The purpose of this project is to analyze Operational Contract Support (OCS) planning doctrine for maturity and applicability to single services. In the OCS Initial Capabilities Document, the Department of Defense declared OCS a core defense capability. Service components are participating in numerous initiatives to institutionalize this function through the creation of resources spanning doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, education, personnel, facilities and policy (DOTMLPF-P). This project argues for the balanced development of OCS planning acquisition and non-acquisition focused resources to effectively integrate this function across disciplines.

The project analyzes Joint and Army current Operational Contract Support planning doctrine for maturity using a hybrid of E. Cory Yoder’s Three Integrative Pillars for Success and Dr. René Rendon’s Contract Management Maturity Model. Next, the project analyzes the execution of OCS and contingency contracting during Army and Combatant Command readiness exercises using E. Cory Yoder’s Three-Tier Model. The analysis revealed Joint level OCS planning resources are higher in maturity than operational level resources. The author recommends establishing immaterial planning activities and common vocabulary linking inorganic acquisition and non-acquisition entities. Also, that future contingency contracting planning guidance developed is appropriate for initial entry operations applicable to various levels of theater maturity.
AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT OPERATIONAL CONTRACT SUPPORT PLANNING DOCTRINE

Sara D. Kimsey, Major, United States Army

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION

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Graduate School of Business and Public Policy
AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT OPERATIONAL CONTRACT SUPPORT PLANNING DOCTRINE

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this project is to analyze Operational Contract Support (OCS) planning doctrine for maturity and applicability to single services. In the OCS Initial Capabilities Document, the Department of Defense declared OCS a core defense capability. Service components are participating in numerous initiatives to institutionalize this function through the creation of resources spanning doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, education, personnel, facilities and policy (DOTMLPF-P). This project argues for the balanced development of OCS planning acquisition and non-acquisition focused resources to effectively integrate this function across disciplines.

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<td>CSP</td>
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<td>Operation Order</td>
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<td>PMESII</td>
<td>Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure and Information</td>
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<td>Public Law</td>
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<tr>
<td>PWS</td>
<td>Performance Work Statement</td>
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RCO  Regional Contracting Office
SAT  Simplified Acquisition threshold
SES  Senior Executive Service (Designator for senior federal service civilians)
SOW  Statement of Work
SPOT Synchronized Pre-deployment and Operational Tracker
SOUTHCOM U.S. Southern Forces command
U.S.  United States
USAID United States Agency for International Development
USC United States Code
USD(AT&L) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistic
USCENTCOM United States Central Command
YTTM Yoder Three-tier Model
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank my thesis advisors, E. Cory Yoder and Dr. Dayne Nix, for their time, guidance, mentorship, and assistance provided during this entire process. Truly, their expertise and research in this field provided the foundation for me to explore this topic. I would also like to thank the many subject matter experts who assisted in this process by providing interviews, guidance, and information on best practices and the doctrine background found in this report to include Charles “Chuck” Maurer, LTC Richard Pfieffer, Anna Carter, and Rafael Gavilan. I would also like to acknowledge The Graduate Writing Center’s staff, specifically Noel Yucuis, who contributed many hours of assistance in the writing process. Professor Bryan J. Hudgens and Dr. Mark J. Eitelberg’s class guiding the composition of the literature review provided the framework to create this product. A special thank you to my academic advisor, Dr. René Rendon, and area chair, Professor John Dillard, who always supported my academic pursuits enabling me to succeed. Finally, thank you to all the staff and faculty of the Graduate School of Business and Public Policy who allowed me to think freely, taught me to think critically, and most importantly, to challenge my own conventions.

Finally, I would like to acknowledge my grandfather, William “Bill” Kimsey, who served aboard a navy submarine, the USS Sawfish in the Pacific during World War II. His selfless service to his country, devotion to his wife and family, and contributions to his local community continue to inspire me to achieve both personally and professionally.

“[William Kimsey] as a (Reserve) Midshipman at the United States Naval Academy at Annapolis [MD in 1943]” (Kimsey, 1988, p. 26). Picture from unknown source as found in Recollections of Early Scottsdale “the way it was” by William Kimsey.
I. INTRODUCTION

One of the most significant and oft repeated lessons of World War II was that the combatant commander must have control of his logistic support in order that his logistics might always be responsive to his combat needs. (Eccles, 1959, p. 224)

A. BACKGROUND

Throughout United States military history, the Department of Defense (DOD) has consistently relied on contracting with commercial sources to fulfill capability gaps and support an operational commander’s mission. Today’s military, having recently closed two major stability operations, finds a changing pattern of global threats and conflicts that require a different operational focus. New strategies in this unpredictable environment include rapid adaptation to threats and maintaining an agile global response force, which is a contrast to the large ongoing stability operations of the last decade (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff [CJCS], 2015b). In contracting with commercial sources for these efforts, DOD agencies rely on lessons learned and planning phase operations to prepare for these new contingencies while executing force reduction plans.

Contingency contracting is defined in Joint Publication (JP) 1.02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, as “the process of obtaining goods, services, and construction (from commercial sources) via contracting means in support of contingency operations” (CJCS, 2015a, p. 48). A declared contingency operation is defined by the acquisition focused Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR), section 2.102 as

A military operation that:

(1) Is designated by the Secretary of Defense as an operation in which members of the armed forces are or may become involved in military actions, operations, or hostilities against an enemy of the United States or against an opposing military force; or
(2) Results in the call or order to, or retention on, active duty of members of the uniformed services under ... *title 10* of the United States Code, chapter 15 of title 10 of the United States Code, or any other provision of law during a war or during a national emergency declared by the President or Congress.

*Title 10* governs how United States (U.S.) military forces prepare for wartime. Executing contingency contracting during peacetime without the declared title 10 status means that the acquisition officer does not have access to streamlined or urgent procedures available in modern federal acquisition regulations. The title 10 status declaration creates a contracting environment allowing for faster turnover of contracts in a condensed timeline compared to peacetime operations. From a supported unit perspective, preparing for an anticipated contingency before the official declaration could create problems with funding during early stages of an operation. In contrast, from a contracting perspective, the garrison/peacetime environment provides less pressure to meet deadlines and is typically supported by non-deployable contracting staff. Regardless of the environment, today’s fiscal realities require cost-consciousness in business practices.

Recent testimony by Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter regarding the defense budget underscores the urgency for all departments to better define business practices in all areas eradicating inefficiencies, which includes contingency contracting.

American taxpayers rightly have trouble comprehending—let alone supporting—the defense budget when they read of cost overruns, lack of accounting and accountability, needless overhead, and the like.

If we’re asking taxpayers to not only give us half a trillion of their hard-earned dollars, but also give us more than we got last year, we have to demonstrate that we can be responsible with it. We must do all we can to spend their money more wisely and more responsibly. We must reduce overhead, and we must curb wasteful spending practices wherever they are.
DOD has sought to continuously improve our acquisition processes over the past five years, and I am proud myself to have been a part of that effort. Today, I am recommitting the Defense Department to working both with Congress, and on our own, to find new and more creative ways of stretching our defense dollars to give our troops the weapons. (Carter, 2015, p. 4)

Meeting Ashton Carter’s intent requires diligence in identifying value for each dollar spent. The key to re-evaluating business practices in contingency contracting resides in Phase 0, known operationally as the shaping phase, as actions here have a significant impact in later stages of operations according to JP 4–10 Operational Contract Support. Acquisition and non-acquisition performance standards defined for spending and contingency contracting outcomes are important to creating a cost-efficient environment. These standards defined in the presiding acquisition regulation, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) are listed in Figure 1 with some supporting text meant to translate the performance standards into a contingency contracting environment, with a non-acquisition focus.
Figure 1. Federal Acquisition Performance Standards and Contingency Contracting

The Federal Acquisition Regulation describes contracting performance applicable to any phase of an operation in section 1.102.

1. “Satisfy[ing] the customer in terms of cost, quality, and timeliness of the delivered product or service.”

   This includes incorporating stakeholder needs, such as achieving competition to lower costs representing the taxpayer’s interests. For contingency contracting professionals, this can mean fully utilizing current contracting initiatives, such as developing and leveraging the market base to develop healthy competition. Within a contingency environment, operational planners can incorporate cost-consciousness into the outsourcing plans by ensuring that the contracting officers are resourced with the time necessary to develop this market base.

2. “Minimizing administrative operating costs.”

   Achieving the best value of contingency contracting requires considering the initial award cost along with the total cost of manpower to provide contractor management, administer, and ultimately closing a contract. Developing contract management plans with the total cost of the contract, to include claims and oversight, can better inform leader’s looking to minimize administrative costs in contingency contracting environments.

3. “Conduct[ing] business with integrity, fairness, and openness.”

   Creating an ethical climate in a contingency contracting arena is not only a contracting office(r) requirement, but extends to the supported unit, referred to as the requiring activity, and the commander. Conducting each contract award and administration with the highest level of ethics requires a well-trained and professional workforce ultimately creates the perception of an equitable business environment confidently supporting good civil-military relations.

4. “Fulfill[ing] public policy objectives”

   Fulfilling policy objectives in a contingency environment can be a lesser task when compared to a garrison environment when contracting under streamlined acquisition protocols. Although, ensuring that an operational commander’s strategic objectives, like procuring commodities from host nation sources, are included in the acquisition strategy may take a higher precedence in a contingency, versus garrison environment.

After the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) (2015,1.102). The supporting analysis of FAR performance standards focuses on contingency contracting.

Actions taken during the planning phase enable logisticians and commanders to move from reactive and ad-hoc logistical support to deliberate contract planning that is capable of supporting the aforementioned performance standards. The 2014 release of Joint Publication Operational Contract Support added phase 0, referred to as the shaping operations, to the operational model (CJCS, 2014a). Previous OCS doctrine, prepared during large stability operations, focused on changing authorities with the rotation of units into and out of an established theater of operations, rather than providing general
initial entry operations guidance or readiness metrics. As contingencies evolve from mainly stability and reconstruction operations to global and rapid-response missions, logistical needs procured on local economies incorporates initial entry environments in either mature or immature theaters of operation. Establishing unity of effort among the commander, the host nation, allied country, and contractors requires each service to execute well-crafted and well-integrated OCS/logistics plans taking into account conditions including crises action planning in initial entry environments. The 2014 addition of the shaping phase to OCS doctrine provides the opportunity to define activities relevant for all services in the military’s current operational environment. Developing processes for the shaping phase starts with a review of current doctrine.

B. PROBLEM

Over the last ten years, several major commissions found inefficiency and ad-hoc responses in contingency contracting, which contributed to high levels of fraud, waste, and abuse. The Commission on Wartime Contracting (CWC) in Iraq and Afghanistan and Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations (Gansler Commission) conducted separate investigations into contingency contracting efforts in starting in 2007–2009. Overall, they found that the Army, the lead service for contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan had been unprepared for the number of contractors on the battlefield. These operations found the ratio of contractors to service members approaching 1:1. The CWC specifically estimated over 5 billion of dollars was lost due to poor oversight (CWC, 2009, p. 86.) The commissions called for better contractor management, accountability and oversight in expeditionary contracting. Institutionalizing these lessons learned and appropriately planning for contracting into future operations prevents the risk of fraud, waste and abuse.

The DOD has identified Operational Contract Support as a new core defense capability and identified key capability gaps requiring closure for the vision supporting the Future Force 2020 (Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Support [DASDPS], 2014a). However, there are four key challenges that the services face while working towards this goal. First, no other services have created the same depth
of OCS and contingency contracting doctrine, education, and personnel structures as the Army. Second, this doctrine was developed largely during stability operations and requires re-tooling in this era of post-Afghanistan and Iraq operations. Third, the recent addition of phase 0 requires re-definition. Finally, OCS and contingency contracting is not fully recognized across all DOD departments as a critical aspect to readiness (Defense Science Board, 2014; Government Accountability Office (GAO), 2015). Further expanding the OCS framework is necessary not only to develop lessons learned but also to adapt current doctrine while meeting today’s new threats and budgetary climate.

C. PURPOSE

This project evaluates Joint and Army force’s Operational Contract Support and contingency contracting planning doctrine and best practices for relevancy to other services. Each service needs to define the role that the relatively new function, OCS, plays in its organization as DOD level initiatives require the institutionalization of this function through the force. To date, the Army created a large bulk of contingency contracting and OCS doctrine, acting as the Lead Service for contracting efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Each service has the opportunity to utilize the developed OCS doctrine to evaluate for the efficiency of its service constructs. This project analyzes the relevant doctrine and practices institutionalizing the OCS framework Joint and Army operations.

D. OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH

This research report examines the role that OCS planning and integration should play during shaping phase operations (Phase 0) at the service component level. Phase 0 is the shaping phase as defined in the Joint Publication (JP) Joint Operations. Within the Joint planning construct, the shaping phase identifies peacetime activities as “designed to dissuade or deter adversaries and assure friends, as well as set conditions for the contingency plan to dissuade or deter adversaries and assure friends, as well as set conditions for the contingency plan,” and was only recently added to the OCS Joint planning construct model (CJCS, 2011a, p. V-8). As a result, OCS spans every phase of an operation and plays an important role in the full range of military operations. The
addition of a shaping phase to OCS doctrine provides an opportunity to identify and evaluate effective readiness activities and doctrinal planning factors applicable to all services. Developing a shared understanding in planning, educating, and executing OCS shaping activities is critical for planners, operational commanders, and the non-acquisition community. These activities should support efficiently and effectively spending in contingency environments. Operationally defining what the intended effects contracting and spending should have on the battlefield can better establish effective contingency contracting, and reduce the risk of fraud, waste, and abuse.

E. METHODOLOGY

The methodology of this project incorporates a case study approach to examine the problem. Two primary models in this thesis were developed acquisition specific research models from the Naval Postgraduate School and supports analysis of doctrine and planning assets. The activities include interviews with various contracting and logistics professionals.

F. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

- Primary question: What components of current OCS planning doctrine can be adapted into single/lead service planning doctrine?
- Subsidiary question 1: What is the relevant history leading to current OCS doctrine and practice?
- Subsidiary question 2: What are key elements of Joint and Army doctrine relevant to single service contingency contracting constructs?
- Subsidiary question 3: What is the current state of practice in OCS and how is it related to single services?
- Subsidiary question 4: What specific findings and recommendations can be made?
G. ASSUMPTIONS

Several assumptions are critical if other services or the Joint staff use this project to assist in crafting OCS solutions. First, this project assumes that OCS is a subset of logistics. Logistics planners do facilitate the crafting of an OCS plan supporting a greater logistics effort. Just as important, OCS must be integrated into the primary role/function of all staff shops during the planning process. Thinking of OCS as only a logistical function creates a conflict in the staffing processes. This project assumes that OCS requires staff integration during planning and training exercises, with the logistics planner primarily responsible for crafting the OCS or contingency contracting plan.

Finally, as is repeated throughout strategic guidance, OCS is a “commander’s responsibility” as it influences the civil-military aspects of the battlefield and the operational outcome. The complexity of integrating OCS into an operation rests in the potential for contracting activities to impact civil-military aspects of the operational environment. For instance, an ethical environment in the contracting process can create good will with the host nation contractors while rebuilding an economy during a disaster recovery operation. Additionally, contracting is affected by battlefield conditions. For instance, if the lines of communication between forces are underdeveloped, movement along the host nation road network becomes a challenge. Taking civil-military relations into account occurs through appropriate operational framing during MDMP, and the evaluation of doctrine here assumes this is already part of the organization’s processes.

H. LIMITATIONS

This review does not specifically evaluate the doctrine, education and training created by all services including the United States Air Force, Navy, and Marines; rather, it focuses on Joint and Army doctrine. The final findings will make recommendations for operational level planning factors and supported activities appropriate for shaping phase operations.

One limitation of this research is that the doctrine and best practices evaluated are based on the Army’s role in OCS. The Army has taken the primary lead in contracting within the last major operations. Each service’s definition and relationship to OCS is
unique and requires different personnel solutions for the acquisition and non-acquisition doctrine. Services can expect to either support larger Joint forces contracting efforts or conduct their own contracting role at the inception of a single service contingency (Defense Science Board, 2014). Ultimately, each service will individually define the scope, and the applicable OCS role that supports its own operations. These factors will be considered in the analysis of doctrine

I. CONCLUSION

As stated by Ashton Carter, improving business practices and finding cost savings is important in today’s fiscal environment. As the DOD moves to institutionalize OCS into the forces, there is a call for OCS best practices and lessons learned. The primary benefit of this research is to provide strategic and operational leaders of all services an in-depth analysis of one service’s doctrinal approach to institutionalizing this function. Additionally, this project provides a description of best practices for the OCS process in the shaping phase. This project will also provide a historical description of contingency contracting and OCS doctrine and legislation, as well as the development of today’s acquisition personnel structures. Another benefit of this research is that it provides a broader discussion of OCS implementation and practice within all services. Based on my research, my recommendations should provide the services tools needed to institutionalize OCS.

Doctrine developed for planning OCS shaping phase activities should be relevant for the operational level. The operational level of war is defined in Joint Publication 1.02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated terms, page 87 as: “The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to achieve strategic objectives within theaters or other operational areas.” This level of war focuses on initial planning and guidance for major theater operations. The Army definition of unified land operations includes:

How the Army seizes, retains, and exploits the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage in sustained land operations through simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability operations in
order to prevent or deter conflict, prevail in war, and create the conditions for favorable conflict resolution. (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2011b)

Conducting unified land operations can mean working with smaller units and missions outside of a Joint Task Force at the Army Forces or Corps level. Therefore, the use of the term operational level includes both concepts, meaning applicable to a joint task force or for smaller single service lead contingencies. I examine current doctrine for appropriateness to single service lead initial entry, and Joint operations at an operational level. To accomplish this, first, I will describe the relevant history leading to OCS doctrine and practice. Second, I will identify key elements of relevant doctrine (Joint and Army) to single service contingency contracting planning constructs. Then, I will describe the current state of practice in OCS and how it is related to single services. Finally, I will make specific recommendations for the adaptation of OCS planning factors found in Joint and Army doctrine to fit an operational level, single service–led mission.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING AND OPERATIONAL CONTRACT SUPPORT

This literature review incorporates a historical perspective to highlight the growth and trends of developing structures supporting contingency contracting and Operational Contract Support (OCS) from inception to today. This chapter will cover wartime contracting through the development of OCS up to current doctrine. An analysis of current doctrine will be covered in Chapter III. The Appendix provides a graphic depicting the development of historical doctrine, legislation, and developments of OCS. This function was recently identified as a defense department’s core capability, and has a limited scope of contracting during wartime operations. Therefore, current literature that provides a focused historical context and background specific to wartime and contingency contracting and doctrine development is limited.

This literature review uses a strategy similar to a 2010 Naval Postgraduate School student thesis titled Contingency Contracting Officer Proficiency Assessment Test Development by Juan Arzu, Brian Mack and Biere Castro (2010). Several Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) and Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) student theses provided a historical perspective and analysis of this field. Additionally, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports provided the foundation of legislative history (Arzu et al., 2010). The 2014 OCS Action Plan provided the direction and guidance needed for current legislative requirements and future development requirements. Finally, the basis of this review was developed from the author’s literature review generated in 2015 for a Naval Postgraduate School class GB4044 Defense-Focused Managerial Inquiry supporting the Masters of Business Administration project development. Since the Army is the main provider of support for land forces, it continues to lead doctrine development based on best practices and lessons learned in OCS. Therefore, this literature review focuses on both Joint Force and Army doctrine. The intent of the literature review is to provide a foundational understanding of the relevance of OCS/wartime contracting and track the development of this discipline’s doctrine and legislation.
For simplicity, this historical perspective literature review identifies overall trends in the development of wartime contracting to OCS integration. These trends are categorized into major time frames ranging from wartime contracting to “institutionalization of OCS,” as depicted in the Appendix. First, I review the extent of wartime contracting in major conflicts and discuss resulting legislation. Second, I will describe the emergence of the term contingency contracting and development of a Joint specialty. Third, the emergence of the term OCS and its evolution provides the context for current doctrine. Finally, I describe the movement to fully integrate OCS throughout the Defense of Department (DOD). The intent is to provide the services a perspective on what policies and procedures they developed resultant of large sustainment operations. However, the primarily procedural-based doctrine typically neglects the tangible and intangible capabilities that using OCS in missions brings to the operational and combatant commander. While literature and studies record the effects of poor OCS integration, a limited amount of literature focuses on the positive value of deliberate planning.

