CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN POST-CONFLICT SRI LANKA: SUCCESSFUL CIVILIAN CONSOLIDATION IN THE FACE OF POLITICAL COMPETITION

by

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### Title and Subtitle
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### Abstract (maximum 200 words)
The LTTE insurgency seeking a separate Tamil state in Sri Lanka was successfully eliminated by the Sri Lankan military in 2009. Toward the end of the conflict, Sri Lanka’s armed forces strength rose to approximately 375,000. The use of the military in nation-building projects was misunderstood by many as militarization of the country. Therefore, this thesis asks these questions: How are the civil authorities maintaining control and effectiveness of the country’s armed forces? And how does the civilian government constructively utilize the military and continue to assert civilian rule?

These questions were examined as a comparative single case study because in recent history, no civilian government has concluded terrorism through military means. A combination of Huntington’s subjective and objective civilian control theory, Alagappa’s state coercion theory, and Matei and Bruneau’s CMR dimensions was used. This thesis finds that the civilians used heavy subjective-control mechanisms to ascertain the subordination of military due to political competition. However, the divided political setting prevented the military from entering into party politics, increasing professionalism and antithesis of subjective control, which is objective control. In this situation, Huntington’s subjective control did not happen, as the divided political setting and conflict positively contributed to ascertaining civilian control.
ABSTRACT

The LTTE insurgency seeking a separate Tamil state in Sri Lanka was successfully eliminated by the Sri Lankan military in 2009. Toward the end of the conflict, Sri Lanka’s armed forces strength rose to approximately 375,000. The use of the military in nation-building projects was misunderstood by many as militarization of the country. Therefore, this thesis asks these questions: How are the civil authorities maintaining control and effectiveness of the country’s armed forces? And how does the civilian government constructively utilize the military and continue to assert civilian rule?

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<tr>
<td>CFA</td>
<td>Cease Fire Agreement</td>
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<td>CMR</td>
<td>Civil–Military Relations</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Production GDP</td>
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<td>IPKF</td>
<td>Indian Peace Keeping Force</td>
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<td>ISGA</td>
<td>Interim Self Governing Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>ITAK</td>
<td>Illankai Thamil Arasu Kadchi</td>
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<td>JSS</td>
<td>Jathika Sevaka Sangamaya</td>
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<td>JVP</td>
<td>Janataha Vimukthi Peramuna</td>
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<td>LTTE</td>
<td>Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEP</td>
<td>Mahajana Ekstah Peramuna</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>Peoples’ Alliance</td>
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<tr>
<td>PTA</td>
<td>Prevention of Terrorism Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLFP</td>
<td>Sri Lanka Freedom Party</td>
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<td>SLMC</td>
<td>Sri Lanka Muslim Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>STF</td>
<td>Special Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>TUF</td>
<td>Tamil United Front</td>
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<td>TULF</td>
<td>Tamil United Liberation Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Human Development</td>
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<td>UNF</td>
<td>United National Front</td>
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<td>UNP</td>
<td>United National Party</td>
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I. INTRODUCTION

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

After independence from Great Britain in 1948, Sri Lanka experienced an era of relative peace. In 1975, Sri Lanka faced its biggest challenge in the form of the Tamil insurgency, which led to a three-decade conflict. In 2009, the Sri Lankan military defeated the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) that had fought for a separate state. Toward the end of the conflict, Sri Lanka increased its armed forces by 80 percent, raising the numbers to approximately 375,000, which is still its strength to date.¹ In a post-conflict setting, it is a challenge for any civilian government, especially a small island state, to maintain such a large military. The military comprised 1.84 percent of Sri Lanka’s population, which was 20.3 million as of 2012.² Sri Lanka appears to have done this quite successfully, and the country has bounced back from the civil war, with a 6.3 percent increase in economic growth and at the same time, strong democratic developments with the powerful civilian government.³ In this context, this investigation attempts to answer the following questions: how are the Sri Lankan civil authorities maintaining control and effectiveness of the country’s armed forces and how does the civilian government constructively utilize the military and at the same time assert civilian rule? This thesis will examine civil–military relations in Sri Lanka in the post-conflict period and some of the challenges it faced.

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¹ Muttukrishna Sarvananthan, “Sri Lanka: Putting Entrepreneurship at the Heart of Economic Revival in the North, East, and Beyond,” Contemporary South Asia 19, no. 2 (2011): 209, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09584935.2011.565313. However, this author quotes an interview with Sri Lanka’s secretary of defense in an Indian defense review magazine, in which the secretary of defense says that these figures are fluctuating. Accordingly, the total strength of the Sri Lankan military is approximately 200,000 for the Army; 60,000 for the Navy; and 60,000 for the Air Force.


B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION

In 2009, under the administration of President Mahinda Rajapaksa, the Sri Lankan government successfully defeated the LTTE insurgency. The well-coordinated government–military strategy helped defeat the LTTE organization, which had a large network for international fund raising, arms smuggling, as well as human and drug trafficking associated with financing the insurgency. The LTTE was also one of the first organizations to carry out transnational suicide bombings. It had owned well-structured ground, sea, and air military branches to fight against the Sri Lankan government and society. During the conflict, Sri Lanka increased the military strength to its current numbers, and after the conflict, it used the military’s institutional capacities for nation-building projects. Tamil political elites and scholars viewed these efforts as militarizing the country.4

The country also experienced important political developments as the democratic state strengthened its governance. In 2010, retired General Sarath Fonseka, who had recently led the Sri Lankan army, campaigned against President Mahinda Rajapaksa in the presidential election. This was the first instance in Sri Lankan history that a former commander involved himself in politics after retirement. Fonseka’s political engagement led civilian authorities to scrutinize senior military leaders—over their affiliation with the former general, in fear of a military coup. Despite scrutiny, the Sri Lankan military did not take advantage of its strength to topple the civilian government. This illustrates a trust relationship between the state and the military, which, historically, did not get involved in politics.

There are several reasons why Sri Lanka’s civil–military relations (CMR) are important to study. First, the increased military strength and growing popularity of military after the conflict attracts scholars who are interested in the influence of military participation in domestic affairs. For example, soon after the presidential election of 2010, the Rajapaksa government faced a tense situation over the defeated candidate

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General Fonseka. Jayadeva Uyangoda explains, “[Retired General] Fonseka refused to accept the poll results, creating a state of tension and uncertainty for several days following the election. Events took another dramatic turn when Fonseka was arrested on charges of military indiscipline.” The dilemma then was how the civilian state would maintain its supremacy under this condition. Sri Lanka represents an important case study for other countries struggling with a post-conflict, civil–military imbalance. In addition, identifying the roles and missions that civilian rulers have assigned to the military and examining how effectively the military accomplishes those roles and missions will help to gauge the effectiveness of Sri Lankan military.

Second, from an economic standpoint, Sri Lanka illustrated an unusual case of a country maintaining economic growth and development during and after a conflict. This translated into continued improvement in the living conditions of the people.

The United Nations Human Development (UNDP) index ranks Sri Lanka first in South Asia. How the state fought a three-decade long war while maintaining economic development would be an interesting topic to explore because, arguably, during the conflict, delivering public goods and services to citizens is difficult. Sri Lanka was able to achieve this. How has this continued in the post conflict period? Exploring Sri Lanka’s experience and identifying its unique style of civil–military relations (CMR) after the conflict will contribute to the literature of civil–military relations.

Third, Sri Lanka is subject to Indian and western great power politics. Sri Lanka’s development projects, economic ties, and military cooperation with China have affected relations with India and the West. In relation to that, other great powers see China as using Sri Lanka’s strategic geographic position to project power across the Pacific region. In that context, the Sri Lankan government is important for balancing power in the region, while also strengthening the developing democratic process. The previous government of Mahinda Rajapaksa adopted a pro-Chinese foreign policy. Many believe


that China helped the Sri Lankan economy and elevated its strategic importance in the Indian Ocean.\textsuperscript{7} In contrast, new president, Sirisena has promised publically that he will adopt a non-aligned foreign policy. Military participation in United Nations peace keeping missions can support the military to inculcate democratic norms in the long run. Therefore, India and the West being in major influential position in the United Nation organization, those countries can assist Sri Lanka to secure more participation in United Nations missions.

Moreover, twenty-first century security challenges affect developing democracies like Sri Lanka more seriously, due to weak, inexperienced institutions and lack of resources (equipment and technology); all of this can limit the capabilities of the armed forces. This affects the military’s effectiveness in carrying out assigned roles and missions.\textsuperscript{8} Therefore, identifying how Sri Lanka’s civilian government uses and prepares its military to undertake new challenges, such as participating for international peace operations, is important information for other developing democracies.

C. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES

Sri Lanka has a long history as a democratizing country, but democracy in any country is not consistently guaranteed. According to Stewart Patrick, “state strength is relative and can be measured by the state ability and willingness to provide the fundamental political goods……and social welfare.”\textsuperscript{9} A state’s strengths and weaknesses can shape its democratic nature. When examining the Sri Lankan post-war democratic consolidation, it is evident that the democracy level fluctuated in varying degrees after the conflict. The government failed to fully execute its democratic rights of peaceful governance during the conflict, especially in the Northern and Eastern areas, but in the


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post-conflict phase, the state started to expand democratic development, as seen in the elections of 2010 and 2015.

The democratically elected civilian rulers face a multitude of challenges while in power. They face the full spectrum of national security threats, international and domestic political pressures, and administration deficits in delivering public goods and services. Sri Lanka has experienced these challenges but has managed to meet its social and welfare obligations to its citizens efficiently during the conflict and the post-conflict period.

Sri Lanka’s Post-conflict military is approximately 320,000, but Sarvananthan says in the year 2011, it was 450,000 uniformed personnel and “one armed person for every 50 people in the country.”10 However, there were no coup-attempts made by the military against President Rajapaksa, but this raises the question, “How influential is Sri Lanka’s military?”

In addition, to deal with external and internal aggressions and non-sate actors, the civilian-decision makers rely on the institutions of military. Even though military control is a challenge, the military reputation of a country is an asset for the rulers to legitimate coercion. Therefore, providing services through the military in order to gain credibility and public acceptance towards military is important. In democratic countries, the civilian rulers decide the role of military. Therefore, it is important to understand this relationship particularly in a post-conflict period, such as in Sri Lanka. How is the relationship reasserted?

Hypothesis #1

The Sri Lankan government’s CMR strategy used to control the military in the post-conflict period is a combination of a new conceptualization framework, subjective and objective civilian control, and state coercion.

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Hypothesis #2

The Sri Lankan military is the largest institution that supports state coercion and is an important nation-building force in the post-conflict setting. The growing popularity, reputation, and confidence in the military will increase its power and influence in the political realm. However, the military will not exploit its opportunity to intervene in politics, because it accepts civilian supremacy and hopes to maintain professionalism.

D. LITERATURE REVIEW

This literature review focuses on civilian control of the military and the roles assigned to the military during the post-conflict period. In the field of civil–military relations (CMR), many available literatures focus on established democracies and developed countries; however, it is important to determine whether established CMR concepts can be applied to Sri Lanka, which is a developing country that recently concluded its three-decade-long war.

While there are several important CMR theories, scholars do not uniformly agree with a single model. Thomas Bruneau states that Samuel P. Huntington’s four-decade old CMR theory is not relevant for either developed or emerging democracies, in particular considering the current global setting, and he submits a new conceptual framework. 11

Peter Feaver acknowledges that Huntington’s theory was the landmark study but also suggests that it is an important point of departure for new paradigms. 12 However, Feaver notes that during the Cold War period, Huntington’s advice and predictions made on the United States’ CMR did not happen as he said. 13 Therefore, Feaver suggests the principle agent theory to substitute Huntington’s theory. 14

13 Ibid., 16.
14 Ibid., 10, 16.
Muthiah Alagappa’s work further identifies that CMR in Asia is different from CMR in Western Europe and notes some similarities with South American nations.\(^{15}\) Clearly, in the field of CMR, there is no standard model to test the supremacy or the effectiveness of civilian control. Since there is no specific post-war CMR-related literature to use to examine the Sri Lankan situation, I will combine Huntington’s subjective and objective civilian control; Bruneau’s work on civilian control, civilian oversight, and roles and missions; and Alagappa’s work on identifying CMR dimensions. Alagappa states that subjective civilian control will continue in Sri Lanka,\(^{16}\) but Sri Lanka has strong executive governance oversight in designing roles and missions for the military.\(^{17}\) In this context, understanding which theoretical concepts are more relevant to examine the civilian control in Sri Lanka will provide a new theoretical insight into post-conflict CMR.

1. **Definition and Explanation of CMR**

CMR is a discipline in the field of social science that examines the relationship between civilian rulers or institutions and military commanders or the military as an institution. Huntington points out that CMR is only “one aspect of national security policy.”\(^ {18}\) Matei notes that civilian control is basic and fundamental to CMR.\(^ {19}\) However, these relations are often contentious, and countries transitioning through democratic stages will experience civilian supremacy accordingly. The failure or inefficiency of political institutions to provide fundamental political goods, economic management, and

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\(^{16}\) Alagappa, *Coercion and Governance*, xvi.


\(^{19}\) Matei, “A New Conceptualization of Civil Military Relations,” 33.
physical security for citizens can lead to a military coup, which is a threat for democratic consolidation.\textsuperscript{20}

Over the last decade, three dozen coups were reported in the world; from 1950 to 2010, there were 94 coup attempts.\textsuperscript{21} Only seven were reported from 2008 to 2010,\textsuperscript{22} but despite this decline, military influence has been harder to measure and remains challenging for civilian rulers.\textsuperscript{23} In 2010 and 2015, Sri Lanka’s civilian leaders feared a military coup. The first instance was after the presidential election in 2010 when the defeated candidate, retired General Fonseka, was jailed accusing the violation of military law. Fearing a military coup, the Rajapakse government suspended the service of another group of senior officers on compulsory retirement grounds.\textsuperscript{24} Soon after the 2015 presidential election, the defeated Rajapaksa government was subjected to the opposition parties’ criticisms for attempting a military coup.\textsuperscript{25} However, in both instances, the military did not side with any individuals or any particular political party. It maintained neutrality.

2. Debate

Huntington’s book \textit{The Soldier and the State} is considered the leading theoretical paradigm in CMR even after nearly 40 years.\textsuperscript{26} Nevertheless, his arguments on officer corps professionalism, subjective civilian control, and objective control have often been

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{22} Powell and Thyne, “Global Instances of Coups,” 249–55.
\end{itemize}
reexamined by other scholars. Bruneau states that “it became clear to me that Huntington’s formulation could possibly be useful for discussing civil–military relations in stable democracies, but it provides little help to those still in the process of reaching this state.”

Accordingly, Bruneau points to three weaknesses. First, subjective and objective civilian control that centers on military professionalism is a tautology and cannot be disproved or proved. Second, there is selective data use in the conceptualization of the military profession. Third, professionalism cannot be measured because it is similar to culture. In addition, although other scholars have identified weaknesses in the Soldier and the State, Bruneau notes that these individuals have not been able to present alternatives without referring back to Huntington’s work.

Huntington’s main discussion focuses on subjective civilian control, objective civilian control, and military professionalism. In subjective civilian control, civilian groups with various interests compete with each other to gain superior control over the military. In this discussion, power maximization of one or more civilian group is relative to other civilian groups at the national level. Control of the military is achieved through governmental institutions, social classes, and constitutional forms. At the government level, the President and members of the legislature compete with each other on decisions about the military. This allows these competing groups to politicize the military. This competition indicates that when no professional military officer corps is present, the subjective civilian control is evident in governing systems.

Next, Huntington notes that objective civilian control allows for autonomy and supports the military to maximize its own professionalism. The main idea is to keep the military away from politics while recognizing its autonomous state in deciding military

27 Bruneau, “Impediments to the Accurate Conceptualization of Civil–Military Relations,” 13
28 Ibid., 15–17.
29 Ibid., 15
30 Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 81.
31 Ibid., 81.
32 Ibid., 83.
affairs; however, it remains under government civilian control. Huntington expected that this objective could be achieved naturally. He stated that once the military becomes more professionalized, then it can remain neutral in political alignments. However, Bruneau explains that Huntington’s work abruptly measured the complex and contending relationships between authority, influence, and military ideology with non-military groups.

Huntington’s subjective and objective civilian control is centralized into military professionalism, and he uses examples from Germany, Japan, and the United States to support this conceptualization. However, Bruneau points out other scholars’ disagreement on Huntington’s military professionalism, indicating that military professionalism—much like culture—cannot be measured as a stable component because it is subject to frequent change. Huntington’s CMR model focuses on achieving civilian supremacy through subjective and objective control, which significantly affects military professionalism. Given this circular logic, Bruneau states that Huntington’s concepts are impossible to prove or disprove. However, some of Huntington’s concepts, like subjective civilian control, are relevant for developing democracies. Huntington’s study was a landmark in the early stages of CMR, and as Feaver notes, “what has been written since has been an explicit or implicit response to [Huntington’s] argument.” Sri Lanka is a developing country, yet its civilian rulers have managed to subordinate their military for decades. Therefore, to examine the post-conflict CMR in Sri Lanka, Huntington’s concepts provide analytical insight.

Samuel E. Finer argues that Huntington’s military professionalism is not the only factor that keeps military away from politics. He notes that actually it is the military

33 Ibid., 83–88.
34 Ibid., 84.
35 Bruneau, “Impediments to the Accurate Conceptualization of Civil–Military Relations,” 16.
36 Ibid., 16.
37 Ibid., 15.
38 Alagappa, Coercion and Governance: the Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia, xvi.
39 Feaver, “Civil–Military Relations,” 212.
acceptance of the civilian supremacy. Finer introduces the term “consciousness,” which he argues makes the armed forces believe that they are servants of the state. The Sri Lankan military invest in military education, aiming to elevate military professionalism. The Sri Lankan military has proved its acceptance of civilian supremacy by maintaining neutrality in the 2010 and 2015 presidential elections. Finer’s concept in accepting the civilian supremacy can provide analytical insight to examine CMR in Sri Lanka.

Peter D. Feaver states that CMR creates a paradox. Feaver explains, “The civil-problematique is a simple paradox: because we fear others we create an institution of violence to protect us, but then we fear the very institution we created for protection.” In turn, Feaver highlights two principles that are conflicting with each other in this paradox. The first principle is that the military must be strong to prevent war within society and must be able to protect it from outside aggressions; second, while protecting the political structures and society from enemies, it should be able to organize its own affairs and should not destroy the society that it intended to protect. Democratic societies elect political agents to govern and control state affairs; in turn, they act upon on behalf of the people. Next, they delegate authority to professionals for managing the institutions. Professional military agents manage the military institution and ruling civilian political agents control the military agents.

3. Principal Agent Theory

In that context, to prevent a military exercising coercion on society or on the ruling government, Feaver introduces the principal agent theory, which explains the

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44 Ibid., 153.
continuing interaction between principal agents and military agents at a strategic level for monopolizing the use of force. In the theory, civilians establish relatively intrusive or nonintrusive monitoring mechanisms to control the military, and in response, the military agents have the option to preform or shirk their responsibilities. The military will respond on either material incentives or fear of punishment. Any number of agencies (legislature, judicial system, and other bureaucratic institutions) will conduct monitoring of the military. This theory explains how Sri Lanka’s civilian rulers’ strategy is effective in controlling the military through institutionalized mechanism. I will present the details in chapter three.

4. New Conceptualization Framework

Bruneau emphasizes that much of the literature is focused on well-established western democracies. In addition, Bruneau indicates that there are new democracies around the globe, so new conceptualization framework is needed to address CMR issues. Therefore, Matei and Bruneau’s work presents a new conceptualized framework to fit both developing and consolidated democracies. Such new conceptualization is required because of the changing nature of warfighting.

