on the tacit or explicit agreement of the population or, at worst, on its submissiveness.”3 One of the chief ways insurgents attain popular support is by capitalizing on government ineffectiveness. In fact, government illegitimacy is considered by many COIN strategists to be the “root cause of and the central strategic problem in today’s unstable global-security environment.”4 Counterinsurgents, then, must have as their primary objective the creation of a government that derives legitimacy from its ability to provide its population with effective security, responsive governance, and sufficient economic development.5 In fact, Kilcullen considers the security, political, and economic mission elements to be co-equal “pillars” in his Inter-agency Counterinsurgency Framework (Figure 1).6
Due to the complexities of COIN, the US Army and Marine Corps collaborated in 2006 to provide their forces with “a manual that provides principles and guidelines for counterinsurgency operations.” Recognizing “that every insurgency is contextual,” the authors set out to highlight the “common characteristics of insurgencies” in order to provide military implementers of COIN “a solid foundation for understanding and addressing specific insurgencies.” Along with security, the manual concedes the criticality of governance and economic development to COIN success, and acknowledges that military members must work closely with “many intergovernmental, host-nation, and international agencies” to capitalize on skills such as “rebuilding infrastructure and basic services,” and to facilitate the establishment of “local governance and rule of law.” Moreover, it advocates synchronizing these three mission elements and unifying “efforts of joint, interagency, multinational, and Host Nation (HN) forces toward a common purpose.”

While military forces have a legitimate role in each of the mission elements, their primary expertise lies in providing a secure environment so that political and economic development can occur. To this end, the chapter entitled “Executing Counterinsurgency
Operations” advocates using a “Clear-Hold-Build” approach for “specific, high-priority area[s] experiencing overt insurgent operations” in order to “create a secure physical and psychological environment; establish firm government control of the populace and area; and gain the populace’s support.” Since publication of the military COIN guidance, many observers feel the strategy has been expanded to include a preliminary “Shape” phase and a concluding “Transfer” phase (see Figure 2 for associated tasks within each phase).

![Figure 2: Security Mission Element](image)

*The tasks associated with each phase are taken from several sources. Those included in the “Clear, Hold, Build” phases are largely pulled from Field Manual 3-24, 5-18–5-22.

Whether or not the military’s “Shape, Clear, Hold, Build, and Transfer” model is correct, it provides a useful framework that political and economic development experts can use to integrate their actions with their security colleagues.

To date, political and economic developers have not created comparable models to guide their actions or inform their mission partners. Consequently, their efforts appear somewhat reactive and disjointed, and may, as a result, be perceived as being subordinate to the security mission. To address this weakness, this paper focuses on the economic development mission. It
proposes five key principles that should guide economic development activities in a
counterinsurgency, and it presents a four-phase conceptual model that can be used by economic
developers, as well as security and political planners, to better synchronize all COIN efforts. It
does not, however, offer a context-independent recipe for COIN success or an easy-to-follow
checklist that simplifies COIN complexities. No matter how efficiently a COIN campaign is run,
success depends on a number of complicated factors, many of which are outside the economic
developers’ control. Most importantly, COIN success presupposes a capable HN government
partner that is willing to make the changes necessary to win popular legitimacy. Secondly, it
assumes the US desires to defeat the insurgency and not merely to alleviate some lesser risk.
Both of these are weighty assumptions that may, at some stage, prove inaccurate. While this
paper hopes to provide general guidance that will increase the probability of US COIN success, it
concedes the enormity of the COIN challenge upfront.

**Economic Development Principles**

Rather than propose a new definition for economic development, this paper utilizes
David Kilcullen’s description of the “economic pillar” in his Inter-agency Counterinsurgency
Framework. Within the pillar, he includes “Humanitarian Assistance, Development Assistance,
Resources & Infrastructure Management, and Growth Capacity” as key tasks. Economic
development, then, is the provision of sufficient basic services, infrastructure, and economic
essentials to garner popular support and engender government legitimacy. Because “sufficient
economic development” is largely based on the affected population’s expectations, it is always
contextually determined.