A. KEY TERMS

The term “Operational Contract Support” is still being socialized into Joint forces, and the associated supporting terminology has subtleties in historical doctrine. While the military has a long history of contracting for supplies and services from commercial sources on the battlefield, a formalized approach to planning and integrating them into a battlefield operation is a relatively recent phenomenon. Now, the planning framework and construct Operational Contract Support (OCS) encapsulates the widely recognized term contingency contracting. This literature review uses the terms, as defined in Figure 2, throughout the literature review.
Contingency contracting, from a tactical and operational perspective, is the most identifiable term and indicates an overseas contingency declared by the Secretary of Defense under title 10 of the United States Code requiring military forces, as covered in Chapter I. For the contracting professional, this title 10 authority allows streamlined and abbreviated procurements timelines, which enable faster delivery in obtaining the goods and services for the warfighter, as compared to peacetime operations. From a planning perspective, contracting with commercial sources in this environment is complex compared to peacetime. Expeditionary and wartime contracting are terms found in the many inspection reports regarding the execution of contingency contracting supporting deployed forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. The terms wartime and expeditionary
contracting indicate an operational environment that may include counterinsurgencies or enemy actions although expeditionary contracting also includes domestic disaster relief environments. Understanding the differences between these terms assists with understanding the associated operational environment surrounding the historical literature.

The modern-day military procurement system’s utilizing commercial sources to fulfill wartime needs is not a new trend. Throughout U.S. history, the military has relied on contractors in major conflicts to assist in meeting the warfighter’s needs. A common pattern is found at the beginning of each conflict developing unique economic conditions. On identification of mobilizing forces, logisticians/military planners/operational units identify a capability gap and the military’s solicits vendors to help fulfill service and supply needs. Vendors/contractors are eager commercial sources who participate and capitalize on the chance for profits (Nagle, 1999). The importance of contractor’s integration into war plans as steady, despite over 200 years of change, is illustrated in Figure 3.
The Army’s Commission, called the Gansler Commission, and presented this to congress in the 2008 released report. This graphic reflects the trend to incorporate contractors into each major conflict through the ratio of contractor’s to service members. (Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2009, p. 21).

**B. WARTIME CONTRACTING 1775–1990**

The period from 1775 to almost 1990 denote a time where significant use of contracts meet warfighter needs occurred throughout major and minor conflicts. See the Appendix for a doctrine map of legislation, DOD initiatives and doctrine throughout the history of OCS to today. During this timeframe, the centralized nature of the department’s logistics chains meant little developed of meaningful structures focused on executing contingency contracting. This means that contracting with commercial sources for wartime was largely ad-hoc and reactive. This era here referred to as “wartime contracting,” exhibited a pattern of requiring commodities, and incorporating contractors
during major combat operations. Important lessons learned and legislation arose during this timeframe.

1. 18th Century

While the terms operational contract support and contingency contracting are relatively new, procuring on the commercial economy in support of war occurred early in American history. In fact, the modern formalized procurement system traces back to a need for integrating contractors during the revolutionary war. In 1775, Joseph Trumbull was granted the authority to procure on behalf of Congress for the Continental Army, (Nagle, 1999). Here, throughout the war, contracting/supply officers were co-located with the battlefield unit providing direct contracting support, when supply trains were incapable of reaching positions. This early system appeared reactive and prone to supply shortages and muddled the responsibilities between the quartermaster and acquisition departments (Nagle, 1999). Eventually, Joseph Trumball would be charged and eventually cleared of war-profiteering (Nagle, 1999). Congress grants the authority to procure for the armed forces and even today, investigations into fraud, waste and abuse are answerable to them.

Legislation passed during this timeframe provides the beginnings of a foundation of contingency contracting authority used in subsequent combat operations. For example, while Congress works towards authorizing funds for overseas contingency operations, military movement without appropriations is available. The Feed and Forage Act (41 United States Code (USC) 11) provides the DOD authority to obligate funds beyond appropriations for: “clothing, subsistence, forage, fuel, quarters, and transportation, medical, and hospital supplies” (Department of Defense, 2001, September 21). Nevertheless, the modern-day emphasis on institutionalizing and implementing Operational Contract Support planning and readiness into the forces reduces the risk of non-funded emergency contingencies requiring this act.

2. 19th Century

World Wars I and II supply lines primarily focused on centralized shipping from the United States, and support from the British economy for the gaps (Roser, 1984). For
the supplies and services needed, from British sources, reliance on Cost, Plus Percentage of Cost contracts were common practice during this war (Koster, 1991; Roser, 1984). This contract type was thought to incentive industry to adjust factories output to match the goods needed by armed forces. These types of contracts are now illegal due to the incentive to incur, versus control, costs.

Understanding that industry’s goals are ultimately to earn profit and benefit their enterprise, and not simply to be an extension of the government, might create disharmony in establishing unity of effort. The commercial sources here, in a government contractual relationship are incrementally rewarded for incurring of costs, are incented to provide too many supplies and/or services and the highest prices. This type of contract might require active government involvement and oversight, in what is meant to be a more decentralized process. Today, price competition and the appropriate cost reduction incentives assists in creating a unity of effort in achieving cost controls, and supplying the forces. Ultimately, understanding that the industry/market base needs be identified and developed during planning phases is important to contingency environments.

World War II also used small contract agreements within the theater of operations to control shipping costs and leverage allies supply lines (Rodeschin, 1997). The use of government credit cards and imprest type fund instruments on local economies offer efficient and speedy avenues to procuring in foreign economies. Today, this typically is leveraged through declaring title 10 authorities, thereby waiving the garrison/peacetime procedures and accessing streamlined procedures. Many conflicts since utilize the strategy of smaller purchases to meet warfighter needs quickly and efficiently. The Korean conflict uses an entirely different strategy to provide troops equipment and services.

Contractor’s supplies and services on the battlefield directly impacted the unity of effort and logistical capabilities of combatant commanders in the Korean and Vietnam wars. U.S. Forces during the Korean conflict relied on a large contracting effort in overseas operations providing all classes of supplies moving away from shipping supplies from the United States to augment overseas mission (Allen et all, 2010). Two major problems surrounded supplying forces through contingency contracting in the Korean
Conflict. First, contracting officers worked without an official declaration of war leaving them reliant on peacetime logistical supply lines and procedures (Mason, 1984; Torreon, 2015). Today, the significance of establishing title 10 authorities, both overseas and domestically, is pivotal in providing rapid response supplies and services from commercial sources. Second, the Korean conflict found many services procured through the host nation and through Japan but the process was fraught with cultural disconnects (Bok, 1987). The South Korean market base was adequate in size to provide the quantity and quality of goods necessary for U.S. forces (Bok, 1987). Additionally, the military specification and standards needed for items, such as vegetables, required the forces to train/educate the local businessmen to develop a more viable business base in South Korea (Bok, 1987; Koster, 1991; Mason, 1984). Today, understanding that culturally informed interaction between host-nation contractors and members of the U.S. armed impacts civil-military relations (CJCS, 2014b). The lesson here is, understanding that contracting in local economics requires the development of a viable vendor base for the most needed commodities and an understanding of the cultural influences of the local economy. Developing the contingency contracting business environment during planning phases will be discussed in later chapters.

The Vietnam conflict also lacked a formal declaration of war (Mason, 1984). While some attribute this to difficulties in contingency contracting in the theater, specific contingency authorities established to waive the socio-economic programs and preferences used in “garrison” or peace-time contracting today were not in place. Contracting officers may have benefited from the relationships and market base built in Korea (Rodeschin, 1997). An area of weakness, the Comptroller General of the United States reported issues in the construction contract management arena finding the contracting community unprepared for the extent of construction (Comptroller General of the United States, 1970). A theme in the audit is the recommendation to streamline construction contracting into one lead service agency to reduce costs and the occurrence of duplicative requirements for one material need. In 1980, the newly created Office of Federal Procurement and Policy established a uniform procurement regulation, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) in 1980 as a coordinated and uniform system to
guide federal procurements. Although, it would be years before these regulations recognized contingency contracting title 10 waivers to time-consuming socio-economic programs in favor of timely delivery schedules. For contingency contracting situations, the Air Force and the Army created guides and doctrine to support the efforts. A researcher at the Air Force Institute of Technology found them not substantive to assist contracting officers finding unofficial documents more useful (Mason, 1984).

**a. 1982 Definition of Contingency Contracting**

An early service specific, definition for contingency contracting existed in the Air Force regulation 70–7 governing contingency contracting. This definition was extracted from a master’s degree student thesis at AFIT titled Contingency contracting during low-intensity conflicts by Mason written in 1988.

Contingency contracting support plans for deployments provide for contracting actions to be completed according to all laws, executive orders, and regulations that apply. As a rule, deployed contracting officers are able to use small purchase procedures to buy required supplies and services. (Mason, 1984, p. 12)

The above definition found in the Air Force regulation was referenced to be a total of three pages, and reflects still a centralized structure for providing for supplies and services through “small purchases.” Soon this condition changes as the need for supplies and services expands with the trend in outsourcing rising over the next few decades. One of the earliest definitions of contingency contracting is found in a student thesis as a proposed definition from the Director of Logistics for the Joint Chief of Staff. The memorandum recommends the inclusion into Joint publications both a definition of contingency and contingency contracting responding to perceived gaps in “on the spot” contracting in deployed environments.

**b. 1988 Proposed Definition of Contingency Contracting**

The following contingency contracting definition was suggested to be added to the Joint regulations and publications in 1988. This definition was extracted from a
The reference to the application of peacetime operations might be a reflection there was little distinction between peacetime and wartime contracting procedures. Currently, declaring title 10 contingency operations allows contracting officers to access streamlined procedures to assist in responding in abbreviated and constrained timelines, compared to peacetime operations. The memorandum further recommends the start of providing waivers to peacetime acquisition procedure, specifically raising small acquisition thresholds. This begins the genesis of contingency contracting awareness with the combatant commands and Joint policies.

A decade after the Vietnam War, several key pieces of legislation created the acquisition branch and formed the acquisition structures known today. The Packard Commission examined the defense acquisition structure calling for education and experience of military and civilian acquisition personnel. Soon after, legislation created the head of the acquisition professionals, providing a focal point for the fragmented acquisition workforce. Many years later, in 1989, under the Bush administration, the Army Acquisition Corps came into being with a projected strength of 1,350 military and civilian personnel (Lumb, 1999, p. 34) The organizations efforts remained focused primarily on major weapons system focused acquisitions, not necessarily creating a distinctive niche for wartime contracting. Today, the roles between the two are vastly different although they both use the terms operational contract support. One role supports contingencies, the other supports major weapon’s system fielding. Although, the lessons learned of this time era emphasizes the need for an acquisition focused senior leader to advocate for the function during the planning process.

The end of the cold war presented new global threats and operational battlefield conditions quite different than those of the European logistical infrastructure. Most likely,
the end of the cold war created shelves of now unneeded contingency plans, and faced with planning for the next conflict, found leaders facing an uncertain and unknown new enemy. Logistical elements now needed a new approach to providing support—although the workforce significantly downsized, to include logistical elements leaving the forces even more dependent on contractors to assist in executing combat missions (Allen et al., 2010).

C. CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING AND THE 20TH CENTURY

A contingency contracting framework developed through lessons learned in Desert Shield. The development of doctrine, law and regulations become more rapid. The Appendix provides a timeline and icon representation of the associated works from this period. The rapid deployment and buildup of forces in a new theater required extensive commercial support providing a challenging first 45 days for contracting officers (Koster, 1991). The contracting activities handled up to 80 new requirements a day although staffed by contracting officers with little to no experience in contingency environments (Koster, 1991) Expanding the streamlined contingency contracting procedures assisted in meeting these requirements by raising the threshold for small purchases from the peacetime $25,000 limit to $100,000 in the 1991 Appropriations Act, Public Law. 101–510, November 5 1990 (Rodeschin, 1997). The end of operations in Desert Storm and Desert Shield led to a substantial downsizing leaving the forces ever more reliant on contractors to support logistics. As a result, the subsequent versions of the Federal Acquisition Regulations included consideration and provisions for better access to streamlined procedures.

The lessons learned in providing for Desert Shield drove lawmakers and the DOD to respond with new resources. First, contingency contracting focused acquisition doctrine was incepted. Second, a new position called the Contingency Contracting Officer (CCO) was created establishing a contingency contracting acquisition subspecialty. The contracting function acted as a decentralized special staff function. This researcher found the earliest evidence of the Army’s assignment of a formal position of “Contingency Contracting Officer” designated to Army forces in a 1993 Naval
Postgraduate student thesis titled “Contingency contracting officers: Can they adequately support the force?” (Campbell, 1993). In this study, contracting officers indicated difficulties due to the late integration of CCO in the deployment and an institutional unawareness of their position (Campbell, 1993). In 1993, the Air Force Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (AFFARS) numbers one and two were the primary contingency contracting doctrine focused primarily for the acquisition professional. A student thesis at Naval Postgraduate School provides a narrative and analysis of this doctrine, which was unavailable at the time of writing this project. They speculated that the upcoming revision of the 1998 AFFARS would create the beginnings of a contracting structure beyond the recognition of a single CCO deployed (Rodeschin, 1997).

With an established awareness and development of the contingency contracting specialty, the focus shifted to integrating this new specialty into the force. The general theme of subsequent doctrine was creating an awareness that the responsibility for contractors was confined to the contracting process itself, rather, that there are supporting relationships that commanders and battlefield commanders are responsible to fulfill. The documents lacked contingency contracting planning procedures to create a cohesive effort in executing contingency contracting in Joint operations. The concept of contractors as part of the total force is evident in doctrine and legislation during the late 1990s. The first example of the doctrine was through 1996 Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 3020.37 titled *Continuation of Essential DOD Contractor Services During Crises*. This is not contracting specific guidance but provides the emphasis that contractors are a part of the “total force” and require consideration in contingency plans, especially when overseas. Contracting is only explicitly mentioned once.

The Department of the Army regulations addressing policies, responsibilities, and procedures for using contractors on the battlefield and provides an early contingency contracting definition in the 1993 Army Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement No. 2.
1. 1996 Acquisition Specific Contingency Contracting Definition

Contingency Contracting: The provision of those essential supplies and services needed to execute and sustain the mission. It includes emergency contracting in the continental United States (CONUS) or outside the continental United States (OCONUS) for those actions necessary for the mobilization and deployment of units.

The earliest contingency contracting definition this researcher found was in an Army supplement to the Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement. The acquisition specific regulation describes how contracting officer’s fit into a contingency operation through describing the capabilities and effects that contingency contracting brings to the battlefield. This regulation provides the acquisition officer relief from some federal acquisition timelines by raising the simplified acquisition threshold for declared contingencies. This allows contracting officers to more quickly fulfill smaller purchases without the burden of non-contingency or peacetime requirement advertising timelines, or advertising timelines. As discussed in Chapter I, declaring a contingency under title 10 allows for streamlined protocols when contracting for wartime missions. While acquisition specific guidance for contingency contracting was available, limited Army specific non-acquisition documentation was created during this time.

2. 1999 Non-acquisition Contingency Contracting Definition

This researcher found an early non-acquisition definition in the 1999 Army Field Manual 100–10–2 Contracting Support on the Battlefield.

**Contingency contracting** is the process by which essential supplies and services needed to sustain deployed forces are obtained on behalf of the U.S. Government. It includes emergency contracting in the continental United States (CONUS) or outside the continental United States (OCONUS) for those actions necessary to support mobilizing and deploying units. This manual addresses contingency contracting, commonly associated with Army contracting personnel procuring goods and services in support of deployed Army forces to supplement organic combat service support (CSS) capabilities. (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1999a, p. 1–2)

The supporting definition is procedural and defines contingency contracting as a process distinct from a weapon’s system focus, in terms of planning. The focus remains
on meeting the warfighters needs and subordinated the function, hinting at integration across the logistics realm (supply primarily, transportation or ordnance corps.) No acknowledgement remains of inclusion into an operations order or planning process. The risk here is that contingency contracting would remain an ad-hoc logistics function.

The regulation identified the need and importance of contingency contracting and addresses the community to accept contractors into the total force mix. This definition leaves the non-acquisition user to define whether direct contracting support was applicable to their organization, presumably if the resulting contract required services or personnel. This definition is reinforced by the Field Manual (FM) 100–10–2 *Contracting Support on the Battlefield*, published at the same time. This field manual is designed for non-contracting/acquisition personnel both identifying and defining contingency contracting as a subset of logistics. Notably, this field manual identifies that executing contingency contracting during wartime has strategic implications on the battlefield, although it does not specifically define them. The ‘pre-deployment activities’ of contracting officers are described with the end-state as maintaining a rapid-deployment capability, albeit was ad-hoc as planning for this function began at notification of mission (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1999a).

Overall, the doctrine of the time identified the need and importance of planning and integrating contingency contracting, but provided little evidence of organization wide procedures to accomplish this. A researcher at this time found an emphasis on the importance of contingency contracting at a joint operations level, but identified a gap in the doctrine in defining procedurally how this should be done (Leisenring, 1997). This timeframe found crises action planning in overseas environments which required integrated procedures and doctrine into operations like those executed in Somalia and Bosnia. Additionally, the researcher found Joint and Army doctrine available at this time insufficient to maintain efficient contracting in contingency environments (Leisenring, 1997). Soon, major changes in contingency contracting doctrine and procedures would result from events after the launch of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) in Afghanistan and Iraq.
D. CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING AND REFORM IN THE 21ST CENTURY

Understanding the history of Army contracting structures is important to evaluate today’s relevant OCS doctrine. Two key commissions identifying the challenges and cost of inefficient contingency contracting operations resulted in the emergence of the first programmatic approach to this function. Their findings sparked major changes in, and the emergence of, contingency contracting related Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership & Education, Personnel, Facilities and Policy (DOTMLPF-P) solutions. The theme of this time recognized that doctrine and training were needed to support the amount of spending and contracting functions on the battlefield in Iraq and Afghanistan. The contractor’s on the battlefield equaled approximately the same number of uniformed service-members. The commissions brought awareness to the need for appropriate planning and oversight of contingency contracting. The doctrine at the time fulfilled the capability gap surrounding tactical level non-acquisition contract oversight and procedures during stability operations, referred to as post-Gansler influence throughout this MBA project. To aid in the understanding of the emergence of this doctrine, first I will discuss the contracting structures in place at the beginning of major operations.

The force structure that took the Army into major theater combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the new organizations built during that time, heavily influenced the doctrine available today. The Army developed the Army Contracting Agency (ACA) in 2002 to act as both a centralized acquisition focused Command and contracting authority (Hannon, 2004). The ACA structure came to being during a time of downsizing and a need for consolidation of disparate contracting activities throughout the force. This affected the Army Garrison Commander as the control over the budget personnel and structure of contracting offices moved to the ACA. Additionally, the contracting authority moved from an assigned Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting (PARC) to the ACA regional headquarters (Hannon, 2004). Research indicates that the organization suffered resource shortages during this period, which could affect the upcoming major operations in Iraq beginning in 2003.
On the eve of major operations, the Army released new acquisition focused contracting doctrine. The theme of this doctrine primarily acknowledged that contractors are part of the total force mix when in deployed situations. In 2003, the Army updated the manual reflecting some lessons learned in FM 3–100.21 *Contractors on the Battlefield*. The key change from previous doctrine is the identification of integrating contractor management as essential for support synchronization and protection/accountability of contractor personnel. The regulation recognizes that integration of a contracting support plan is not required by the primary operational planning doctrine (Field Manual 5–0) but relies on common practices (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2003). A significant portion of the document describes the specific logistical aspects of considering contractors as part of the total force. This document with this theme remain in place until major combat operations begin in Iraq and Afghanistan, just prior to major contingency contracting reform.

The 2007 National Defense Authorization Act section 854 further directed the Secretary of Defense to develop a Joint policy and contingent contracting formalized program. This includes a “preplanned organizational approach” to contingency operations. Military services are directed to appoint primary personnel (a senior commissioned officer or Senior Executive Service member) to oversee Joint contingency contracting policy. The efforts of all services after this requirement represents a profound effect on the arena of contingency contracting, spawning a new era. The commencement of major operations in Iraq and Afghanistan finds contracting officers requiring centralized support and the contractor management function too wieldy to oversee with newly, or un-trained non-acquisition personnel.