After the Cold War, nations have identified a need for versatile military force to face new challenges. Nations are less subject to interstate wars but they are facing challenges in the form of transnational threats, acts of international terrorist organizations, effects of natural disasters, requests for international peace support operations, and demands for humanitarian assistance. Such military force is capable in protecting the national security as well as supporting the international community. In relation to these new challenges, the new framework identifies that CMR should not only focus on civilian control but should also analyze how both civilians and military agents are working on interdependency and tradeoffs between control, effectiveness, and

45 Feaver, Armed Servants, 284
48 Ibid., 29.
efficiency.\textsuperscript{49} The effectiveness is determined by military preparedness for the civilian rulers’ assigned roles and missions while efficiency relies on the allocation of resources at the lowest cost.

In this framework, civilian control is formed in the areas of institutional control, oversight, and incorporated professional norms. Institutional mechanisms support civilians in providing guidance for military forces through laws and regulations; these mechanisms support civilian leadership.\textsuperscript{50} Civilian led organizations can include the Ministry of Defense whose purpose is to direct military affairs. The work of Matei and Bruneau suggests creating a separate ministry of interior for police and national intelligence agencies.\textsuperscript{51}

Oversight is achieved through institutional regulations and administrative laws. The executive, legislative, and judicial branches have the authority to monitor the military. In addition, to conduct oversight, independent media, think tanks, NGOs, and international organizations can support the government.

For professionalism, legally backed policies and regulatory mechanisms should be involved in deciding military size, training, and promotions. Subsequently, the effectiveness of the military depends on how accurately civilians define and design military roles and allocate resources to carry out assigned tasks. This conceptual framework discusses achieving effectiveness at a minimal cost.\textsuperscript{52}

This framework identifies the necessity of controlling not only the military but also other security agencies like police and intelligence units required to preserve democracy.\textsuperscript{53} This framework helps examine Sri Lanka’s strategy for maintaining control and effectiveness of the country’s armed forces.

\textsuperscript{49} Matei, “A New Conceptualization of Civil Military Relations,” 33.
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid., 30.
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., 31.
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid., 30.
5. Governance and Coercion

Alagappa identifies colonial origin as the obvious reason for some countries’ civilian supremacy in political structures of Asia, which has given birth to institutions that were required to govern states through bureaucratic procedures. Some of those procedural legacies are still in effect in post-colonial countries. For example, Sri Lanka achieved its independence in 1948 from British rulers; therefore, in the Sri Lankan parliamentary system, proceedings are conducted in British fashion. CMR in the country also demonstrates the legacy of British rule.

State coercion is a tool used for constructing political domination in society; it exercises the government control within national boundaries. The Sri Lankan government used military in Northern and Eastern regions to control the Tamil militancy. In relation to Alagappa’s work, if a civilian government uses the coercive power of the military excessively, it lacks legitimacy and has to depend on the military to be in power. As a result, either the military or other security apparatuses have the advantage, and the civilian rulers have to accommodate military requests and political agendas simultaneously. This leads to a larger military that is supported by a legal framework to legitimize its action. According to Alagappa, this situation creates an opportunity for the military to establish a commanding position above all other rival institutions but hinder the development of political, administrative, and judicial institutions in a government. To avoid the influence of the military, he suggests increasing or decreasing the military’s expenditures for internal security and defense. This involves the correct sizing of security forces, changing of command structure, and deployments; moreover, reforming the security mandate, declaration of emergency and martial law are few.

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54 Alagappa, Coercion and Governance, 58.
55 Ibid., 59.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid., 59.
In addition, Alagappa considers the following to understand the CMR challenge: the developments of political, diplomatic, socio-economic, and cultural measures.\textsuperscript{58} However, he also states that military has a key role to play in nation-building.\textsuperscript{59} Therefore, any study has to apply a macro framework. Soon after the conflict, the Sri Lankan military undertook many nation-building projects and became heavily involved in other administrative institutions. Therefore, the state coercion and governance concept is relevant to analyze post-conflict CMR in Sri Lanka.

Moreover, Alagappa’s study on 16 countries in Asia identifies that the “military is still a crucial actor in domestic and international politics, playing key roles in state and nation-building, in political domination, in maintaining internal order, and in ensuring international security.”\textsuperscript{60} This confirms that Finer’s argument on why the military engages in politics is not relevant, but the more important point here is to examine why they do not.\textsuperscript{61} Finer’s work asserts that military interventions are overt in the low political order countries like Haiti, but the covert influences of militaries exist in the developed and high political order established countries like the U.S.\textsuperscript{62}

Alagappa also identifies that when state coercion is salient, the military acts with the government to deliver state coercion and increase the power and influence of the military. On the other hand, Alagappa discusses that the success in economic development and developing strong institutions of non-coercion has proved the decline of military power and influence.\textsuperscript{63} However, some scholars have argued that civilian control cannot be achieved through increased social conditions or economic development and through increased levels of professionalism of the military or distributing one civilian group’s political domination on another.\textsuperscript{64}

\textsuperscript{58} Ibid., 61.
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid., 9.
\textsuperscript{60} Alagappa, Coercion and Governance, 2.
\textsuperscript{61} Finer, \textit{The Man on Horseback}, xv.
\textsuperscript{62} Ibid., 21.
\textsuperscript{63} Alagappa, \textit{Coercion and Governance}, 6.
The degree of power and influence that the military can force on society or civilian rulers will depend on how civilian rulers see its importance or weight of coercion relative to norms, rules, laws, and customs in the practice of governance.\(^{65}\) He argues that civilian supremacy will depend on the weight of state coercion, and it varies depending on the challenges faced by the country. Both Alagappa and Olmeda agree on the high level of civilian supremacy that can be achieved during interstate war compared to intrastate conflicts,\(^{66}\) but Olmeda argues that it is extremely difficult to gauge the civilian control because CMR studies are more descriptive than casual analysis. He points out that the reason for this is the difficulty of collecting data from interviews, government resources, and official documents.\(^{67}\)

6. Roles and Missions

Matei suggests six broadly categorized roles for the military: “war, internal wars, terrorism, crime, humanitarian assistance, and peace operations.”\(^{68}\) Few studies on post-conflict scenarios implicitly discuss roles and missions for military, yet Matei’s work identifies temporary humanitarian assistance roles for military. These indicated roles and missions are part of the national security strategy. When examining the Sri Lankan post-conflict setting, these roles and missions could be validated to some extent.

In contrast, some scholars like S. Sarvananthan have strongly criticized the Sri Lankan military involvement in civilian business ventures and warn that those actions will lead military involvement in politics that is similar to Pakistan.\(^{69}\) On the other hand, Larry Jay Diamond and Marc F. Plattner note, “Historically many of the militaries have undertaken non-combat roles, including disaster relief, internal security and policing, economic development and social welfare provisions.”\(^{70}\) They further indicate that

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\(^{65}\) Alagappa, *Coercion and Governance*, 4.

\(^{66}\) Olmeda, “Escape from Huntington’s Labyrinth,” 65.

\(^{67}\) Ibid., 69–72.

\(^{68}\) Matei, “A New Conceptualization of Civil Military Relations,” 31.


missions other than war will not raise options for the military to participate in politics or effect warfighting capability. \(^{71}\) The Sri Lankan military maintain their warfighting ability and professionalism by keeping one reserve strike division and training their troops while participating in annual joint operation exercises.

7. Literature Specific to Sri Lanka

There is no post-conflict-specific literature for Sri Lanka’s CMR, but Jagath P. Senarathne notes in his work in 2002, that subjective civilian control has existed in Sri Lanka.\(^{72}\) He points out that the majority Sinhala Buddhist ethnic representation in civilian elites and the military is high compared to other ethnic groups, and he believes that this shapes the political and institutionalization process. In the article, he describes Sri Lanka’s executive branch, legislature, and military linking institutional framework. This study is not current, but it discusses many supporting CMR concepts. Don Wijewardana, an economist, points out President Rajapaksa’s ability to delegate tasks to professionals and refrain from interfering in operational activities.\(^{73}\) Even though the book does not describe the CMR concepts in the post-conflict period, it contributes to the literature by describing CMR in Sri Lanka during the conflict.

The scholars discussed above disagree on a single model for controlling the military but admit changing dynamics of international politics, globalization, and new domains of warfighting, often shape CMR in nation states.

8. Designing CMR Model

This thesis seeks to determine how existing CMR literature explains the Sri Lankan government’s continuing effectiveness in controlling the military in the post-conflict setting. Sri Lanka’s military is the largest, most organized and capable institution of the state. This study on Sri Lanka can provide an important theoretical case for

\(^{71}\) Larry and Plattner, Civil–Military Relations and Democracy, xv.


\(^{73}\) Wijewardana, How LTTE Lost the Eelam War, 24.
understanding the stabilization of CMR in the post-conflict phase, which few developed countries have experienced in the West.

When examining the Sri Lankan government’s strategy in controlling the military in a post-conflict setting, Huntington’s literature on subjective and objective civilian control can be considered with other scholars like Muthiah Alagappa because he identifies that the “subjective civilian control is likely to continue in Singapore, Malaysia, and Sri Lanka.” 74 Reexamination of the validity of this statement is important because prior to the end of the Sri Lankan conflict, the military faced severe setbacks while fighting with LTTE, raising the question of how the same military defeated the LTTE under a different civilian leadership.

E. METHODS AND SOURCES

In the field of CMR, there is no standard model to test the supremacy of civilian control neither its effectiveness. Moreover, there is no specific post-conflict, CMR-related literature for Sri Lanka; therefore, to examine the Sri Lankan situation, I will combine Huntington’s subjective and objective civilian control theory, Alagappa’s state coercion theory, and Matei and Bruneau’s new conceptualization framework to identify CMR dimensions. Each work is interconnected to theoretical concepts of CMR, but different scholars use unique dimensions to explain their own case studies. Therefore, to examine CMR in Sri Lanka’s unique post-conflict period, Figure 1 shows a schematic theoretical process that is more relevant.

74 Alagappa, Coercion and Governance: the Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia, xvi.
Moreover, while the examined literature provides a framework for understanding the Sri Lankan government’s strategy to control its military, there is a gap in identifying the roles and mission in a post-conflict setting. Post-conflict settings are unique and different from country to country. Various dimensions in politics, culture, and society shape CMR norms. The available literature explicitly discusses why civilian supremacy is required to control military, but it does not adequately discuss how military can be used effectively in post-conflict nation-building in places such as Sri Lanka. This is important for theory because of the types of conflicts we are seeing in the world today.
Therefore, I examine the type of civilian control the Sri Lankan government uses to control their military while facing political competition and how effective the assigned role of the military is in a post-conflict setting. I also explore if there is any space to improve the efficiency of the military while achieving subordination.

**F. RESEARCH DESIGN**

I conduct this research as a comparative single case study because post-conflict Sri Lanka is a unique case where similar cases are not evident for comparison. I will look at various timeframes for comparison purposes. Sri Lanka is a rare case in the world, because when other countries are struggling to eradicate terrorism, Sri Lanka has succeeded in use of force to defeat the military group that represented state-seeking ethnic minority. 75 I will use a variety of sources like academic personnel, published books, journals, reports, Sri Lankan governmental publications, and newspaper articles. I will also use international organizations’ websites, Sri Lankan government websites, and military websites to examine the sphere of CMR in post-conflict Sri Lanka.

**G. THESIS OVERVIEW AND DRAFT CHAPTER OUTLINE**

The thesis will be organized into Five chapters. The first chapter presents the introduction, question, and my hypothesis, including the relevance of this study to the larger field of CMR studies. The second chapter discusses the Sri Lankan government’s historical approach in controlling the military and also provides a political background of the country since British rule. Next, the third chapter establishes the military’s response to civilian control institutional mechanism and analyzes civilian and military agents’ interaction. The fourth chapter analyzes which CMR models have had more influence in different timeframes, and the fifth chapter concludes the thesis with findings and considers future CMR in Sri Lanka.

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II. AN EXAMINATION OF HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF SRI LANKAN CIVIL–MILITARY RELATIONS

A new era of post-colonial celebration dawned in Sri Lanka after 1948 with the departure of the British. However, the ethno-nationalism that had been promoted under the British, with its divide and conquer strategy, continued to be a part of the political consolidation process. People embraced their own ethno-nationalisms and religious identities as a tool for mobilization in the struggle for political power. This chapter provides the background of the political struggle and also discusses Sri Lanka’s CMR from post-independence to the emergence of the LTTE. The purpose is to illustrate how Sri Lanka’s socio-political setting and ethno-nationalism shaped the CMR—in particular their effect on civilian supremacy.

A. SRI LANKAN ELITES STRUCTURE IN POST-INDEPENDENCE 1948 - 1956

The current organization of the Ceylon army was formed in 1949 with the help of ex-colonial powers. After a year of independence from British rule, the Ceylon government requested assistance from the British to establish a regular army. As one British officer stated, “The Ceylonese wanted to create a full regular army shortly after independence—‘overnight.’”76 Sri Lanka had a military service of volunteers and an officer corps entirely composed of European planters that had been set up in 1881.77 At that time, representation of the Sinhalese and Tamils, which constituted the major and minority ethnic groups was minimal in this organizational structure. Instead, colonial rulers recruited Burghers and mercenaries from Malay to achieve colonial standard

77 After the British conquest of Ceylon in 1815, the British found no reason to maintain the Ceylon Rifle Regiment that was used in conquering. This colonial army consisted of paid Malay soldiers. They disbanded Ceylon Rifle Regiment in 1874 and absorbed many Malay into the police force. This police force was used to suppress unrest. Horowitz reports, “The only remaining army function was reserve or militia role. Accordingly, the Ceylonese units have always been infused with volunteer ethos.” Horowitz, Coup Theories and Officers’ Motives, 60. Then in 1881, “The British formed the the Ceylon Light Infantry Volunteers (CLIV) with 210 European and 156 Ceylonese soldiers under the honorary command of the Prince of Wales.” Brian Blodgett, Sri Lanka’s Military: The Search for a Mission, 1949–2004 (San Diego: Aventine Press, 2004), 21.
control. The British also kept the Sinhala and the Tamil representation at a minimum, because they saw them as mismatched with the European volunteers. Three Burgher companies and the Malay constituted the majority of this battalion structure.

This discrimination and strategy for control was also reflected in the educational institutions, which fed the military. Missionary education was promoted over the Buddhist schools, and Christian beliefs and cultural norms were considered more supportive of the military’s professionalism. The few Tamils and Sinhalese who joined the military were from these Christian schools, which had a cadet corps that was the main provider of recruits for the established “Ceylon Defense Force” in 1910. By 1945, the Ceylon defense force consisted of 645 officers and 14,247 soldiers. The majority of these Sinhala and Tamil officers were Christians and represented the upper end middle class. Meanwhile, the Buddhist schools lacked a cadet corps.

Another reason for low Sinhala participation was that the military service was not attractive to Sinhala Buddhists. According to Donald L. Horowitz, there were two reasons for this. First, Sinhala Buddhists resisted killing based on their religious beliefs. In addition, the caste system restricted Sinhala Buddhist youth from joining the military. The Sinhala Buddhist ‘govigama’ higher caste families rejected military service for their sons because they had lands. Second, Sinhala Buddhist uprisings were brutally suppressed by colonial militaries in the past. Therefore, the military had few Sinhala Buddhists, particularly from the rural areas, and these groups remained outside the military organization. Meanwhile, the British were able to include the Sinhala and Tamils from the coastal areas, because the colonial rulers had converted them to Christianity during earlier missionary work. Tamils were more highly represented because of their

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78 Horowitz, Coup Theories and Officers’ Motives, 61.
79 In 1910, the volunteer service changed to Ceylon Defense Force and remained to reservist, evening and weekend soldiers. The middle class provided the sufficient educational standard and spare time for training. Nevertheless, the young men educated in Christian colleges like Royal College had a cadet training and those were established in the prestigious schools. Horowitz notes, “These [cadet companies] continued to be a principle source of recruits for the volunteer there after.” And “the cadet corps was not generally found in Buddhist school.” Horowitz, Coup Theories and Officers’ Motives, 61.
80 Horowitz, Coup Theories and Officers’ Motives, 73.
81 Ibid., 73.
presence in coastal areas of Jaffna, in the north where the missionary work had been the strongest. According to Horowitz, “Sinhalese Buddhists, two-thirds of population, accounted for only two-fifths of the officer corps in the pre-1956 period.”

The bureaucratic institutions also reflected a similar ethno-religious structure and therefore shaped the elite structure. Like the Sinhala and Tamil Christians in the military, Tamils over-represented the majority Sinhala Buddhists by two to one in the government accounts services and the government’s audit services. British rulers had used a divide and conquer strategy to govern their colonies. In the case of Sri Lanka, they placed English speaking Tamils and Sinhalese into the high ranks of the bureaucratic administration. Argus Tresidder describes this situation: “[Tamils] are represented in far greater proportion than their numbers warrant in government, the civil service, and the profession.” However, Brian Blodgett views this scenario differently: “English authorities … favored the Jaffna Tamils at the expense of Sinhalese.” As a result, Sinhala ethno-religious nationalism emerged demanding the prominence of both the Sinhala language and Buddhism.

B. EARLY FORMATION OF ETHNO-NATIONALISM POLITICAL PARTIES

This minimal representation in government institutions was a major grievance of the majority Buddhist Sinhalese. After 1920, the deteriorating relations between the two communities started to be reflected in the political arena. This was reflected in the organization of the first political party under the British, the Ceylon National Congress (CNC), which was organized along ethnic lines. The local political elites failed to establish a pluralistic national identity in Sri Lanka and instead formed ethno-nationalist Tamil and Sinhalese political identities. Michael Roberts describes, “The failure to bring together the principal Tamils and the Sinhalese associations in the period dating from the

82 Horowitz, Coup Theories and Officers’ Motives, 67.
83 Ibid., 47.
split in 1921-22 to the formation of the United National Party in 1946 underlines the divergence in material interests and the weight of primordial loyalties as well as the influence of a West European model which hindered concessions to ethnic claims.”

In other words, this type of model promoted by the British did not allow the needed federal structure.

Ethno-nationalist identity became a popular tool to mobilize the two ethnic groups in Sri Lanka, which created a power struggle. Western educated Tamil elites like Ganapathipillai Gangaser Ponnambalam and Samuel James Velupillai Chelvanayakam, motivated by India’s partition, requested a federal structure that would accommodate Sri Lankan Tamils’ demand for autonomy in 1947 from the British rulers. When Tamil elites’ separate state ideology came to the surface, it was opposed not only by British rulers but also by the majority Sinhalese, who saw this as a threat to their access and control of the Buddhist historical sites in northern and eastern regions.

Grievances between the two communities started to shape the political institutions which, as a result, became part of the independent democracy of Sri Lanka. The Sri Lankan ethnic groups and classes became embedded into its newly forming political parties. Jagath P. Senarathne notes, “All the major ethnic groups are mobilized politically through parties.” The first major political party was the United National Party (UNP), established in 1946. During the early stages of independence, the UNP managed to incorporate all ethnic groups. However, the majority Buddhist Sinhalese aspirations were not fully addressed by this party, as it remained an elite-led party. Discontent soon became apparent. Solomon West Ridgeway Dias Bandaranaike (known popularly as SWRD), then a minister, resigned from the UNP government to become the face of Sinhalese Buddhists.

Asoka Bandarage describes:


In 1956, however, while discontent with the UNP grew, Bandaranaike was able to tap into Buddhist religious fervor as the country celebrated the two thousand five hundredth year since the Buddha’s death to restore the island’s historical legacy as the Sinhaladipa (island of the Sinhalese) and Dhammadipa (island of the Buddha’s teachings).89

This led to a division within the UNP, because the UNP’s multi-ethnic political party platform failed to give equal attention to the Sinhala Buddhist majority, particularly in rural areas.