As a growing number of development experts have observed, economic development is
not a panacea and cannot be divorced from security and governance. The government cannot
gain sufficient legitimacy solely by building projects or otherwise infusing money into a local economy. In fact, such “development” can actually increase instability rather than decrease it. Andrew Wilder and Stuart Gordon conclude from their research in Afghanistan that US and international aid efforts “show little evidence of … winning hearts and minds or promoting stability.” An Afghan tribal elder summed up the argument this way: “…lack of clinics, schools, and roads are not the problem. The main problem is we don’t have a good government.”

This finding was echoed by a group of development experts who discussed the topic at the 2010 Wilton Park Conference entitled, “Winning ‘Hearts and Minds’ in Afghanistan: Assessing the Effectiveness of Development Aid in COIN Operations.” The end-of-conference report found that “…many Afghans believe the main cause of insecurity to be their government, which is perceived to be massively corrupt, predatory and unjust. …. Without getting the ‘politics right’ both military and aid efforts are unlikely to achieve their desired effects.”

In contrast to the US Army’s 2009 handbook entitled, Commander’s Guide to Money as a Weapons System, which claims that warfighters can use “money as a weapons system to win the hearts and minds of the indigenous population to facilitate defeating the insurgents,” mounting evidence indicates that money (and economic development more broadly) is effective in COIN only if it bolsters government legitimacy. Development can buy the population’s good will temporarily, but it cannot do so indefinitely by itself. While economic development efforts will depend on the nature of the insurgency and the specific context of the situation, US economic development strategies for a counterinsurgency should broadly comply with five key principles.
I. Endgame Legitimacy. Economic development in COIN must have as its overriding purpose the creation of HN legitimacy. Every other aim must be subordinated to this objective. While the concept is easy to understand, it is often difficult to practice consistently and may increase local instability and opposition in the short-term. It requires developers to bypass unethical, local power-brokers and shun corrupt business practices in favor of closely monitored, community-led development programs. Using this approach, developers may be opposed by economically powerful business people, corrupt government leaders, organized crime syndicates, and local warlords who seek to protect their power and influence, in addition to traditional insurgents. Nevertheless, to achieve the long-term goal of building HN government legitimacy, economic developers and policymakers must resist the urge to compromise overall mission success for short-term progress. This is far easier said than done.

One way of legitimizing the HN government is to work within the HN structure as much as possible. Rather than setting up parallel US structures that delegitimize the HN government, US developers should adapt to HN institutions if they exist. It is possible that the HN government has capabilities and institutions that are uniquely suited to the culture and the expectations of its populace. By utilizing them and building upon their expertise, the US increases mission effectiveness, bolsters HN capability, and lends credence to the government. If the HN structures are ineffective, US developers should use their expertise and financial leverage to reform them since the HN will eventually inherit the long-term mission. Reforming the government institutions can be problematic since affected HN officials may resist the changes and accuse the US of neo-colonial meddling—an accusation the US is particularly keen on avoiding and one insurgents can exploit to discredit HN government legitimacy.
Resolution of these conflicts will be difficult and will require diplomatic acumen, but the US cannot simply acquiesce to HN intransigence if it hopes to be successful.

Similarly, economic development should utilize HN implementers as much as possible so that the HN gets the credit. While this development approach takes longer and may require more people to institute initially, it builds long-lasting HN capacity and engenders popular support for the government. Making this more difficult is the fact that US economic developers are usually under pressure from an impatient US public to generate results quickly. Consequently, developers are susceptible to two common development pitfalls. Either they are tempted to use whatever structures are already in place without regard for the negative effect such practices have on the local population, or they opt to do all the work themselves. Both of these approaches de-legitimize the HN government and minimize the chances for long-term success.

II. Synchronicity of Missions. Economic development must be integrated and fully compatible with security and political strategies. As all three mission elements are necessary to generate the requisite legitimacy to defeat the insurgency, great care must be taken not to pursue one at the expense of the other two. This requires thorough inter-mission planning and an acknowledgement that each component affects the success of the others. In order to achieve this synergy, planners from all three mission sets, including representatives from the HN government, must work together to develop compatible plans. It may also require appointment of a single decision-maker who exercises authority over all three missions.

