20th Annual NDIA SO/LIC Symposium & Exhibition

“The Persistent Conflict: The Path Ahead”

Washington, DC

10-12 February 2009

Agenda

Essay, “Scoring the Long War”, by Andrew Boyden, Phillip Menard and Robert Ramirez
White Paper, “The Road to Peace, One Person at a Time: Sister Cities International and Its Role in Persistent Conflict”, by Patrick Madden and Christopher P. Dufour
White Paper, “Special Reconnaissance/Unconventional Warfare—How about an UxV for a Teamate?”, by Miles Libbey, Ph.D and Robinson Harris, Ph.D. (Cand.)
White Paper, “Private Sector Efforts to Relieve the Burden of SOF Forces”, by Sam Miess

Tuesday, 10 February 2009

Panel 1: Regional Views of Persistent Conflict
Panelists:
- LTC Charles Miller, Jr., USA, AFG/PAK Section Lead, J3, USSOCENT, Briefing 1, Briefing 2
- LTC Brian Petit, USA, Commander of 2-1 SFG(A), USSOCPAC
- CDR Victor D. Hyder, USN, J3, USSOCENT
- CAPT (OF5) Bruno Julien de Zelicourt, French Navy, J3 Director, NATO, Special Operations Coordination Center

Panel 2: Technology and Persistent Conflict
Panelists:
- Col Hondo Geurts, USAF, USSOCOM SOAL
- Mr. Richard Higgins, Program Manager, Technical Support Working Group, CTTSO/IWSP
- Dr. Miles Libbey, Lockheed Martin, Advanced Solutions MS2

Panel 3: Views from the Practitioners
Panelists:
- Col Joseph Clem, USAF, Deputy Director, Directorate of Plans, Programs, Requirements & Assessments

Wednesday, 11 February 2009

Panel 4: Persistent Conflict and the Human Dimension
Panelists:
- COL Mark Lowe, USA, Commander, 1st Special Warfare Training Group
- CDR Ann Kubera, USN, Division Chief, Personnel Operations, USSOCOM
- COL Rocky Farr, USA, Command Surgeon, USSOCOM
- Mr. Jim Lorraine, Director of Care Coalition, USSOCOM
Panel 5: Strategies for Persistent Conflict
Panelists:
- Mr. Konrad Trautman, Director of Intelligence, USSOCOM

Panel 6: Meeting the Challenge of Persistent Conflict through Education and Training
Panelists:
- CAPT Chuck Lockett, USN, Senior Education Programs, Joint Special Operations University

Thursday, 12 February 2009

Panel 7: Interagency Perspectives
Panelists:
- LTG Ronald Burgess, Jr., USA, Director of Intelligence Staff, Office of the Director of National Intelligence
- Dr. Christopher Lamb, Institute for National Strategic Studies, NDU
- Ambassador Dell Dailey, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Department of State

Keynote Speaker
- GEN Barry McCaffrey, USA (Ret), President, BR McCaffrey Associates, LLC
20TH ANNUAL SO/LIC SYMPOSIUM AND EXHIBITION

“The Persistent Conflict: The Path Ahead”

ONSITE AGENDA

Note: The use of the spearhead image and USSOCOM component command seals does not imply USSOCOM endorsement, nor the endorsement of its component commands, for this event.

FEBRUARY 10–12, 2009

MARRIOTT WARDMAN PARK HOTEL ➤ WASHINGTON, DC

WWW.NDIA.ORG/MEETINGS/9880
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 10, 2009

7:00am – 6:30pm  Registration Open

7:00am – 8:00am  Continental Breakfast in Exhibit Hall

8:00am – 8:15am  Welcome and Opening Remarks
  MG Kenneth Bowra, USA (Ret), Chairman, NDIA SO/LIC Division
  Lt Gen Lawrence P. Farrell, Jr., USAF (Ret), President & CEO, NDIA