In opposition to the Tamil elites’ federal state demand, Bandaranaike had a different idea for political integration of other communities.90 He believed that eliminating the caste, provincial, and class differences among the Sinhalese was vital to promoting the nation state.91 Robert quotes Bandaranaike: “Firstly, unity among the Sinhalese; and secondly, whilst uniting the Sinhalese, to work for the higher unity, the unity of all communities.”92

This Tamil-Sinhala difference dates back to 1920, when the Ceylon National Congress generated sectional nationalism.93 The local political elites failed to establish a pluralistic national identity to Sri Lanka and instead formed ethno-nationalist Tamil and Sinhalese political identities. In other words, the formation of the modern state did not allow for a federal structure, which may have helped quell ethno-nationalisms.

Similarly, the Ceylon Tamil National Congress (CTNC) was split over one of Ceylon’s first legislative acts that restricted citizenship to those registered with seven years residence in Ceylon. This impacted Indian Tamil citizenship and franchise rights. The founder of All Ceylon Tamil Congress (ACTC), G. G. Ponnambalam, and many senior leaders of CTNC, voted in favor of the bill, but the deputy of ACTC, S. J. V. Chelvanayakam opposed the party decision and broke away. In the early stages, high

89 The UNP failed to transform the colonial social structures and to elevate the dignity and self-respect of the Sinhala Buddhists; Bandarage, Separatist Conflict, 42.
90 S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, fourth Prime Minister of Sri Lanka was a son of wealthier elite family and his wife Sirimao Bandaranaike became Prime Minister after his assassination in 1959.
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid., 357.
caste ‘vellala’ Tamils did not recognize the Indian Tamils labor force as part of their community. The British rulers had imported these cheap laborers to work in the colonial planation sectors. Bandarage describes, “In other words, the voting was very much on class lines which cut across ethnicity.”94 Chelvanayakam formed the party Illankai Thamil Arasu Kadchi (ITAK) in 1949, which was more radical and extremist.95 He identified caste and religious differences among the community and worked for a common Tamil identity. Bandarage notes, “Given that an Island-wide Tamil ethnic identity did not exist at this time, the ITAK worked zealously to ‘manufacture’ such an identity, exaggerating primordial Sinhala versus Tamil antagonism.”96

Consequently, Bandaranaike broke away and formed the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) in 1951. He was an Anglican Christian Sinhalese from an elite family and Oxford educated, but he identified with growing sentiments of the Sinhala Buddhists and converted to Buddhism. According to some analysts, he was an opportunist who noted that the future leadership of the UNP would not be easy to secure unless one was able to mobilize masses. He mobilized the majority Sinhala Buddhists’ platform in the 1956 election, which resulted in the victory of Mahajana Ekstah Peramuna (MEP), a coalition front made up of the SLFP and Viplavakari Lanka Samasamaja Party (VLSP), a breakaway faction of the old Lanka Sama Samaja Party, (LSSP), all of which are leftist. This political victory was a landmark moment in the history of Sri Lanka because it brought Sinhalese Buddhist to power for the first time in centuries.97 The SLFP led MEP coalition victory also shaped other political institutions in Sri Lanka. For example, the multi-ethnic oriented parties, like the UNP, which also had to realign their platforms toward the majority Sinhalese voters.98

95 Ibid.
96 Ibid., 40.
However, despite Bandaranaike’s broader vision of a democratic socialist ideology, his coalition was influenced deeply by the demands of Sinhala Buddhists.\textsuperscript{99} The major grievance of the Sinhalese was the lack of opportunities in public service. This led the MEP administration to pass the Sinhala Only Act in 1956 and made Sinhala as the official language eliminating Tamil competition from state jobs. Until then the administration had resisted making any similar decisions and had maintained English as the official language, which favored the elite. Due to resulting protests, the Sri Lankan government issued another gazette recognizing Tamil and English as official languages.\textsuperscript{100} The Tamil leaders claimed that the Sinhala language legalization would make Sinhalese masters.\textsuperscript{101} They also claimed that they would be left out of government employment as they would be required to know the language.

This concern reestablished the 1947 demand of the ITAK, which sought a separate state to Tamils under a federal constitution. Bandarage notes, “With the rise of Sinhala linguistic nationalism, the Tamil separatist position of the ITAK, which had once seemed to be extremist, gained popularity.”\textsuperscript{102} The language issue became the root cause of Sinhala and Tamil ethnic conflict.

From then on, the power struggle between majority and minority parties continued on ethno-nationalist lines. According to Ashutosh Varshney:

> In the nationalism of exclusion, a dominant group within a society—domestic or foreign—seeks to impose its own values on the various other groups within that society or seeks to exclude, sometimes violently, other ethnic groups from the portals of power. Typically, this takes the form of enforcing language, religion, or culture via control of the state, or excluding groups from power on the basis of ethnic characteristics only. In the nationalism of resistance, a dominated group opposes such a move and seeks to preserve its cultural identity and resist the hegemony and power of the dominant group.\textsuperscript{103}

\textsuperscript{99} Bandarage, \textit{The separatist conflict in Sri Lanka}, 42.
\textsuperscript{100} Bandarage, \textit{The separatist conflict in Sri Lanka}, 45.
\textsuperscript{101} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{102} Bandarage, \textit{The separatist conflict in Sri Lanka}, 45.
\textsuperscript{103} Ashutosh Varshney, “Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Rationality,” \textit{Perspectives on Politics} 1, no. 1 (March 2003): 86.
Similarly, the Sinhala and Tamil political contention can be understood as the majority ethnic group trying to impose its will on the minority group.

However, this power struggle has another dimension: the insecurity of the majority ethnic group. The Sinhalese felt that they were outnumbered in the public sector by the Tamils. In addition, the Sinhalese were afraid of plantation sector Indian Tamils who were brought into Sri Lanka by the British rulers to work in the plantation sector. The Sinhalese felt that the Tamils were linked to the great neighbor India, which also consisted of a large Tamil community. This connection was exploited by both Tamil and Sinhala politicians. After the failure of the peaceful “Sathyagragya,” in 1961, which was carried out against the Sinhala-only act, the ITAK’s non-violent movement turned militant. On the other hand, Sinhalese insecurity pushed them into ethno-nationalism based political identity and they demanded more job opportunities in government institutions.

C. RISING ETHNO-NATIONALISM: IMPACT ON MILITARY

Ethnic representation in the Sri Lankan military also provided the space for subjective control, as it maximized one civilian group’s interest, governmental institutions, social class, and particular constitutional forms. In 1956, Sri Lanka’s new linguistic law, its class differences, and the religion of the majority ethnic group changed the recruitment pattern of Sri Lanka’s military. For example, Table 1 shows the ethnic composition of commissions awarded in the Ceylon Light Infantry, and Table 2 shows the religion compositions. It shows the shift toward subjective civilian control gained by one civilian group—majority Sinhala Buddhist who were associated with the MEP and SLFP.

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105 Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 81.
Table 1. Ethnic Composition of Commissions Awarded in the Ceylon Light Infantry, 1949–74

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Table 2. Religion Composition of Commissions Awarded in the Ceylon Light Infantry, 1949–74

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<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>4</td>
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After 1962, Sinhala Buddhist representation in the military sharply increased. Horowitz states, “After Mrs. Bandaranaike took office in July 1960, every single cadet sent from Ceylon to Sandhurst was Sinhalese.” The previous officer corps which had been educated in English-dominated Christian schools had seen a decline of their influence in this all-Sinhala environment and notably, they launched a coup to prevent this trend in 1962. Thirty military and police high ranking officers attempted a coup against Prime Minister Srimavo Bandaranaike, wife of assassinated S. W. R. D

106 Horowitz, *Coup Theories and Officers’ Motives*, Table 3–2.
107 Ibid., 75.
108 Ibid., 136.
Bandaranaike in 1959. She survived because of the presence of a majority of Sinhala officers in the military, as well as in other bureaucratic institutions. According to Horowitz, motives seemed closely linked to the background of the conspirators, who were Christians, wealthy, prominent family members, and educated in prestigious Christian schools.\(^{109}\) However, according to Horowitz, the motives and corporate interests of officers involved in the coup were different. In 1962, Bandaranaike’s government faced island wide strikes and unrest based on economic reforms and Tamil “Sathayagarh” related riots. The government used the military to maintain public order. The coup leaders of the military had a different view of this situation: they believed that the government was unable to manage the Tamil cause and leftist party emergence, and that it used the military excessively for non-operational missions. Horowitz notes, “The officers [came] to believe that the politicians [were] unwilling or unable to manage the political system.”\(^{110}\)

In addition, during the time of the coup attempt, the officer corps divided into two factions. The first group, the Ceylon Artillery regiment, consisted of mainly volunteers who favored British traditions and were unhappy over the Bandaranaike government’s pro-Sinhala Buddhist stance.\(^{111}\) The second group, the Ceylon Light Infantry (CLI) regiment, was absent from the coup plot and commanded by a Sinhala Buddhist.\(^{112}\) The majority of the officers of CLI knew about the coup attempt of the artillery regiment but remained loyal to their commander Colonel A. R. Udugama who was well connected to the Bandaranaike regime.\(^{113}\) Family connections and relationships played a great role in the elite’s circle. One participant of this plot had revealed the coup arrangement to his father-in-law, a pro-regime parliamentarian. This tipped the plot toward the regime.\(^{114}\)

\(^{109}\) Horowitz, *Coup Theories and Officers’ Motives*, 76.

\(^{110}\) Ibid., 201.

\(^{111}\) Ibid., 106.

\(^{112}\) Ibid., 102.

\(^{113}\) Ibid., 102.

\(^{114}\) Ibid., 97.
Despite the division, the officer corps felt common discontent towards the overuse of troops for emergency duties, the unethical response to the Tamil “Sathyagraha” and the civilian rulers’ extensive involvement into military affairs. For example, “they [the politicians] told them [the military] to enforce order in the Tamil protest areas, but without their Tamil commander.” The officer corps saw this as the politicians creating the ethnic division and importing its social and cultural dynamics into the military, polluting the organizational ethics and discipline standards. The military elites saw this as Bandaranaike playing with the ethnic sentiments. In addition, the military saw discipline eroding, when Bandaranaike directly spoke with one group of artillery soldiers who had enacted the first ever strike in Sri Lankan military history. This illustrated that the Sri Lankan officer corps was not politically neutral.

In addition, the attempt indicated that the civilian rulers had failed to create an effective military capable of defending the country. Instead they were using it for national development and food production. For example, Brian Blodgett describes, “During the 1960’s the army conducted seven missions. These operations, which were police and not ‘true’ military missions, detracted from the army’s ability to conduct combat training—leaving the army incapable of defending the country.” All of this was a consequence of civilian elites’ incapacity to define and design accurate military roles and allocate resources to carry out assigned tasks. However, the coup attempt failed because the majority of officers at the time of the coup accepted the supremacy of civilian rule due to ethno-nationalistic nature of the system.

115 Horowitz, *Coup Theories and Officers’ Motives*, 117.
116 Ibid., 117.
117 Ibid., 112–115.
118 Ibid., 122.
119 Ibid., 81.
Despite the intensity of the Sinhala-Tamil clash, the first Sri Lankan armed struggle did not start due to ethnic and linguistic reasons but due to economic and class differences. The Sinhala official language and the education standardization in the 1970s did not help the unemployment of Sinhala youths compared to urban Sinhala Christian elite and Tamil youths educated in English. The two groups continued to dominate public sector jobs, leaving out the Sinhala rural communities. For example, Bandarage notes, “The best jobs still went to the well-connected, English-speaking elite, and this contributed to a hardening of social class boundaries within the Sinhala community.”123 Consequently in 1971, Rohana Wijeweera, from an active Marxist rural family, formed Janataha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), a leftist revolutionary party. The JVP took up arms against the state and ordered their 100,000 members to fight against capitalism and the Sinhala elites.124 Many insurgents were from low economic backgrounds and belonged to the lower castes, as well—like karawa, vahumpara, and bathgama, compared to the high caste—govigama, illustrating a class difference.125 Interestingly, the JVP demands aligned with the Buddhist ethno-nationalist demand for the removal of the Tamil and Christian elite from the power circles. In 1971, the Marxist insurgency coupled with Tamil discontent allowed the military to enter the civilian domestic control arena.

According to Alagappa, domestic insurgencies minimize other institutions’ functions but allow for increased military control over public administration and the economic and commercial activities in troubled areas.126 In Sri Lanka, the government gave autonomy to military and police to suppress the uprising by declaring a state of emergency. They overruled other public administration systems in troubled areas and ruled those areas in a very decisive manner. In April 1971, this uprising was started and ruthlessly crushed within two months. Bandarage notes how the elites gave a free hand to

124 Ibid., 56.
125 Ibid., 57.
126 Alagappa, Coercion and Governance, 59.
the military, “full powers of arbitrary arrest and disposal of bodies without having to carry out inquests or inform the relatives of those killed.”

The class representation in the military is not available from the period of 1969, but Horowitz recorded 1969 social class representation, which helps to elucidate the majority class representation. According to his report, the Sri Lanka Light Infantry regiment officer corps consisted of 75% govigama, 6% karawa, 6% salagama, and 13% of unknown caste. During the 1971 JVP insurgency, the military directed its coercion tactics towards the Sinhala Buddhists. It is believed that nearly 1,200 to 50,000 were killed during the insurgency. This highlights the high-caste officer corps allegiance toward the high-caste political elite, which continued the subjective civilian control.

In addition, international support elevated the legitimacy of civilian government and helped the civilian rulers consolidate political power and achieve military control. The Sri Lankan government received military aid worth $8 million from China and the USSR. Meanwhile, in 1971, India sent its commandos to protect Sri Lanka’s national airport. Next, the JVP’s operational strategy was centered in cities and villages, which isolated them from their main support bases in peasant areas. As a result, the JVP fell to the military.

Moreover, the government heavily relied on state coercion to suppress the JVP uprising in 1971. The foundation of the uprising started as the result of the government’s closed economic policy that maintained elites’ domination of the public sector and policy-making. The military was given a free hand to crush the insurgency. Since, the

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127 Bandarage, The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka, 56.
128 Horowitz, Coup Theories and Officers’ Motives, 212.
129 “If the bulk of the officers are drawn from a particular social class or geographical section, this may be assumed to enhance the influence of the corps with that class or section.” Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 88.
130 The Sri Lankan government received military and financial aids from Britain, India, Pakistan, Egypt, Australia, the US, Soviet Union, and China. (Bandarage, “The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka,” 56.). It indicates that international community accepted the legitimacy of government while these supports increasing the government legitimacy, it shaped the contending forces capability. Alagappa says, “When the legitimacy of civilian government high, the military power and influence is low and the civilian control of the military is the norm.” Alagappa, “Coercion and Governance” 61
131 Blodgett, Sri Lanka’s Military: The Search for a Mission, 64.
majority military elites were from high caste and were connected to the political elites during the JVP insurgency periods, the Sri Lankan government’s CMR strategy was focused on heavy subjective control that aligned the military to them.

E. THE EMERGENCE OF TAMIL MILITANCY: CLASS AND ETHNIC COMPETITION

The Tamil society suffered similar social and class divisions as the Sinhalese. According to Bandarage, “the rigid caste system and ‘vellala’ domination of the Tamil community was also a significant factor in the rise of youth violence in the north.” 132 Due to ‘vellala’ domination in the Tamil community, the non-vellala became increasingly restless and dissatisfied and therefore, turned away from ‘vellala’ as their political leaders. This internal struggle added to the radicalization of the marginalized Tamil community. In 1972, after enactment of its new constitution, Ceylon changed its official name to the socialist republic of Sri Lanka, which is a Sinhalese name for the country. The new constitution reestablished the unitary status of Sri Lanka, which ignored the Tamil demands for a federal structure. During this period, lower class Tamil youths turned against the dominant farmer caste ‘vellala.’ Subsequently, the fishing caste, the ‘karaiyar’ became dominant during the LTTE era as the ruling class in Tamil areas.133

In addition, Tamil youths were fed up with the ITAK’s nonviolent tactics such as ‘Sathayagrha,’ which failed against the Sinhala Only Act to obtain a separate state. Instead, they were attracted to the Tamil United Front (TUF) indoctrination of armed struggle, which was present during at the 20th annual convention of ITAK in 1973. 134 The new government’s language-wise education standardization policy and 1976 district university quota system discriminated rural Tamils. As the youth militancy grew, it directed its violence against the state, Sinhalese, and Tamil elite. Violence against the state and officials started in 1971 but increased tremendously in 1975. Meanwhile, their

militancy spread in the northern region, killing and threatening high caste Tamil political elites. The LTTE leader Prabakaran emerged from a lower middle class family; he killed the mayor of Jaffna, A. Duraiappa, a Tamil leader in 1975.\textsuperscript{135} Then LTTE also carried out a series of attacks against the Tamils who worked in police, military and other bureaucratic institutions. Consequently, the Tamils working in the military and police were treated with suspicion about their link with separatist groups. These circumstance prevented the Tamils from being enlisted in the police and military. As a result, a drastic change occurred in recruitment patterns—leaving Sinhalese to occupy the entire security sector.

A separatist Tamil group used this change to indoctrinate their cadres. The TUF, passed a resolution known as the Vadukkodai Resolution that intended to establish a separate Tamil Elam state. Later, the TUF changed in to the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF). The Tamils claimed the North and Eastern provinces and other areas as part of their territory. In addition, they had a broader strategic vision to encompass Tamils living in other parts of the world. For example, Bandarage explains, “It sought to embrace all Tamils speakers by offering Elam citizenship to Tamil-speaking people living in any part of the island and to Tamils of ‘Elam origin’ living in any part of the world.”\textsuperscript{136}

Meanwhile, in 1977, the election changed the SLFP government and Juniors Richard Jayewardene led UNP came in to power, and the TULF leader became the leader of the opposition. This gave an advantage to the UNP government to reintegrate moderate Tamils into the main political system. Consequently, this slowed the military action against the Tamil separatist movement. However, the expectation of integration failed because of a hard-line backlash. They feared that the UNP party would negate the Sinhala Buddhist majority concerns in polity and support the minority demands. Since its inception, the UNP party was more liberal than the SLFP. Whenever the UNP was in power, it was common that the SLFP and Sinhala Buddhist hardliners suspected their commitment to majority Sinhalese. This never ending dilemma continues to exist.

\textsuperscript{135} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{136} Ibid., 71.
After the 1977 election, communal violence erupted across the island. The Sinhalese, fearing the Tamil separatist state, believed that the victory would affect the unity of Sri Lanka; yet, they directed violence to Tamils living in other places than the north and the east because of access issues. Tamils retaliated toward the Sinhalese living in the north and the east. During this period, nearly 300 victims and over 25,000 displaced civilians were reported in the country.\textsuperscript{137} The subsequent fact-finding presidential commission headed by M. C. Sansoni, a Berger, in 1977 revealed that the politicians of both communities were responsible for the violence. The military was predominantly occupied by the Sinhalese, and the growing ethno-nationalist ideology shaped the military’s alignment with the ruling majority civilian group.