Synchronization is also key to eliminating gaps between mission elements. The counterinsurgents’ ability to eliminate gaps between missions can be the difference between success and failure. As Figure 3 illustrates, each COIN mission assumes prominence at a different point in the campaign, even though all three operate throughout the COIN effort.24
Security is the foundational need for all others, and, therefore, takes priority in the early stages of a COIN operation. Development reaches its critical point after security has been established but is a precursor to and facilitator for effective subnational governance. Lastly, political mobilization is critical toward the end of the COIN effort because the HN government must be capable of exercising long-term effective governance before successful transfer of the mission can occur.

Economic development must be synchronized with the security mission so that there is no gap between the termination of kinetic operations in the security mission and the initiation of humanitarian assistance in the economic development mission. Immediately following the “Clear” phase of the security mission, the local population is likely to feel a degree of cautious optimism that the HN government can positively change their lives. While locals may not yet feel comfortable expressing support for the government, they are expectant and hopeful that their lives might improve. Simultaneously, the immediate post-kinetic period is when local populations are particularly vulnerable and dependent on the government to meet their needs due to injuries, infrastructure destruction, economic upheaval, and population displacement. If the necessary assistance lags behind the security operation or is inadequate in its scope, the people’s
hopes are dashed and their assessment of government legitimacy declines, possibly even below pre-security operation levels. This sense of betrayal gives the insurgent another leverage point with which to influence the population.

Moreover, the longer it takes the counterinsurgent to follow the security gains with economic development, the less able the security forces are to maintain the secure environment. Effective economic and political development activities build confidence among populations resulting in the growth of an internal security dynamic. Without this internal security, it is virtually impossible for the security forces to maintain security, regardless of the number of people at their disposal. Insurgents will eventually infiltrate back into the community and exact vengeance upon those who collaborated with the government. The resultant insecurity will further highlight the government’s ineptness, and will create lasting doubt in the minds of the people that will be very difficult to eradicate.

Similarly, there should be no gap between effective economic development and the establishment of good governance. To achieve the intended COIN effect, the local population must associate the economic development with effective HN governance, which can only be accomplished if the political mission is functional and effective while the economic development is taking place. Simply put, people are more likely to respond favorably to governance when they associate it with meeting their needs.

III. Simultaneous Tactical and Operational Development. Economic development must be employed simultaneously at tactical and operational levels. Along these lines, the Wilton Park conferees made a distinction between “stabilisation and development objectives” of economic aid. Stabilization funds were those used for “relatively small scale and short-term projects designed to promote stability effects at a tactical level” and development funds were for
“larger-scale and longer-term development aid projects designed to promote development objectives.” Whether the distinction is between stabilization and development or between tactical development and operational development, economic development has the potential to generate crucial effects at both levels. Effective economic development will strive to take advantage of both domains in order to bolster government capability and generate popular support.

At the tactical level, economic development provides the counterinsurgent with a tool to incentivize the population to resolve factors of instability and bolsters local support for the HN government. Pragmatically, it also buys the counterinsurgent limited goodwill and forms the basis for trust from the local population. Effective economic development must take advantage of this window of optimism and provide tangible benefits that cannot easily be countered by insurgent information operations. Early on, tactical economic development comes in the form of emergency provisions and humanitarian assistance, such as medical care, food and water, and temporary shelters. Because of the “kinetic” nature of the environment, implementers at this stage will primarily be composed of military personnel.

Once immediate needs are met, tactical economic development progresses to the provision of necessary economic infrastructure (such as wells, roads, electrical generators, etc.), resolving communal instability, and laying the framework for sustainable development institutions. Tactical economic development should not be a blank check designed to meet every individual desire within a community; instead, it should be an incentive to motivate community members to work together to identify and solve local problems. In this latter stage, economic developers provide populations with training in basic economic development principles and organizational expertise and assist them in the acquisition of necessary infrastructure.
development in accordance with the community’s priorities. Ultimately, the latter stage of tactical economic development should build the community’s capacity to take control of its economic future, and it should set the stage for the political pillar to operate effectively.