8:15am – 9:00am  Keynote Address
  ADM Eric Olson, USN, Commander, USSOCOM

9:00am – 9:30am  Break in Exhibit Hall

9:30am – 11:30am  PANEL 1: REGIONAL VIEWS OF PERSISTENT CONFLICT
  Moderator: LTC Chris Haas, USA, Director, USSOCOM Legislative Affairs
  Panelists:
  LTC Charles Miller, Jr., USA, AFG/PAK Section Lead, J3, USOCCENT
  LTC Brian Petit, USA, Commander of 2-1 SF(A), USOCCAPAC
  CDR Victor D. Hyder, USN, J3, USOCSOUTH
  CAPT (OF5) Bruno Julien de Zelicourt, French Navy, J3 Director, NATO Special Operations Coordination Center

11:30am – 1:00pm  Lunch in Exhibit Hall

1:00pm – 2:30pm  PANEL 2: TECHNOLOGY AND PERSISTENT CONFLICT
  Moderator: Dr. Maren Leed, Policy Analyst, RAND Corporation
  Panelists:
  Col Hondo Geurts, USAF, USSOCOM SOAL
  Mr. William Shepherd, Science Advisor, USSOCOM
  Mr. Richard Higgins, Program Manager, Technical Support Working Group, CTTSO/IWSP
  Mr. Bill Natter, Professional Staff Member, House Armed Services Committee
  White Paper Presenter: Dr. Miles A. Libbey, III, Director of the Advanced Solutions Team, New Venture Group, Lockheed Martin MS2

2:30pm – 3:00pm  Break in Exhibit Hall

3:00pm – 5:00pm  PANEL 3: VIEWS FROM THE PRACTITIONERS
  Moderator: COL Kevin McDonnell, USA, Director, USSOCOM Washington Office
  Panelists:
  Col Joseph Clem, USAF, Deputy Director, Directorate of Plans, Programs, Requirements & Assessments
  Maj Michael A. Brooks, USMC, Operations Officer, 2d Marine Special Operations Battalion, MARSOC
  CAPT Tom Brown, USN, Commander, Naval Special Warfare Group ONE, NAVSPECWARCOM
  COL Sean Mulholland, USA, Commander, 7th SF(A), USASFC(A)
  CPT Brian Findlay, USA, Det Commander, 3rd Bn, 7th SF(A), USASFC(A)
  CPT Christopher Hume, USA, Det Commander, 3rd Bn, 7th SF(A), USASFC(A)

5:00pm – 6:30pm  Reception in Exhibit Hall

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 11, 2009

7:00am – 6:00pm  Registration Open

7:00am – 8:00am  Continental Breakfast in Exhibit Hall

8:00am – 8:05am  Welcome and Administrative Remarks
  MG Kenneth Bowra, USA (Ret), Chairman, NDIA SO/LIC Division

8:05am – 9:00am  Keynote Address
  ADM Eric Olson, USN, Commander, USSOCOM

9:00am – 9:30am  Break in Exhibit Hall

9:30am – 11:30am  PANEL 4: PERSISTENT CONFLICT AND THE HUMAN DIMENSION
  Moderator: Mr. Sally Donnelly, Special Assistant, Office of the CJCS
  Panelists:
  CDR Mark Lowe, USA, Commander, 1st Special Warfare Training Group
  CDR Ann Kubera, USN, Division Chief, Personnel Operations, USSOCOM
  COL Rocky Farr, USA, Command Surgeon, USSOCOM
  Mr. Jim Lorraine, Director of Care Coalition, USSOCOM
  White Paper Presenter: Mr. Sam Miess, Principal Staff, Concurrent Technologies Corp.
9:30am – 10:00am  Break in Exhibit Hall