**F. IMPACT ON DOMESTIC POLITICAL STRUCTURES AND MILITARY**

The collapse of law and order increased the use of state coercion, but the military never challenged the civilian control. There are possibly two explanations for this. One, the military and police consisted of the majority Sinhalese, and their ethno-nationalist grouping was the same as the elites promoting their ideology. Therefore, the military personnel’s political priorities matched that of the civilian state. The military therefore, supported state coercion. For example, Darani Rajasingham-Senanayake reports that “the process of decolonization of military traditions turned into an exercise of politicizing the armed forces…objectivity as Sinhala nationalism came to dominate the state and its coercive apparatus, effectively marginalizing the minorities.”\textsuperscript{138} The majoritarian nationalism of political elites influenced the military elites, whereby it allowed subjective civilian control. Second, Blodgett argues that the military was ill-equipped and poorly trained. For example, the army did not begin weapon training until January 1978 as a result of the lack of ammunitions. Also since the 1962 coup attempt, the army had been restricted from collective training.\textsuperscript{139}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{137} Bandarage, \textit{The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka}, 76.
\end{flushright}
According to Huntington, “anti-military ideologies create low military political power and low military professionalism.” In 1978, when the Tamil arms struggle was gaining its momentum, the Sri Lankan military was at a low professional status. The defense expenditure remained a low 1.5 percent in the context of an increasing insurgency. In addition, the military demands for reorganization were not fully backed by the civilian rulers. Blodgett notes, “The army ordered several studies of its organization in 1978. All of the studies stated that the army needed another reorganization, but they differed in recommendations.” The reorganization remained focused on the stereotyped external threats instead on the looming internal conflicts which faced the country. The civilian rulers retained subjective control by minimizing the defense budget to limit military recruitment, retention, and training. In the early 1980s, despite the rising insurgency, the army’s missions remained focused on police and excluded the military.

G. NEW CONSTITUTION: COMPETITION FOR POWER AND ECONOMIC SHARE

The UNP government introduced a new constitution in 1978 and expected to integrate the minority ethnic groups into the main polity. It replaced the majority ruling concept which had been in effect since the 1972 constitution. Introducing an executive presidency and proportional area-basis representation in the legislative body were the major changes to the older constitution. This system allowed the minorities to play a decisive role in the outcome of the competition between the two major Sinhala parties. Consequently, this constitution shaped the Sinhala Buddhist decisive role in political competition because the Sinhalese was divided into two major parties, and it was rare for one party to win. Accordingly, after the 1978 constitution, whatever party secured majority electoral seats had to rely on minority parties to form a government.

However, the TULF under the pressure of Tamil separatist terrorist groups pointed out that the new constitution also did not support federalism and decentralization of power. In fact, the TULF refused all party constitution enactment committee, but the

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Muslims welcomed the changes. In 1981, the majority of Muslims were united under the new party, Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC), which increased their decisive role in the parliament. The continued dissatisfaction among the Tamils and the hardliners representing SLFP created an ethno-nationalism paradox that impacted the more liberal UNP party policies. The UNP leader, J. R. Jayewardene, was known to lean towards a more economically liberal and secular society. David Little notes, “Jayewardene believed that, like the unattached forest monks for whom he had special esteem, bikkhus should stick to their apolitical calling; they should provide spiritual leadership and not become a substitute for government.”143 Ironically, in order to win an election, he needed the majority of Buddhist votes. Little explains this dilemma: “the tension between his [Jayewardene’s] liberal sentiments and his Gaullist disposition toward central control was mirrored in his conflicting attitudes towards the government’s role in religion.”144 In addition, Jayewardene also faced the pressure towards economic liberalization from international institutions. He soon introduced open economic policies, which also had an impact on Sri Lankan politics and society. However, he increasingly had to be an authoritarian leader in order to control the growing discontent under his presidency due to increasing pressures from the Tamils, as well the left who opposed his economic liberalization, especially those in rural areas, who started to feel the loss of subsidies and financial neglect.145 Jayewardene’s economy depended upon foreign investments. To secure foreign funding, a stable governance and security were prerequisites. The new constitution made President Jayewardene a powerful leader because he headed the cabinet and held several chief ministerial posts besides commander-in-chief of armed forces.146 The president also retained the Ministry of Defense (MOD) portfolio.

144 Ibid.
145 In 1982, Jayewardene called for a referendum to extend his government term by six years without going to an election in 1983. Furthermore, during the referendum polls, government used the emergency law to arrest the opposition leaders, to deny accesses for civilians being cast their votes, and unleashed state terror on the society, Bandarage, *The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka*, 102–04
Jayewardene executed this centralized power to suppress all opposition forces. In his first term, he used the UNP trade union henchmen and police teams to intimidate whoever challenged the external funding and economic prosperity. During his second term, he created the police special task force that is similar to police elite commandos and used it against the second JVP insurrection and the LTTE. Consequently, his government faced two challenges; first, from the Tamil separatists, and second, economically, from the trade union actions that opposed the removal of the state protection from private and foreign investments and the removal of rural subsidies. Certainly, the open economy increased the competition between groups. Urban Tamils and Muslims benefited from this new economic liberalization policy. Under the previous government, the closed economic policies supported state owned enterprises and local Sri Lankan products, but due to the new open economic policy, imported cheap products replaced the local services and products.

The new policy increased foreign investments, resulting in private sector domination over state owned and supported businesses. Unexpectedly, liberalization in urban areas enhanced the ethnic conflict. In 1980, Colombo’s ethnic representation was 50 percent Sinhalese, 22 percent Tamil, and 21 percent Muslim. While the Sinhalese engaged in public sector areas, the minority groups dominated the private commercial sector. Bandarage notes,

Under the new economic liberalization, Sinhala entrepreneurs lost many of the special concessions and political patronage that they had enjoyed under the previous government, weakening their competiveness, thus enabling the Tamil and Muslim entrepreneurs who had historically dominated local and regional trade to re-assert their position.

This elevated the domination of Tamils and Muslims in the commercial sector and increased the Sinhala outcry against minorities augmenting the ethnic-centric mobilization in the cities.

\[\text{147 Ibid., 95.}\]
\[\text{148 Ibid., 80.}\]
\[\text{149 Ibid., 80–81.}\]
The open economy also disturbed the income distribution. Regardless of ethnicity, peasants suffered economic hardships. In 1979, the unemployment rate was as follows: 19% low-country Sinhalese, 14% up-country Sinhalese, 11% Sri Lankan Tamils, and 6% Indian Tamils.\(^{150}\) As political structures became more ethnically biased, it dislodged the moderate Tamil representation in polity, and deprived open economy opportunities for both peasant Sinhala and Tamil youths and pushed them towards armed struggle.\(^{151}\) An instance of this country-wide discontent occurred when the urban middle class went into a general strike in July 1980, which took place after 40,000 workers were dismissed. Indeed, many of them were public sector Sinhalese, and they were never reinstated.

**H. STATE COERCION AND CMR**

To gain political domination in society and to exercise government control within national boundaries, the UNP government used state coercion as a tool.\(^{152}\) The Sri Lankan government used the military in Northern and Eastern regions to control the Tamil militancy, while using Jathika Sevaka Sangamaya (JSS), the UNP trade union, to suppress other trade union movements and individuals against the government. Alagappa asserts that when governments use the military excessively, it begins to lack legitimacy and, at the same time, has to depend on the military in order to stay in power.\(^{153}\) As a result, either military or other security forces have the advantage, and civilian rulers have to accommodate military requests and political agendas simultaneously. Accordingly, it leads to a larger military that is supported by a legal framework to legitimize its action.\(^{154}\) In Sri Lanka, the UNP government passed the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) in 1979 after considering the intensified terrorist attacks in the northern region, where many

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\(^{150}\) Bandarage, *The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka*, 78.

\(^{151}\) Ibid., 111.

\(^{152}\) Alagappa, *Coercion and Governance*, 58.

\(^{153}\) Ibid., 59.

\(^{154}\) Ibid.
Tamil police officers were targeted.\textsuperscript{155} They did this in order to ally with the military and use the military as a coercion tool. Following that, Jayewardene ordered the Jaffna military commander to eliminate terrorism within six months. Jayewardene was also able to use kinship links in order to work with the military. For instance, General Weeratunga, a relative, was in charge of this task, illustrating elements of subjective civilian control.

According to Huntington, at the government institution level, the President and members of the legislature compete with each other on decisions about the military. This allows these competing groups to politicize the military. But in this situation, it was only the president who directed the military. Bandarage explains that “the continuity of presidential power and the five sixth majority of the UNP were ensured by imposing strong controls: UNP members of parliament, for instance, were required to submit signed undated letters of resignation to the president, which he could then use to dismiss MPs as he needed.”\textsuperscript{156} This indicates that there was no room for legislative competition, as well as the participation of professional military officer corps in devising a national security strategy. In such instances, subjective civilian control is evident.\textsuperscript{157} For example, Bandarage notes the military’s incapacity, “Like their counterparts in other countries facing an insurgency, they too found conventional fighting methods inadequate to fight an escalating guerrilla war.”\textsuperscript{158} This proves that the military agents were not in a dominant position to advise the civilian agents or neglected national security policy planning.

The new 1978 constitution created an executive presidency and an authoritative command of the military. The constitution dictated the subjective control, because Jayewardene used his executive power to dismiss his own party members, if their obedience was in question. He collected earlier undated resignation letters from his party members.\textsuperscript{159} The Elam campaign gained sympathy aboard while …such as the killing of police officers, steadily increased. ….after incidents like the killing of police inspector Guruswamy at his residence in Jaffna, the government imposed emergency rule in Jaffna on 12 July 1979.” And “But as the violence continued, in July 1979 government enacted the draconian prevention of terrorism Act (PTA).” Bandarage, \textit{The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka}, 101.

\textsuperscript{155} “The Elam campaign gained sympathy aboard while …such as the killing of police officers, steadily increased. ….after incidents like the killing of police inspector Guruswamy at his residence in Jaffna, the government imposed emergency rule in Jaffna on 12 July 1979.” And “But as the violence continued, in July 1979 government enacted the draconian prevention of terrorism Act (PTA).” Bandarage, \textit{The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka}, 101.

\textsuperscript{156} Bandarage, \textit{The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka}, 96.

\textsuperscript{157} Huntington, \textit{The Soldier and the State}, 81.

\textsuperscript{158} Bandarage, \textit{The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka}, 102.
parliamentarians and used the Special Task Force (STF) as a political force. In other words, the state coercion was directed at state agents. Moreover, the growing Tamil separatist movements changed the recruitment pattern along ethno-nationalistic lines, increasing Sinhalese domination, because the separatist Tamil groups killed Tamil police and military personnel and threatened them to resign from institutions. Furthermore, the Tamils worked in the military and police faced anti-Tamil segment challenges. This had prevented Tamil enlistment in the military. In contrast, the majority Sinhalese believed that joining the military would help protect their country from the Tamils. This sectional ideology helped the civilian rulers to continue the politicization of the military along ethno-nationalism lines and to draw politically motivated deadlines for military operations. As a result, during the pre-LTTE era period, CMR strategy focused on a combination of state coercion and subjective control.

I. EMERGENCE OF THE LTTE AND THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE CONFLICT

In response to government military actions, the LTTE emerged as the most dominant militant group among the Tamils. In July 1983, the LTTE attacked army convoy and killed 13 soldiers in Jaffna. The government tried to hide this news from the public and declared it the following day. The cover up engulfed the public with rumors regarding the government’s covert act. During the funeral of these soldiers on July 24, 1983, large anti-government crowds gathered, using the funeral to express their frustration with the economic policy and the growing income inequity among the middle class. These crowds marched to the President’s house nearby.159 At this instance, the UNP thugs, like the JSS, diverted attention by attacking nearby Tamil shops. In addition, after the July 1983 ‘Black July’ incident, the UNP banned the JVP, alleging its involvement in the incident. The resulting anger of the Sinhalese was directed at Tamil businesses and Tamils living in Colombo. It was believed that wholesale and retail trade were in control of Tamils hands, accounting to 60 and 80 percent of the both trade respectively.160 The UNP government failed to stop these mobs and deliberately delayed

159 Ibid., 105.
160 Ibid., 107.
imposing curfew in Colombo. Mobs killed 200 Tamils and forced another 100,000 to seek shelter in refugee camps. Nevertheless, 30,000 private sector employees became unemployed as the result of the burning down of their industries and businesses. While the majority of Sinhalese did not join the mob violence, internationally, all Sinhalese were condemned. As a result of this ethnic violence, Sinhala, Tamil, and Muslim groups started to migrate away from threatened areas shifting the demographics of the country towards more ethnically-concentrated areas.

Incidences of violence saw an escalation in 1984-1985. The LTTE targeted many economic and highly-populated centers in Colombo and the southern part of the country. The LTTE and the security forces were alleged for reprisal attacks that killed many civilians. With the help of India, the LTTE gradually transformed its capabilities from guerrilla tactics to hybrid terrorist conventional maneuvers. Bandarage notes, “Within a year [1983] of Indira Gandhi’s policy decision, the number of Sri Lankan Tamil training camps in Tamil Nadu had increased to 32.” 161 They were trained, financed, and armed by Indian Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) agents as a part of India’s foreign policy to stop Sri Lanka’s shift towards the west in order to maintain India’s hegemony in the region. The LTTE started ethnic cleansing in the Tamil-claimed homeland territories. The majority of Muslims living in the eastern province were also subjected to the LTTE massacres. For example, Bandarage reports, “Armed Tamil separatists killed hundreds of Muslims and destroyed Muslim property worth billions of rupees.”162 On November 30, 1984, they had killed 100 Sinhala settlers, and, to reciprocate, the military had killed 63 Tamils. The LTTE traumatized the southern Sinhalese by blowing up car bombs in the commercial city Colombo, and by targeting the Sinhalese places of worship like the Temple of the Tooth relic in Kandy and the sacred city Anuradapura in 1985, which claimed the lives of more than 150 worshippers.163

By 1986, in the Northern and Eastern regions, the army camps were sieged and the government institutions were crippled in Jaffna district. To regain state political

162 Ibid., 121.
163 Ibid., 124.
control, the Sri Lankan military conducted its first division level operation in 1987 and almost succeeded in eliminating the separatist terrorists.\textsuperscript{164} However, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi stopped the military campaign due to Tamils’ propaganda and the growing pressure in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu. The Tamil and Tamil Nadu politicians alleged that the government of Sri Lanka denied essential supplies to Tamils living in troubled areas and directed carpet bombings at Tamils. However, in reality, the state never stopped relief supplies to Tamils living in LTTE controlled areas, and their commitment to the care and protection of civilians was commended by many humanitarian agencies.\textsuperscript{165} Despite this fact, India violated Sri Lanka’s air space on June 4, 1987, and dropped relief supplies to Tamils leaving the government helpless; Bandarage explains the sequential events in June 1987, “Outside the region, the international reaction to India’s move was muted, and Sri Lanka felt abandoned by the western powers.”\textsuperscript{166}

The internationalized nature of the conflict elevated Sinhala nationalist sentiments not only in society but also in the military. Bandarage explains, “There was also widespread popular sympathy for the anti-Indian and anti-separatist cause.”\textsuperscript{167} The military was not satisfied with the government decision to hold the operation, because between 1981-1989, they had lost nearly 951 soldiers.\textsuperscript{168} These situations increased the tensions between civilians and the military. Yet, Jayewardene did not have the option to refuse Indian intervention. According to Bandarage:

Despite the fact that that Operation Liberation had been near victory… Jayewardene was pressured by… Indian claim that the Sri Lankan armed forces were not capable of beating the Tamil insurgents into surrender and that the war was unwinnable. Thus Jayewardene agreed to the terms laid down by the Indians in the interest of what was considered ‘sheer national survival.’ \textsuperscript{169}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{166} Bandarage, \textit{The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka}, 131.
\bibitem{167} Ibid., 140.
\bibitem{169} Bandarage, \textit{The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka}, 132.
\end{thebibliography}
Therefore, it was forced to agree to the merging of northern and eastern regions into one administrative province and advised to amend the constitution for power devolution. This direction formed the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement to Establish Peace and Normalcy in Sri Lanka. Further, the intention was to allow the Tamils to govern their ethnic majority living areas. Accordingly, India promised to stop funding, training, and to return all militant groups to Sri Lanka. In fact, an Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) was to come into the country, and IPKF was they mandated to disarm the terrorists groups. Instead, the Sri Lankan military had to stop operations in Tamil areas. These conditions were not accepted by many opposition parties including the Prime Minister Ranasinghe Premadasa from the same ruling party UNP and some other important political figures. 170 Despite the strong nationalist opposition, the Indo-Sri Lanka agreement was signed on July 29, 1987, through the use of curfew and emergency law. 171 The JVP, who went underground after the 1983 proscription, re-merged and carried out violent protests and challenged the accord and the state economic policy.

J. EMERGENCE OF SECOND SINHALA UPRISING – JVP 1987-90 AND CMR IN DOMESTIC TURMOIL

The JVP regained its social class mobilization in this time against the economic liberalization policy that favored the private sector, removal of subsidies, and the nationalist themes like anti-Indian and anti-separatism. The island wide protests and unrest crippled the government’s rule of law and challenged its legitimacy. As Alagappa describes, when a government is contested by domestic and international threats, it uses coercion to regain the stability. Consequently, the government increased the military influences. 172

The JVP fought against the government between 1987 and 1989. The SLFP, MEP, and some of the UNP members also protested against the Indo-Lanka peace accord. The military had an anti-Indian and anti-separatist mindset, with some sympathy

170 Agriculture Minister Gamini Jayasuriya resigned, Athulathmudali and Prime Minister Premadasa did not attend the accord signing ceremony- Bandarage, *The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka*, 135.
172 Alagappa, *Coercion and Governance*, 56.
toward the JVP armed struggle. For example, while inspecting the guard of honor, the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was attacked by a navy soldier who was in the parade.\textsuperscript{173} This incident happened shortly before the peace accord was signed reflecting the military’s anti-Indian sentiments.

However, the military did not disobey or become involved in challenges to the government, although its size increased tremendously after 1985. It went from 16,000 to 40,000 soldiers by 1987.\textsuperscript{174} First, the soldiers came from rural areas and their job security was paramount in feeding their family members. The expansion of the military created job opportunities to Sinhala youths. Every government that came to power had to increase the defense budget, resulting in the increased numbers and capabilities of security forces. Bandarage notes “Toward the end of the 1990s, approximately half of the Sri Lankan government’s defense expenditures went for salaries and wages.”\textsuperscript{175} The same author describes, “In 1990, 30.4 percent of all households and 34.7 percent of all households in the rural sector were below the poverty line,”\textsuperscript{176} and in 1989, 20 percent of the unemployed were youths below 20 years of age.\textsuperscript{177} The military recruiters were from rural villages. Interestingly, the JVPs cadres were also from villages, but they were educated youths, undergraduate dropouts, teachers, and university student. Whereas, the recruiters who joined military had little educational qualification and few alternative means to live. The economic benefits bonded soldiers into the military institution rather than to their social class.\textsuperscript{178} In addition, the government’s legal support to curb the insurgency elevated military autonomy in operational design. Furthermore, the UNP government used rival services, like police elite commandos. In addition, the PTA act provided autonomous status to the security apparatus, which covered their many arbitrary arrests and detention. Overall, the military had many benefits, and therefore there was no reason to challenge the government. According to Bruneau and Matei, a sufficient

\begin{footnotes}
\item[175] Bandarage, \textit{The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka}, 169.
\item[176] Ibid., 140.
\item[177] Ibid.
\item[178] Ibid., 169.
\end{footnotes}
resource allocation to the military usually leads to its effectiveness, and indirectly professionalization, in terms of increase in expertise. In addition, an increase in resources keeps the military content, hence it will be less prone to threaten the government. In Sri Lanka, the expansion of the military in terms of high recruitment during this time took away some of the discontent among the Sinhalese and the military.