1. **Acquisition Reform and Contingency Contracting**

Over the last decade, contingency contracting played a large role in overseas missions for operational units. Contractors provided key services, supplying necessary commodities, and enabling the application of civil support programs. Spending in these areas was significant with contract obligations in overseas environments from 1999 to 2012 ranged between $170 to $360 billion dollars (Schwartz & Ginsberg, 2013). The
ratio of contractors to service members consistently equaled one another, in Iraq and Afghanistan and with that, issues surrounding contractor oversight and fraud, waste and abuse. After six years of combat, the DOD and Congress responded with two key initiatives: 1) The Gansler Commission focused on a systemic review on contracting procedures and 2) The Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan (CWC) assessed specific actions within the theater. Both these initiatives provided recommendations for development and improvement of structures, policies, and resources for managing the contingency contracting process.

a. The Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management (Gansler Commission)

Understanding how the Army adapted to the Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management (Gansler Commission) finding is important to allow other services to glean their own policies, structures, and way forward. The Commission, launched by the Secretary of the Army in 2007, took place during a time of an emerging pattern of headlines declaring fraud, waste and abuse associated with contingency contracting. This independent commission was headed by Jacques Gansler, reviewed five years of expeditionary operations (through the testimony of over 100 individuals directly involved) and made recommendations. The following findings and recommendations led to major improvements in resources for the contingency contracting community, both acquisition and non-acquisition focused.

(1) Findings:

Insufficient Resources to Monitor Contractor Performance
Cultural understanding of contracting throughout warfighter force
Impact of contractors performing on the battlefield
Inadequate contracting regulations for expeditionary operations
Lack of recognition of complexity of contracting
Insufficient focus and resources on post-award contract management
Extremely poor interagency operations
Provide training and tools for overall contracting activities in expeditionary operations

(2) Recommendations:

Increase training and career field of contracting personnel in expeditionary operations

Restructure to facilitate contractor management in expeditionary operation

Increase training for expeditionary contracting activities

Develop legislative, regulatory and policy assistance to enable contracting effectiveness (CWC, 2007)

This report resulted in recognizing contingency contracting as a focused discipline. The identified capability gap required leadership, personnel, training and doctrine focused on contracting in contracting in expeditionary environments.

b. The Commission on Wartime Contracting

A major emphasis on contractor oversight to mitigate the risk of fraud, waste and abuse, is the emphasis of this document. This congressionally sponsored commission and independent council investigated the contracting operations in expeditionary environments including Iraq and Afghanistan. The final report Transforming Wartime Contracting: Controlling Costs, Reducing Risks issued in 2011 estimated billions of dollars lost to fraud, waste and abuse (Commission on Wartime Contracting (CWC) in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2009). The key findings included serious problems in the planning and oversight of contracting functions. Weaknesses found in the contracting process included poorly defined requirements determination processes; disparate service-specific contracting organizations and processes, and poor oversight procedures. This report spurred reform and overhaul of the doctrine, training, organization, laws and regulations relating to the planning and of contingency contracting in expeditionary operations. In fact, this report continues to influence and shape the development of this field.

The results of both the Gansler Commission and Commission on Wartime Contracting increased the awareness and stature of contingency contracting. The identification of resourcing both acquisition and non-acquisition personnel became a
reality. The Army established the Army Contracting Command (ACC) within a year of these events. The ACC and its subordinate agency Expeditionary Contracting Command lead contracting efforts in major combat operations emphasizing a professional workforce.

c. Key Legislation

In response to this reform, Joint and U.S. Army forces formalized an expeditionary focused contracting command structure and developed policy, doctrine and training. Not only did training focus on developing contingency contracting officers specializing in this area, but also focused training on the non-acquisition personnel. The Army offered a functional designator with required training focused on creating personnel capable of supporting tactical commanders in all aspects of contract support in contingency environments. Many factors addressed here launched the eventual initiative for Joint and Army doctrine to develop more specific guidance and a larger planning framework for contingency contracting. The NDAA 2007, 2008 and 2013 are key legislation driving the transformation of OCS into a core defense capability.


The NDAA identifies and directs the development of Joint OCS policies and resources. Additionally, this legislation defined contingency program management as:

Planning, organizing, staffing, controlling, and leading the combined efforts of participating civilian and military personnel and organizations for the management of a specific defense acquisition program or programs during combat operations, post-conflict operations, and contingency operations. (National defense authorization act for fiscal year 2007)

Contingency contracting is defined as “all stages of the process of acquiring property or services by the Department of Defense during a contingency operation,” (110th Congress, 2007).

These definitions impose a needed framework and oversight similar to major acquisition programs onto the process. This provides the oversight and focal point to develop an institutional approach. Further that contingency contracting in “all stages” can
mean to include peacetime operations. Further, the OCS program management is related to meet JFC objectives.

(2) 2008 NDAA:

The 2008 NDAA directs the collection of lessons learned in contingency contracting and the development of non-acquisition focused training. Additionally, the 2008 NDAA directed the development of the Initial Capabilities Document, discussed below. Relevant for all services, the NDAA directs training non-acquisition personnel who may be designated to support contracting duties in a deployed environment. Training non-acquisition personnel can effect and require changes to their DOTMLPF-P. The Army, developed mobile training teams and a curriculum to supplement non-acquisition focused training for operational units deploying requiring support. This advent will be covered in later chapters.

These pieces of key legislation, commissions and reviews provided the political will and resources to create the contingency contracting acquisition structures of today. More importantly, this reform underscores the need to create a structured approach when contracting in contingency environments. OCS was critical to the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan where the ratio of contractors to service members approached a one to operation. Some might argue that the sheer size and effort of both Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom is what lent to the conditions for fraud, waste, and abuse. Large stability and reconstruction conditions are not likely in the near future, as the force faces a new challenge, fiscal austerity. Today’s post-stability and reconstruction missions can benefit from a larger focus on cost-consciousness in OCS business practices achievable through deliberate planning and shaping phase processes. The DOD now has an OCS framework to assist in this process.

E. THE EMERGENCE OF OPERATIONAL CONTRACT SUPPORT

The move from contingency contracting, to an overarching framework was introduced by the Joint publication (JP) 4–10 “Operational Contract Support” in 2008. The Joint doctrine introduces a new term: Operational contract support (OCS) encompassing the process of planning and executing contract support in contingencies.
The OCS planning framework subordinates contingency contracting to a larger set of functions: contract support integration, contractor management, and contracting support. These pillars are necessary, in a Joint environment, to create an OCS plan, where successful OCS is defined.

1. **2008 Joint Publication 4–10 Operational Contract Support**

Successful operational contract support is the ability to orchestrate and synchronize the provision of integrated contract support and management of contractor personnel providing that support to the Joint force in a designated operational area. (CJCS, 2008)

This outcome based definition is multi-dimensional recognizing a separation between the execution of contingency contracting, contract support integration and contractor management. OCS here might be interpreted as beginning when an operation is named, or “when a need from a requiring activity is first identified and concludes with contract close out,” (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1999b). The regulations at the time both neglect to underscore the importance of planning OCS during peacetime by defining procedures whenever a capability gap is identified within the context of planning. This approach was relevant as most contingency contracting was executed within the context of large stability operations, and generating new requirements was under an established contracting structure. The term “contingency contracting” is most recognizable to the operational force.

2008 Joint Publication 4–10 Operational Contract Support

**Contingency contracting** is the process of obtaining goods, services and construction from commercial sources via contracting means in support of contingency operations. It is a subset of contract support integration and does not include the requirements development, prioritization and budgeting processes. Contracts used in a contingency include theater support, systems support, and external support contracts. (CJCS., 2008, p. 1–2)

The OCS framework in JP 4–10 articulates to the warfighter how to employ the OCS capabilities through the three associated functions: contractor management, contract integration and contracting support. This framework provides a process that assists in
integrating those with contracting authority, and the term “Operation Concept Support” continues to evolve.

The Army also adopted OCS into its evolving contracting structure during the height of executing unprecedented contractor support levels in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2007, the contractor presence on the battlefield approximately matched the warfighter presence. The Gansler Commission gave the political attention needed to create the contracting support and resources required at a time when little structure was apparent. The Army met this challenge by creating organizational solutions to manage procurements and contractor management. The Army Contracting Command, a two-star level command developed in 2008, was designed to perform all levels of contracting work and support from major weapon’s systems to contingency contracting. Their primary mission effects the warfighter through the full spectrum of operations through subordinate commands. The Mission Installation Contracting Command with field directorates executed over $7.6 billion dollars in support in FY 2012 alone (United States Army Contracting Command, February 6, 2015). The Expeditionary Contracting Command expeditionary, a one-star command, supports Joint and Army specific stateside and overseas contingency operations. Their stated mission is to provide all functions of operational contract support and contingency contracting with rapid response. Their supporting structures, the Contract Support Brigades are regionally aligned with each combatant command executing $1.75 billion dollars in FY 2014 with over 1,800 personnel relayed in a personal communication. From 2008 to 2014, the vast amount of lessons learned best practices and the doctrine in use today emerged. Non-acquisition education was also expanded at this time. The Army Logistics University began offering a 2-week focused course designed for officers and non-commissioned officers involved with planning and integrating OCS at a tactical or operational level. The Additional Skill Identifier 3C denoting “Operational Contract Support” was created and is described in the following chapter. The next chapters describes the Army’s expeditionary contracting supporting organizations, best practices and doctrine for applicability to other services.
The legislation directed formation and the upkeep of a new Joint OCS framework tasked to Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (now the DASD) for Program Support. Under the auspices of the DASD, the Operational Contract Support Concept of Operations defines a unifying strategy recognizing the value that institutionalizing OCS, as a component of program management, brings to the forces (Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense [Program Support], 2010):

**Build a balanced and versatile Joint force.**

**Maintain the capability to project and sustain military power over global distances.**

**Improve the ability to operate in urban environments.**

**Markedly increase language and cultural capabilities and capacities.**

**Markedly improve the ability to integrate with other U.S. agencies and other partners.**

**Improve organizational solutions for protracted missions that cut across geographical boundaries.**

**Develop innovative and adaptive leaders down to the lowest levels.**

2. **2010 Money As a Weapon System**

Money as a Weapon System (MAAWS) changed the definition and scope of contingency contracting from providing tactically for the warfighter, to enabling economic programs affecting the battlefield. OCS and contingency contracting are often stated to directly impact the operational environment on the battlefield, and MAAWS provides some insights on that aspect. In 2010, Iraq and Afghanistan operational commanders benefited from programs instituted as describes in MAAWS. The theaters of Iraq and Afghanistan incorporated economic programs into the counterinsurgency strategy. This doctrine was a financial management policy enabling economic tools for the operational/ground commander aimed at providing positive effects through economic means.

This document’s themes are relevant to planning for OCS in today’s environment. MAAWS created and assigned responsibility for contracting through the often quoted
“contracting has to be a commander’s business.” Contingency contracting can affect the operational environment deliberately, for instance through embedding socio-economic goals providing preferences in the bidding process to host nation countries. In MAAWS, leaders are challenged to think “beyond cost, schedule and performance,” to include goals of achieving less tangible benefits through developing relationships and addressing security issues. While the operations in those theaters benefited from economies of scale, host nation economies benefited from outside spending.

Overall, MAAWS articulated that procuring goods and services can affect the local operational economy. Impacting civil-military relations on the battlefield through free-enterprise can benefit commanders. A Naval Postgraduate School student thesis, “Shoot, Move, Communicate, Purchase: How United States Special Forces Can Better Employ Money As A Weapon System,” analyzes some of these initiatives within the context of smaller team operations. Debate still occurs as to whether MAAWS counterinsurgency initiatives were effective. Either way, the programs and awareness developed from this document are still taught and replicated today.

F. INSTITUTIONALIZING OPERATIONAL CONTRACT SUPPORT

We must take aggressive steps to institutionalize OCS within the Department, generating capacity to deliver effects when and where they are needed to support the full range of military operations. This initiative is critical to achieving our national and operational objectives, ensuring compliance with Federal statutes, and supporting commander’s needs. (Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Support [DASDPS], 2013, p. 1)

OCS faces two key challenges when institutionalizing this function across the force. First, the drawdown of forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, combined with the DOD challenges to meet different national security objectives requires a new approach. Second, the declaration of OCS as a core defense capability changed the stature of this area and immediately set forth the resources needed to develop this capability across the services. OCS and contingency contracting regulations written primarily during stability operations, now need redefining in this post-stability/reconstruction period. Newer missions include smaller forces, and require the ability to conduct initial entry operations,
as compared with OIF/OEF operations focused on transition units with already established operations in a mature theater. Even with the drawdown of forces in deployed environments, the commitment of resources in developing OCS is increasing.

The goal of OCS DOD institutionalization is to optimize this function into the DOD fulfilling Joint Force 2020 concept (DASDPS, 2014a). This vision intends to fully institutionalize and develop the OCS capability throughout the DOD by 2018. Following is a brief overview of primary strategic documents guiding OCS into the future force.

1. **OCS Institutional Change Focal Points**

The OCS Joint Concept (OSC JC) validated the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), identifies continuance of integrating contractors on the battlefield in future mission. The concept intends to integrate and institutionalize OCS into the Joint forces by 2020 (CJCS, 2013). The Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) also approved by the JROC, identifies the capability gaps critical necessary to fulfill the vision that OCS is a DOD core competency. The critical OCS capabilities gaps (Figure 4) provide guidance for the services to better develop and institutionalize this area.

![DOD Identified Operational Contract Support Capability Gaps](Figure 4)

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<th>Critical OCS Capability Gaps by Priority</th>
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This capability gap analysis provides the overarching direction of DOD institutional capability gaps requiring solutions to fulfill the Joint Force 2020 vision (DASDPS, 2013).
The OCS Action Plan, a living document, and forum, consisting of over 170 different actions each service and office must fulfill to close the capability gap and achieve the Joint forces vision. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Support (DASDPS) and Vice Director, Directorate of Logistics, Joint Staff maintain and preside over this OCS Action Plan. The office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics established the OCS Functional Capabilities Integration Board (FCIB) in March 2010 ((DASDPS), 2014). This board was established as a forum for combatant commanders, services and defense agencies as a forum for furthering OCS capabilities and resources and maturing the OCS capability. Under this initiative, the amount of new DOTMLPF-P initiatives and results are too numerous to list here. Many of these resources will be reviewed throughout this project.

2. **2013 NDAA**

Related to the 2013 NDAA contractor planning is now included in the Joint Military Education (JPME) for senior leaders. OCS oriented curriculum embedded into JPME provides each service a level of inherent institutional knowledge to leverage within the operational planning process and benefits from leaders exposure to the OCS discipline.

Significantly, section 845 requires the incorporation of OCS into the readiness reporting systems further cementing OCS into peacetime activities. The Army supports this objective with exercises like the Operational Contract Support Joint Exercise led by the Expeditionary Contracting Command, and operational level OCS integration through major training centers like National Training Center, in Fort Irwin, CA.

Finally, the NDAA required a DOD wide senior service who is responsible for many facets of OCS. These subordinate office OCS responsibilities include planning, assessment of total force, non-acquisition requirements determination, and determination of policy.
3. **Cost-Consciousness in Contingency Contracting**

Recently, the concept of cost-consciousness has gained prominence as an issue in contingency contracting and is now taught in JPME courses. A report released to congress in 2012, titled Cost-Consciousness in Contingency Contracting reiterates the initiative to institutionalize OCS into the DOD citing cost-consciousness as, to use terminology found in MAAWS, *commander’s business*. The Commissions on Wartime Contracting’s 2011 final report first addressed the concept of “cost-consciousness” in contingency contracting. The report recommended agencies address cost-consciousness through assigning senior leaders responsible for this function and creating metrics to capture the value in contingency contracting. Legislation to reform contingency contracting was attempted, unsuccessfully in 2012, but this idea of cost-consciousness continues today. Most recently, the OCS Joint Concept identifies an increased cost-consciousness in the overarching strategy and development of this Joint capability.

The services can incorporate cost-consciousness in contingency contracting through, the report cites, “Better Buying Power.” This is an acquisition initiative that includes promoting competition in contracting and improving tradecraft for services contracting. This seems to indicate that cost-consciousness is primarily an acquisition function. Integrating contracting with the planning process early allows the contracting officer(s) the ability to promote cost-consciousness by developing a competitive and appropriate market/vendor base in a new theater of operations. The remainder of this project focuses on the planning phase as, this is key to creating cost-consciousness and preventing fraud, waste and abuse in contingency contracting.

**G. SUMMARY**

This chapter described the evolution of OCS throughout inception to the present. Throughout American military history, contractors supplied needed goods and services to the armed forces. First, the chapter describes the ad-hoc roots of OCS, through the emergence of Army doctrine integrating contractors onto the battlefield. Then it describes the development of contingency contracting reform during major combat operations. It next noted the institutionalization of OCS through the introduction of a planning
framework and the supporting evolution of Joint and Army resource. Finally, it reviews the vision and plan for the next evolution of Joint OCS operations. The next chapter will discuss and evaluate relevant current doctrine. Each service is faced with defining what institutionalizing operational contract support means for their operational and tactical levels. They have the benefit of reviewing the historical perspective and emergence of this field since Joint and Army forces have developed this doctrine.
III. EXAMINATION OF CURRENT DOCTRINE AND OPERATIONAL CONTRACT SUPPORT PLANNING RESOURCES

Understanding the current level of planning doctrine and process capability for Operational Contract Support (OCS) will help organizations develop or improve their doctrinal OCS procurement processes. This chapter will evaluate current Joint force and Army planning doctrine for OCS. I will analyze existing doctrine for OCS planning tasks through two models, the recognized Three Pillars for Integrative success by E. Cory Yoder (2013) and the Contract Management Maturity model by Dr. Rene Rendon (2005). This chapter will contribute to an understanding of the current maturity level of Operational Contract Support (OCS).

A. MODELS

The following review of current doctrine and contracting structures focuses on what is relevant to a single service OCS construct. This research will also discuss the assessment results by providing insight on gaps and trends at the operational level in an attempt to characterize the current state of doctrinal OCS planning procedures outside of Joint operations. Much of the doctrine was incepted and written during major stability combat operations and created a structure to address on-going tactical level execution issues. Criticism surrounding the execution of OCS documents the original failure of the service’s planning processes and lack of institutional knowledge as a causal factor in the rates of fraud, waste and abuse observed in Iraq and Afghanistan. Therefore, the focus here is extracting the planning guidance, review for operational level planning efficacy, and evaluating through two acquisition focused models. The assessment results and related recommendations for OCS doctrinal planning process improvement will guide the non-acquisition logistical planners in developing a road map for either developing similar, or improving current, OCS planning process doctrine.
1. Contracting Management Maturity Model

In 2003, Dr. Rene Rendon developed the Contract Management Maturity Model © (CMMM) as a method to assess the maturity of contract management processes within an organization (Rendon, 2004). CMMM provides organizational leaders a tool to map and transform a procurement process, like planning for OCS, from tactical to more integrated and optimized levels (Garrett & Rendon, 2005). The author focuses on measuring the maturity of a process in practice within an organization through the issuing of surveys and measuring the responses. The model used in this project does not issue surveys; rather it measures the available doctrine, personnel structures and platforms for maturity. Understanding the maturity of available OCS resources can assist planners and doctrine writers with developing similar strategies, or new ones depending on the maturity, in developing OCS resources within other organizations.

The CMMM consists of 6 phases and five levels of maturity, as depicted in Figure 5. This project requires only the planning phase (Garrett & Rendon, 2005). This phase involves determining, if, what to buy, how much, and when to, procure. For the simplicity of this project, this includes all of shaping activities from both an acquisition and non-acquisition perspective. In OCS and logistics, the shaping phase includes identifying capability gaps and developing a market base to procure needed services and commodities.
This figure, found in the *Contract Management Organizational Assessment Tools*, is the CMMM (c) graphic supporting the model. This model rates the maturity of the contract management phases from planning through closeout (Garrett & Rendon, 2005).

The levels of maturity are designed to reflect the level of competence of the specific process evaluated. The five levels of maturity range from Level 1”Ad Hoc” to optimized (Garrett & Rendon, 2005):

**Level 1: Ad Hoc**

The ad hoc designation indicates an early or initial level of process maturity. Much like the early years of contingency contracting, ad hoc reflects a lack of, or mostly undeveloped, organization-wide processes even with continued use of the function. Ad-hoc could include informal documentation of the process that leaders are not held accountable.