Operational economic development, on the other hand, is aimed at increasing the HN government’s legitimacy by bolstering its ability to provide economically for the entire country. What tactical developers do inside and amongst local communities, operational developers do on a national scale—using development to resolve disputes, increase employment opportunities, and provide skills training. US economic developers at this level serve as advisors to key development ministries, facilitate US access to key HN leaders, and act as the conduit for HN-US meetings. Moreover, they should assist the HN government in identifying and sourcing large infrastructure projects that will have a positive national impact, training government personnel to implement and oversee these projects, and increasing HN capability to utilize international aid effectively. Vitally important to generating confidence within the HN population and the international community is the creation of transparent procedures for financial accountability.

IV. Host-Nation Capacity Building. Economic development must deliberately build HN government capacity so that the government is eventually able to conduct the mission without US assistance. From planning to implementation to sustainment, US developers must prioritize “transferability” by utilizing methods the HN government can perpetuate. The goal of US developers should be to transfer the mission seamlessly to their HN partners so that the population experiences no difference in the quality of service it receives. To this end, the US must avoid using equipment or software that the HN can neither operate nor sustain. This constraint can be challenging for US developers who often rely on the latest technological and mechanical tools. They must either change their way of doing business to be compatible with
HN capabilities, or they must invest in the HN’s long-term infrastructure development and commit to its sustainment and maintenance until the HN is able to sustain it on its own.

Because of the lead-time required to train HN personnel and the need to avoid gaps between the mission sets, the US must begin capacity-building at the tactical and operational levels long before the need for implementation. Once there is agreement between the US and HN government regarding the manner in which economic development will occur (in the early planning phase), the US should prioritize the capacity-building mission at the operational and tactical levels. Early on, US personnel may, out of necessity, lead development efforts, but they must not do so indefinitely—particularly at the tactical level. The US must deliberately taper its involvement until it is an unseen entity providing advice, technical expertise, and funding.

For the tactical mission, the US must strive to transfer implementation responsibilities to the HN as soon as possible. To facilitate this, the US must ensure the HN has a rapidly deployable development capability that can quickly reach all parts of the country. Recognizing that some countries cannot afford to support permanently-based local HN developers in every part of the country, the US should train deployable HN Development Teams (HNDTs) to meet this need. These teams should be composed of people who work for various HN development ministries or departments and who have the requisite skills and knowledge to mobilize post-kinetic populations, manage expectations, assess immediate needs, and distribute essential life-sustaining necessities in conjunction with applicable government departments. In addition to meeting immediate needs, these HNDTs should be trained to identify sources of instability within populations so that development resources can be used to resolve them. USAID already employs a stabilization framework designed to highlight sources of instability, but to be truly
effective, USAID needs to partner more comprehensively and consistently with trained HN personnel to administer it.  

Not only would HNDTs bring cultural expertise and a shared cultural identity to complex situations, they would also represent the HN government in a way that foreigners never could. Additionally, because of their knowledge of the HN government, they would be better able to coordinate the people’s perceived needs with the long-term plans of the government. For instance, if a particular community desired the construction of a new school, members of a HNDT would be better placed to liaise with the appropriate government department to ensure the proposed school aligns with HN government plans and resources. Too often, foreign economic developers, hoping to engender good will with a population, build infrastructure projects in the wrong locations or to the wrong specifications because they do not coordinate their actions with the HN government. Instead of fostering HN government legitimacy, the abandoned project becomes a testimony to the HN government’s inability to meet the population’s needs.