Between 1987 and 1990, the JVP insurgency was in a commanding position. The universities were shut down due to large student protests. Bandarage describes, “By November 1988 there was ‘near anarchy,’ and unseen parallel JVP government …seemed to be running the south.” During the 1988 presidential election, they intimidated the voters in south, while the LTTE did the same in the north. R. Premadasa became the president with lowest voter turnout in Sri Lankan history—only 50-55 percent of voters casted their votes. He came to power on the platform of opposing the IPKF presence, and soon after coming to power, he requested the Indian government to call off the IPKF mission.

Meanwhile, the IPKF failed to decommission the LTTE and, instead, engaged in a bloody fight with the LTTE. The IPKF also accounted for many human rights abuses and some humiliated retreats in the battles undermined the credibility of IPKF. In fact, when Rajiv Gandhi refused to call back the IPKF, Premadasa used the LTTE to pressure the Indian government. In 1990, the IPKF left the country without any success. They lost over 1,500 soldiers and had spent $1.25 billion.

Meanwhile, Premadasa earned the sympathy of the lower social classes of all ethnic groups because he was the first non-elite family member to rise to the highest political rank. In 1989, he invited the JVP and LTTE for a negotiated settlement; the LTTE agreed and JVP refused because in the south JVP was the major force and saw no reasons to negotiate. Whereas, in the north, the LTTE was weakened. The LTTE was

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180 Bandarage, The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka, 141.
181 Ibid., 142.
182 Ibid., 153.
183 Ibid., 152.
seeking an alliance with the state using Premadasa’s anti-Indian sentiments to acquire arms from government to fight with IPKF, and to eradicate other Indian proxy groups like the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF), People's Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) and Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO). The fight among these groups caused more deaths in Sri Lanka and India. Finally, the LTTE was able to consolidate and become the sole representative of ethnic Tamils. Other Tamil groups were marginalized in this process.

During these two insurgency periods, the civilian government further equipped and professionalized the military. For example, the military officers received training from Pakistan and hired western experts. Blodgett notes, “Throughout the decade [1980-90], the army changed from a ceremonial force incapable of defending the country to a reasonably well-equipped force capable of halting insurgencies with unconventional tactics.”\(^{184}\) Meanwhile, the government used subjective and state coercion control mechanism while professionalizing their military.

After the IPKF took over the camps from the Sri Lankan military in the north and east regions, the state transported the Sri Lankan military from the north to the south to fight the JVP insurgency. The JVP threatened the soldiers to resign and join their movement; but they failed in this attempt. The JVP threat opened the space for some politicized military personnel and paramilitary consisting of the PLOTE and TELO personnel to conduct operation against the JVP. Bandarage notes, “Posters began to appear in prominent places throughout the south, threating that for each of the army’s relatives killed, 12 relatives of JVP supporters would be killed in return.”\(^ {185}\) By the end of November 1989, including the JVP leader Wijeweera, 60,000 Sinhala deaths were reported in diminishing the second JVP insurgency.

Meanwhile, in 1990, the LTTE had a secret pact with President Pramadasa, in which the President had agreed to withdraw some strategic Sri Lankan military camps.\(^ {186}\)

\(^{185}\) Bandarage, *The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka*, 143.
\(^{186}\) Ibid., 153.
However, they bluffed by sending a committee to negotiate but secretly prepared for a military offensive.\textsuperscript{187} The LTTE managed to capture large stocks of the Indian army’s weaponry and became stronger. It also introduced a pass system to Tamils to move in and out of their claimed territory, as well as a taxing and administration system to support its arms struggle. This extended LTTE’s global network for fundraising and the diaspora lobby gained the international states and non-state actors’ support for their cause.\textsuperscript{188} However, they gained further recognition after killing the ex-Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991 but, consequently, lost the Tamil Nadu sanctuary.

During this period, CMR of Sri Lanka continued heavily along the lines of subjective civilian control under the executive presidency but training and resource evidence points to increased effectiveness of the military. Moreover, the state failed to strengthen institutionalization of the legislative body as well as an oversight mechanism and used the state coercion to tame the northern terrorists. This freedom of act increased military influence in the affected areas leading to some isolated human rights abuses. For objective civilian control, according to Huntington, the military should be professionalized through training because training keeps the forces occupied. In Sri Lanka, during the civil war, the government tried to equip the military, but western countries, in fear of a coup, refused to support the government.\textsuperscript{189} The state increasingly relied on private companies to provide anti-terrorist training to soldiers.\textsuperscript{190} Therefore, professionalization activities continued during this period.

After Sri Lanka’s independence in 1948 to 1990s CMR was shaped by three insurrections. Two in the south, left-radicalization led by JVP in 1971, and in 1987, second JVP insurrection and northern insurgency of Tamil separatist movements. To suppress those, the governments relied on state coercion; therefore, the military became politicized, and the MOD and enactment of the PTA offered legal backing for

\textsuperscript{187} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{188} Bandarage, \textit{The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka}, 154.

\textsuperscript{189} Minister Athulathmudali visited the U.S. to buy military hardware, but the U.S. feared a mutiny and coup. Blodgett, \textit{Sri Lanka’s Military: The Search for a Mission}, 92.

\textsuperscript{190} Blodgett, \textit{Sri Lanka’s Military: The Search for a Mission}, 94.
military operations. This led to abuse of power and several instances of human rights abuses. The common reason was lack of legislative and non-governmental oversight; this, indeed, supports subjective control.

Moreover, CMR was unchallenged during the JVP insurrection and the Tamils’ separatist war, because the military provided job security for the peasant youth who joined the military. They were also politicized along the lines of ethno-nationalism as majority Sinhalese representation. Certainly, the military was aligned with the majority society’s displeasure with Indian involvement and the threat it posed. These sentiments against India unified all social forces seeking a unified Sri Lanka, testing popular demand verses class incentives and the professionalism of CMR. The military accepted civilian supremacy, while also illustrating professionalism.
III. CIVILIAN CONTROL AND INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS: SRI LANKAN CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS

After 1990, the LTTE-led separatist conflict continued to shape Sri Lanka’s civil-military relations. During this time, there were several military setbacks due to domestic and international challenges, which tested the loyalty of the military elites toward the political system. However, the civilian leaders’ control over the military remained stable. In addition, after the conflict in 2009, the civilian leaders were able to change role of the military from a firefighter counter insurgency force to a firefighter national development force. This chapter discusses civilian control and institutional mechanisms, and it analyzes civilian and military interactions through periods of civilian leadership.

A. REINFORCING CONTROL THROUGH INSTITUTIONAL COLLABORATION: EXECUTIVE COMMAND, 1989-1994

The LTTE conflict and JVP uprising challenged Premadasa’s era, but the military supported Premadasa by accepting his command, even though the LTTE resumed its attacks on the military with weapons which Premadasa had provided. Despite the fact that he armed the LTTE, the military accepted the constitutional executive command for various reasons. First, President Premadasa was the Commander in Chief of the armed forces. Second, the public opinion against the IPKF justified his action. In addition, after his failed negotiation strategy, he increased military strength and capabilities. Also, while he faced internal party dissent, his position allowed him to keep the civil and military opposition divided. He was the first president in the history who faced impeachment because of his armament of the LTTE and nepotism. President Premadasa had not only armed the LTTE to fight against the IPKF but also closed many strategic army camps because he believed that the LTTE was sincere about peace negotiations.\(^\text{191}\) Later, during the impeachment process, leading politicians such as L. Athulathmudali and G. Dissanayake, who were members of his party (UNP) went against Premadasa and became his main competitors. These internal disputes in party politics and arming of the LTTE

did not change the military stance because constitutional power of the president had allowed removing and reinstating of the officers. This president’s power to politicize the military and the executive command mechanism increased the subjective control during this period.

However, there were unintended consequences of this blatant political opposition and competition. While the senior military positions were political, in that the president had power to remove the commanders, this caused the senior officers’ to remain neutral and refrain from political affiliations. They knew party politics were temporary and could have negative impact on their military careers. Eventually, the un-intended consequence of this was increased professionalism, which equates, based on Huntington theory, objective control. In addition, while some officers used a strategy of maintaining ties with the second line of leadership in each major party in order to obtain better positions, it actually decreased subjective control. Burger notes, “The obvious strategy was for each officer to cultivate close ties with a factional leader in major parties. While these ties may have helped prevent coups, they also prevented the development of autonomous forces.” As a result, subjective control became objective control and the combination of both helped to control the military.

Meanwhile, the military refused to surrender as ordered by the president to the LTTE, but it did not cause any contestation between civilian ruler and the military agents

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193 In subjective civilian control, civilian groups with various interests compete with each other to gain superior control over the military. In this discussion, power maximization of one or more civilian group is relative to other civilian groups at the national level. Control of the military is achieved through governmental institutions, social classes, and constitutional forms. At the government institution level, the President and members of the legislature compete with each other on decisions about the military. This allows these competing groups to politicize the military. Moreover, when no professional military officer corps is present, then the subjective civilian control is evident in the governing systems. (Huntington, *The Solider and State*, 80–83).

Next, Huntington notes that objective civilian control allows for autonomy and supports the military to maximize its own professionalism. The main idea is to keep the military away from politics while recognizing its autonomous state in deciding military affairs; however, it remains under government civilian control. Huntington expected that this objective could be achieved naturally. He stated that once the military becomes more professionalized, then it can remain neutral in political alignments. (Huntington, *The Solider and State*, 83–85).

194 Ibid., 83–85.
because the refusal led to a more effective action. In 1990, the LTTE wanted the police and military removed from north and east provinces; it demanded the Sri Lankan police and military surrender. Premadasa attempted to negotiate a settlement. The president gave his consent to surrender through the Colombo police chief to the police stations in the east because the LTTE had promised the government safety of all security personnel. However, the LTTE killed 600 policemen on June 11, 1990.195 For example, Shamindra Ferdinando reports, “President Premadasa turned a blind eye to what was going on. Instead of taking up the issue with the LTTE, the President directed the army to cooperate with the LTTE! Gen. de Silva has admitted that the army was taken by complete surprise when the LTTE swung into action in Batticaloa.” 196 In contrast to these orders, operational level troops retaliated the LTTE threat. Ferdinando quotes Rear Admiral Razeek (Retd) describing the second week of June in 1990:

Razeek said: “I felt Vice Admiral Silva’s instructions meant that I could deploy troops to neutralise enemy positions established during the ongoing truce. Having decided to take on the enemy, I briefed officers and men that enemy positions threatening the Elara base should be neutralised, regardless of the consequences.” 197

Similarly, many military camps refused to follow that command. The LTTE cut off the main supply routes in order to isolate army camps in the north and east provinces. This situation demanded joint operations to restore the freedom of movement to and from those camps. By then the military had improved its capability to operate jointly. 198 The military launched joint operations like “Thrividabala” and “Sea Breeze” which provided the reinforcement and security of these camps. 199 During this period, Premadasa’s commitment to improve the military capabilities lessened the officers’ mood to intervene for taking over the government. For example, Blodgett explains, “Likewise, Lt. Gen.


199 Ibid., 111.
Wansingha wanted tanks to provide the necessary firepower when needed, and on 14 October 1991, the SLA received 25 T-54/55 tanks purchased from Poland which became operational in 1992.” 200

Moreover, in 1990, the army created its third division and procured long range artillery guns and tanks. Therefore, when the opposition initiated the impeachment based on the fact that he had armed the LTTE, the president’s consent to the military leadership’s demands illustrates that the CMR was undisputed because Premadasa’s prior actions had negatively impacted the military, so, he had to provide them with new military hardware. Additionally, the size of the army was increased from 70,000 to 89,000 during the 1991-92 period. These actions allowed civilian leadership to obtain the loyalty of military.

In 1990, President Premadasa adopted the strategy of “escalation of conflict while talking peace” which the U.S. President L. Johnson had used during 1965 Vietnam War. This allowed President Premadasa to use state coercion and negotiations simultaneously to win the hearts and minds of moderate Tamils and Sinhalese. The increase in violence demanded more counter-insurgency military operations and law and order maintenance in war torn areas, which led the military leadership to focus only on internal conflict and prevented equipping and training military for external national threats. Therefore, the military deviated from its major macro defending role and moved into a firefighter role, which undertook internal security matters. As the commander of chief, the president agreed to the military agents’ plans for the defeat of the LTTE. Blodgett notes:

Plans for the defeat of the LTTE on the Jaffna Peninsula were drawn up, but after a detailed assessment of the situation, the SLA decided that it first needed to expand its perimeters at Palaly to give the army a wide bridgehead with more options. Because of the need for additional troops in the North, the SLA requested, and received, permission to reduce the number of troops in the East.201

201 Ibid., 114.
This indicates an instance in which civilian leadership used objective civilian control, and the President allowed the military to manage violence without interference in its operational strategy.

B. REINFORCING CONTROL THROUGH INSTITUTIONAL COLLABORATION: INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISM 1989 -1994

According to Bruneau and Matei’s framework, the civilian control is a form of authority, an institutional mechanism that provides an oversight and professional standards, all of which are expected to support military effectiveness. These mechanisms allow civilians in providing guidance for military through laws and regulations.202 During the period between 1989 and 1994, Sri Lanka was under the rule of the UNP party and the country’s security sector organized into the National Security Council (NSC), Ministry of Defense (MOD), army, navy, and air force. In addition, police, a Special Task Force (STF) and intelligence agencies were connected to the NSC, which is the policy-making national security body. To improve CMR, inter-connectedness of these agencies with legislative and executive branches have contributed by allowing military agents to participate in national defense policy-making.

The above-mentioned NSC mechanism had existed informally since 1970.203 The NSC was comprised of the chairperson-president, the deputy minister for defense, secretaries to the president and MOD, the commanders of the three services, the inspector general of police, and directors of the intelligence services. The three service commanders acted as the principal advisers for their departments.204 The president made the final decision on any policy matter which was then channeled through the MOD for implementation. The MOD was responsible for promotions, appointments, budgetary allocations and procurements. However, other than the auditors’ general department, which oversaw the public fund usage, there were no legislative bodies or defense committees which had the power to oversee and scrutinize military functions. Therefore,

204 Ibid.
pre-Premadasa-era institutions did exist, but they were ineffective because of the subjective nature of constitutional power.

The executive branch’s subjective control nature minimized the military advisers’ role in NSC and defense strategy planning. As a result, the security of military was endangered. During early 1990, senior military leadership and the secretary of defense failed to advice or lacked the expertise to influence the president about military preparedness and waited until the escalation began in June 1990. Ferdinando explains, “His security and international affairs advisors, Gen. Cyril Ranatunga and Bradman Weerakoon remained mum. Although Gen. Ranatunga had been subsequently critical of President Premadasa’s style of peacemaking, he never dared to express his opinion before the President’s assassination on the early afternoon of May Day 1993.”

This illustrates a clear failure of the MOD and interagency connectedness and also highlights the prevailed subjective control of executive command allowed the LTTE to gain more ground.

Interestingly and ironically, the LTTE conflict led to growing defense expenditure, helping build a well-organized professionalized military. Soon after the peace negotiations failed in 1990, the Elam War II commenced. The escalation of the conflict demanded more budgetary allocations and procurements. In 1990, 4.5% of the GDP was spent on the military. To cover the defense expenditures, the government imposed a defense levy tax of 1% for goods and services. By 1994, the army had been organized into three divisions and four task forces, while the numbers rose to 105,000 troops. In 1990, the air force had 35 fixed-wing aircraft and 23 rotary-wing aircraft, out of which 23 were combat aircraft. By 1994, it acquired seven Chinese F-7 jet fighters for air defense, four ‘Pucara’ ground attack aircraft, six Mi-17 transport helicopters. Similarly, the navy purchased 28 naval assets ranging from patrol boats to

205 Ferdinando, “War on Terror Revisited: President’s Shocking Complicity in Massacre of Policemen.”


207 Ibid., 24.

208 Ibid., 24.
landing crafts. The army’s role in counter-insurgency elevated it as the predominant service and two other services became support role providers to army to carry out ground military operations. These new military assets and the increased number of troops improved each service’s professionalism and institutional connectivity among stake holder channels of the services. It became a supportive factor for the improved CMR.

The military invested in professionalizing and through the MOD facilitation, it secured foreign training opportunities and obtained budgets for development of combat effectiveness. In 1991, the army launched an intensive jungle training course to improve each soldiers’ combat effectiveness. Moreover, in 1994, the army launched a battalion level training program for each battalion to educate fighting in built up areas (FIBUA). These training programs contributed to increase military expertise in managing violence, but the MOD control over the allocated military budgets were detrimental for those professionalism programs. However, the MOD did not interfere in military training doctrines, nor did it conduct any review on them. It supported the military budget demands and training. Blodgett explains, “In 1994, the army commander realized that units were still not properly trained in jungle and guerrilla warfare and he directed that every battalion receive jungle training.” In addition, officers received training from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the U.S. military. Accordingly, these training courses increased military professionalism—a prerequisite to achieve objective control. Therefore, this limited involvement of the MOD and other institutions helped professionalize the military, which then allowed for civilian leaders to elevate objective control.

The military was used as a political tool to restrict the LTTE violence not to eliminate it. According to Paul Shemella, firefighter’ countries often use their forces to assist civilian authorities to fight against insurgencies, combatting terrorism and

209 Blodgett, Sri Lanka’s Military: The Search for a Mission, 118.
210 Ibid., 118.
211 Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 83.
providing humanitarian assistance. In this context, the Sri Lankan civilian authorities set the objective of eliminating the LTTE insurgency. The MOD controlled budgetary allocations of each service and examined its relevance to the designated role. The service commanders had to submit their respective service’s annual capital and recurrent budgetary demands to the MOD for approval. The military gained the control of insurgency operations, but it was not able to achieve a full victory due to the president’s belief in negotiated settlement. For example, Blodgett notes, “The numerically larger and superior equipped SLA slowly defeated the LTTE although they did suffer several serious losses. The cease-fire forced the SLA to halt their advance and allowed the LTTE time to reorganize and rearm.” These setbacks did not affect the civilian and military agents’ interaction because the institutional control mechanism allowed enough budget to improve joint operation capabilities and incentives of the military, like foreign training. More importantly, MOD control did not challenge the military institutions’ internal procedures and operational orders, which allowed the military autonomy.

C. REINFORCING CONTROL THROUGH INSTITUTIONAL COLLABORATION: EXECUTIVE COMMAND, 1994-2005

When President Chandirka Kumaratunga Bandaranaike took office in 1994, she had to face raging war, establish control of a military facing political rivalries, and navigate pressure from external peace-brokers. She led the Peoples’ Alliance (PA) coalition party which consisted of the SLFP, the Communist Party, the MEP, Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC), and other small leftist parties. She defeated Mrs. Srima Dissanayake, the UNP candidate. The internationalized nature of the Tamil conflict advocated for a political solution of the ethnic conflict. Chandrika was educated in Paris, and her victory was welcomed by the non-government organizations (NGOs), the international community, and the groups favoring a federalist solution because she accepted the ethnic nature of the conflict and regional autonomy solution. Her


214 Bandarage, The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka, 156.
government started negotiations with the LTTE in 1994 and signed a ‘Cessation of Hostilities’ on January 5, 1995. This signed agreement was monitored by Norway, Canada, and the Netherlands. The military remained loyal during this period.