**Level 2: Basic**

This level of maturity reflects some basic planning processes within the organization. The organization lacks the requirements for consistent use of these

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processes. The primary means to evaluate this level is through the use of surveys identifying personnel adherence to this level.

**Level 3: Structured**

Here, formally documented contract management processes are institutionalized throughout the organization. Further, these processes allow for a tailored approach to adjust for strategic considerations and/or operating environments. Senior leaders provide the guidance and direction for key contracting strategies and decisions. Again, this is established through the use of survey to determine the extent of the participation and inclusion of senior leader guidance.

**Level 4: Integrated**

The processes are ingrained into the core organizational processes and integrated throughout key offices. Within OCS, this includes the various staff sections and commanders.

**Level 5: Optimized**

The highest level of maturity includes the use of performance metrics, quality control over the process, and an evaluation of the efficiency and effectiveness of the contract management process. Process improvement is continuously informed by established lessons learned and best practices. Streamlining the process is considered and implemented by the organization.

This method has been used to evaluate Army contracting processes within organizations assessing the Army Contracting Command (Rendon, 2010, Rendon, 2011). All levels, while somewhat subjective, provides general guidance on examining the maturity processes as presented in doctrine. The CMMM assessment results assist in guiding recommendations for contract management process improvement in developing a road map for increasing contract management process capability.

2. **Three Pillars for Integrative Success**

This highly regarded and utilized model by E. Cory Yoder incorporates tools designed for analyzing various aspects of contracting processes designed to achieve an efficient and effective mix of resources. The Three Integrative Pillars for Success (TIPS)
was originally published in *Phase Zero Operations for Integrative Planning* and included as a model in the Gansler Commission. The TIPS created an early contingency contracting model designed to guide activity development in the shaping phase operations. This model, depicted in Figure 6, analyzes three key aspects needed to optimally execute contingency contracting and integration of the function. The incorporation of this model into the research is intended to provide a framed approach in evaluating each area for phase 0 process maturity. Each of the three pillars: personnel, platforms and protocols will be evaluated across single service and supporting a Joint contingency lead service agency.

Figure 6. Three Integrative Pillars for Success

![Three Integrative Pillars for Success](image)

This graphic presented in Naval Postgraduate School’s MN 4371 Acquisition and Contracting Policy class in summer quarter 2015 depicts the Three Integrative Pillars for Success (TIPS) model. This model is updates with the base of Authorizations and Appropriations, different than found in less recent publications (Yoder, 2015a).

**a. Personnel**

This first pillar provides the “critical link between personnel, rank, position, credential and capability” (Yoder, 2010b, p. 42). This pillar recognizes that an organization needs the right mix of credentialed personnel including both acquisition and
non-acquisition workforce. OCS is a spectrum of activities that incorporates more than logistical contracting tasks. Effective OCS planning and supporting OCS plans are developed through non-acquisition personnel integrating the plan throughout each staff section, requiring activity, commander, and engaging the acquisition staff early. Evaluating the pillar means looking at both the skills and mix of both acquisition and non-acquisition personnel. Also, personnel also include rating the level of integration of OCS across staffs in the planning process. Personnel includes all stakeholders influencing the planning process.

The timing, mix and credentials of personnel in logistics planning during phase 0 directly impacts the later stages of executing OCS ad contingency contracting. The Gansler Commission cited multiple personnel issues, including the lack of credentialed staff as a contributor to contracting management issues in Iraq and Afghanistan. Each service approaches both acquisition and non-acquisition/logistics career fields differently. Contracting officers are not the only key players in planning for contingencies. Pivotal stakeholders and influencers in OCS planning and operations are the non-acquisition workforce. These include acquisition planners, the requiring activity personnel, commanders, and policy-makers. Determining the appropriate credentials for both groups of personnel (acquisition and non-acquisition) to support OCS missions appropriate across all services can prevent the historical mistakes (in the Gansler Commission) and reduce the risk of fraud, waste and abuse.

b. Platforms

The second pillar of integrative success must work in harmony with the other pillars, personnel, and protocols. Platforms are the hardware, software and reporting systems enabling integration throughout the OCS process. These platforms proved the needed conduit for analysis, decision-making, and integration. Examples of these include Joint systems, like Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) now replaced by the Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) system.
c. **Protocols**

The third pillar, protocols, are defined as rules, regulations, and business processes that guide and define phase 0/shaping phase. Similar to the CMMM model, doctrine can range from unit standard operating procedures to formalized doctrine. The primary doctrine in OCS is the Joint Publication (JP) 4–10 Operational Contract Support. While single service missions using OCS might be less complex in scope and size, this regulation provides a good foundation to begin OCS planning. Additionally, any service embedded into a Joint operation task force requires an understanding of this framework and associated key players to “plug into” the logistics capabilities and assets. The lack of the OCS framework and knowledge could result in inefficiencies on the battlefield and risk redundancies in procuring for the supported mission.

3. **Hybrid Integrative Planning Maturity Model for Operational Contract Support**

This project uses a hybrid of both the above described models (CMMM and TIPS) creating a frame to analyze existing OCS doctrine, personnel structures, and available platforms for maturity in recorded organization-wide planning procedures. The framework shown in Figure 7 reflects only the planning aspect of the CMMM model and utilizes the levels of maturity as a gauge for analyzing planning activities organized around the Three Pillars of Integrative Success. The TIPS pillars are modified to reflect personnel to include both acquisition and non-acquisition. The remaining pillars, protocols, and platforms remain non-acquisition as OCS planning named in Army doctrine as a logistical task. The purpose of the Hybrid Integrative Planning Maturity Model (HIPMM) was to identify the level of maturity of current OCS planning guidance and resources. With this evaluation, I will recommend strategies suitable for multi-services in developing an OCS strategy ensuring an integrated and optimized focused solution.
This model was developed by merging two published acquisition models, the Yoder Three Pillars for Integrative Success (C) with the Contracting Management Maturity Model (C) model.
Level 1: Ad Hoc

The ad hoc designation indicates an undefined level of OCS planning process maturity. An organization at this level lacks focused OCS planning resources and the inclusion of acquisition assets occurs on the identification of a requirement during mission execution.

Level 2: Basic

The basic maturity level indicates an early or initial stage of process maturity as reflected with the identification of some OCS planning resources within the organization. For example, acquisition member(s) are assigned to support an organization for only specific contingencies and are primarily responsible for OCS planning tasks. Further, the acquisition specific planning tasks identified may be defined by the attached or assigned acquisition staff versus the operational unit’s doctrine or procedures. The non-acquisition planner also is identified only in contingencies, and might be the logistician who works with the acquisition staff to carry out execution tasks including requirements generation and contract management. Platforms, formal or informal, are developed but not required.

Level 3: Structured

The structured level indicates that an organization has formally documented OCS planning resources developed and assigned across each pillar. The acquisition OCS planning personnel are identified and assigned to the organization during all phases of operations. The non-acquisition OCS planner, to include the logistician, are identified and documented, although not necessarily co-located with the acquisition personnel. The planning protocols include both acquisition specific and logistical tasks. Finally, planning platforms are developed, and required during the planning process.

Level 4: Integrated

The integrated level reflects a process maturity that includes OCS planning tasks throughout different office and functions in an organization beyond solely logistical and acquisition concerns. Organization doctrine or standard operating procedures include the recognition of working board, task groups, or an inclusion of OCS considerations in forums that include all staff elements. These tasks could include key staff offices, requiring activities, and an inclusion of commander’s guidance early into the OCS
planning process. Additionally, external stakeholders and their concerns are recognized in doctrine, procedures, communications and working groups. At the integrated level, OCS planning is enabled by acquisition personnel permanently assigned to a supported organizational throughout all phases and working with an identified non-acquisition OCS planner. Finally, the planning platforms enabling this function are both required and integrated into the organizational processes.

**Level 5: Optimized**

The highest level of maturity fully integrates OCS considerations with the assigned acquisition personnel, non-acquisition planners, supporting staff and stakeholders into the planning process. This level of optimization within an organization is enabled through permanently assigned acquisition staff integrated into the supported unit’s staff during all phases of operations. The non-acquisition OCS planner is permanently assigned to the organization’s staff working to integrate the function across all other staff and stakeholders. This trained and validated OCS focused planner provides continuous staff and commander support for shaping phase operations to include readiness exercises. The supporting doctrine identifies and defines performance metrics that continuously improves the OCS planning process and outcomes. Finally, a lessons learned platform, in addition to OCS planning platforms, is integrated into the core organizational process.

In conclusion, the above Hybrid Model, HIPMM, will be used to analyze the available OCS planning doctrine, personnel structures, and platforms available in Joint and Army OCS and contingency contracting arenas. The intent of this project is develop an understood maturity of the available OCS planning tools, as various organizations may use these tools as models for developing their own OCS capabilities. Evaluating the OCS planning tools starts with first understanding the current Joint OCS framework and is necessary to build a common vocabulary.
B. OPERATIONAL CONTRACT SUPPORT FRAMEWORK

1. OCS Definition and Framework (JP 4–10)

Joint Publication (JP) 4–10 Operational Contract Support is the primary doctrine for Joint force OCS related operations. Each military department supports OCS and the combatant commander by preparing to act as both the requiring activity and the contracting task authority (CJCS, 2014). While the OCS framework is not prescribed for single service operational use, the doctrine can inform and shape effective supporting doctrine and best practices. The basic principles of OCS describe that Phase 0 significantly impacts all stages of an operation, underscoring the need of all services to prepare and institutionalize this function for Joint operation preparedness.

a. 2014 Contingency Contracting and Operational Contract Support Definition

The release of the 2014 version of the Joint Publication Operational Contract Support finds both the terms OCS and contingency contracting separately defined.

Contingency contracting is a subset of OCS and includes the process of contracting for supplies, services, and construction from commercial sources in support of contingency operations. Contingency contracting, by definition, is conducted by contracting officers warranted under authorities granted to the Services, CSAs, and functional CCMDs under Title 10, USC, in accordance with (IAW) rules established in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS), Service FAR supplements (Title 48, Code of Federal Regulations and applicable contingency contracting acquisition instructions. (CJCS, 2014, p I-4)

This implies that contingency contracting can be executed and managed without the OCS hierarchy in a single service construct. Leading an OCS function in a Joint command requires an understanding of the framework. OCS as a process of planning for and obtaining supplies occurs in a framework of three pillars appropriate for any phase of the operation (CJCS, 2014c).
b. **OCS Planning Framework**

The OCS planning framework separates the process into three functions requiring separate, but cohesive planning products. The three functions are depicted in Figure 8.

![Operational Contract Support Framework](image)

**Contract Support Integration**

The first pillar requires an understanding of the operational environment and stakeholders (requiring activity, multinational players and effect of OCS across each staff) integrating through OCS-related working groups. These efforts are intended to extend across multi-disciplinary teams ensuring that each staff, stakeholder, and agency articulates their function, capability or need for consideration in the OCS planning process. The publication emphasizes that OCS planning is an operational, and not specifically an acquisition effort.

**Contracting Support**

The second pillar focuses on planning the actual function of contracting support from requirements identification through contract closeout. This is carried out by both acquisition and non-acquisition personnel. Requirements determination in JP 4–10: “encompasses all activities necessary to develop, consolidate, coordinate, validate, approve, and prioritize Joint force contract support requirements. Requirements determination is an operational command function (who can designate a lead requiring activity to conduct this function), not a contracting activity function” (CJCS, 2014, p. I-4). This has skill set implications at the operational staff level discussed in the analysis section.

**Contractor Management**

This function emphasizes the need to include into a plan how to manage (and sustain for) the amount of contractors required for an operation. The responsibility for deliberately planning and executing this task, in JP 4–10, needs to be integrated early across the staff which is primarily a non-acquisition staff function. Figure 9, found in Joint Publication 4-10, provides a an example of OCS contractor management planning tasks and risk assessment opportunities as integrated across a joint staff (CJCS, 2014, p. V2).
Figure 9. Contractor Management Staff Tasks


The three pillars provide a context to develop the OCS supporting plan both in a Joint or single service construct. The integration of OCS across stakeholders provides consistency of thought in planning for OCS and managing contractors on the battlefield. This occurs on both the Joint Task Force level, as well as apply to a service-specific operational staff. The contract support pillar provides the emphasis to any level staff utilizing OCS, that the requirements determination process is part of a larger scope, and lead by the requiring activity/supported unit/task force. Finally, that managing and supporting contractors emphasized as it is part of the cost and needs be considered as a deliberate activity.
2. Contracting Roles

Each service must decide what role, or levels of roles are appropriate for a mission and develop the needed supporting OCS acquisition and non-acquisition structures. JP 4–10 covers the roles and responsibilities within the context of an operation. A service can play one of three roles in an operation as designated by the geographic combatant commander. The designation of each, which does not necessarily happen in single service lead contingencies, depends on the complexity, length and other factors. The establishment of a Joint Theater Support Contracting Command (J-TSCC) is described more in detail within Army doctrine, and later in the chapter. The understanding here is that integration becomes more complex as the number of services and international players become involved. This circumstance requires a different skill set for a short term Lead Service Contracting Command (LCSS) in a limited contingency versus the JTSCC as seen in Iraq and Afghanistan. There is a significant distinction between the LSCC and the Lead Service for Contracting (LCS). The LCSS retains the responsibility for contracting with their own service versus the LCSS where a service taking on the coordination responsibility for all services. For each service to act as an LSCC, a core set of personnel with the appropriate skills and access to common platforms is key. The remainder of this current doctrine review assumes that each service can create the LSCC capability, not necessarily the J-TSCC.
3. Major Contract Types

Single-service lead operations are characterized by one of three contract types, as identified by JP 4–10. These contract types are typically referred to in Joint and Army doctrine, and the differences between the two require a different approach and role in planning. Primarily, single service contingences would nest with external support contract vehicles in phase, or create a theater support contract.

a. Theater Support Contracts

Most significantly, regardless of acquisition structure within the services, each one executes some level of theater support contracts. These types of contracts apply to both large and small operations though, while they are most associated with recent contracting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Although, each service is not currently
manned to maintain the lead service for a contingency operation that executes all needed theater support contracts for an operational area.

b. **External Support Contracts**

These contracts are associated with external agencies with unique contracting authority. The civil augmentation programs (CAPs), include Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) and requires integration into an operation with a logistics plan

c. **Systems Support Contracts**

OCS is also utilized to support major weapon’s systems, to include repair parts and fielding activities. These two are required as integration into a major combat operation.

4. **Phases of an Operation**

The newly released JP 4–10 (Figure 11) now aligns the phases of notional operational contract support phases with those in JP 3–0 *Operations* (Figure 12). The various contracting authorities are arranged by level of effort from Joint Publication 3–0, *Operations*. Notably, the levels of military effort culminate in phases III and IV in both charts. This implies, that planning for contractor management needs to account for the highest levels of operational ground employment.
Figure 11. Phases of a Joint Operation

![Diagram of Phases of a Joint Operation](image1)


Figure 12. Operational Contract Support Phases

![Diagram of Operational Contract Support Phases](image2)

The phases of OCS execution with the projected military effort overlaid into the phases as depicted in Joint Publication 4–10 (CJCS, 2014, p. I-12). The newest release of JP 4–10 now includes Phase 0, also known as the shaping phase.
JP 4–10’s depiction of the phases of effort describe an essential to types of contracts employed by phase. Differentiating between these types of contracts is key for any logistical planner to understand when employing OCS into their operational plans. The planning phase added the Phase 0, or shaping phase, now aligning the phases of OCS processes to operational processes. The publication also defines phase 0 and provides an emphasis on the critical nature of OCS planning and phase 0 activates on impacting the operational outcomes of a given mission.

**Phase 0 (Shape).** Shape phase missions are designed to dissuade or deter adversaries, develop relationships with, and assure multinational partners, as well as to set conditions for the successful execution of contingency plans and are generally conducted through security cooperation activities. Significant OCS-related phase 0 actions include establishment of contract-related boards, cells, and working groups; gathering OCS analysis of the operational environment information; deliberate planning; and support to security cooperation activities. Contract support to security cooperation activities is generally characterized by low dollar, short-term, locally awarded contracts executed IAW peacetime contracting procedures. OCS security cooperation actions support deliberate OCS planning actions by providing U.S. forces experience and knowledge of the local commercial vendor base and general business climate. (CJCS, 2014, p. I-11)

Phase 0 encompasses more than simply requirements generation activities. In the 2013 article *Phase Zero Contracting Operations—Strategic and Integrative Planning for Contingency and Expeditionary Operations* by E. Cory Yoder and Dayne E. Nix identify Phase 0 as a cyclical process. Here, the intent of Phase 0 is to encompass all activities from planning through contract closeout, as depicted in Figure 13. This means that Phase 0 activities range not just capability gap identification and requirements generation, but also includes developing viable contract vehicles, contract administration and anticipation of claims. For an operational planner, this brings the idea of cost-consciousness to the forefront of planning. As, the true cost of a contract is not just the awarded price, but the hours spent by the operational force to oversee that contract and possible remediation issues for subpar performing contractors. The article also proposes a three-tier model including an integrated planner and executer which is covered in the next chapter describing current Phase 0 best practices.
This contingency contracting phase 0 model found in the 2013 Defense Acquisition Research Journal article *Phase Zero Contracting Operations*. This model recognizes that phase 0 as an iterative process incorporating all operational phases from planning through closeout (Nix & Yoder, 2013, p. 360).

The shaping phase, phase 0 can significantly impact the operational battlefield, later stages of the operation, and the final budget outcome. In fact, JP 4–10 states that a lack of emphasis on this function in phase 0 is a major hindrance in the planning process. This newly added phase requires further definition and understanding of what tasks need to be executed to best leverage OCS capabilities. The services continue to collect best practices and lessons learned to better understand how OCS affects the battlefield economically, fulfill the warfighters needs and avoid fraud, waste and abuse. Currently, several common products assist operational level missions and Joint planning to create feasible OCS plans. These products are discussed below in the examination of OCS planning protocols.
C. EXAMINATION OF CURRENT DOCTRINE AND OCS PLANNING RESOURCES

1. OCS Current Planning Resource Analysis Personnel Pillar

The use of planning and integration cells determines the eventual success of OCS within a theater of operations, as stated in Joint Publication 4–10, Operational Contract Support. Organizational OCS planning and execution is enabled by OCS trained and functional personnel structures tailored to each mission. These cells are not mandated as organic to operational units although they are designed for ongoing operations at the combatant command. Given that operational planning is stated as a non-contracting function, these cells and personnel include non-acquisition OCS planning professionals. Understanding these structures are important to embedding into joint operations and to develop relevant single-service operational planning structures. Additionally, when directed by the geographic combatant commander, the services are generally responsible for OCS activities.

a. Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office

The Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office (JCASO), established in 2008, provides operational and strategic OCS support through deployable teams. They assist all levels across the DOD from combatant commanders in synchronizing to integrating OCS activities into specific operations. Located under the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) this is an ‘on-call’ OCS enabler fills a needed capability in deliberate and crises action planning through embedded OCS planners and formed cells. JCASO assists in institutionalizing OCS across the DOD and provides subject matter experts assisting combatant command, OCS lead service designees and single service lead missions with development. Best practices and analysis of a JCASO OCS planner role as embedded within a combatant command Joint Task Forces staff is reviewed in the next chapter.

b. OCS Integration Cell

This permanent cell embedded in the combatant command primarily plans, coordinates, and integrates OCS-related functions across the staff. According to Joint Publication 4-10, the Operational Contract Support Integration Cell (OCSIC) are
responsible for “gathering and analyzing information”, framing the operational environment in terms of OCS using tools like Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure and Information (PMESII) analysis (CJCS, 2014, p. G-1). This includes elements of the business environment to include capacity, currency, banking capabilities, vendor lists, and the identification of contract vehicles available. The resulting products include The OCSIC should publish its priority countries, OCS analysis data requirements, frequency of reporting, and duties of the Service components in the GCC’s theater campaign plan (CJCS, 2014, p. G-1). The structure of the staff is not prescribed, but the expectation is that the members of the staff have operational OCS experience and can embed/guide a subordinate Joint Forces Command. JP 4–10 mentions that the OCSIC has two JCASO representatives, which depending on the combatant command is a permanent asset aligned within the staff. These cells have performed functions from conducting drawdown operations for United Stated Forces Command-Afghanistan to planning and facilitating OCS actions in recent operation United Assistance in Liberia.

c. **Army Personnel OCS Structures**

(1) Acquisition personnel contracting structures: Army Contracting Command/Expeditionary Contracting Command

Creating OCS supporting personnel structures in any service requires an understanding of the Army contracting structures, as they often provide lead contracting duties in many Joint operations. The U.S. Army’s Contracting Command as well as Expeditionary Contracting Command are recognized throughout the DOD as primary contracting enablers that provide fast and responsive support for contingencies ranging from small and short duration missions to large stability operations (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2014). The ACC defines successful warfighter capability fulfillment as an integrated contracting network. This network includes the customer, or requiring activity, the contracting workforce, the supporting contracting process, and industry partners. The Expeditionary Contracting Command (ECC) provides OCS planning and phase 0 support to both combatant commands and operational units. According to the United States Army Contracting Command in a presentation in February 2015, the execution of OCS operations in Fiscal Year 14 alone had included
over 181 missions in over 52 countries. Contingency support has been provided through a hierarchy of acquisition-specific structures.