V. Responsiveness to Local Input. Finally, economic development must respond to local demand. When seeking to bring economic development to a community, US developers have a tendency to assume they know best what the community needs and what will most quickly resolve instability and engender legitimacy. To simplify logistical and financial planning and avoid conflict among local communities over aid equity, it is tempting for US developers to eschew input from the local populace. While these concerns may be valid, they do not justify ignoring local input entirely. After all, the point of economic development is to create HN government legitimacy in the minds of its people, which requires government responsiveness to the people’s perceived needs. There are reasonable limits to the flexibility that
can be allowed in the system, but some portion of the development budget must allow for 
popular input into the decision-making process.\textsuperscript{32}

A compromise approach would be to give each community a per-capita amount of money 
for spending on a community-selected project, in addition to other centrally-selected 
development packages. The community project could then be used as a skills-development 
opportunity in which development experts mentor community leaders through every phase of 
project implementation. A similar approach is already used effectively by Afghanistan’s 
Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development with its National Solidarity Program.\textsuperscript{33} Time 
and again, this community empowerment and rural development program is lauded by 
researchers and inspectors alike for its high accountability, broad popular support, and national 
reach.\textsuperscript{34}

Regardless of the details of the economic development strategy that is implemented, US 
developers would do well to incorporate these five economic development principles, even if it 
means the pace of development is slower, the selection of projects is sub-optimal, or the credit 
for the efforts goes elsewhere. Above all, the US should remember that if economic 
development is de-linked from HN legitimacy, it is a fruitless exercise and a potential contributor 
to instability.

\textbf{Economic Development Model}

Utilizing the five economic development principles above, it is possible to construct an 
economic development model for COIN operations to guide future planning efforts. The model 
is composed of four phases: Shape, Stabilize, Build, and Transfer (Figure 4).
While three of the phases share the same names as their security model counterparts, they do not necessarily share the same timelines. Figure 5 illustrates the correlation between the security and economic development models.

**Phase 0 Shape:** The Shape phase is primarily a planning and preparation phase. For the COIN effort to be successful, representatives from all three mission elements must participate.
equally in building a macro-level counterinsurgency plan. Because one mission element’s needs may drive the actions of the other two, it is critical that planning for all three mission elements be integrated from the beginning. For example, if successful economic development in a particular area requires uninterrupted electrical power, economic development planners should convey this requirement to the security planners so that they conduct their operation accordingly. Special emphasis should be placed on planning transition points between one mission element and another to ensure there is no gap in momentum or service to the population. Each mission element should share special considerations regarding timing, location, measures of success, and follow-on actions. At the micro-level of economic development planning, military, interagency and HN personnel should actively participate, even if it slows the process.

In addition to planning, the Shape phase is devoted to identification and acquisition of necessary resources. To prevent a security-development gap from occurring, the financial mechanisms, personnel, and key equipment must be ready in advance of need. Moreover, economic developers should identify, train, equip, and exercise HN Development Team members. Because of the questionable security environments and austere locations in which they will operate, HNDT members should possess a wide variety of skills. If development skills are lacking, the US should consider initiating educational programs for host nationals in return for their obligatory government service. This “development college” would not only benefit the individuals and the HN government in the short term, but it would also broaden the foundation for longer-term economic success as the graduates apply their skills after completing their service obligations.

**Phase 1 Stabilize:** The Stabilize phase is divided into two stages. The first stage begins while the security mission is still conducting clearing operations. Because kinetic operations are
still ongoing, the military leads this phase, primarily using special operations forces and civil affairs teams who have been trained in economic development tasks. As the environment grows more secure, economic development responsibilities shift to civilian experts from USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) and joint civil-military Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). Economic development in this early stage focuses on providing advice to US military combatants on how best to terminate their operations in order to facilitate economic development success, assessing humanitarian damage for planning refinements, and providing emergency humanitarian assistance. As the security effort transitions from Clear to Hold, HN economic developers play a greater support role, helping US PRTs conduct initial needs assessments and stability surveys with returning Internally Displaced Populations. They also work together to initiate small-scale projects designed to build on the population’s optimism, all the while actively managing the population’s expectations.

The second stage of this phase occurs when security has become fairly constant and the environment is relatively safe for civilian workers. The HNDTs lead this effort at the tactical level with the US PRTs in support, when necessary. Because US presence can be a destabilizing force within some communities, PRTs should limit their involvement to providing advice and access to US development funding for projects, as needed. HNDTs should concentrate on conducting stability surveys, mobilizing the population to prioritize the community’s needs in a systematic way, and providing the community members with necessary training for follow-on infrastructure projects.