The government presented a ‘Devolution Package,’ which addressed several grievances of the Tamils. It proposed unions of regions within a unitary Sri Lanka, which would transform present provinces into regional councils, each with a governor and its own regional council with the power to maintain law and order, to institute its own judicial system, and to control education, public services, and finance management. In addition, a regional police and tax collecting administrative body would be installed; however, the defense, national security, foreign affairs, immigration, currency, and international economic affairs would remain under the control of central government. Chandrika appointed Anuruddha Ratwatte, a retired colonel of the volunteer force and also her uncle, as her deputy defense minister. She also moved close senior level generals into the high-ranking positions, such as General Daluwatte, as commander of the army. He had been accused of failure of command previously. Frederica Jansz reports, “Daluwatte maintained that since the two courts of inquiry, he had been cleared of all allegations by President Chandrika Kumaratunga in her capacity as Commander in Chief of the security forces and police.” In another case, Major General Jayawardena was appointed as overall operation commander and later he became the secretary of MOD. The Island defense reporter says, “Maj. Gen. Jayawardena is known to be a close confidante of the President.” These actions helped her to gain military support and control of the military through subjective control.

However, there were efficiency consequences to this subjective control. The military leaders accepted the president’s command failing to provide expertise to maintain an effective military in the event of failed negotiations. Her moves towards peace-negotiations sidelined the military’s strength compared to the LTTE because this

‘Devolution Package’ was strongly supported by peace brokers, the peace lobby of NGOs and other international donors. There were indications that the senior military leadership believed negotiations undermined the military preparations for another round of conflict. For example, until 1995, when the Riviresa Operation began, there was no major recruitment drive, and the recruits were not trained properly. This affected follow-on operations and retreats for the military. For example, Iqbal Athas reports, “Certainly recruits have to be inducted into operational area but experienced military officials say this must be done on the completion of advanced recruit training wherein they are pitted into operational duties in a mix with trained cadres. To do otherwise is to expose recruits unnecessarily to fatal situations.”

This highlighted the lack of professional standard maintenance and continuation of subjective control. Moreover, according to Bruneau and Matei’s new conceptualization framework, this situation illustrated failure of military agents’ expertise on identifying number of troops for future role and missions as well as the executive command oversight in military affairs, which was needed to maintain an effective military.

The military was under subjective control and missions were unchanged during Chandrika’s presidency. According to Huntington, civilian leaders who want to assert their own views in military policy do not wish for a politically neutral officer corps and subordinate the officer corps for their own gains. Similarly, Chandrika used her close confidants (such as General Jayawardena) to accept short-sighted military strategy designed to gain political objectives rather than eliminating the LTTE. She adopted a ‘war and peace’ policy and never continuously targeted the LTTE. For example, Crisis Group Asia reports, “This led to a shift by Kumaratunga from a pro-peace agenda to the ineptly titled ‘war for peace’ policy, in which military action was meant to dislodge the Tigers, while a political solution was offered to the Tamil people.”


219 Huntington, The Solider And State, 85.

speculated, the peace negotiations collapsed, after the LTTE withdrew from the agreement in April 1995 because of the LTTE’s disagreement on disarmament conditions, and the SLMC’s demand for a separate south-east province for Muslims.\textsuperscript{221} Moreover, this package was subject to the strong criticisms of Sinhala nationalist movements. Soon after it broke off peace negotiations, the LTTE launched attacks against the military and civilians.\textsuperscript{222} At the President direction, the military captured Jaffna town within 47 days in December 1995 using three divisions.\textsuperscript{223} By 1997, the military controlled the Jaffna peninsula and achieved the objective of cutting off Jaffna peninsula from the rest of the country and taking it under government control. This challenged two dimensions of Huntington model.

Despite the fact that the military was under subjective control, the military achieved success. According to Huntington, subjective control means like infiltrating military decision-making, using service rivalries, using politically close generals for command and control increases antimilitary ideology resulting in low military political power and low military professionalism.\textsuperscript{224} However, in the Sri Lankan case, the military did not fall short of professionalism. Instead, the military illustrated that they were professional enough to carry out the civilian leader’s assigned task regardless of its short-sighted nature, this increased objective control. This contradicts Huntington’s subjective control theory, which leads to low professionalism instead of objective control. Therefore, this military success disproves Huntington model because this operational success illustrates that when subjective control increases, it could lead to a more professional military.

In addition, according to state coercion model, this situation could be attributed to increased military influence in the political arena, but in this situation, it absorbed into subjective and objective control preventing military influences. On the other hand, the military was equipped to carry out these tasks from 1995-1997, but later exhausted its

\textsuperscript{221} Bandarage, \textit{The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka}, 159.
\textsuperscript{222} Ibid., 162.
\textsuperscript{224} Huntington, \textit{The Soldier and State}, 82-96.
men and material, which highlights some failures in maintaining balanced control and effectiveness at affordable cost, as described in the new conceptualization model. Nevertheless, this highlighted that the civilian leader used combination of CMR models to ascertain civilian control.

Unfortunately, this military success was short-lived as LTTE’s counter offensive reversed the military victories. Notably these setbacks did not affect CMR because even though the president advocated a wrong national security strategy by using her confidant senior military agents, she had to rectify those mistakes; therefore, she allocated more budgets and incentives. The military adopted a conventional strategy in order to recapture the area, but this military strategy demanded more troops on ground. The LTTE used cease fire agreements to improve its organizational and military capabilities to manage the violence. As the LTTE attacks created more national security challenges, there were increased military demands. By 1995, the military had created three divisions, increasing its personnel strength. These developments in the military raised the average defense expenditure to 6% of the GDP during the years 1993 to 1996. In 1996, the defense expenditure was 21.6% of the total government budget. While military spending helped to improve professionalism through training, these economic incentives helped ascertain subjective control. However, in comparing low-cost effectiveness, according to new conceptualization CMR model, it was evident that the government expenditure in 1996 on conflict was futile due to failed military strategy. However, the overall positive effect on CMR was undisputed because military expansion created higher positions for officer corps and maintained their loyalty.

Chandrika and her uncle, General Ratwatte directed the military and intervened for operational matters limiting military agents’ expertise. This minimized the voice of military autonomy in participation in defense policy matters allowing consolidation of subjective control. Ratwatte directed the operation to capture Jaffna and, after the victory, he was promoted to the rank of General by the President. In July 1996, the LTTE overran a large military base in Mullaitive and killed 1200 soldiers, illustrating the problem with

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promoting un-professional civilians to military office. This base was isolated and military agents failed to reinforce and protect it. Consequently, in 1997, the government launched another offensive—Jayasikuru—to open a land supply route from the north central province to the Jaffna peninsula along the A-9 road from the town of Vauniya to Jaffna. At this time, no senior officer challenged the military’s weak strategy affecting the effectiveness of military assets. For instance, due to military failure, the recruitment process was not successful. Blodgett notes, “In the second quarter of 1996, the SLA sought to recruit 10,000 troops. Only 1,800 applicants applied.”

Despite an increased defense budget, there was a man-power shortage. In addition, poorly trained soldiers were sent into battle. As a result, the military could not hold the areas captured during the ‘Jayasikuru’ operation. Subsequently, the LTTE managed to attack weakly held military positions. By 1999, the government military campaign proved to be a failure; the ‘Wanni Debacle’ commenced in the north of Vauniya and the LTTE recaptured the area and cut off Jaffna. However, during these setbacks, the military did not respond negatively to the executive command’s negligence and military humiliation because both political and military leadership was responsible for the great loss of men and material.

For example, Bandarage notes:

As military analyst Iqbal Athas and others have commented, the opportunisms and bloated egos of politicians and top-level military men were responsible for the failure of conventional strategies in the guerrilla war and the massive sacrifice of the lives of ordinary soldiers in debacles such as those of Vanni and Elephant Pass.

Moreover, the military provided jobs to poor rural youth and eased the economic hardships of their families. This politically supported the regime as it boosted employment. Therefore, despite the fact of military setbacks, the soldiers remained in the service. Bandarage notes, “By 2000, 5% of the Sri Lankan population, mostly rural poor, were estimated to be living on the salaries of soldiers, 400,000 urban poor were also engaged in security and other services in the private sector linked to the war

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economy.” This situation illustrates that the civilian leadership overall used military institution for political purposes and subjective nature of her control strategy formed the military into jobs, providing a mechanism for rural, low-educated youths. Therefore she was able to maintain military control.

However, these actions could not prevent military losses. By 2000, the military lost Kilinochchi and Elephant Pass military camps. Bandarage explains, “As 10,000 Sri Lankan troops were withdrawn, 30,000 other troops were trapped in the Jaffna peninsula without access to the land route.” The military repeatedly retreated in the period of 1999 to 2000, and there was no evidence that military challenged the civilian authority. Therefore, it illustrates that the military accepted Chandrika’s constitutional authority and objective control.

This era highlights objective control and depicts how effectively she used incentives to subordinate senior commanders who had close links like General Daluwatte and ignored the corruption for subjective control in the same period. At the same time, she helped military education. The president and her team often kept the military commanders in dark. For example, three service commanders learned about the structural changes in NSC, when they were at a party with the secretary of defense. In 2000, Army Commander General Srilal Weerasooriya, who was responsible for severe military setbacks, was appointed as Pakistan High Commissioner to Sri Lanka. Frederica Jansz reported the Deputy Defense Minister Ratwatte’s corruption allegations regarding funds amounting to 41 million rupees—that “Amidst allegations that Anuruddha Ratwatte has long sought to ensure the war in Sri Lanka continues due to vested interests, three vaults in the names of Anuruddha, his wife Ramani, and her son Shivan Kanageeswaran were discovered at a private bank last week.” While it is true that President Chandrika maintained civilian control by offering incentives, she also helped the military to improve

229 Ibid., 169.
its professionalism. The establishment of the Army Command and Staff College in 1998 is an example. 233 This is the highest joint military educational institution that prepares mid-level military officers and young civilian government officials for future command and staff duties. This eventually elevated objective control. Therefore, the executive command used a combination of heavy subjective and medium level objective control.

D. REINFORCING CONTROL THROUGH INSTITUTIONAL COLLABORATION: INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISM: 1994-2005

The interagency institutional guidance and control on military was undisputed in 1994, but after 2002 political competition shaped CMR due to increases in executive and legislative branch contestation. In addition, lack of oversight provisions allowed the military autonomy, but it did not improve the influence of military in society or polity nor effectiveness. In May 1999, the PA government institutionalized the ad-hoc NSC, formalized its command relationship with other services, and connected it with government agencies by a Gazette notification. 234 The major structural change created a new Chief of Defense Staff appointment that was directly responsible to the president with regard to the three services. It was responsible for joint operations and coordination of counter-terrorist operations conducted by the three services and police. 235 This new position took the command of three forces and the police. Athas notes:

The armed forces and such officers of the police force as are engaged in anti-terrorist operations shall be under the command of the Chief of Defence Staff, Joint Operations and for this purpose, the Commander of the Army, the Commander of the Navy, the Commander of the Air Force and the Inspector General of Police shall act under his command. 236

However, this new structural change and position did not change the constitutional autonomy of the presidency. The president held the finance and defense

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234 Iqbal Athas, “A New Body and a New Head to Counter Terrorism.”

235 Ibid.

236 Ibid.
ministry portfolios, which created a predominant executive institutional mechanism for controlling the military, rather than allowing parliamentary or legislative control.

In addition, the Sri Lankan democratic governance system lacked proper legislative mechanisms for overseeing the military. The level of the PA government’s corruption and fraud were higher than the previous government; as a result, the military corruption was not investigated. Bandarage notes, “Between US $80 million and US $120 million out of a government allocation of US $800 million for military equipment in early 2000 allegedly went to politicians and military officials as kickbacks.” 237 The reasoning behind less oversight of governmental processes was the elites’ belief that this would jeopardize the national security. 238 Therefore, military autonomy or corruption was not challenged or curtailed by the institutional mechanism. For example, Jayadeva Uyangoda explains “Generally, parliamentary oversight on security expenditure and military policies has been quite weak in Sri Lanka.” 239 This allowed the military to not challenge the status quo.

During the 2001 general election, the military was used to intimidate opposition parties. Ratwatte was accused of using his personal protection platoon to kill 10 Muslim youths belonging to a rival political party. 240 This illustrates the extent of politicization and lack of professionalism, which was the result of subjective control. However, the political competition in the 2001 general election challenged this institutional mechanism of president-centric control of the military. The ruling party, PA, lost the election, and the UNP leader became the new prime minister. This was a new experience in Sri Lankan political history, one in which the president and prime minister of rival political parties shared authority.

The new era of the two parties in ruling institutions changed the CMR in two ways because this divided political setting led to professionalize the military. First, the

UNP tried to downsize the military. Second, influenced by international peace lobby, Prime Minister Ranil Wickramasinghe’s government undermined military capabilities and service. The NGO peace lobby rallied around the new Prime Minister led United National Front (UNF). The UNF marginally won the election after receiving the support of minority parties such as the SLMC, Indian Tamil CWC, and the Indian Tamils’ Up-Country Peoples Front (UCPF). The UNF also received Tamil National Alliance (TNA) support, which was considered the pro-LTTE political party. In this new divided political setting, the military remained subservient to civilian authority because the political parties’ competition to take control of military increased objective control, allowing the military to become more professionalized.

The military followed the final authority command and stayed out of politics during competition for the defense ministry between the executive and legislative, which at that time was represented by two rival political parties. After the election, President Chandrika was reluctant to hand over the Ministry of Defense to her political rival, because according to the constitution the President was the commander-in-chief of armed forces. However, she handed over the MOD to the prime minister, and he appointed a new minister of defense. This created a contestation between defense policy-making and controlling the military. On the one hand, the prime minister tried to cripple the presidential power in defense policy-making in order to make the military more responsive to legislative control. The president retained the power of convening NSC and directing the military commanders. This political contestation did not affect CMR because among the military officers, party politics are identified to negatively impact their career progression. Therefore, objective control prevented military influences because the military deliberately wanted to stay neutral and avoid sided with any of the political parties.

Later in 2002, the new government of Ranil signed a Cease Fire Agreement (CFA), which resulted in military humiliation and a CMR gap. The CFA was initiated by

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241 Bandarage, The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka, 177.
the Norwegian peace brokers and the international community. To monitor this agreement, the Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission (SLMM) was established, which consisted of Scandinavian nationals. This agreement was not welcomed by the majority and was heavily criticized by the opposition because of the way in which the CFA signing was hidden from the public, legislature, and executive president. Some other reasons for criticisms were as follows: A) the negotiators offered equal status to the democratically elected government and internationally proscribed LTTE organization. B) the peace process weakening of the military and its strengthening of the LTTE. C) the negotiators did not raise the point to impose sanctions against the LTTE child soldiering and conscriptions. D) the Prime Minister has violated the PTA Act entering for terms with a terrorist outfit. These criticisms shaped the dynamics of the elite and the military and its impact was evident in the NSC. Jayadeva quotes a case study report:

The meetings [NSC] were never held punctually and scheduled with short notice given, which made the prime minister an absentee due to his heavy schedules. No serious deliberation was made on CFA implementation at the NSC, but ad hoc criticisms were levelled giving an indication to the military authorities of the president’s apparent negative responsiveness and displeasure of the CFA.

This popular criticism shaped the military response because it was dissatisfied over the acceptance of two military forces in one country and the monitoring of Sri Lankan military’s actions by foreign nationals. This pushed the military into the President’s realm. Jayadeva notes, “the military was not overtly enthusiastic about the implementation of the CFA” because prior to the signing of the CFA, the Prime Minister had consulted with the Army and Navy chiefs, yet their concerns were neglected in formulating the CFA.

Moreover, the CFA limited the freedom of movement of the military, but not the LTTE; the Norwegian funded program instructed the elites and the military to reduce the

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244 Ibid., 183.
246 Ibid., 46.
High Security Zone (HSZ) and downsize the military. These moves were highly opposed by the military elite. For example, then Jaffna commander “Major General Sarath Fonseka said that the relaxation of the High Security Zones (HSZ) should be conditional on the disarming of the Tiger Cadres.” Furthermore, Bandula Jayasekara reiterated the generals comment note:

In his de-escalation plan General Fonseka says that it should be borne in mind that when talking in terms of a political solution, political criticism in the South of Sri Lanka cannot be ignored, therefore any adjustment or variations in security zones should not create a political turmoil in the south and should be considered as critical.

However, the military remained subservient to the civilian institutional mechanism. As Jayadeva notes, “In its relations with the civilian political elite, Sri Lanka’s security sector appears to operate within a framework of professional norms.”

The Norwegian backed peace process helped Sri Lanka to take part in United Nations peacekeeping missions in 2004. Furthermore, this peace process created political turmoil in the south, and Norway’s role as a neutral mediator was in question. The Norwegian funded programs armed the LTTE and facilitated them in obtaining training from their special forces. The LTTE’s military build-up also created animosity for the CFA in the south. Bandarage notes, “Effiges of Norwegian facilitator Erik Solheim were burnt, and mass protests were organized by the Sinhalese and Tamil dissidents against what was seen as Norwegian favoritism towards the LTTE. One rally drew over 50,000 people, considered to be the largest protest in Sri Lankan history.” As a result, in February 2004, President Chandrika used the constitutional power to retake the MOD and

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248 Ibid.


251 Ibid., 193.
two other ministries. This led to dissolution of parliament and call for 2004 general election.

However, the military remained neutral during this political turmoil; the reasons could be a combination of the following: 1) the nurtured subjective control, like appointing retired loyal senior officers for the government institution’s higher positions, 2) the nurtured objective control through personal and professional competition among the officers, which led to connecting those officers with both of the major political parties, 3) societal faith in the military, which prevented a breach of trust, 4) that in April 2004, the new United Nations peacekeeping mission added the military into its mission, thereby not only elevating the military’s professionalism and recognition in the international arena but also creating economic incentives to the troops.

E. REINFORCING CONTROL THROUGH INSTITUTIONAL COLLABORATION: EXECUTIVE COMMAND 2005-2009 AND END OF TERRORISM

The new President Mahinda Rajapaksa, the head of the SLFP came in to power in 2005. He had to build confidence and restructure the military to face semi-conventional capabilities of the LTTE. In the presidential election of 2005, the UNF’s leader Ranil lost to the SLFP leader Rajapaksa, who was backed by strong nationalist movements and the parties against the CFA. The peace process elevated the LTTE’s strategic position in the international system and paved the way to establish a de-facto administrative body, judicial system, police force, and separate military, naval, and air wings. Therefore, President Rajapaksa had to take a calculated risk while using military strategy because the military was in a demoralized state after repeated retreats and was ineffective due to previous government politicizations. During this era, the president formulated a national security strategy collaborating with political, military, economic, government, and media institutions. These branches were allowed extended autonomy to achieve a single national objective, which was to eliminate the LTTE.

252 Ibid., 189.

253 State of Democracy and and Human Security Survey in 2004–05 notes that 77.8 percent% of people trust the security forces, and they do not see the military as a corrupt or oppressive institution. - Uyangoda and Bastian, “State Responsiveness to Public Security Needs,” 34, 47.
The strong Sinhala nationalist and moderate Tamils demand for eliminating the LTTE shaped Rajapaksa’s executive command. His determination to end the conflict gave confidence to the military commanders. At the beginning of Rajapaksa’s tenure, the military had less faith in the president, but a strong nationalist movement encouraged the president to use force and, in turn, the military accepted the new political dimensions. Jayadeva notes, “In the context of the war against Tamil sectionalist rebel groups, ethnic and ideological factors have contributed to ensuring solidarity between the political and security elite.” The LTTE started the Elam War IV in April 2006. As a prelude, it killed the deputy army commander, attempted to kill the army commander General Fonseka using a suicide bomber, massacred Sinhala peasants in Kebithigollawa and closed Mavil Aru sluice gate, which was the lifeline of Sinhala and Muslim farmers cultivating in the east. President Rajapaksa decided to commence operations against the LTTE in 2006, and by 2008, made the SLMM and CFA null and void.