10:00am – 12:00pm  PANEL 5: STRATEGIES FOR PERSISTENT CONFLICT
Moderator: COL Joe Osborne, USA, Director, Irregular Warfare J10, USSOCOM SOKF
Panelists:
- Ms. Linda Robinson, Author, Masters of Chaos and Tell Me How This Ends
- Mr. Vikram Singh, Fellow, Center for a New American Security
- Mr. Sean Nagle, Senior Correspondent, Army Times; Author, Not A Good Day to Die
- Mr. Konrad Trautman, Director of Intelligence, USSOCOM
- LTG Jim Vaught, USA (Ret), President, All Veterans Association

12:00pm – 1:30pm  Lunch in Exhibit Hall

1:30pm – 2:15pm  Keynote Address
Presentation of the R. Lynn Rylander Award
- Gen Norton Schwartz, USAF, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force

2:15pm – 2:45pm  Break in Exhibit Hall

2:45pm – 4:45pm  PANEL 6: MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF PERSISTENT CONFLICT THROUGH EDUCATION AND TRAINING
Moderator: Dr. Brian Maher, President, Joint Special Operations University
Panelists:
- MG Thomas Ceranko, USA, Commander, USASOC/SWC
- CAPT Chuck Lockett, USN, Senior Education Programs, Joint Special Operations University
- BG David Grange, Jr., USA (Ret), President & CEO, McCormick Foundation
- White Paper Presenter: Ambassador (Ret) David C. Litt, Executive Director, Center for Stabilization and Economic Reconstruction, Institute for Defense and Business

5:00pm – 6:00pm  Reception in Exhibit Hall

6:00pm – 9:00pm  Awards Banquet with Guest Speaker
Presentation of deProspero Lifetime Achievement Award and Achieveent Awards
- ADM Michael Mullen, USN, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 12, 2009

7:00am – 12:30pm  Registration Open

7:00am – 8:00am  Continental Breakfast in Exhibit Hall

8:00am – 8:05am  Welcome and Administrative Remarks
- MG Kenneth Bowra, USA (Ret), Chairman, NDIA SO/LIC Division

8:05am – 8:50am  Keynote Address
- Honorable Michael Vickers, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations, Low Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities

8:50am – 10:50am  PANEL 7: INTERAGENCY PERSPECTIVES
Moderator: LTG Frank Kearney, USA, Deputy Commander, USSOCOM
Panelists:
- LTG Ronald Burgess, Jr., USA, Director of Intelligence Staff, Office of the Director of National Intelligence
- Dr. Christopher Lamb, Institute for National Strategic Studies, NDU
- Ambassador Dell Dailey, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Department of State
- BG Scott Miller, USA, J3, Deputy Director, Special Operations, The Joint Staff

10:50am – 11:20am  Break in Exhibit Hall
Last Chance to View Exhibits

11:20am – 12:20pm  Lunch with Keynote Speaker
- GEN Barry McCaffrey, USA (Ret), President, BR McCaffrey Associates, LLC

12:20pm – 12:30pm  Closing Remarks
- MG Kenneth Bowra, USA (Ret), Chairman, NDIA SO/LIC Division

12:30pm  Symposium Adjourned
Raytheon

Raytheon Company, with 2006 sales of $19.7 billion, is a technology leader specializing in defense, homeland security and other government markets throughout the world. With a history of innovation spanning 85 years, Raytheon provides state-of-the-art electronics, mission systems integration and other capabilities in the areas of sensing; effects; and command, control, communications and intelligence systems, as well as a broad range of mission support services. With headquarters in Waltham, Massachusetts, Raytheon employs 72,000 people worldwide.

www.raytheon.com
### Section III: Global Security Risks
- Extremism and terrorism
- Proliferation
- Reliance on computer networks
- Cyber war
- Information operations (INFO OPS)
- Criminal issues of concern
- Criminal organizations and networks
- Illegal immigration and human trafficking
- Diminished law and order
NATO SPECIAL OPERATION TRANSFORMATION INITIATIVE
The NSCC will enable and support NATO SOF as the focal point for strategic SOF advice and operational planning to the NATO Chain of Command