At the operational level, US development experts work within key HN government development ministries. They advise the HN government departments, train civil servants, and act as liaisons between the US chain of command and the HN government, as well as between
the tactical development teams and the central government. In addition, they advise the
government on strategic messaging and help it navigate the complicated financial rules of US
funding. Just as tactical developers seek to gain the trust of the people at the community level,
operational developers seek to gain the trust of HN government officials.

**Phase 2 Build:** The Build phase begins as the environment becomes more consistently
secure and trust develops between the HNDTs and the populace. At the tactical level, HNDTs
continue to collect stability data, but their emphasis transitions to resolving the sources of
instability using the previously collected and analyzed information. During this phase, HNDTs
utilize the construction of new infrastructure projects as a vehicle for mentoring communities
through the development process by training, advising, and monitoring the community’s efforts.
HNDTs also begin to interact more frequently with experts from the political mission element in
anticipation of the upcoming political thrust. Throughout this phase, US PRTs continue to
distance themselves from the day-to-day mission, and PRT expertise either moves from the
tactical level to the operational, or prepares to move to the next community.

At the operational level, US developers concentrate almost exclusively on building long-
term capability. They emphasize their role as advisors rather than implementers and seek to
transform tactical successes into broader government legitimacy by helping the government with
its information operations. Former PRT members with unique development skills (civil
engineers, agricultural specialists, etc.) move from the tactical level to the relevant operational
ministries, further increasing HN government capacity. At some point in this phase, the HN
government should attain sufficient legitimacy and capability to act with minimal US technical
assistance.
Phase 3 Transfer: The Transfer Phase must be an overall COIN decision, not just an economic development decision. It is the least complicated phase to explain but potentially the most difficult to complete. US COIN planners, in conjunction with the HN government, should agree upon a timetable and criteria for an area’s readiness, as well as long-term US commitments in terms of advisors and financial resources.

Conclusion

In his 1963 book on COIN, David Galula conceded that some insurgencies simply could not be defeated, regardless of the COIN methods employed. This paper may have created an impression that an economic development strategy that employs the four-phase model and the five principles of government legitimacy, mission synchronicity, simultaneous tactical and operational development, HN capacity building, and responsiveness to local input is guaranteed to bring success. Unfortunately, it is not so. As Clausewitz warned years ago, wars are fought against living opponents with strategies and counterstrategies of their own, and they are fought in the context of complex factors that exist outside the counterinsurgent’s control. This is especially true when supporting another state’s counterinsurgency effort. The one truth US COIN planners must keep in mind is that no amount of external US assistance, modern firepower, development expertise, or sound political advice can save a country from eventual defeat if the HN refuses to govern legitimately. Consequently, the US should invest more effort into evaluating the HN government, as well as the criticality of long-term US objectives, before agreeing to augment another government’s COIN campaign.

Nevertheless, when counterinsurgency operations on behalf of another government are required, COIN planners must concentrate on building the HN’s capacity and legitimacy. COIN expertise and development projects do not matter if they fail to enable the HN to provide for the
needs of its population and govern legitimately. Therefore, the US should focus its efforts at the operational level as soon as possible. Developers must quickly extricate themselves from the tactical mission or else risk encouraging an unhealthy dependence within the HN government and a “recipient mentality” within the local population. Only when the HN government is required to meet the public’s needs will it be able to demonstrate the capability and persistence required to earn the trust of the population. The development model presented here is not guaranteed to generate COIN success, but utilizing the principles contained within it increases the probability that development can be an effective tool towards that end.


5 Authors differ in the terms they use for the building blocks of government legitimacy, but nearly all use terms that fall within these three general categories. Cohen et. al., 49, cites “a culturally acceptable level or rate of political, economic, and social development” as one of their five key indicators of legitimacy. Galula discusses security, political, social and economic measures as key enablers of popular support throughout his work—for instance pages 52, 54-55, 62-63, 84. Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates defined COIN tasks as follows: “One of the most important lessons of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is that military success is not sufficient to win: economic development, institution-building and the rule of law, promoting internal reconciliation, good governance, providing basic services to the people… these, along with security, are essential ingredients for long-term success. See Robert M. Gates, Landon Lecture, Kansas State University, 26 Nov 2007, http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1199.