The president used service chiefs to formulate the defense strategy along with his secretary of the MOD—his brother, Gotabaya Rajapaksa, a former lieutenant colonel. President Rajapaksa used a hands-off approach with regards to military affairs during the conflict. Don Wijewardana notes, “The president delegated the task of fighting the war to professionals, the team being led by Gotabaya Rajapaksa and service chiefs.” By appointing his brother as defense secretary, he continued the practice of subjective control, which entails family, caste, ethno-nationalism based CMR. The military commanders’ relationships with the Gotabaya were used to obtain civilian control. For example, VK Shashikumar reports, “He (Gotabaya) was embraced and accepted by the military and his was a legitimate voice in the Army,” said a senior official in the president’s office. “Gotabaya communicated the military requirements to the government—men, material and weapons.” This connection improved the cohesion among civilian elites and military.

255 Wijewardana, How LTTE Lost the Eelam War, 58.
The president allowed military further autonomy improving objective control, but at the same time, he used personal, professional, and service rivalry to maintain subjective control. The army commander was allowed to pick his own team and operational strategy. General Fonseka was a highly-esteemed military character; however, he did not respect other service commanders, especially to the navy commander Admiral Karannagoda. The president and secretary of the MOD knew that General Fonseka was the best professional commander to eliminate the LTTE, but among the army officers he was not seen as a compassionate commander. According to D. B. S. Jeyaraj, “they admired him as a professional but disliked him at a personal level. But Fonseka was highly popular among the rank and file.”257 The navy invented a new asymmetrical tactical concept, Small Boat Operation, similar to the Small Infantry Team Operation (SIOT) invented by the Army. These innovative concepts were real game-changers in land and sea domains. However, both General Fonseka and Admiral Karannagoda tried to compete and claim success in the battlegrounds based on their personal planning. D. B. S. Jeyaraj notes, “Fonseka and Karannagoda the navy chief were not on speaking terms. Relations were rather strained though not ruptured between Air Force Chief Gunatilleke and Fonseka.” 258 These service rivalries allowed the executive to retain civilian control over military because it increased the involvement of the secretary of MOD to coordinate the joint military strategy. Jeyaraj reports, “He [Gotabaya] liaised between the Army and navy and Army and Air Force. He smoothed ruffled feelings and secured the cooperation of all.”259 As a result, during the conflict, the executive command was unchallenged due to established subjective control from rivalry and improved objective control.

In addition, the president’s executive command used a holistic approach that paved the way to ending the conflict in 2009. When examining the failure of previous president’s, the following factors prevented their success: lack of coordination in joint


258 Ibid.

259 Ibid.
operations, absence of a secretary of the MOD to obtain the trust of the military, lack of confidence in the military, and fear of military coup, which prevented military autonomy.260 Rajapaksa’s military strategy rectified these issues as follows: A) President’s hands-off approach and military autonomy B) managing service rivalry and selecting the right personnel in other bureaucratic institutions like in the MOD, foreign affairs, and national media). C) Unifying those institutions to focus on the war effort. D) Maintaining uninterrupted military hardware supply and winning India’s concern E) Restricting media and NGO activities that targeted the military and protecting the military from domestic and international pressure.261

This holistic approach improved the military commanders’ confidence and elevated civilian supremacy in controlling the military, illustrating a combination of subjective and objective CMR models. According to new conceptualization model, usually when the military is engaged in counter-terrorism roles, the level of democratic control is high in institutional control mechanisms, oversight, and professional norms. Interestingly, in this case, direct institutional executive control was visibly low because of the president’s hands-off approach but through subjective control it maintained a high status of control over the military. Executive command employed its agents to scrutinize military activities. Therefore, the president was able to ascertain the command while maintaining a professional, effective military.

F. REINFORCING CONTROL THROUGH INSTITUTIONAL COLLABORATION: INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISM 2005-2009 AND END OF TERRORISM

During this era, the interagency institutional guidance and control on military was well-coordinated among the executive office and other institutions. The increased executive and legislative branch cooperation contributed to military success. The NSC formulated clear objectives in its defense strategy, including roles and missions. To defeat the LTTE, it expanded military manpower to launch attrition warfare, exploited the LTTE’s dependence on sea lines of communication in supplying military hardware,

260 Wijewardana, How LTTE Lost the Eelam War, 126.
261 Ibid., 24–25.
intercepted the LTTE sea tiger movements, restructured the military, and equipped the military to meet the objective. Moreover, it created a media center for national security to manage public information and report the battle situation to others. In turn, this center limited the access of adverse domestic and international media groups to battle front information, thereby restricting the LTTE’s propaganda mechanism and maintaining the morale of military and society. Essentially, these developments led to improved military effectiveness in terms of plans, structures, and resources, yet oversight arrangements and mechanisms remained weak.

The restructuring of the military took place while the conflict was ongoing. Some of the changes were internal, such as promoting battle-hardened corporals and sergeants as commissioned officers to the rank of second lieutenant. This filled the shortages of small team commanders who were required to operate the SIOT behind the enemy lines as well as provide support to mission command. The army lacked the men and materials to engage in protracted insurgency. However, during 2006-2009, the legislature approved the military demands because of the successful war against the LTTE. The MOD budget allocation was at average 3.35 percentage of country’s GDP. As a result, military strength rose by 85,000. This helped to meet the shortages of manpower and material. For example, Sergei De Silva-Ranasinghe notes, “New offensive formations were raised—the 57th division in February 2007; the 58th division (initially known as Task Force 1) in September 2007; the 59th division in January 2008; Task Force 2 in November 2007; Task Force 3 in November 2008; and Task Force 4 in December 2008.”

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263 Wijewardana, How LTTE Lost the Eelam War, 72.

264 Ibid., 63–64.


266 Ranasinghe, “Good Education. Sri Lankan Military learns Counter Insurgency Lessons.”
In addition, the military and the MOD supported professional development for the military which strengthened CMR. In 1997, the military had established a directorate for the training of men in International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and Human Rights (HR).\textsuperscript{267} The military had 24 institutional facilities to provide professional training.\textsuperscript{268} These centers, along with the training establishment under the MOD, such as the Defense Services Command and the Staff College (DSCSC) and Kothalawela Defense University (KDU), made contributions which enhanced the professionalism of the military officers, especially in terms of expertise and ethics. Furthermore, many officers were regularly sent for overseas training.\textsuperscript{269} These established institutional mechanisms with regard to professionalizing the military contributing to the achievement of objective control, such as obeying for civilian rulers and the military is abide by laws to following civilian rulers command regardless of personnel political ideologies.

However, legislative and non-governmental institutional control was weak in the areas of oversight. The constitutional power of the president shaped the public service mechanism. Chandrasena Maliyadde notes, “The public service was created in Sri Lanka to cater to the needs of the “Master”. Serious and unprecedented changes are taking place outside the public service and the country at an accelerated pace. The public service changes at a snail’s pace and continue serving the “Master” at the expense of the very public.”\textsuperscript{270} The participatory politics in the society was high, but its involvement in security sector affairs manifested itself along the lines of ethno-nationalism and majority concern. Furthermore, the military depended more heavily on the executive branch than the legislative branch. For example, the many demands of military were met along informal channels; Wijewardana notes, “Gotabaya communicated the military requirements to the government—men, material, and weapons. His brother and head of

\begin{footnotes}
\item[268] Sri Lanka Army, \url{http://www.army.lk/training.php}.
\item[269] Sri Lanka Army, \url{http://www.army.lk/training.php}.
\end{footnotes}
the government, President Rajapaksa, ensured the military got what it wanted.”271 The President held the finance minister’s portfolio and to pass the defense budget in parliament, his party had less than a majority, 105 of 225 seats in 2004-2007. But in 2007, he managed to win 18 opposition members of the parliament of the UNP and consolidated the majority approval for budgets.272 Therefore, legislative and other institutional mechanisms in control were clearly dominated by the executive branch, but it proved to be successful in helping end LTTE terrorism.

G. POST-CONFLICT CHALLENGE 2009-2015: TRANSITIONING THE MILITARY TO NATION-BUILDING

Having won the conflict against the Tamil insurgency in 2009, the government and military’s popularity shaped their relations. Interestingly, the military popularity aggravated subjective control fearing military takeover. However, reconstruction, rehabilitation, reconciliation, and economic challenges created a shift in military roles. President Rajapaksa called for an early presidential election in January 2010 hoping to capitalize on the victory to get reelected.273 While the president claimed credit for victory over the LTTE and for bringing peace, the former army commander General Fonseka claimed that the victory belonged to him, and he presented himself as an opposition candidate. Then retired General Fonseka was backed by the UNP, JVP, and other segments in the society. The growing popularity of the military made General Fonseka ambitious. Jeyaraj notes “On ‘spirited’ occasions the General fires off like a loose cannon. Fonseka began talking of himself as the man who defeated the Tamils like the son of Ruhunu and began querying from friends and acquaintances in bantering tones ‘Why can’t I be the next president?’” 274 To illustrate this growing tension in the CMR, the General wanted to raise the military strength to 300,000 and projected the deployment

271 Wijewardana, How LTTE Lost the Eelam War, 127.
272 Ibid., 137.
274 Jeyaraj, “Rajapakse Regime and the Fonseka Phenomenon.”
of 100,000 in the north. There were also instances when he challenged the President’s executive command, as Jeyaraj reports:

An address to the nation was scheduled by the president for the morning of May 19th to announce the tiger supremo’s death. But to Mahinda’s chagrin Fonseka refused to confirm the death and the president’s anticipated announcement did not materialise. But after the presidential address was concluded the Army chief announced to the nation that Prabhakaran had been killed. Sarath Fonseka and not Mahinda Rajapaksa made the historic announcement. 275

However, the subjective control of military helped President Rajapaksa to survive this power challenge. His brother, the Secretary of Defense, made use of his military friendships with other military elites mitigating the powers of the General. Moreover, the General was overly confident and accused the politicians of corruption. Realizing the growing threat to civilian supremacy, he was relieved from the commander of army position.276 His nominated successor, General Jayasuriya, who was penalized and harassed by General Fonseka, was hand-picked as the commander of the army. This compelled General Fonseka to retire and declare candidacy, and the military elites were pushed into a state of disarray.

The military remained loyal to civilian leadership for various reasons: the majority of the officers accepted General Fonseka as a great warrior and one of the most successful military commanders in history, but they disliked his personal attitude.277 The state also engaged in field promotions and incentives to senior officers, like postings in diplomatic missions. There was also growing uncertainty of election outcome, and the fact that many officers had direct connections to the secretary of MOD kept them on the side-lines. In addition, the Api Wenuwen Api welfare program supported the disabled and active personnel to ease their economic hardships. These improved the CMR and helped civilian leaders to maintain subjective control.

275 Ibid.
276 Jeyaraj, “Rajapakse Regime and the Fonseka Phenomenon.”
277 Ibid.
President Rajapaksa won the election and the military was brought under heavy subjective control. The officers closely linked to General Fonseka were forced into compulsory retirement, and some were sidelined. The NDTV reported, “Sri Lanka on Monday sacked 12 senior military officers for being a ‘threat to national security’ and hatching ‘political conspiracy’ during the just-concluded presidential polls.” Later, General Fonseka was accused of violations of military acts and jailed. Ranil Wijepala notes:

His [Retired General Fonseka] defeat at the 2010 presidential election gave the Mahinda Rajapaksa regime ample room to seek vengeance against him and rip him of his titles, his military ranks, decorations and convert him to a civilian sans any of the credentials he earned and deprived him of even his civic rights and sent him to jail.

The senior officers who played a significant role in the conflict and those who remained loyal to the President were offered lucrative positions in diplomatic missions and government civil administrative sectors.

The next challenges were to rebuild the economy, resettle Internally Displaced persons (IDP), reconstruct, and rehabilitate ex-LTTE carders and reconcile with the marginalized population. The military played an important role in this. The government used military agents and their expertise knowledge in all these arenas. Since 2000, the Sri Lankan governments have managed to maintain a constant economic growth. The U.S. Department of State reports, “Despite the 1983-2009 civil war GDP growth averaged around 5% from 2000-2008.” Sri Lanka’s economic growth fell to 3.5% GDP due to the global economic crisis in 2009. The western countries also influenced the donor
countries and pressured monetary institutions to ignore Sri Lanka’s demands. Wijewardana notes, “Hillary Clinton, his [Obama’s] secretary of state, took the unusual step of demanding the IMF, an independent UN institution, not to release a loan of US $1.9 billion it had already agreed to give Sri Lanka, claiming ‘the timing was inappropriate to provide the money.’”  

These forms of pressure were well-managed by the government, which utilized the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) power play. China, Japan, India, and Pakistan came to help Sri Lanka. China, especially, helped with the Hambanthota port development project worth US $1 billion, the Norchcohalai coal power plant worth US $855 million, the Colombo-Katunayake highway worth US $248.2 million. These projects helped Sri Lanka to manage its economy. Other sources also helped, according to the U.S. state department:

Remittances from migrant workers, at around US $6 billion per year, are Sri Lanka’s largest source of foreign exchange and helped to partially offset the trade deficit. Sri Lanka also receives multilateral and bilateral financial support. While China has emerged as the largest recent lender, traditional donors such as the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, Asian Development Bank (ADB), and Japan as well as neighboring India continue to provide significant funds.

As a result, the military was able to increase its professionalism standards.

The majority of government expenditure was the military budget. Historically, it had been proven that military jobs were the major income source of many rural youths. At the end of the conflict, the military strength rose to 375,000. This defense sector job opportunity attracted rural youths by offering many fringe benefits. For example, initially, the Api Wenuwen Api welfare program project aimed to provide 50,000 houses to Tri-service personnel. It offered a house worth 0.9 million rupees free of charge to the soldiers. To construct these houses, the military provided the labor.

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282 Wijewardana, *How LTTE Lost the Eelam War*, 95.

283 U.S. Department of State, “2013 Investment Climate Statement - Sri Lanka.”


The Media Centre for National Security Director General Lakshman Hulugalle spelled out the first phase of this project: “Seven hundred houses will be constructed throughout the country for Security Forces personnel under the Api Wenuwen Api housing program.” These projects elevated the confidence and allegiance of the military towards the civilian government.

However, many scholars, like Muttukrishna Sarvananthan, argue that maintaining such a large military is a burden for the economy of Sri Lanka; Sarvananthan says, “Moreover, every member of the armed forces (including the police), on average, costs the exchequer $4,348 (LKR 478,266) per year, which is significantly higher than the average cost of any other public sector personnel.” However, he failed to recognize the effective use of the military in resettlement of IDPs, reconstruction, rehabilitation of ex-LTTE carders, and reconciliation. According to the MOD, in 2009, soon after the conflict, there were 300,000 IDPs. After six years, these figures came down to 13,459 families that accounted for 44,000 IDPs. These resettlement projects demanded skilled labor to build houses, schools, and other community related infrastructure. The military deployed in the north and eastern region had more resources than any other public or private sector to support this humanitarian effort. The Sri Lankan Army Humanitarian Demining Unit (SLA & HDU), along with another six agencies, carried out a national demining action plan to free the lands to civilians, in addition to the military supported housing projects. The international Reliefweb reports, “The Sri Lankan Army has provided 1,230 displaced families in Jaffna with houses at an approximate cost of Rs. 250

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Similarly, other regional military establishments created housing for IDPs. The Ministry Of Resettlement, Reconstruction and Hindu Religious Affairs notes:

> Under this relocation project [in Mullaithiv], houses for 165 families will be constructed in two stages. Apart from houses, 05 common Dug wells, 10 Tube wells, 165 Toilets, a Community Centre, a Pre School, 10 Km of Internal roads will also be constructed at a total of Rs. 111.5 Mn. The Sri Lanka Army in Mullaitivu is in the forefront in constructing these houses and other amenities.

In addition, rehabilitation of ex-LTTE cadres was another challenge. The military provided the vocational training and technical support to reintegrate these individuals. These efforts were carried out in association with government, private, and nongovernmental organizations. This was a joint effort of military and government. For example, the rehabilitation commissioner general was a senior military officer. By October 2014, the Ministry of Rehabilitation and Prison Reforms had reintegrated 12,016 former LTTE cadres. Accordingly, to contribute to the success of reconciliation, the military recruited some of these cadres. The MOD reports, “A large number of these youths were recruited to the Civil Defense Department. As a trust building initiative, youth from the North and East were recruited to the Police. Recently 100 Tamil females from Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu joined the Army.”

The civilian leaders used heavy subjective control mechanisms to control the military and, as a consequence, it helped to increase the objective control because the divided political setting prevented the military agents’ allegiance to one civilian group. Therefore, the military accepted the constitutional authority vested on executive presidency and its command illustrating professionalism norms. The civilian leadership in power utilized constitutional authority to minimize the legislative control mechanisms.

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involved in controlling the military. Furthermore, they used this authority to politicize military agents together with other subjective control mechanisms like appointing generals close to party politics into higher command positions. In each of these instances, the other military agents did not engage in party politics because they understood the consequence for their military careers at divided political settings. On the other hand, the intensity of the LTTE conflict compelled civilian leaders to equip and professionalize the military. As a result, the increased budgets and training facilities increased the military professionalism. Accordingly, increased subjective nature of control prevented total military politicization, and instead increased professionalism.

Moreover, after end of the conflict, the civilian leaders changed the role of the military from a firefighter counter insurgency force to a firefighter national development force. This new role increased the military involvement across the country, but civilian leaders’ subjective control along with institutional mechanisms controlled its effect because the military carried out nation-building projects under the supervision of the MOD. Therefore, it prevented military prerogatives securing civilian supremacy.
IV. ANALYSIS

How does the civilian leadership in Sri Lanka maintain control of its military effectively? This chapter analyzes the applicability of Huntington, Alagappa, and Bruneau and Matei’s CMR models to Sri Lanka during its three-decade insurgency and post-conflict era. For the purpose of this evaluation, civilian leadership eras are sectioned into nine different time periods and each of the CMR models are analyzed during these periods and given weight: heavy (H), medium (M), low (L), and no evidence (N). While all three models are applicable, the result is unique because while subjective control is high in Sri Lanka, it surprisingly resulted in professionalizing the military. In other words, this analysis highlights the fact that while the military was primarily controlled through subjective mechanisms, the divided political setting aided in professionalizing the military.

In the CMR model evaluation, Table 3 depicts the level of applicability of the theoretical model of Huntington’s subjective and objective control and Alagappa’s state coercion theoretical model. Table 4 depicts Bruneau and Matei’s new conceptualization framework.

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<th>Time Frame and Major Events</th>
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Table 4.  CMR Model Evaluation

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A. 1948-1956: POST-INDEPENDENCE

During 1948–1956, Alagappa’s state coercion and Bruneau and Matei’s new conceptualization models have little relevance for CMR in Sri Lanka because the state was new, and it carried on the British administration and practices. During this time, it is evident that a balance of subjective and objective control prevailed. The military was in its organizational phase after the 1948 independence and at the same time, the elites’ class interests were merged with military agents because colonial legacies and ethnic representations favored English-educated elites. The ethnic representation in the military did not favor the major ethnic group, Sinhala Buddhists, because they were marginalized during British rule. As a result, military and society were divide ethnically. Therefore, the officer corps who worked under the British rulers’ favored a similar political setting and
elite culture that contributed to subjective control. The British military professional ethics influences also helped to maintain relative objective control.

Towards the end of the first phase, the political structures aligned along ethno-nationalism lines and changed recruitment patterns. When the Sinhala Buddhist representation increased in the military, Huntington’s model of subjective control gained momentum. The military professionalization, which is a part of objective control, discussed in the same model, was not developed to undertake a full spectrum of operational tasks. At the same time, the relative conditions of peace that existed promoted a ceremonial military rather than an effective military to protect national security; therefore, the civilian leadership sidelined the importance of allocating resources to the military.