The ECC’s acquisition structure is designed to support different sizes of the army’s operational units as described in Figure 14 from Army Technical Publication 4-92, *Contracting to Support Unified Land Operations* (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2014). The ECC’s subordinate unit, the Contract Support Brigade (CSB), is aligned with a combatant command. This alignment creates a habitual relationship in which the CSB acts as the lead contracting provider for the combatant command’s associated operating area. Contracting Support Battalions provide OCS for their assigned theater, field Army, or corps, habitually. The base unit of the contracting structure is the contingency contracting team (CCT) designed to provide support to a brigade-sized element. However, the unit is not necessarily habitually assigned to any specific brigade or unit during shaping operations. Discussed in later chapters are the ongoing brigade level operational readiness exercises that practice OCS support.

![Figure 14. Army Contracting Command’s Basic Acquisition to Non-acquisition Supporting Structures](image)

The intended alignment of acquisition to non-acquisition contingency contracting structures, in the above figure, is found in Army Doctrine *Contracting Support to Unified Land Operations* released in 2014 (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2014, p. 1-12).

Single services can adapt established Army contracting structures to fit small and mid-sized expeditionary operations. The 2014 Army Techniques Publication 4–92,
*Contracting to Support Unified Land Operations,* states that contracting support for small-scale operations at a tactical level are met through organic assets. Pre-arranged contracting vehicles fulfill small capability gaps using established Field Ordering Officers in possession of Government Purchase Cards (GPC) instead of deploying contracting personnel. Contracting for larger needs in an expeditionary environment requires adding non-organic contracting assets to supported Army units.

Contracting with commercial sources in expeditionary environments requires a contracting structure, or team, to work directly with the supported unit. ECC provides contracting authority and expeditionary support by deploying contracting teams. In Fiscal Year 13, over 490 individual contingency contracting officers were deployed to 60 countries. These teams derived contracting authority from the established ECC acquisition structure whose personnel are certified in contracting by the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWAI). Deploying contracting assets requires a basis of oversight and contracting authority separate from command authority and backed by the appropriate DAWAI certified contracting officers.

Operating in a significantly resource-constrained environment puts more pressure on ACC/ECC to determine how best to enable contracting support across multiple organizations. Several challenges face the organization as force reduction plans are implemented:

**Declining resources that require ‘hard choices.’**

**Workforce demographics: 50% have less than 5 years of experience.**

**Post Afghanistan contracting requires retooling/readjusting strategic and operational approaches**

**Increased oversight and regulations:**

(i) 4,000 audits in 4 years

(ii) 450 Federal and Defense acquisition rule changes

(iii) Emerging Missions and resource constraints (United States Army Contracting Command, 2015)
Funding cuts to the ACC/ECC as a whole can reduce the capabilities of an already taxed contracting structure. The risk in moving to a smaller contracting asset structure is that it decreases the availability of personnel to conduct contract administration and closeout prior to the end of an expeditionary operation. In a cost-conscious environment, contract administration and claims accrue additional real and transactional costs, increasing the overall cost of the mission beyond the awarded price of a contract.

Within the HIPMM, ACC as an organization is optimized because it consistently adjusts protocols to adapt to a new operational environment, and provides permanently assigned staff/units to support major Army commands throughout Phase 0. This allows the contracting organization to provide the needed Contracting Authority: the ACC can respond to any size contingency by deploying an appropriate contracting asset depending on mission needs. Single services can look to Army for such best practices to support the development of their own OCS structures. First, providing dedicated acquisition resources that are centrally funded and located provides a focal point to create an effective contracting structure. Second, developing an acquisition workforce that supports professional development and promulgates lessons learned throughout the workforce assists in creating an integrated structure. Additionally, all personnel should understand how ACC/ECC fit into a Joint operation as they often lead the OCS aspect of Joint services.

(2) Non-Acquisition: Operational Contracting Support Officer

The Non-Acquisition: Operational Contracting Support Officer (OCSO) is a skill identifier assigned to Army operational-level representing non-acquisition personnel knowledgeable in the OCS process. A key link between planning and executing a contingency is the non-acquisition and logistics planner. The United States Army established the OCSO skill identifier and course in response to the OCS non-acquisition capability gap. The course prepares non-acquisition mid-grade officers and non-commissioned officers to work as operational level logistical planners that are knowledgeable about the OCS process. OCSO or 3CI is a designator and additional duty assigned to staff members in the Army’s modular units such as Brigade Support Battalions (BSBs) and Heavy Brigade Combat Teams (HBCTs.) Full-time positions have
been intended, in the original plan, for theater support units and Army support commands. The skill identifier is not limited to logistics personnel but integrates across staffs including Communications Officers and key field grade planning slots such as the Support Operations Officer.

The Army is institutionalizing OCS into the non-acquisition workforce by training and credentialing OCS planners within tactical units. The Army Logistics University administers and credentials the 3CI Army Skill Identifier, which indicates OCS training. This course appears to cover tactical level OCS execution and touches on the Joint-planning framework and key requirements for generating documents. From an operational planning perspective, this course reviews OCS in the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) and spends time on ethical and legal considerations. Outside of doctrine, participants are exposed to the effects of OCS on the battlefield. This includes an introduction to the Money as a Weapon System and the risk of unintended consequences on the battlefield in the form of corruption and a local disruption of the economy. Joint planning documents are also discussed such as the OCS Annex W. On completion of the course, graduates receive the skill identifier notated on their personnel service records.

From a non-acquisition perspective, this course and the embedded skill identifier provide the needed focus at the operational level to institutionalize OCS across the Army. The doctrinal primary duties of these planners include many supported unit functions:

Advise commander and staff regarding OCS matters.

Coordinate and manage unit OCS training.

Integrate OCS matters/requirements among the staff.

Participate in unit operational planning teams to apply OCS expertise to the planning process.

Develop, review: Statements of Work (SOW)/Performance Work Statements (PWSs), Independent Government Estimates (IGEs), requirement justification documentation, and purchase requests.

Coordinate staffing and submittal of requirements packages.
Monitor, track and coordinate required unit actions associated with: Requirements package processing, awarded contracts, contracting officer representatives and receiving officials, and interface with supporting contracting activities, such as Contingency Contracting Teams (CCT)s and Regional Contracting Offices (RCOs). (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2011, p. 2–5)

Currently, OCSO provides a first step to train non-acquisition personnel, at an operational level, to become active and informed OCS participants. At the operational level, previous efforts to plan and execute contingency contracting relied on the interactions between the assigned acquisition staff and the supported unit during the mission. Now, non-acquisition education fulfills the Gansler Commission’s capability gap by providing operational units the planning tools. As the force enters focused initial entry operations in a post-Iraq and Afghanistan era, the need for these planners will increase.

Within the HIPMM, non-acquisition personnel structures are rated as integrated level. This level was assessed because now OCS planners still being assigned to Army units and then trained. Optimization in the model occurs when this course and the trained personnel are fully integrated into Army personnel. Once the slots are created and filled with 3C designated individuals, the rating will become optimized. Overall, formally trained OCS non-acquisition personnel integrated throughout each Army tactical level unit begins to institutionalize this function throughout the force. Other services can use a similar tactic, identifying key personnel needed to plan OCS into operations and provide them the needed formal training to accomplish this mission.

d. Conclusion:

The evaluation of Joint Forces OCS planning acquisition and non-acquisition personnel structures reflects a HIPMM optimized rating. Within a joint task force environment, the permanent assignment and integration of the Army Contracting Command’s Contract Support Brigades provide an optimized structure. The ACC provides flexible contracting solutions for the assignment Combatant Commander and associated Joint Task Forces as supported units. Similarly, the permanent assignment of
non-acquisition OCS planning focused working boards and ongoing assignment of personnel in the JCASO office provides an optimized rating.

The evaluation of Army Forces OCS planning acquisition and non-acquisition personnel structures reflects a staggered HIPMM rating. At an operational level, the alignment of the acquisition structure, the Contracting Battalion, with major operational commands provides OCS shaping resources and earns a HIPMM optimized rating. The development of the Operational Contract Support Officer 3C skill identifier as a duty within the operational unit staff will provide an optimized structure once the slotting and education is completed. Until then, the non-acquisition planners are integrated based on individual commands structures. This researcher did not query each of the supported commands for the identification of these structures outside of a joint task force construct. So, the assumption is this is filled, and the resulting evaluated level is integrated.

2. Examination of Current Doctrine and OCS Platform Planning Resources

Many of the systems available for OCS planning can range from informal systems to larger Joint focused systems. Some of the available Joint systems and contractor planning systems are briefly covered and explained.

a. Adaptive Planning and Execution

The Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) is the Department of Defense (DOD) primary platform for planning a theater campaign in Joint environments assumes that the planning process is ongoing. For OCS, this implies that contingency contracting is not to be reactive and requires constant planning throughout all phases, instead of being constrained to planning in phase 0 (Sweeney, 2013).

b. Joint Lessons Learned Program/Information System

The Joint Lessons Learned Program/Information System (JLLIS) platform is an effort to collect lessons learned and share OCS-related experiences. Combatant commands and Joint forces collect this data and which is then shared with other organizations. The Government Accountability Office reports that combatant commands
and the Army are making and improving efforts to collect OCS lessons learned. Currently, efforts are being made towards requiring all services to fully develop service specific OCS guidance (Russell, 2015).

c. **Synchronized Pre-deployment and Operational Tracker**

The Synchronized Pre-deployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT) system is intended to store contract and contractor information for contingency operations. This system applies not only to Joint operation, but to any acquisition over $100,000 with contractors deployed more than thirty days. The ability to track and manage contractors ultimately assists the commander in making informed decisions directly affecting the battlefield.

d. **Summary**

The platforms discussed reflect an optimized level of support as multiple systems are required and linked into the core organization processes. The OCS planning platforms available include contractor accountability, development of informed and integrated across staff OCS plans, and the sharing of lessons learned. The diversity of systems reflects the trend to integrate OCS across staff, stakeholders and supported units. Conclusive evidence that combatant commands and service components use these systems consistently was not available at the time of writing this MBA project.


The amount of Operational Contract Support focused products is extensive, to include the following: financial management guidance, published standard operating procedures, logistics planning, task lists, commissions reviewing ongoing operations, and lessons learned. The following doctrine/protocol analysis focuses on a few key Department of Defense level OCS planning guidance documents and Army specific doctrine. The evaluation of protocol will do two things, first to understand what planning/phase 0 considerations have developed. Second, to evaluate the Army’s available protocols for maturity within this project’s specific, HIPMM model.
This project uses three strategies to evaluate and determine the OCS tasks relevant to all services. First, I review each document for specific phase 0 definitions and tasks. Second, I extract key tasks directed to combatant commanders as possibly relevant to a service specific, operational level commander. Finally, I conclude by reviewing the stated tasks listed as relevant to phase 0 operations. The limitation of this doctrine/protocol review is in the date of publication as this is important in understanding the assumptions of each document. All documents were published prior to the end of major operations in Afghanistan and still need analysis for efficacy in post Afghanistan/Iraq operations that include initial entry, versus entering into a mature stability focused theater.

a. Guidance for Employment of the Force

The Guidance for Employment for the Force (GEF) is the highest level protocols providing strategic guidance for planning including contingency contracting (Sweeney, 2013). This assists in linking the strategic view and goals to the operational plan. Significantly, this guidance requires planning for OCS in all phases of the operation, similar to the Yoder Phase 0 model. The combatant commanders assigned to develop a contracting plan for a joint task for can delegate this function to any service. The assigned service is required to develop a specific contingency plan.

The adaptive planning assumed into the GEF processes creates a need for proactive OCS throughout the entirety of the operations process. The combatant commander retains the capability to revise plans quickly through the assumption that planning is ongoing. Within an OCS context, creating, adapting and revising real time missions required on-going situational awareness of the effects of contracting on the battlefield and how those changes affect the budget.

b. Joint Publication 4–10 Operational Contract Support

JP 4–10 version 2014 (CJCS, 2014) built on the 2008 version creates a framework providing OCS planning solutions. A key change/addition to this doctrine was the addition of phase 0 or the shaping phase, now aligning with the planning phases in operational planning doctrine. The addition of the shaping phase to the OCS notional phase model highlights the importance of planning, training, and exercising for OCS.
throughout the force. OCS readiness was mandated in the 2013 National Defense Authorization Act and still requires further definition to successfully incorporate into training exercises. Although, the meaning of this readiness, and at what level this is appropriate, is still be determined. The various Joint and Army OCS and contingency contracting exercises will be discussed in Chapter IV.

c. **Department of Defense Instruction 3020.41 Operational Contract Support (2011)**

The institutionalization of OCS into the DOD and service components begins with developed doctrine. This Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) originally published in 2005 and re-released in 2011 sets policies and procedures for OCS. The applicability includes all DOD operations as directed by the combatant commander, and all DOD components. This document established planning OCS actions to include fully considering planning, integration, and execution as directed by the combatant commander. This document identifies key OCS focal points and responsibilities for doctrine development and planning. The document established a DOD level emphasis on the importance of developing comprehensive OCS plans providing a vision.

**OCS Vision:** optimize operational unity of effort by analyzing existing and projected theater support and external support contracts to minimize, reduce, and eliminate redundant and overlapping requirements and contracted capabilities. (Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD[AT&L]), 2011, p. 42)

Reducing waste, redundancy of effort, and achieving efficiency through creating unity of effort requires an OCS strategy and phase 0 preparations. The institutionalization of OCS into the DOD and service components begins with developed doctrine.

COCOM OCS planning considerations are described through the document. These recommended OCS combatant command level planning tasks can easily adapted into single service led phase 0 activities. Additionally, this doctrine prescribes specific planning considerations into developed policy, doctrine, training and operations. The named tasks required by the combatant commander to subordinate service components is depicted in Figure 15 (USD[AT&L], 2011, p. 41).
Shaping phase planning activities can assist in fulfilling the above tasks in support of contingency operations. First, that personnel are appropriately trained and proficient in developing acquisition requirement documentation. Additionally, the supporting contractor management plan too, is resourced with the appropriate organic oversight capability. Finally, that all planning occurred in an integrated environment including intelligence analysis and contractor vetting and personnel reporting procedures are normalized across the staff. While prescribed to subordinate commander’s participating in a Joint operation, they can be easily adapted into lower level OCS policies. More tasks can be extracted for service specific tasks through analyzing combatant commander’s responsibilities.
d. Army Tactics Techniques and Procedures 4–10 Operational Contract Support

The Army Tactics Techniques and Procedures (ATTP) for Operational Contract Support first emerged in 2011. The pre-Gansler Commission lineage of this 1999 document focuses on the contractor’s on the battlefield emphasis in contingency contracting. The 2011 version, released during ongoing stability operations articulates OCS actions surrounding Relief In Place/Transfer of Authority.

This document is a key document in applicability of OCS doctrine to other services. The stated intent is to inform Brigade and above commanders and staff in executing OCS in full spectrum operations (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2011a). At the time of writing this thesis, a multi-service version of this document is in the works and soon-to-be-released. As a result, I will briefly overview this document, and provide critical analysis of what the document is missing from an operational planning perspective, as compared to the previously reviewed Army OCS doctrine.

The Army Tactics Techniques and Procedures for Operational Contract Support first emerged in 2011. This document describes at a tactical level standard tactics, techniques and procedures developed for OCS aimed at commanders and non-acquisition personnel. This begins with a distilled OCS framework and process from JP 4–10, described earlier in this chapter while expanding on best practices. The overall process is aptly described in Figure 16.
This depiction of the OCS process synchronizing during the Military Decision Making Process. The Army publication Operational Contract Support Tactics, Techniques and Procedures published this in 2011 for the primary audience of Army Brigade staffs or higher. (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2011a, p. 2–1).

This graphically depicts some of the horizontal integration required during a contracting operation. The JFC/Army Requirements Board can simply be exchanged with the relevant services oversight. The actual process is relevant regardless of the location of the contracting officer, as funding, source selection, and COR nomination process all occur within the process. The implied integration tasks include legal, resource management, finance, a contracting officer representative and service specific oversight.

This publication must take into account the current operational realities and environment to inform operational units on OCS processes and capabilities. The 2014 post-Afghanistan operational environment does not support simply entering a mature
theater of operations and conducting a transfer of authority with a unit. Future operations remain smaller, uncertain in destination and may require initial entry through theater closeout. This requires defined phased activities including timeliness, recommended contract management structures and contracting specific capability gap considerations. The ATTP discusses several planning considerations important to defining OCS in a new operational environment.

This is a key consideration when considering if and what services to procure in an overseas environment. A command must make an informed decision as whether to augment a mission with support, as recent operations reflect more than providing logistical support in operations.

**Procurement lead time:**

An operational planner needs to understand how long the lead time for the delivery of goods, especially when including non-organic procurement team into the operation. The Gansler commission cited late inclusion of contracting officers, at less than adequate numbers, as a main contributor to the levels of fraud, waste and abuse occurring in Iraq. The regulation offers a graphic, Figure 17, depicting a time phased version of procurement tasks and integration with the requiring activity and the special staff designated officer (3C) (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2011a). The activities of a 3C skilled staff can supplement the tactical or operational unit’s contracting capabilities in the early planning stages of an operation requiring contracted support.
The notional contract support timeline graphic from the 2011 ATTP 4–10 *Operational Contract Support Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures* provides a timeline depicting the separation of duties between a contracting officer representative and an OCS 3C staff officer (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2011a).

**Unauthorized commitment and ratification:**

The command must understand the risk and remedy of unauthorized commitments and authorizations. This is specifically important when establishing effective Contracting Officer Representative oversight and limitation of authority. Incurring an unauthorized commitment, as a result of uninformed actions, and the resulting ramifications can provide a level of visibility and reduced efficiency in a high-operational tempo environment.

**Importance of integration across staff:**

A common misconception of OCS is that the function resides within the logistics staff. OCS integration is left to the definition of the operational planner. Lessons learned underscore the importance of including all staff members into the planning process. Defining the tasks common to each staff section can assist in relaying the importance of horizontal integration. Additionally, the OCS planning process that includes the requiring
activity, the tactical unit and the commander’s strategic priorities describes the vertical integration required for effective OCS execution.

**Phase 0/shaping phase activities are key to OCS success:**

The mention of phase 0 in the ATTP acknowledges the importance of this phase.

**Effects of contracting on the battlefield:**

Joint Publication 4–10 states that OCS directly impacts the civil-military aspects of the battlefield. For an operational commander utilizing OCS, the goal might be to avoid harmful or adverse effects while filling tactical needs. Awareness that specific preferences embedded into the contracting process can create favorable effects on the battlefield. The Joint planning process relies on operational framing and the art of the field grade officer leading this effort, ideally a graduate of an intermediate/field grade level course. This document fills a gap in the absence of extensive formal accrediting non-acquisition focused OCS education. For services and agencies developing operational OCS specific guidance, this document can easily be adjusted to operational level phase 0 planning considerations.

Overall, this document provides detailed tactical guidance for the non-acquisition focused staff and requiring activities. The limitation of this document is in the apparent assumption that initial entry operations are not part of the tactical OCS mission set. Using this doctrine provides a structured approach for those organizations lacking doctrine. Moving from a structured to a more integrated maturing occurs once this document is accepted into an organization and becomes part of the OCS planning process.