6 Kilcullen, 4-6.

7 Headquarters, Department of the Army FM-3-24, Counterinsurgency, December 2006, Foreword.

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid.

10 Ibid., para 5-7, page 5-3.

11 Ibid, 5-18.

12 Anthony Cordesman points out the following with regard to US COIN strategy: “The British have used the phrase: ‘Shape, clear, hold, and build;’ while senior US NSC officials have used the term ‘Clear, hold build, and

13 Kilcullen, 4.


15 Fishtein and Wilder, 41-50; Kilcullen et.al. “Quiet Professionals,” 102.

16 Wilder and Gordon, “Money Can’t Buy America Love.” Also, Fishtein and Wilder, 67-68.

17 Wilder and Gordon.


19 Ibid., 2.


21 According to the Report on the Wilton Park Conference 1022, “Researchers and practitioners described ways in which aid had been used effectively to legitimise interactions between international forces and local communities (i.e., ‘to get a foot in the door’), which had proven useful in terms of developing relationships, and gathering atmospherics and intelligence. But these were relatively short-term transactional relationships, and there was little evidence of more strategic level effects of populations being won over to the government as a result of development aid.” 2.

22 Trevor Hublin, USAID Field Worker, interview with author, 4 February 2012. Also, Mohammed Ehsan Zia, former Afghan Minister of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, interview with author, 30 Jan 2012.


24 This is a general rule-of-thumb and an oversimplification. It is not meant to suggest that the COIN effort will progress in a work in a smooth, unidirectional fashion from start to finish or that mission elements have only one period of primary emphasis. There are times when unforeseen complexities will force the counterinsurgent to return to a previous phase or spike the influence of a particular mission element outside the normal period so as to deal with a particular contingency.

25 According to Cohen et. al., 50, “The cornerstone of any COIN effort is security for the populace. Without security, no permanent reforms can be implemented, and disorder will spread.” Similarly, Galula said, “Political, social, economic, and other reforms, however much they ought to be wanted and popular, are inoperative when offered while the insurgent still controls the population.” 55.

26 Ibid., 4.

27 General David Petraeus makes the following observation, “…the liberating force must act quickly, because every Army of liberation has a half-life beyond which it turns into an Army of occupation. The length of this half-life is tied to the perceptions of the populace about the impact of the liberating force’s activities. From the moment a force enters a country, its leaders must keep this in mind, striving to meet the expectations of the liberated in what becomes a race against the clock [emphasis in original].” Lieutenant General David H. Petraeus, “Learning
31 Wilton Park Report, 15.
33 According to the National Solidarity Programme’s Weekly Status Report from 3-9 Dec 2011, the programme has mobilized 28,745 communities, presided over the election and training of over 28,521 Community Development Councils, and funded 47,721 community-selected subprojects worth over $964,000,000 since its inception in 2002. Moreover, the approach increases popular ownership over a project and builds long-term partnership capacity at the tactical level. Marwa Mitra, administrator, National Solidarity Program, to the author, email, 29 Jan 12, “National Solidarity Programme Weekly Status Report, (21-27 Jan 2012).” Kabul, Afghanistan. Especially impressive is the fact that the NSP has achieved these results when the maximum dollar amount for any village is $60,000. The National Solidarity Programme (NSP) is not designed as a rapidly deployable program but a deliberately-planned program that takes two years from initiation to project completion. A modified version of this program that can immediately respond to post-kinetic situations could create the conditions for longer-term development and stability.
At the end of his book, Galula concedes the following: “Is it always possible to defeat an insurgency? This work, through a common intellectual accident, may have given the impression that the answer is a strong affirmative. …. Obviously, it is not always possible to defeat an insurgency.” Galula, 96.


Bibliography