B. 1956–1962: ATTEMPTED COUP

As the new nation-state formation was ongoing during 1956–1962, ethno-nationalism ideologies, kinships, and class interests blended into subjective control. The ethno-nationalist ideology changed the military recruitment pattern and increased the civilian leaders’ ability to easily politicize the military. Those actions distorted the professional norms and the effectiveness of the military, which led to an unsuccessful coup in 1962. By then civilian leadership had begun to rely on a high degree of subjective control. As Huntington noted, when the military represents a particular class or group and the same civilian group gains control over the military, it becomes politicized.294 Similarly, the SLFP leaders consolidated their power over the military using the loyalty

294 In subjective civilian control, civilian groups with various interests compete with each other to gain superior control over the military. In this discussion, power maximization of one or more civilian group is relative to other civilian groups at the national level. Control of the military is achieved through governmental institutions, social classes, and constitutional forms. At the government institution level, the President and members of the legislature compete with each other on decisions about the military. This allows these competing groups to politicize the military. Moreover, when no professional military officer corps is present, then the subjective civilian control is evident in the governing systems. (Huntington, The Soldier and State, 80–83).

Next, Huntington notes that objective civilian control allows for autonomy and supports the military to maximize its own professionalism. The main idea is to keep the military away from politics while recognizing its autonomous state in deciding military affairs; however, it remains under government civilian control. Huntington expected that this objective could be achieved naturally. He stated that once the military becomes more professionalized, then it can remain neutral in political alignments. (Huntington, The Solider and State, 83–85).
of the majority Sinhala Buddhist officers. Therefore, the increased ethno-nationalism based on political competition allowed the subjective control mechanism to consolidate beyond Alagappa’s state coercion model and Bruneau and Matei’s new conceptualization framework. In addition, as result of this attempted coup in January 1962, the military was not able to increase its professionalism. Therefore, Table 3 shows that objective control is low but this coup attempt was the military’s first test of officer corps’ corporate interest. However, it indicates a divided officer corps as a result of the level of subjective control.

While the subjective control mechanism helped to maintain civilian supremacy, the government faced unrest in the country as a consequence of the Sinhala Only Act that threatened to marginalize the Tamils and the closed economic policy. Then the SLFP government had to rely on state coercion; therefore, evidence of Alagappa’s state coercion model’s impact was low. At the same time, other government or NGO institutions were not developed enough to provide institutional control and oversight. Therefore, Alagappa’s state coercion and Bruneau and Matei’s new conceptualization models had little relevance during this era. However, Alagappa indicates that subjective control means are used in the CMR of South Asian countries, which is true in the Sri Lankan case.\footnote{Alagappa, \textit{Coercion and Governance}, 9.}

\section*{C. 1962–1971: JVP INSURGENCY}

Table 3 highlights the continuation of the heavy influence of Huntington’s subjective control, leaving objective control at low point during 1962–1971. Huntington’s theory of low military professionalism applies here because governmental fears of another coup prevented further investment in the military. The class interests and ethno-nationalism combined with subjective control suffocated objective control. Therefore, military subordination was achieved through high subjective control.

In the same period, JVP emerged as a radical anti-state organization leading to the expansion of state coercion. This is because, according to Alagappa’s state coercion model, during internal conflicts the military becomes a political instrument and the
influence of the military increases. However, during this period, the military did not engage in protracted conflict. Therefore, at high levels of state coercion, the civilian leaders retained military control subjectively.

Table 4 indicates that during 1962–1971, there was mid-level institutional control and oversight was at a low level. The first institutional mechanism used to control and guide the military arose during the 1971 JVP insurrection. According to Bruneau and Matei’s framework, institutional mechanisms become laws and regulations, which the military directly enacts through institutions like MOD. In 1971, the civilian leaders enacted an emergency law, which helped the military to crush the insurrection in a short period of time, but it led to some human rights abuses. This occurred as a result of ignoring professional standards. In addition, fearing another coup attempt, the civilians prevented collective military training. As a result, Table 4 indicates a low professionalism norm, according to Huntington’s theory of subjective control—which forms along political and class interests. This shapes the analysis in addition to Bruneau and Matei’s framework. At the same time, subjective control inhibited military autonomy, as discussed in Huntington’s model, which is needed for increased professionalism. The civilian leaders effectively used the military to crush the 1971 JVP insurgency, thus illustrating the effectiveness of subjective control and, in turn, influencing the medium level of effectiveness highlighted in Table 4. This indicates the interconnectedness and combined applicability of these three models. But it also highlights the continued domination of subjective control.

In applying Matei’s model of institutionalism to this period, professionalism and effectiveness were low, but the subjective nature of civilian control increased the effectiveness of the military, particularly in this case. Therefore, research indicates that this framework’s applicability will depend on the intensity level of the insurgency. As discussed in this framework, the democratically elected civilian leadership creates policies and regulations for recruitment, education, and training for military personnel; however, during the JVP insurrection those factors were at low levels. Sri Lanka’s case shows that subjective control can increase the effectiveness of the military, which is also linked to its level of professionalism.
D. 1971–1978: EMERGENCE OF TAMIL MILITANCY

During 1971–1978, Huntington’s subjective control model has a high applicability at the emergence of Tamil militancy because the change of recruitment patterns increased Sinhala youths’ participation in the military. As a result, military agents were subject to the popular political ideology of ethno-nationalism. On the other hand, since the 1962 coup attempt, the military was not allowed to assemble for collective training and restructuring. During the same period, 1971–1978, due to Tamil radicalization, state coercion (as described in Alagappa’s theory) gradually emerged engulfing the administration in northern areas, increasing military authority. The military became a political tool than a state tool. The Tamils living in the northern region saw the military as a politically biased coercion instrument of the government. Its impact was confined to one region; therefore, state coercion was at medium level. According to the new conceptualization framework, despite the informal NSC meetings since 1970, the institutional mechanism was at medium level, with high subjective control. The politicization of the military was evidenced by the lessening of its level of professionalism and by its medium level effectiveness. This occurred because the government invested less in its defense budget and the military was assigned police tasks rather than those of national defense. The oversight mechanism was also low, because it was limited by budgetary debate and played no part in managing the military. However, the subjective control model dominated. At the same time, ongoing insurgencies compelled civilians to invest in the military, thereby elevating the potential for professionalism.

E. 1978–1989: EMERGENCE OF LTTE

The combination of a new constitution in 1978, an open economic policy, the emergence of the LTTE, and the second JVP insurgency increased the subjective control and domination of the civilians during 1978–1989. The constitutional changes created an executive presidency lessening legislative control. As a result, the President consolidated subjective control, and, eventually, this control became predominant as the misuse of this
constitutional authority negated the control of the legislative branch and other oversight agencies.

In addition, the military provided job opportunities to rural Sinhala youth. This also helped to increase subjective control as they were politicized. This illustrates an incentive-based subjective control, but interestingly and contrary to expectations, Sri Lankan experience provides new evidence of how insurgency movements compelled the government to increase military budgets and increased objective control and military professionalism. In 1978–1989, the military had to be trained for counter-insurgency operations; therefore, the civilian leaders increased the budget and provided foreign and local training opportunities to elevate objective control. Table 3 illustrates an increase of levels from low to medium and medium to high respectively of objective control and state coercion. In Table 4, the new conceptualization model illustrates institutionalism at medium level, because the PTA act provided guidance along with the MOD institutional guidance for the military in managing violence. However, the lack of oversight mechanisms caused unrecognized abuses under the PTA act; therefore, no improvement can be seen in the oversight spheres. But professionalism was at medium level because high subjective control prevented military autonomy. As a result, effectiveness was also at medium level. Furthermore, during 1978–1989, the PTA act also contributed to state coercion model influences, which increased coercion as indicated in Table 3. However, the regionalization of state coercion limited the military’s influence to the northern and eastern regions. Therefore, a high level of subjective control indicates that it can alter the influence of the other models differently while still supporting military professionalism.


The divided political climate and the LTTE conflict helped to maintain the military’s professionalism and objective control. During 1989–1994, the high level of division in the two main political parties led to the impeachment of the president for his controversial arming of the LTTE to fight the IPKF. The military officers distanced themselves from the political competition because they knew that temporary affiliations to party politics would negatively impact their military careers since the president’s
constitutionally-given power to remove senior commanders maintaining high subjective control. Furthermore, President Premadasa traded those allegations for popular anti-Indian sentiments in the public eye, so the military did not want to oppose him in fear of being anti-national. However, in 1991 President Premadasa ordered security forces in the east to surrender to the LTTE. But the military refused and its professional actions saved many lives. In this instance, this military act did not affect the CMR, but allowed the president to rectify his mistakes, and, in turn, he had to provide the military with necessities to conduct war. Therefore, this unique situation offers an example of how subjective control did not have negative ramifications, but instead it helped to increase objective control and professionalism.

In Table 3, Alagappa’s state coercion model’s influence is high because the second JVP insurgency and the LTTE conflict increased military influence, and yet the regional aspect of conflict prevented the expansion of military influences. Also improved military professionalism prevented the military from interfering in politics.

Table 4 indicates that institutional control increased to a high level because the executive branch consolidated its power during the failed impeachment attempt. Then the increased defense budget and training for military supported the development of the military’s professionalism, increasing it to a medium level. However, the military’s autonomy was limited by the MOD-approved regulations for promotions, recruitment, and retention. The military’s effectiveness was at a medium level, because the government failed to create a sustainable military strategy. Therefore, the applicability of Matei’s framework did not increase compared to Huntington’s subjective control in Table 4, yet it does indicate the influence of subjective control, as in Matei’s framework. The president’s constitutional authority became subjective, and it suffocated oversight and professional norms.


During the peace talks era from 1994–2005, the military suffered heavy setbacks resulting from extreme subjective control. As a consequence of those setbacks, the LTTE’s dominance increased and this compelled President Chandrika’s government to
increase the military budget and incentives to maintain subjective control. This, in turn, increased the professionalization of the military. On the other hand, a divided political climate which existed between the executive and legislative branches influenced CMR, but the military remained loyal to constitutional authority, thus illustrating a medium level of objective control (see Table 3).

According to the new conceptualization model, weak NSC functions dropped institutional influences from medium to low because President Chandrika politicized the military and negated the MOD functions. A notable medium level of professional norms and low effectiveness were highlighted in Table 4 because, in spite of an increased budget, the military suffered heavy losses, lowering its effectiveness from medium to low. However, the military remained subject to civilian command. Therefore, even though effectiveness levels dropped, see Table 4, Huntington’s objective control absorbed the impact of those effects, maintaining the medium level in Table 3. Consequently, elevated subjective control predominated in the other CMR models. However, the SLFP president and the competition of the Prime Minister from the rival political party impacted the military agents’ response and, in turn, it helped to elevate objective control.


The years 2005–2009 marked the fall of the LTTE and the end of the conflict. The success of CMR was nominal with medium subjective control and high objective control allowing military autonomy. President Mahinda Rajapaksa managed to retain subjective control with a nominally low profile. But through Gotabaya Rajapaksa, his brother, and the secretary of the MOD, he maintained a hidden high subjective control until the conflict ended. In addition, the president and civilian leaders managed the service rivalry and used it to achieve subjective control. Nevertheless, this era illustrated a high level of institutional mechanism coordinated through the MOD. The military gained more resources and support from the institutional mechanism to invest in military education. It increased military professionalism. In addition, this was a byproduct of the LTTE conflict
because the level of conflict forced the government to invest in military education, which resulted in high objective control.

The state coercion was also high due to military operations in the northern and eastern regions. However, the military’s influence was less in the general polity and society because it was regionally limited. The budget and increased strength of the military allowed it to become a predominant government institution. This helped the military to shift its role from a counter-insurgency force to nation-building force. Therefore, by the end of the conflict, when the civilian leaders demanded military engagement in post-conflict development projects, its resources and expertise were allocated to meet the demand. Therefore, this unique case illustrates that subjective control can also lead to high objective control with an increased level of professionalism.

Interestingly, during 2005–2009, according to Table 4, professional norms and effectiveness rose to the highest levels, because the MOD and military institutions launched training programs, which increased professionalism and finally created an effective military. The constitution continued to limit the legislative oversight mechanism. However, a strong executive presidency and institutional mechanism helped to control non-government oversight agencies, like INGOs and media, which were paramount in supporting the end of the thirty-year-long conflict. If such restrictions had not been imposed, efforts may not have been successful. Therefore, this unique case challenges the applicability of new conceptualization models’ oversight through INGOs, NGOs, and the media. As a result, countries should adopt democratic values into warfare strategies, but they should not hinder national objectives and military strategy; therefore, depending on the stability of political leadership (in developing and consolidated democracies), popular demand, social standard, and economic strengths can dictate the terms of democratic control.

I. 2009: TO POST-CONFLICT ERA

Table 3 illustrates a high subjective level of control for the period from 2009 to the present that led to professionalization of the military in a divided political climate. After the conflict, civilian leader and former commander of the army, General Fonseka
contested each presidency in 2010. As a result of the general’s political actions, the military establishment was taken under heavy subjective civilian control. The punishment and incentives contributed to subjective control. The senior officers affiliated with General Fonseka were relieved of their duties and officers loyal to President Rajapaksa were promoted. The other officers remained neutral because the subjective control and divided political climate contributed unintentional objective control and increased professional behavior within the officer corps.

On the other hand, the government increased foreign training and infrastructure facilities to create the highest level of professional standards, which contributed to objective control and kept the military away from politics. In this unique situation, subjective and objective control were both equally high because when civilian leaders initiate subjective control, it increases both professionalism and objective control to similar levels.

According to Bruneau and Matei’s new conceptualization framework, institutionalism was at a high level because the MOD connected other government agencies and managed procedural regulations. The MOD provided close supervision and monitored military promotions, foreign training courses, budget allocations, and procurement of military hardware. This established a balance between civilian control and military autonomy in decision making. The MOD set the objectives, role, and missions for the military. The use of military nation-building projects was criticized by many and there were allegations of militarization of the country. Some argued that military was not making the best use of its potential. However, the military has taken part in peacekeeping operations since 2004, which also increased professionalism and democratic values. The military has not lost its operational readiness because it has two strategic reserve divisions and a standby brigade for UN peacekeeping operations.

In addition, in this case, the military’s involvement in rehabilitation, reconstruction, and reconciliation projects did not negatively affect or derail democratic civilian control. Instead, it increased military objective control because it became a state tool for reconstruction, not a political one. According to Alagappa, this could be described as a state coercion instrument, but this unique case proves that during peace
times, it can be used as a state tool. In other words, Sri Lanka’s case study uniquely establishes interconnectedness across the three CMR models.

Bruneau points to other scholars’ disagreements on Huntington’s military professionalism, indicating that military professionalism—much like culture—cannot be measured as a stable component because it is subject to frequent change.296 In this context, it is connected with the divided political system because regardless of Huntington’s professionalism, the Sri Lankan military experienced repercussions in being affiliated with political parties. Furthermore, the service rivalry and peer competition amongst officers shows that it will never unify officer corps to overthrow civilian government. In other words, officers in Sri Lanka cannot develop a corporate interest to stage a coup. Therefore, the military will be separate from politics in the future.

Bruneau and Matei’s framework illustrates that professionalism is a legally-backed policy and regulatory mechanism involved in deciding military size, training, and promotions. Table 4 shows that it is at the highest level currently because the military does not have sole authority to decide its recruitment, retention, promotions, and retirement. The government administrative policies and financial regulations dictate the size of the military and promotions, which involve budget allocations. Therefore, in terms of new conceptualization frameworks describing professionalism, the military will not have any space to override civilian supremacy. In this Sri Lankan case study, subjective control over the years unexpectedly continued to undermine politicization due to divisions in the political system, pushing professionalization of the military, as the officer corps feared loss of jobs. Therefore, models offered by Huntington, Alagappa, Bruneau and Matei have to be combined because individually they don’t provide a sufficient framework for understanding Sri Lankan CMR.

296 Bruneau, “Impediments to the Accurate Conceptualization of Civil–Military Relations,” 16.
V. CONCLUSION

Historically, Sri Lankan government’s CMR strategy illustrates high levels of subjective control, but due to a deeply divided political setting and war, the military has experienced gradual professionalization due to increased resources and an officer corps that is has tried to stay away from the political divisions. Alagappa’s state coercion and Matei’s new conceptualization framework models are applicable in the different time periods since post-independence and the post-conflict period, but it is Huntington’s model of subjective civilian control that has primary applicability because the civilians are more prone to use ethno-nationalistic, socio-political, socio-economic, and constitutional authority combined with incentives and service rivalries to subordinate military agents.

After the conflict in 2009, the Sri Lankan military’s growing popularity, reputation and confidence were seen as increments of military prerogatives by many scholars. In addition, observers also saw the immense challenge for a civilian government of a small island state to maintain a 375,000 person military. In other words, it is possible that such a large military force might overpower its civilian leaders in the event of a serious breach of national security. Also if the government cut military incentives, it could overthrow civilian leadership. In the Sri Lankan context, those hypothetical scenarios have not emerged. Since Sri Lanka’s independence, the Sri Lankan military has never developed any corporate interest among its officer corps. This is attributable to peer competition and a divided political system. Therefore, it is very unlikely that in the future Sri Lankan military would overrule its civilian supremacy.

In a post-conflict setting, Sri Lanka proved that it can effectively utilize the military in six different roles and missions, which Matei’s framework discusses.297 The use of military in nation-building projects was criticized by many who alleged militarization of the country. However, in this case, the military’s involvement in rehabilitation, reconstruction, and reconciliation projects did not undermine democratic

civilian control. Instead, it increased objective control, improving CMR. The military became a state tool, not a political one.

The subjective control approach to counter-insurgency operations against the JVP and the LTTE compelled civilians to allow the unintentional development of objective control. In addition, dynamics in state coercion and in Bruneau and Matei’s framework have also been used to maintain CMR. The subjective control was based on ethno-nationalistic, socio-political, socio-economic, and constitutional authority in different time frames. The civilian leaders used those elements as follows:

- First, the above mentioned three elements were used to create public opinion and were subsequently used to politicize the military.
- Second, civilian leaders used constitutional authority as a tool to obtain this subjective control.
- Third, they used incentives and corruption to gain military subordination.

However, at the end of the conflict, the military had grown professionally and developed its own culture, which allowed objective control.

The Sri Lankan government’s success in eliminating the LTTE in 2009 contributed to a situation of high objective control in which military autonomy was fully established because President Rajapaksa used a hands-off method and allowed military commander to decide the military strategy. At the end of the conflict, this military autonomy distracted the senior military leadership because General Fonseka failed to identify a strong hidden subjective control network developed inside the military, and civilian leaders never realized the unintentional effect. The peer competition and service rivalry led to increased objective control and professionalization of the military. However, for the success of internal conflict, the Sri Lankan case explicitly provides evidence that civilian leaders should allow the military autonomy and maintain low subjective control officially. However, subjective control under certain conditions can also lead to professionalization. Consequently, the conflict illustrates that high state coercion model dynamics can elevate the military’s influence in specific regions and political arenas, but high levels of institutional mechanisms, reliance on few generals
other than the commanders of armed services along with service rivalry can be used against any CMR threats.

Exploitation of subjective control remains a possibility in the civilian sector because Sri Lanka’s legislative oversight process is weak, and will continue to be, as long as its capacities are limited by the executive power and a lack of political will. Politicians are reluctant to become involved in defense policy planning and to criticize the military because of its growing popularity due to the end of the war. Therefore, the full spectrum of democratic control values will not be inculcated into the Sri Lankan CMR in the current setting unless things change or after a few years when the memories of war have faded.
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