**e. 2014 Army Training Publication 4–92 Contracting Support to Unified Land Operations**

Contracting in Unified Land Operations, written in 2014, for operational commander’s and staff, provides a description of how contracting fits into major Army and Joint forces (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2014). Overall, this document provides the best overview and understanding of how the Army acquisition structures and process work. This can act as a primer for any service’s logistical officers or OCS
planners embedding into Army OCS lead operations. The primary contracting unit, the Contracting Support Brigade (CSB), often acts as the lead service in Joint operations and key tasks to support the combatant commander includes de-conflicting contracting actions between other services. This implies that each service might conduct their own contracting in an area of operations and requires a focal point to contact. The efficiency gained here is understanding the primary logistic and acquisition focal point of contact within ongoing operations, which can be chaotic during high-tempo operational phases. The need to exercise OCS in phase 0 operations provides the opportunities for all services to integrate their OCS capabilities/assets.

Phase 0 planning and shaping activities relevant for all services can be extracted from the CSB tasks in this regulation. Phase 0 is defined as Joint Publication 5–0’s phasing model and is recognized as peacetime (not contingency operations) conditions where participation in on-site contracting support, exercises, and training events contribute to unit readiness and on preparation of acquisition personnel. There is an acknowledgement that OCS dependence may be increasing as the Army is reduced in size thus placing a greater emphasis on Phase 0/shaping operations. This regulation states that while the CSB plays a critical role in the OCS planning process, the primary responsibility resides with the component commands. The CSB doctrinally conducts specific phase 0 planning activities include, but not limited to the, following general tasks as updated from Army Technical Publication 4–92, *Contract to Support Unified Land Operations* in Figure 18 (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2014, p. 2–2).
These tasks reside in phase 0. The above tasks were grouped into a few titles, and the supporting text is from the regulation. The Phase 0 education that ACC provides to stakeholders, in Figure 19, reflects the complexity of OCS beyond logistics, to include subjects like ethics, fiscal law, law of war, and Status of Foreign Forces. These phase 0 activities reflect a high level of integration appropriate for a higher level of OCS and acquisition experience rather than being appropriate for newly warranted contracting officers. In practice, Army OCS exercises include both acquisition and non-acquisition personnel and best practices are further discussed in the following chapters.
Army Training Publication 4–92 Contracting in Unified Land Operations published in 2014 presents a figure that describes training available from Army Contracting Command. The variety of training reflects the complexity that contracting brings to a battlefield (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2014, p. 2–19).

**f. Army Regulation 715-9 Operational Contract Support Planning and Management**

This publication, released in 2011 a few years after the Gansler Commission and amid ongoing stability operations, intends to prescribe OCS planning roles and responsibilities in contingency environments. Originally released in 1999, this regulation still has the hallmarks of the original contingency contracting focus as specific guidance for contractors accompanying the force. The 2011 version includes and significantly expands the original contractor deployment coordinating instruction, contingency contracting coordinating tasks to high level Army staff, and non-acquisition guidance regarding the appropriateness of specific services (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2011b). For services looking to create and expand their own institutional knowledge, this regulation is intended to provide non-acquisition focused contingency contracting guidance applicable to the Army operational level (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2011b). This document provides insight on which staff members and agencies are charged as the focal point of specific OCS aspects.
1. **Contractor management development.**

   Focal point for training and managing specific aspects of OCS management, such as contractor management and tracking through SPOT and maintaining the appropriate mix of contracting versus organic support (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2011b).

2. **Education development.**

   Appoints offices to manage the OCS aspect and embedding into Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2011b).

3. **Policy Development.**

   Identifies the office at the Army staff level offices responsible for OCS policy development, both acquisition and non-acquisition/logistics focused (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2011b).

4. **Integrate OCS planning across staff functions.**

   The regulation identifies key areas of OCS integration by naming specific functions in key staff areas (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2011). The offices/areas considered include, legal, resource management, mortuary affairs, medical command, G-1 contracting accountability reporting, G-2 vetting of contractor linguists, surgeon for pre-deployment contractor responsibilities, and criminal investigations to act as the ethical/fraud investigative arm of OCS.

   The list is linear and non-exhaustive, but the identified tasks can assist the operational single service planner a starting point to consider integrating tasks across a smaller elements. The limitation here is integration is not considered vertically with stakeholders, requiring activities and the tactical personnel executing and overseeing OCS within a specific operation.

   Key to phase 0, for acquisition and non-acquisition professionals, is the preparation of an Annex W, or Contract Support Plan (CSP). Army Regulation (AR) 715-9 Operational Contract Support Planning and Management (2011) describes key steps and functions required in phase 0, applicable to all services aimed at a non-acquisition audience. The primary responsibility for this names Army operational level planners to
develop “orchestrated, synchronized, and detailed” contract support plans as supporting an operation orders (OPORDs) (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2011b).

Operational planners focusing on initial entry operations must consider the appropriateness and the cost versus capability gained of included contracted services support into an operation. This regulation provides a detailed and well-developed description and guidance appropriate for OCS planner regarding the inherently governmental functions, aimed at non-acquisition processinals. Beyond the basic definition, several restrictions and considerations are suggested when including contracted service support in a course of action. Some of these considerations include: Direction and control of combat and crisis situations, budgeting, and policy decisions (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2011b, p. 22). These considerations are important to operational level personnel considering when to contract out services.

g. Summary Protocols

There are multiple documents recording various aspects of OCS planning doctrine applicable to various levels. The inclusion of lessons learned protocols in the documents gives it an integrated rating. The elements of optimization do exist, notably external stakeholders are mentions, and tasks are defined for multiple staff sections. The lack of published metrics to measure the efficiency of planning tasks is lacking. Notably, a capability gap remains with initial entry operations lacking significant operational level planning factors. Common phase 0 themes were apparent through analyzing the themes in each document, tasks to commander’s, and identified phase 0 planning factors. For example, multiple documents describe the term inherently governmental function’ as a factor in considering services contracts. Additionally, procurement lead-time was mentioned in several documents although, only one provides a narrative and supporting graphic. These themes, necessary to initial entry operations and making procurement decisions were highlighted and expanded on in each section.

The author recommends consolidating contingency contracting OCS planning factors relevant to single services. Some areas to consider:
Definitions of: inherently governmental function, procurement lead time, unauthorized commitment and ratifications, effects of contracting on the battlefield, and the importance of phase shaping phase activities (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2011a, p. 2–1).

Identifying key activities in the contingency contracting shaping phase at an operational level to include: Analyze the operational environment, develop operational contracting plan, requiring activity preparation and integration with contracting staff, lessons learned gathering, sharing and archiving. (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2014, p. 2–2).

Defining inherently governmental function considerations to include: Direction and control of combat and crisis situations, budgeting, and policy decisions (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2011b, p. 22).

Contingency contracting executed at an operational level may be lesser in scope than that of a Joint Task Force. Still, understanding how to frame the operational environment without an OCSIC, and identify the focal points of contact to leverage a business base in a contingency environment are important tasks.

D. SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS/CONCLUSION

This chapter conducted an analysis of current OCS and contingency contracting resources. This analysis was conducted with the Hybrid Integrative Planning Maturity Model (HIPMM) model. This model was adapted to evaluate the maturity of OCS planning doctrine from two well-known acquisition and procurement models The Yoder Three Integrated Pillars of Success (TIPS) and the Contract Management Maturity Model (CMMM). I evaluated Joint and Army OCS planning doctrine, personnel structures, and protocols for maturity, at an operational level. Figures 20 and 21 reflect the findings of each section. The color-coding and designation, as explained in the methodology section, relates to the evidence found in published doctrine and GAO reports as evidence of the maturity of each pillar.
## Figure 20. HIPMM for Joint Task Force Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Maturity Level</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>Protocols</th>
<th>Platforms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5 Optimized</td>
<td>Acquisition member or unit <em>permanently</em> assigned to supported unit, and integrated into NA staff during all phases.</td>
<td>NA planner <em>permanently</em> assigned to supported unit and integrated into acquisition staff.</td>
<td>Performance metrics as well as planning tasks defined for all staff sections, and external stakeholders identified.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Integrated</td>
<td>Acquisition staff assigned and integrated into supported unit during all phases.</td>
<td>NA planner integrated into supporting acquisition staff.</td>
<td>Broad planning tasks defined for all staff sections, and external stakeholders identified.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Structured</td>
<td>Acquisition staff assigned to support organization staff during all phases.</td>
<td>NA planner assigned but not integrated.</td>
<td>Only logistical and acquisition planning tasks defined.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Basic</td>
<td>Acquisition personnel assigned only for contingencies.</td>
<td>NA planner identified only for contingencies.</td>
<td>Only acquisition planning tasks defined.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Ad-Hoc</td>
<td>Acquisition personnel neither assigned nor integrated into supported unit.</td>
<td>NA planner unidentified.</td>
<td>Planning tasks undefined.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maturity Level</td>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>Non-Acquisition (NA)</td>
<td>Protocols</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Optimized</td>
<td>Acquisition member or unit assigned to supported unit, and integrated into NA staff during all phases.</td>
<td>NA planner assigned to supported unit and integrated into acquisition staff.</td>
<td>Performance metrics as well as planning tasks defined for all staff sections, and external stakeholders identified.</td>
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<td>NA planner unidentified.</td>
<td>Planning tasks undefined.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Platforms

Within a Joint Forces, and Joint Task Force construction, the platforms pillar is rated as optimized reflecting organizational planning incorporating OCS planning factors in system working across staff functions and phases of the operation. The use of formal planning structures in a joint task force environment includes APEX in planning and JJLIS in lessons learned. The Army Forces level also utilized a lessons learned platform,
while allowing for operational level planning resources to incorporate OCS planning factors. Therefore, the Army Forces command receives an optimized rating in the HIPMM.

2. **Protocols**

The protocol pillar was found as integrated for both Joint and Army doctrine, as the planning doctrine reflects an acknowledgement of both acquisition and non-acquisition tasks are articulated across staff members. Although, performance metrics were not published, although may be held within specific combatant commands. JP 4-10 specifically mentions the assignment of mission specific metrics to the OSCIC, so possible this is optimized at each individual combatant command. The primary weaknesses of the reviewed protocols include too much literature with varying levels of focus ranging from strategic to tactical level. Additionally, a capability gap was identified at the operational level planning guidance applicable to initial entry, midsized single service missions.

3. **Personnel**

Both the Joint and Army operational command’s acquisition personnel were found as optimized as contracting units are assigned habitually to supported units. The Army Contracting Command’s Brigade supports combatant commands along with the Contingency Contracting Battalion (CCBn) supporting major Army Command’s during all phases of operations, to include readiness exercises. Joint force non-acquisition personnel structures were rated as optimized as multiple structures multi-disciplinary OSC Integration Cell, and permanent assignment/availability of the Joint Contracting Acquisition Support Office. The Army specific non-acquisition personnel structure was rated as optimized with the creation of the 3C skill identifier embedded into operational staff structures.

The above analysis of OCS resources as ranging from integrated to optimized in maturity, and appropriate for the services. The military services looking to adapt Army and Joint doctrine into their own can use this to guide the level of maturity needed to support their decided role within OCS operations. Deciding what level guidance is
needed based on that role, ranging from participating in Joint exercises to allowing operational units the capability to support/augment a contingency with OCS. With that guidance, extracting tasks relevant for smaller scale (not lead service operations). Additionally, each service’s new doctrine needs takes into account the need to incorporate initial entry operations, not just RIP/TOA factors. Overall, the guidance specific to a single service lead operational level mission is scattered among multiple documents.
IV. CURRENT PRACTICE OF OCS IN THE SHAPING PHASE

Institutionalizing Operational Contract Support, as a key defense capability, requires all services to define the planning actions to develop and maintain this function. Developing this function with other services’ current doctrine and personnel structures requires a focus on their training and exercises. This chapter investigates the tactics, techniques, and procedures in Army and Joint readiness exercises executed during the shaping phase. To do this, first, I will describe the current OCS operational environment and recent challenges in institutionalizing OCS across the forces. Next, I will describe the practice of the Army’s inclusion of OCS in tactical-level exercises. Then, I will describe OCS exercises executed at the combatant command level. Finally, I will evaluate each exercise for tiered integration as described in Yoder’s Three Tier Model (c).

A. OCS AND CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING

The practice of OCS in the DOD are affected by both the current operational environment and the problems OCS faces institutionalizing across the forces. Current doctrine focuses on units transitioning into an established and mature theater of operation. Today’s operational units no longer transition solely with units already established in a theater of operation; now, they can expect to conduct initial-entry operations into either a mature or immature theater of operation. The basic framework surrounding the operational contract support was discussed in Chapter III although it does not address theater maturity. This chapter identifies OCS readiness best practices and planning factors for these levels of maturity outside Joint and Army doctrine already covered.

1. Current Operational Contract Support Environment

Planning OCS into expeditionary operations includes factors such as, type of mission, the degree of the economy’s maturity, and successful integration with interagency participants. The 2015 National Military Strategy (NMS) describes the
strategic environment as one of rapid change and complexity which “requires … a Joint Force capable of swift and decisive force projection around the world” (CJCS, 2015, p. 10). Developing speed in force projection from an OCS and contingency contracting perspective requires focused shaping phase planning factors and integration among staff reinforced in readiness exercises.

The newly aligned operational phases in JP 4-10 Operational Contract Support and the addition of the shaping phase requires further definition. The Joint Force Prioritized Mission list in the 2015 NMS identifies two priorities relevant to developing timely OCS planning factors. First, the mission list identifies that the forces must be capable of conducting stability operations, albeit on a limited basis, and with broad interagency participation. Higher on NMS joint forces priority list is conducting limited contingency operations, which involves crises action planning in new theaters that at varying degrees of maturity. Given both priorities, OCS planning factors need to account for both initial entry operations and for conducting stability operations.

Planning for initial entry operations requires more guidance than using the tactics, techniques and procedures developed for stability operations in a mature environment. Both mission priorities reference external stakeholders or partners, developing the expectation of interagency participation. An integrated planner, as found in the Yoder Three-Tier Model (YTTM) can assist integrating and planning for both these conditions facilitating the recognition of external stakeholders and the ability to integrate across them.

2. **Yoder Three-Tier Model**

The Yoder Three-Tier Model (YTTM) was first published in 2004 to address the challenges of contracting in military operations (Yoder, 2004). The YTTM captures the hierarchy of credentials needed to optimize the OCS planning process, which is especially relevant in today’s integrated operational environment. Two primary assumptions are stated for this model. First military contracting must optimize
stakeholder integration and second, this is best addressed through the use of credentialed planners. The central theme in the YTTM is the use of a high level integrator planning expert (IPE) among staff, external stakeholders and the combatant commander as depicted in Figure 22.

Figure 22. YTTM Integrated Planner and Executer Model

This figure depicts the intended use of an IPE on a combatant command’s staff, integrating among external stakeholders, across Joint Task Force staff, and assisting in the operational framing of a mission (Yoder, 2010a, p. 94).

The model proposes three tiers of personnel needed to optimize the contingency contracting planning process (Yoder, 2004). The three levels include an Ordering Officer (OO), a Leveraging Contracting Officer (LCO), and finally an Integrated Planner and Executor (IPE). The original framework’s first two levels, as depicted in Figure 23, focus on the acquisition contracting structure. The OO executes the lowest level of contingency contracting duties and is generally uninvolved in the planning process. The focus on this level is procuring to fulfill the identified requirements through established contracting
vehicles and structures. The LCO represents the next higher level of operational planning and knowledge with more responsibility and authority than the ordering officer. Here, the expectation is the LCO “leverages” the buying power of the requiring activity onto a local economy (Yoder 2011).

The IPE is the highest level credentialed personnel linking strategic objectives to an operational plan while facilitating the staff integration process during planning process. The IPE has both experience and credentials as a planner and is embedded into the combatant commander’s staff. The experience comes from previous contracting tours, and the credentialing are through attending Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) phases I and II, and completion of War College. The OO, LCO and the IPE combined provide a multidimensional approach in OCS from the planning phases through execution at the tactical level designed to fully optimize the function in an operation.
The Yoder Three Tier Model for Contingency Contracting represents a tiered approach to planning and oversight. The model proposes the use of an Intenrated Planner and Executer (IPE) to oversee the integration of planning among staff, external stakeholders, and with the supported units (Yoder, 2004).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model Tier Level &amp; Model Title</th>
<th>Functions/Education/Rank</th>
<th>Highlights and Drawbacks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ordering Officer—Tier One</td>
<td>... basic ordering</td>
<td>... simple buys</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>... some simplified</td>
<td>... little integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>acquisitions</td>
<td>... no operational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>... training: DAU CON 234</td>
<td>planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>... DAVMA Certified CON</td>
<td>... no broad liaison</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Level I or II</td>
<td>functions</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>... junior to mid-</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>enlisted, junior</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>officers, GS-7 to GS-</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9 1102 series civilians</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Leveraging Contracting</td>
<td>... leverages to local</td>
<td>... better local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer—Tier Two</td>
<td>economy</td>
<td>operational planning</td>
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<td></td>
<td>... reduces “pushed”</td>
<td>... some integration</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>material support</td>
<td>... more capability for</td>
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<td></td>
<td>... training/education:</td>
<td>the operational</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>... DAU CON 234,</td>
<td>commander</td>
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<td></td>
<td>recommended higher</td>
<td>... no planned theater</td>
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<td></td>
<td>education</td>
<td>integration</td>
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<td></td>
<td>... DAVMA Certified CON</td>
<td>... no broad liaison</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Level II or III</td>
<td>functions</td>
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<td>... senior enlisted,</td>
<td>... may perform to</td>
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<td></td>
<td>junior to mid-grade</td>
<td>optimize local</td>
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<td>officers, GS-11+</td>
<td>operations at the</td>
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<td>1102 series civilians</td>
<td>detriment to theater</td>
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<td>Integrated Planner and</td>
<td>... highest level of</td>
<td>... performs operational</td>
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<tr>
<td>Executor (IPE)—Tier Three</td>
<td>planning and integration—joint</td>
<td>and theater analysis, integrates</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>... linked/integrated</td>
<td>results into OPLAN</td>
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<td></td>
<td>with J-4 and J-5</td>
<td>... link between COCOM</td>
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<td></td>
<td>... creates and executes</td>
<td>and OPLAN to all theater</td>
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<td></td>
<td>OPLAN CCO strategy</td>
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<td></td>
<td>... provides direction</td>
<td>... coordinates theater</td>
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<td>to tier two and one</td>
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<td>... can achieve broader</td>
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<td></td>
<td>... education: Master's</td>
<td>national security goals</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>degree or higher and,</td>
<td>through effective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>JPMPE Phase I and II</td>
<td>distribution of national</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>... DAVMA Certified CON</td>
<td>assets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Level III, and other</td>
<td>... includes planning,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DAVMA disciplines (LOG, ACQ,</td>
<td>communication,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FIN, etc)</td>
<td>coordination, and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>... senior officers (0-6+)</td>
<td>exercising with NGO and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>, senior civilians, GS-13+</td>
<td>PVO in theater</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

...
This Yoder Three Tier Model, and the Hybrid Integrated Process Maturity Model (HIPMM) will both be used to analyze OCS levels of integration across staff and stakeholders, in varying levels of theater maturity, and integrating and training OCS in two current readiness exercises.

3. OCS and Theater Maturity

Outside of stability operations and the focus on transferring contract management authority with an established unit, crises action planning requires units to integrate and plan for less known environments. JP 4-10 indicates that OCS directly effects the civil-military aspects of the operational environment (CJCS, 2014). The use of the OCSIC in Joint Task Forces provides the expertise and focus to fully consider the operational environment and the maturity of the business base and theater.

Understanding the operational environment is fundamental to identifying the conditions required to achieve stated objectives; avoiding the effects that may hinder mission accomplishment (undesired effects); and assessing the impact of friendly, adversarial, and other actors, such as the local populace, on the commander’s concept of operations and progress toward achieving the JFC’s objectives. (CJCS, 2014, p. G-1)

The OSCIC considers, doctrinally, initial entry considerations can consider civil-military factors such as determining how OCS spending impacts a local economy or understanding how effective contract award and management can increase goodwill with local businessmen toward United States Forces (CJCS, 2014). Additionally, factors such as road infrastructure maturity must also be considered, as undeveloped lines of communication can affect contractor performance, as discussed later in the chapter. For OCS, this means contracting concerns need to be integrated early into the planning process supporting effective, and cost-conscious, contracting solutions in foreign environments. By integrating early, the commander and all staff can understand how best to leverage the OCS capability while facilitating partnerships with other agencies, the host nation and coalition forces as described in the 2015 NMS. During crises action planning, each staff member, and external stakeholder is affected by the level of theater maturity when working to integrate OCS into their operational plan.
Recent operations and readiness exercises now incorporate contingency contracting supporting crises situations in countries at all levels of theater and economic maturity. The Defense Contingency Contracting Handbook released in July 2015 advises the contracting officer to consider the maturity of the theater of operations in planning for contingency contracting. Figure 24 is the DCCH’s description of theater maturity and was updated with additional theater maturity considerations. E. Cory Yoder, a published researcher and advocate of contingency contracting’s phase 0, discussed theater maturity in 2004 to include both the nature of the local economy’s development as important to planning. He also describes disaster relief operations and the inherent nature of disorder in humanitarian relief operations as contributing to theater maturity (or immaturity).

**Figure 24. OCS Theater Maturity**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mature [Theater]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-Acquisition:</strong> A sophisticated transportation and distribution system that can rapidly respond to changing requirements and priorities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Acquisition:</strong> Established government compliant market base with sufficient vendors, with government contracting experience, that can comply with Federal Acquisition Regulation requirements to meet contingency contracting demands; an infrastructure capable of housing e-business tools; and, in the best case, an inplace DoD contracting office or structure.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Examples:** Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Korea, and Western Europe

- Contingency Contracting elements of a foreign marketplace.
- Business capacity and capability
- Host-nation support agreements (legal framework)
- Financial systems able to support complex transactions
- Political willingness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Immature [Theater]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-Acquisition:</strong> An ... area with little or no built-up infrastructure and few vendors. The available vendors are likely to have limited to no experience contracting with the U.S. government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Acquisition:</strong> A marketplace characterized as deficient any of the above element of a marketplace.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Example:** An example of an immature contracting environment is the Horn of Africa...and the initial stages of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.

OCS definition of immature versus mature theater as updated from the Defense Procurement Acquisition Policy published *Defense Contingency Contracting Handbook (DPAP, 2015)*. The graphic was updated from Naval Postgraduate School’s class MN3318 *Defense Contingency Contracting* session 4 titled *Planning and Guidance* (Yoder, 2015c).
Theater maturity effects not only the contingency contracting officer (CCO) executing needed requirements, but also the operational planners preparing the tactical plan and appropriately resourcing the CCO to achieve a cost-conscious environment. These factors are outside to the reviewed doctrine in Chapter III, and require consideration during the OCS planning process.

4. Problems in Institutionalizing Operational Contract Support

OCS has still not institutionalized across all combatant commands, as of March 2015 (GAO, 2013). The Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports that 4 out of 6 combatant commands incorporate OCS into Joint training plans, and into readiness related exercises (GAO, 2013, p. 1). As agencies move toward fulfilling the identified OCS capability gaps, more recent reports regarding the deficiencies in current OCS and contingency contracting operations can provide information to detect weaknesses in either current doctrine or practice and provide an informed position in creating service specific doctrine solutions.

a. Problems Institutionalizing OCS across the Department of Defense

The 2013 GAO report *DOD Needs Additional Steps to Fully Integrate Operational Contract Support into Contingency Planning* states that comprehensive, service specific OCS guidance and contingency contract planning guidance hasn’t been issued by all services because only the Army has been the Lead Service for the effort. (GAO, 2013) The efforts to date surround familiarizing the service personnel with the process versus providing a comprehensive contingency contracting planning solution. (GAO, 2013). Further, the GAO asserts, that the services, outside of the acting as lead service in a joint operation, still spent over $1 billion dollars in Afghanistan in fiscal year 11. The argument here, is that each service needs to create comprehensive OCS and contingency contracting procedures, instead of relying on basic awareness of OCS procedures. Developing these procedures with defined Army doctrine and structures can be further sharpened by understanding the current issues encountered in training and executing OCS operations in recent contingency environments.
b. **Institutionalizing OCS through Mobile Training Teams**

Mobile training teams have been used to facilitate OCS knowledge while the forces work towards institutionalizing the OCS capability across their respective services. An Army divisional staff was appointed a JTF and charged to form an Operational Contract Support Integration Cell (OCSIC) requested OCS pre-deployment training. Several agencies and stakeholders mobilized to provide the needed support. Training included the three OCS joint framework functions, to include contract support, contract integration and contractor management while also addressing requiring activity roles and responsibilities. Many of the staff participated in the training, to include all staff sections (J1, J2, J3, J4, Surgeon and the OCSIC) who discussed the implications of the OCS function in their specific areas of operation. The end result prepared a staff to deploy in support of a crises or contingency through the use of a mobile training team (citation) as doctrinally, an Army division is most likely to be assigned to perform as part of a JTF which includes OCS duties. On de-classification of this operation, future researchers can provide a detailed analysis and review regarding the effectiveness of the training and how executing OCS either positively or negatively impacted the operational environment. The key to effective OCS execution seems to remain in successful integration across staff in the planning process.

c. **Institutionalizing OCS throughout Staff Functions**

Identifying the implications and importance of OCS through staff sections is key to successful integration in the planning process. As discussed in the previous chapter, OCS is more than providing for a warfighters needs. The joint training teams and the army has provided training and definitions of tasks across staff sections. The Operational Contract Support Wheel of Integration video supporting OCS Joint exercise 2015 describes the importance of integrating across all staff and external stakeholders to optimize the function as described in Figure 25.
**Figure 25. OCS Vertical and Horizontal Staff Integration Example**

(OCS is) Commanders Business across all staff sections where optimizing [this function] effects through all phases of operations to further both kinetic & non-kinetic impacts.

**Staff:**
- **J-2 Intelligence:** Targeting effects management capability.

**J-6 Communication:** Synchronization and identifying contracted solution needs early and planning for mission integration.

**J-8 Resource Management:** Transparent use of taxpayer dollars and providing accountability and promoting efficient use of government funds.

**Judge Advocate General:** Legal Counsel across the area of operations ensuring compliance with statues while flexibly using Money as a Weapon System.

**Surgeon:** Contractor support through medical care and ensuring contractor workforce is considered in medical planning and execution.

**Public affairs:** Promoting positive OCS effects and proactively getting story out on negative OCS effects to the public and synchronizing communication.

**Stakeholders:**
- **Department of Defense:** Geopolitical impacts and garnering positive, targeted economic impacts.

**Financial Management:** Money as a Weapon System and capitalizing on the economic power dollars bring...on the battlefield or in a catastrophe.

**Department of State:** Geopolitical impacts, ensuring economic effects are developed in coordination with the department of state and other key players.

**Department of State:** Economic Impact and promoting positive OCS effects through all phases of operations to further both kinetic & non-kinetic impacts.

This is the representation of the 2014 Operational Contract Support Joint Exercise promotional video (OCS, 2015).
This graphic from Defense Acquisition University’s class titled *Introduction to Operational Contract Support Planning and Annex W Preparation* dated 2012 presented at Naval Postgraduate School (Yoder, 2015b).

The importance of horizontal staff integration by position is defined by staff member in Figure 26. Not only does OCS planning guidance include horizontal integration, but also recognizes the need to integrate horizontally with external stakeholders. Figure 25 developed from Army Contracting Command’s annual training exercise promotional video describe several external stakeholders and their value in the OCS mission. These various levels of integration are reinforced with the use of the YTTM IPE whose knowledge and experience in the field provides the connections and knowledge to integrate the stakeholders, staff and commander’s strategic objectives into an operational OCS plan.
B. **EXAMPLE OF OCS IN A TRAINING EXERCISES**

Institutionalizing OCS across the forces and contributing to operational readiness means including this function into training exercises, identified as top priority on the Initial Capabilities Document in 2011 (DASDPS, 2013). As of 2015, the Government Accountability Office recognized four of six combatant commands as identifying OCS as a core capability and included this function in their annual readiness exercises (GAO, 2015). As a significant example, U.S. Southern Forces command (SOUTHCOM) embedded Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office (JCASO) IPE planners into their staff for over seven years who facilitate the integration of OCS into their annual training exercise.

1. **U.S. Southern Command’s integration OCS Exercise**

U.S. Southern Command’s (SOUTHCOM)’s OCS staff integrated this function through the subordinate services in two major readiness exercises. In 2014, SOUTHCOM sponsored the training exercise, commonly referred to as PANAMEX, as a multinational training exercise within their Area of Operations (AOR). The intent of the simulated training exercises is to develop plans supporting increased readiness and response to requests for assistance in areas of their operations. The 2014 PANAMEX joint task force exercise included international participation of 17 nations (U.S. Southern Command, 2014).

OCS integration and planning is represented through the well-established embedded Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office (JCASO) cell (U.S. Southern Command, 2014. The staff in the SOUTHCOM staff representing the JCASO office has years of OCS experience who act as the primary overseer of integrating OCS into bi-annual exercises such as the 2014 and 2015 PANAMEX. As stated in JP 4-10, contingency contracting and material needs are a service specific function. In a personal communication with the JCASO OCS planners, in PANAMEX they facilitated the division of their combatant command’s appointing each service as the lead contracting duties for that area and/or country. The expectation was that each service identify the capability gaps of their projected mission for that area, conduct market research for
fulfilling this gap, develop the requiring activity documents, and finally engage contracting officer’s to develop the market base creating viable contract vehicles for future use.

Service specific OCS shaping phase tasks were reinforced through this exercise. In this particular exercise the tasks include: capability gap analysis, evaluating the business environment, developing a vendor base, forming a contract vehicle development, while consolidating requirements with other services according to the SOUTHCOM JCASO office (personal communication, May 14, 2015). This approach supports OCS the Joint Task Force staff members to conduct OCS integration through their subordinate staff. This also forces the services to identify the viable contracting staff structures within the task force and develop the associated lines of communication. Finally, the contingency contracting staff and assets are either identified or developed by the services. While service specific tasks are highlighted, the JCASO office itself acts as the integrator.

a. **YTTM Model Analysis**

The PANAMEX exercise exhibited a high level of integration using the IPE level to coordinate and oversee OCS tasks, instead of relying on ordering officers to facilitate this function. The JCASO-embedded staff represents a highly credentialed OCS planning workforce helped integrate the lower-level ordering officers and logisticians. Additionally, the JCASO office, as a subordinate agency to the Defense Logistics Agency, has developed relationships within not only their own joint command, but many needed interagency assets throughout the DOD. JCASO linked and integrated the OCS plan across the joint staff and the external stakeholder agencies such as DLA, throughout the shaping phase. They provided the needed integration to the services with to initial entry assets including the Army Contracting Command’s Contracting Service Brigades who provided contracting structures and authorities to this exercise. Overall, the execution of developing the OCS function across the services meets the IPE level of credentialing as described in the YTTM. Overall, this created an environment to
successfully leverage OCS effects across a battle space, versus simply mitigating the risk and incidents of fraud, waste, and abuse.

b. **HIPMM Analysis**

The non-acquisition and acquisition personnel structures utilized in this exercise are representative of an optimized level, as depicted below in Figure 27. The Army’s Contracting Support Brigade is permanently assigned to the joint command and provides ongoing support. The non-acquisition staff, JCASO, facilitates the integration of tasks among logistics and the acquisition staff and is also permanently assigned and integrated across staff and external stakeholders representing an optimized rating. The ongoing relationship of JCASO to this combatant command is defined as permanent, although not necessarily reflective of an actual change to the force structure’s authorization documents. The protocols were evaluated as optimized as actual contracting solutions assist in defining the metrics are held locally and the lessons learned platforms are utilized in both an informal (After Action Reports) and formal arenas. The platforms available to joint exercises includes planning structures and lessons learned platforms reflecting an optimized rating.
## Figure 27. HIPMM Analysis Joint OCS Exercise

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Maturity Level</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>Non-Acquisition (NA)</th>
<th>Protocols</th>
<th>Platforms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>5 Optimized</strong></td>
<td>Acquisition member or unit is <em>permanently</em> assigned to support assigned unit, and integrated with NA staff.</td>
<td>NA OCS planner is <em>permanently</em> assigned to requiring activity or operational unit staff, and integrated with acquisition staff.</td>
<td>Performance metrics are defined to continually improve OCS, and planning tasks defined for staff sections and stakeholders acknowledged.</td>
<td>Lessons learned platforms have been developed and planning platforms part of core organizational process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4 Integrated</strong></td>
<td>Acquisition staff assigned and integrated into supported unit staff, not just the planning phases.</td>
<td>NA OCS planning member is integrated with supporting acquisition staff.</td>
<td>OCS planning tasks are defined for all staff sections and stakeholders are acknowledged, including logistical tasks.</td>
<td>OCS planning platforms are part of core organizational processes, and required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3 Structured</strong></td>
<td>Acquisition staff are integrated with NA staff during OCS planning phases, and contingencies.</td>
<td>NA OCS planning personnel are identified, and documented.</td>
<td>Logistical and acquisition planning tasks are defined for OCS.</td>
<td>OCS planning platforms have been developed and are required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2 Basic</strong></td>
<td>OCS acquisition personnel are used for contingencies.</td>
<td>NA OCS planning personnel are identified.</td>
<td>Only acquisition tasks are defined for OCS.</td>
<td>OCS platforms have been developed but are not required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1 Ad-Hoc</strong></td>
<td>Acquisition personnel are formed and documented.</td>
<td>NA OCS planning personnel not identified.</td>
<td>There are no formal protocols for OCS.</td>
<td>There are no formal platforms for OCS.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. **Army OCS Tactical-Level Training**

   This section will describe the Army’s practice of contingency contracting in tactical level readiness exercises. The planning resources are different when executing OCS at a Joint Task Force and at a single service tactical level. First, the JCASO office and the OSCIC, primary elements integrating the function across staff and conducting operational framing for JTF are not available. The tactical level operates with less OCS resources as compared to a JTF and relies more on executing contingency contracting to fulfill warfighter needs, versus effects based contracting. The following discussion will describe a new shaping phase contingency contracting planning model specific to tactical exercises developed recently for Army exercises at Fort Irwin, CA. First, the use of a credentialed and high level integrator oversees and evaluates the acquisition and non-acquisition personnel in the execution of contingency contracting. Second, an acquisition specific training and evaluation model, called the 270 Road to War, providing Army tactical level acquisition units with the training and support needed to support Brigade sized elements in contingency operations.

   The Army has integrated and executed contingency contracting within tactical level units at Fort Irwin’s National Training Center (NTC). Brigade sized operational units (referred to as the rotational unit) are assigned to conduct 30–60 day readiness exercises at the NTC are assigned an offsite non-organic contingency contracting team who provides real-world contracting solutions. In a personal communication with the overseeing contracting activity permanently assigned to the NTC, inclusion of contingency contracting to support these units began in the mid-1990s for Army rotational units to the NTC. Senior contracting personnel in the Mission Instillation Contracting Command (MICC), Fort Irwin, provide oversight to the contingency contracting teams assigned to support rotational units at the NTC. The overseeing MICC’s stated mission is now changing and reflects the institutionalization of the contingency contracting function within Army forces. Below is the current mission statement, followed by the proposed mission statement, as determined from a personal interview with NTC Contracting Command personnel in June 2015. Current CCO Program Mission Statement
The mission of the NTC Rotational Contracting Officer Program is to provide contracting support to the Rotational Training Unit (RTU) while enhancing CCOs understanding and capability to manage situations that may be encountered while providing expeditionary contracting support.

Proposed CT Program Mission Statement

The mission of the NTC Rotational Contracting Team Program is to coach, teach and mentor Contracting Team leaders, Non-Commissioned Officer In Charge (NCOIC)s and team members on the applications and execution of Operational Contract Support to improve the capabilities of the Contracting Team and train to be a combat multiplier and battlefield enhancer. Provide a critical and direct support component to validate team capabilities in the 270 day Road to War framework.

There are two significant changes in the proposed mission statement. First, it now includes the 270 Day Road to War framework, which is discussed in more detail below. The second change is a shift from training the contingency contracting officer individually to training the Contingency Contracting Team (CCT) as a cohesive and deployable unit capable of supporting a brigade sized element in a contingency environment.

As covered in Chapter III, the CCT provides contracting support to Army tactical level units, specifically brigades (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2014). The CCT is assigned to a brigade when the brigade is assigned a rotation to the NTC. The mission at NTC is to validate the training of army tactical level heavy brigades in a typical 45–60 day rotation in Fort Irwin, CA. The CCT members interact with their assigned brigade staff to provide real-time material solutions to the brigade’s capability gaps. The contracting officers assigned to support brigades during NTC rotations are typically the lowest level ordering officer in the YTTM. The MICC-Fort Irwin engages the rotational unit and the contracting team early in the process to extend the time and planning horizon evaluation process, keeping this from being an ad-hoc function.

The operational units deploy much of their equipment from home station to NTC, much like initial entry operations into a new operating area. The contracting officers provide a link to the local economy providing many of the material solutions needed to house and transport a brigade-sized element. Examples of needed support include
material handling equipment such as fork lifts or refrigerated trucks for food or ice delivery. Many of the planning tools used include the Annex W, although there is a greater reliance on using a contract requirements matrix focusing on the more detailed and time phased by-commodity sync, needed for the tactical level. The acquisition and non-acquisition staff integration in planning, execution and contractor management oversight is conducted by a senior level integrator, as described in the YTTM. A long-range focus for the MICC-Fort Irwin is to provide the anticipated non-acquisition brigade staff 3C OCS planners with the same oversight during the planning phases working providing focused evaluation on the integration of non-organic acquisition support into the supported unit’s staff tasks and functions.

In an interview with the MICC personnel, both the contracting officers and the rotational units are evaluated and provided senior-level observations through prepared action reports capturing the lessons learned. A repeated concern during after action assessments is a lack of cohesion between the brigade staff and the CCT during the planning process prior to arriving at NTC, as relayed in a personal communication from NTC personnel oversight. In general, a lack of cohesion can create issues during planning phases and execution of contractor oversight. Leaders at the MICC-Fort Irwin created a shaping phase model initiative designed to assist in providing more integration feedback to the evaluated units via integrating an experienced contracting professional as oversight to the CCT and the Rotational beyond the 30–60 day execution timeframe at NTC.

The newly proposed model Capstone 270 Day Road to War model provides Army tactical units the ability to train for mission readiness supporting a brigade without actually attending an NTC rotation. MICC-Fort Irwin provides senior level OCS qualified evaluators the acquisition units requesting readiness exercises who present a choice of mission scenarios to include crises action planning or supporting stability operations. These evaluators will provide feedback and mentorship 270 days resulting in the validation of the unit’s 5 team member readiness to deploy and support a brigade sized element in contingency operations. The model’s tasks are developed from doctrine, best practices and the current practices of NTC assigned CCY units providing support to the on the ground rotational units.
a. **YTTM Analysis**

The original intent of the YTTM is to provide a tier approach to integration in a joint environment. Using the YTTM to evaluate the NTC 270 Road to War model articulates an integrated approach to training oversight through the use of an IPE, although at a tactical level instead of the joint level. Matching both the acquisition and non-acquisition staff (future mission), at the tactical level, with mid- to senior-grade staffed positions provides the coaching needed to fully integrate OCS across all staff. The IPE level oversight of the CCT’s ordering officers, provides focused acquisition oversight and additional coaching and mentorship on acquisition specific tasks, but also provides oversight of the CCT integrating successfully across the supported units. Tactical level OCS planning procedures will emerge as this model matures in use.

b. **HIPMM Analysis**

The initiatives put in place by MICC-Fort Irwin to supplement operational level OCS guidance increased the maturity of the OCS planning resources, as depicted in Figure 28. Significantly, the acquisition personnel pillar rated optimized with the use of a permanent integrator to coach and evaluated the inorganic contracting team supporting the rotational unit. The acquisition personnel are assigned to a supported unit for the purposes of a specific NTC training exercise and not permanently assigned to support a unit through all phases, and, therefore, is rated as structured. The non-acquisition OCS 3C officers are organic to the typical units training at NTC. At the time of this research, the rotational unit’s manned with 3C OCS officers was not observed as a regular occurrence resulting in a structure, versus an integrated, rating. Contingency contracting specific tasks are identified for both the logistician in the rotational unit, resulting in a structured evaluation. Protocols are rated as structured, as Army doctrine defines OCS for higher commands than a brigade staff. Finally, the contingency contracting platforms are rated as optimized as MICC-Fort Irwin provides detailed After Action Reports and Lessons Learned feedback to the team and to their supporting commands, resulting in an optimized rating.
The maturity levels of the acquisition pillar and the platforms pillar was increased due to locally imposed initiatives. As previously discussed, Army doctrine is optimized for the joint task force level, although OCS planning activities for an operational level are still undefined. The OCS function here at NTC could appear ad-hoc as the tactical units contracting support is identified and paired on assignment of a rotation to NTC. Although the 270-day road to war initiative enabled by an IPE provides resources to keep this from emerging as an ad-hoc function by extending the planning phase to allow for inclusion of inorganic contracting support. Overall, the permanently assigned MICC-Fort Irwin contingency contracting qualified oversight to NTC assigned personnel, and the initiative 270 Day road to war, provided a boost in the ratings maturity by extending the planning phase timeframe and providing qualified IPE oversight.
C. SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS

This chapter reviewed and analyzed two OCS operations, one a joint level operations and one a tactical level with the YTTM. Both operations were evaluated as effectively using an IPE during OCS shaping phase operational exercises. At the tactical
level, the NTC 270 Road to War model notionally applies the IPE oversight in mentoring, training and coaching to both an acquisition structure and a tactical level non-acquisition brigade staff. The use of the JCASO IPE during a training exercise supports the teaching, coaching and mentoring in single service staff officers participating and interacting within a joint task force. Both models address theater maturity and immaturity. NTC MICC-Fort Irwin staff provides the higher headquarters the option for continuing to reinforce stability operations, or imposing initial entry operations into an immature theater. The JCASO planner inherently provides training in initial entry operations into varying degrees of maturity through assigning all countries under their area of operations and requiring an evaluation and viability of a marketplace. Both training environments support a high level of integration of OCS into associated missions.

D. CONCLUSION

This chapter discussed the current state of OCS in the current environment. Then, problems institutionalizing OCS across the services were discussed. Next, the YTTM model was described as a method to evaluate effective training across the forces. Then, the OCS best practices incorporated into two training exercises were discussed. Joint Task Force best practices at SOUTHCOM as integrated with the JCASO office was described and analyzed as effectively integrated. Training at NTC and the new initiative 270 Road to War model designed to facilitate integration of OCS during training exercises in both inorganic acquisition assigned staff, and tactical level brigade staff. Collectively, both levels of OCS inclusion into readiness exercises provides guidance and a model that single services looking to develop this function can integrate into their own warfighting functions.
V. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. SUMMARY

This MBA project investigated the following research questions:

Primary Question: What components of current OCS planning doctrine can be adapted into single/lead service planning doctrine?

Subsidiary Question 1: What is the relevant history leading to current OCS doctrine and practice?

Subsidiary question 2: What are key elements of Joint and Army doctrine relevant to single service contingency contracting constructs?

Subsidiary question 3: What is the current state of practice in OCS and how is it related to single services?

Subsidiary question 4: What specific findings and recommendations can be made?

In answering the primary question, first the literature review examined the relevant history and leading to current OCS doctrine and practice.

Subsidiary Question 1: What is the relevant history leading to current OCS doctrine and practice?

Current OCS planning doctrine, procedures, and personal structures were developed in recent decades even though United States (U.S.) military forces have significantly contracted with commercial sources during wartime since the revolutionary war. Five distinct timeframes were found to characterize the relevant history leading to modern day Operational Contract Support (OCS) and doctrine; wartime contracting, contingency contracting, contingency contracting reform, OCS and institutionalizing OCS.

Wartime contracting was the longest timespan with commercial contractors supporting operations in most major conflicts from 1775 to the beginning of the 20th century. Each conflict’s contracting environment and operations were afflicted with supply shortages, issues surrounding cost and waste. Even with repeated use, wartime contracting as a function was mostly ad-hoc and the legislation and regulations developed during this time was reactive.
The emergence of contingency contracting marked the first recognition that contracting during wartime was unique requiring resources outside of peacetime contracting. During this time, the term “contingency contracting” was officially recognized and defined in DOD literature. Most doctrine developed at the time, termed “contractors on the battlefield,” contained procedural guidance for incorporating contractors into the total force mix. Acquisition and contracting law recognized the need for streamlined procedures during contingency operations, raising small purchase thresholds for unusual or compelling circumstances. Both Joint and Army doctrine emerged still focusing on procedures to incorporate contractors as part of the total mix. No significant contingency contracting planning doctrine was incepted at this time as a separate or specialized function. Key contingency contracting structures and doctrine emerged after two key commissions found deficiencies in this area.

Contingency contracting reform occurred in the 21st century as a result while the DOD was engaged during major stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Army launched the Gansler Commission whose findings included a need to increase the stature and resources available in the Army contracting/acquisition profession to keep pace with the amount of requirements requested in Iraq and Afghanistan. The congressionally sponsored Commission on Wartime Contracting (CWC) in Iraq and Afghanistan created an ongoing investigative body who uncovered that an estimated $5 billion were lost due to fraud, waste and abuse surrounding issues such as poor contractor management. These two key reports provided the political will and resources needed to create the more centralized acquisition structure represented with Army Contracting Command. This new structure and resource provided an increase in contracting doctrine and resources acting as the foundation of today’s available doctrine.

Operational Contract Support emerged during stability operations, in 2008, providing a joint focused planning construct. The three associated functions; contract management, contract integration and contracting support, provide the foundation of the modern day approach to contingency contracting in joint operations. This new construct and the associated Army Contracting Command provide key resources in conducting contingency contracting in overseas environments for major operations. During this
timeframe doctrine became more focused on planning and integration of the function into stability operations, versus the ad-hoc and reactive legislation and doctrine developed in past decades. Money as a Weapon System, a primarily financial management focused guide for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, created the notion that contracting and spending could influence the operational environment providing those commander tools needed to create targeted effects through reconstruction and goodwill efforts. Debate continues today as to whether these programs were effective and created the intended civil-military focused effect originally intended.

The current strategic focus of OCS is institutionalizing the function throughout the DOD and each service. This function was declared as a core defense capability with the OCS Joint Concept validated by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. The supporting OSC action plan consists of over 170 different actions designed to fill the capabilities gap through 2019. Throughout these documents, the term cost-consciousness is introduced, as used in a report of the same title submitted to congress in 2012. The report recommends addressing this concept through leader awareness and the creation of contingency contracting focused metrics. The remainder of the project focuses on the development of OCS planning phase resources as this is key to developing cost-consciousness in contingency operations.

Subsidiary question 2: What are key elements of Joint and Army doctrine relevant to single service contingency contracting constructs?

The key elements of Joint and Army doctrine relevant to single services were found by analyzing doctrine through a hybrid of two well-known acquisition specific models. The Hybrid Integrative Planning of Maturity Model (HIPMM) was created through the Yoder Three Pillars to Integrative Success© (TIPS) and the Dr. René Rendon’s Contract Management Maturity Model© (CMMM). Before describing the model, the Joint OCS framework was defined and described.

Contract Support was in the alignment of the notional OCS phased model with the standard operational phases found in JP 3-0 Joint Operations through the addition of the shaping phase. The shaping phase, in OCS doctrine, is described in Joint Publication 4-10 as “designed to dissuade or deter adversaries, develop relationships with, and assure
multinational partners, as well as to set conditions for the successful execution of contingency plans and are generally conducted through security cooperation activities. Significant OCS-related phase 0 actions include establishment of contract-related boards, cells, and working groups,” (CJCS, 2014, p. I-11). The shaping phase, phase 0 can significantly impact the operational battlefield, later stages of the operation, and the final budget outcome. In fact, JP 4–10 states that a lack of emphasis on this function in phase 0 is a major hindrance in the planning process. This newly added phase requires further definition and understanding of what tasks need to be executed to best leverage OCS capabilities. Phase 0 encompasses more than simply requirements generation activities. In their 2013 article *Phase Zero Contracting Operations—Strategic and Integrative Planning for Contingency and Expeditionary Operations* E. Cory Yoder and Dayne E. Nix identify Phase 0 as a cyclical process. Here, the intent of Phase 0 is to encompass all activities from planning through contract closeout.

The project reviewed identified OCS planning structures, doctrine, and supporting planning platforms that included both acquisition and non-acquisition structures. The analysis was completed with a model called the Hybrid Integrative Planning Maturity Model built from two published defense oriented contracting models. The Three Integrative Pillars for Integrative Success provided a construct to evaluate each organizations OCS resources. The Contract Management Maturity Model provided the levels of maturity to evaluate planning specific resources.

1. **Personnel:**

Both the Joint and Army operational command’s acquisition personnel were found as optimized as contracting units are assigned habitually to supported units. The Army Contracting Command’s Brigade supports combatant commands along with the Contingency Contracting Battalion (CCBn) supporting major Army Command’s during all phases of operations, to include readiness exercises. Joint force non-acquisition personnel structures were rated as optimized as multiple structures multi-disciplinary OSC Integration Cell, and permanent assignment/availability of the Joint Contracting Acquisition Support Office. The Army specific non-acquisition personnel structure was
rated as integrated with the creation of the 3C skill identifier embedded into operational staff structures, although this function is still being filled and isn’t yet optimized though integration with acquisition structures.

2. **Protocols:**

The protocol pillar was found as integrated for both Joint and Army doctrine, as the planning doctrine reflects an acknowledgement of both acquisition and non-acquisition tasks are articulated across staff members. Performance metrics were not published, although they may be held within specific combatant commands. JP 4-10 specifically mentions the assignment of mission specific metrics to the OSCIC, leaving optimization and metric creation to each individual combatant command. The primary weaknesses of the reviewed protocols include too much literature with varying levels of focus ranging from strategic to tactical level. Additionally, a capability gap was identified at the operational level planning guidance applicable to initial entry, midsized single service missions.

3. **Platforms:**

Within a Joint Forces, and Joint Task Force construction, the platforms pillar is rated as optimized reflecting organizational planning incorporating OCS planning factors in systems working across staff functions and phases of the operation. The use of formal planning structures in a joint task force environment includes Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) in planning and Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) JLLIS. The Army Forces level also utilized a lessons learned platform, while allowing for operational level planning resources to incorporate OCS planning factors. Therefore, the Army Forces command receives an optimized rating in the HIPMM.

The above analysis of OCS resources as ranging from integrated to optimized in maturity, and appropriate for the services. The military services looking to adapt Army and Joint doctrine for their own can use this to guide the level of maturity needed to support their decided role within OCS operations. First, services need to decide what level guidance is needed based on their unique OCS or contingency contracting role. The roles can range from participating in Joint exercises and supporting a lead service effort
to allowing operational units the capability to support/augment a contingency with OCS. Once the role is decided, developing tasks for single services can use current doctrinal planning factors while taking into account the need to incorporate initial entry operations, not just Relief-In-Place/ Transfer of Authority factors. Overall, the guidance specific to a single service lead operational level mission is scattered among multiple documents and a consolidated list of suggestions is in recommendations and findings are described in Figures 29 and 30 below.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Maturity Level</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>Protocols</th>
<th>Platforms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>5 Optimized</strong></td>
<td>Acquisition member or unit permanently assigned to supported unit, and integrated into NA staff during all phases.</td>
<td>NA planner permanently assigned to supported unit and integrated into acquisition staff.</td>
<td>Performance metrics as well as planning tasks defined for all staff sections, and external stakeholders identified.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4 Integrated</strong></td>
<td>Acquisition staff assigned and integrated into supported unit during all phases.</td>
<td>NA planner integrated into supporting acquisition staff.</td>
<td>Broad planning tasks defined for all staff sections, and external stakeholders identified.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3 Structured</strong></td>
<td>Acquisition staff assigned to support organization staff during all phases.</td>
<td>NA planner assigned but not integrated.</td>
<td>Only logistical and acquisition planning tasks defined.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2 Basic</strong></td>
<td>Acquisition personnel assigned only for contingencies.</td>
<td>NA planner identified only for contingencies.</td>
<td>Only acquisition planning tasks defined.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1 Ad-Hoc</strong></td>
<td>Acquisition personnel neither assigned nor integrated into supported unit.</td>
<td>NA planner unidentified.</td>
<td>Planning tasks undefined.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 30. Hybrid Integrative Planning Maturity Model Army Major Commands

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Maturity Level</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>Non-Acquisition (NA)</th>
<th>Protocols</th>
<th>Platforms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5 Optimized</td>
<td>Acquisition member or unit permanently assigned to supported unit, and integrated into NA staff during all phases.</td>
<td>NA planner permanently assigned to supported unit and integrated into acquisition staff.</td>
<td>Performance metrics as well as planning tasks defined for all staff sections, and external stakeholders identified.</td>
<td>Lessons learned platforms developed and planning platforms integrated into core organizational processes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Integrated</td>
<td>Acquisition staff assigned and integrated into supported unit during all phases.</td>
<td>NA planner integrated into supporting acquisition staff.</td>
<td>Broad planning tasks defined for all staff sections, and external stakeholders identified.</td>
<td>Planning platforms required and integrated into organizational processes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Structured</td>
<td>Acquisition staff assigned to support organization staff during all phases.</td>
<td>NA planner assigned but not integrated.</td>
<td>Only logistical and acquisition planning tasks defined.</td>
<td>Planning platforms required and developed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Basic</td>
<td>Acquisition personnel assigned only for contingencies.</td>
<td>NA planner identified only for contingencies.</td>
<td>Only acquisition planning tasks defined.</td>
<td>Planning platforms developed but not required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Ad-Hoc</td>
<td>Acquisition personnel neither assigned nor integrated into supported unit.</td>
<td>NA planner unidentified.</td>
<td>Planning tasks undefined.</td>
<td>No platforms required or developed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Single services looking to develop OCS planning function should consider the use of an integrator similar to joint and army planning personnel resources. The disparity between the two model’s findings is in the staffing approaches to the non-acquisition OCS planning function. At the joint task force levels, the use of the embedded JCASO office, and the development and use of the OSCIC proves stability and continuity of OCS planning focus throughout all the phases. At an operational level, the Army’s OSCO 3C
skill identifier also provides credentialed OCS planning assets, although the slots are still being worked into the force structure and integration with acquisition staff hasn’t occurred. The Army’s acquisition staff may not be co-located with the supported unit’s staff, and may not be permanently assigned below the major Army command level. Single services could embedded this function with already established staff structures as an additional duty. The HIPMM integrated rating reflects an identification of the many external stakeholders and OCS planning tasks across staff members. A comprehensive view of all tasks could be challenging as the doctrine was varied and the tasks were found in multiple documents.

Subsidiary question 3: What is the current state of practice in OCS and how is it related to single services?

The current state of OCS practice in the shaping phase was studied through evaluating a joint and army training exercise incorporating OCS into the processes. To accomplish this, the Yoder Three Tier Model (YTTM) and the HIPMM model (YTTM) was used which included a tiered approach to evaluate the maturity of contingency contracting planning resources developed outside of doctrine.

The joint training exercise was rated as optimized in all categories as the JCASO staff developed and integrated each function, both acting as the IPE and as the developer of metrics related to capturing the efficiency and effectiveness of OCS planning solutions. Since the Joint Task Force exercise used all the OCS planning assets, the rating from the previous chapter was relevant and acted as a base. Conversely, the Army training exercise incorporating OCS was conducted at a tactical level and the ratings were lower in maturity. The personnel assets were not permanently assigned, as Army OCS personnel assets are assigned to major commands. Several local initiatives improved the OCS planning by lengthening the shaping phase and allowing for more than ad-hoc execution of OCS planning. Many of the platforms used in planning and lessons learned were less robust than the joint task force assets but received the same rating. The use of after action reports by a high level IPE provides tiered approach described by the YTTM. OCS planning procedures and resources can be adapted successfully at a more tactical contingency contracting level.
B. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Finding and Recommendation 1

Acquisition focused resources and solutions developed during stability operations without adequate developing matching non-acquisition resources lead to an imbalance in contractor management and planning assets increasing the risk of incurring fraud, waste and abuse.

The recommendation for all services developing contingency contracting structures and doctrine is that both acquisition and non-acquisition resources equally ensure contractor management and oversight are adequately addressed in operations. Institutionalizing OCS with the service’s primary logistics planners should include a brief history to understand the context of current doctrine and the importance of this function. Graphic representations of these included are a brief history of OCS (see the Appendix, or the Commission on Wartime Contracting graphic in Figure 3) and a definition of OCS and its subsidiary terms in Figure 2 (Church & Schwartz, 2015).

Contingency contracting executed at an operational level may be smaller in scope than that of a Joint Task Force. Still, understanding how to frame the operational environment without an OCSIC, and identify the focal points of contact to leverage a business base in a contingency environment are important tasks.

2. Finding and Recommendation 2

The current OCS and contingency contracting doctrine appears to address stability operations leaving out key aspects of the current operational environment including, shaping phase planning factors, initial entry operations, and theater maturity.

Single services developing tactical and operational level contingency planning doctrine include environments: shaping phase planning factors, initial entry operations, and theater maturity. This thesis presented a graphic in Figure 24 titled OCS and Theater Maturity developed from the Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy updated with the Graduate School of Business and Public Policy’s course material from MN 3318 Contingency Contracting. This graphic recognizes that the business environment in a
theater includes not only economic concerns, but also the business capacity of the market base to work with the United States government.

Finally, the author recommends consolidating contingency contracting OCS planning factors relevant to single services. Some areas to consider:

Acquisition and non-acquisition Definitions of: inherently governmental function, procurement lead time, unauthorized commitment and ratifications, effects of contracting on the battlefield, contract support timeline, OCS processes and team members, and the importance of phase shaping phase activities, (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2011a, p. 2–1).

Identifying key activities in the contingency contracting shaping phase at an operational level to include: Analyze the operational environment, develop operational contracting plan, requiring activity preparation and integration with contracting staff, lessons learned gathering, sharing and archiving. (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2014, p. 2–2).

Defining inherently governmental function considerations to include: Direction and control of combat and crisis situations, budgeting, and policy decisions. (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2011b, p. 22).

3. Finding and Recommendation 3

The amount of current doctrine and resources are extensive, with each having various planning phase focuses.

Future doctrine should unify and address both acquisition and non-acquisition planning factors, to include tactical and operational planning factors, such as contractor managing standards, key planning tasks, and metrics to improve future contingency contracting efforts at all levels.

4. Finding and Recommendation 4

The maturity and integration of Joint OCS operations was much higher than Army tactical level contingency contracting.

Department of the Army doctrine needs to address tactical and operational level contingency contracting planning factors and readiness. This can be accomplished by establishing standards contractor management levels in all units and creating a common
vocabulary and tasks for acquisition and non-acquisition planners supporting contingency operations. All levels of OCS and contingency contracting planning require metrics to capture efficiency and effectiveness of OCS planning and execution. These metrics can support cost-consciousness through contract management metrics and

C. AREAS OF FURTHER RESEARCH

Conduct an in-depth analysis of contingency contracting in the execution of a single service lead mission including crises action planning into an initial entry environment from planning through closure.

Conduct an in-depth analysis of Operational Contract Support in the execution in a Joint Task Force lead mission including crises action planning into an initial entry environment from planning through closure.

A Cost Benefit Analysis of the Department of the Army allowing temporary transfers of Multi-Functional Logistic (Quartermaster, Transportation and Ordnance) officers into the acquisition corps for an assignment as a contracting officer, 51C. Currently, the Army’s Acquisition Corps selects a representative population of all branches who comprise the contracting career field. While Acquisition Corps (50) benefits from the inclusion of logisticians into their ranks, the Logistical Corp (90) does not have the same reciprocity. Temporary assignment in the Acquisition career field and returning to the basic branch would provide the logistics officer experience as the contingency contracting support to the requiring activity. This experience can provide a new perspective when moved back into the operational and strategic levels of Army logistics planning and doctrine development.
APPENDIX. OPERATIONAL CONTRACT SUPPORT DOCTRINE AND THEME MAP

Figure 31. Timeline: Wartime Contracting to Operational Contract Support with Supporting Doctrine

This graphic was created by the author to represent the themes in transforming wartime contracting to today’s recognized Operational Contract Support framework and the supporting doctrine.
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