**NB:** NSCC is a NATO coordination and advisory organization. *It does not fulfill a command function*
1. Provide SOF Subject Matter expertise
2. Support Force generation
3. Develop SOF policy, increase interoperability
4. Support SOF training and exercise
5. Establish a NATO SOF Network
### SOF Capabilities Working List

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<thead>
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<th>ITEM</th>
<th>Rational/Remarks</th>
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<tr>
<td>FAC</td>
<td>Operational Requirement</td>
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<td></td>
<td>SOF Commanders Requirement</td>
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<tr>
<td>Biometric Systems</td>
<td>Operational Requirement</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIS for SOF</td>
<td>SACEUR’s task/ MMR CIS for SOF submitted (includes Intel Systems)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non Lethal Capabilities</td>
<td>Applicability for SOF</td>
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</table>
**Depth of NSCC Support**

- **HQ NATO**
  - SACEUR
  - Chief of Staff
  - DSACEUR

- **Crisis Response**
  - ISAF
  - SOCCE

- **NATO HQs**
  - J2
  - J3
  - J6
  - J7
  - J8
  - J9
  - J1
  - J4
  - J5
  - J6
  - J8
  - HSG

- **NATO Exercises**
  - JFC-N
  - JFC-B
  - JFC(L)
  - Spec Ops

- **NATO Schools**
  - JF(C)-L
  - Spec Ops

- **DJTF/DJSE**
  - HRF/NRF

- **ACT**
  - Allied CMD Transform.

- **Nations & Nation’s SOF**

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**Abbreviations & Definitions**

- **DSACEUR**: Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe
- **DCOS**: Deputy Chief of Staff
- **SOCCE**: Special Operations Command & Control Element
- **JFC**: Joint Forces Command
- **DJTF**: Deployable Joint Task Force
- **DJSE**: Deployable Joint Staff Element
- **HRF**: High Readiness Force
- **NRF**: NATO Response Force
NSCC Support to Afghanistan

Pre-NSTI/NSCC Special Operations Command & Control Element (SOCCE)

- 32 pax

Current SOCCE

- 70 pax

Projected SOCCE ‘09

- 83 pax

Pre-NSTI/NSCC ISAF SOF Special Operations Task Groups (SOTGs)

- 2 x SOTGs -

Current ISAF SOF

- 7 x SOTGs -

Projected ISAF SOF ‘09

- 9+ x SOTGs

INCREASE

120% INCREASE

160% INCREASE

250% INCREASE

350% INCREASE

Pre NSTI/NSCC
Current
Projected Spring ‘08
NON KINETIC MISSIONS

MA

KLE

MEDCAP

HA
UNITY OF EFFORT
Coordination of SOF in theatre
Building Partner Nation Capacity

... a Campaign of Prevention

Trafficking In Persons
Money Laundering
Narco-trafficking
Police Corruption
Arms Smuggling
Document Forgery
Contraband
International Access
Safehaven

$1.2B out - $0 in annually

Overall Classification:
UNCLAS
February '09

Disrupt,
Deter,
Dissuade
End State:
The Southern Cone is inhospitable to transnational threats; illicit activities are disrupted / minimized; and partner nation / interagency cooperation is sustained to prevent their re-emergence.
Anti-corruption

“Son Buscados”/Anti-Money laundering (AML) Webpages

“Son Buscados”/AML Billboards

“SB”/AML Joint NPI

Anti-smuggling

MEDCAP
Anti-corruption

Paraguay
Civil Affairs Projects

- Improve HN capacity for self-sustainment.
- Direct coordination with USAID and Paraguayan SEN.
- Tailored efforts to specific needs.

Emergency Response / Humanitarian Assistance Donations

UNCLAS//FOUO
Destacamento Conjunto de Empleo Inmediato (DCEI)

Description: A joint immediate response unit designed with a Battalion level staff, one Tactical Company, and a Support Company, capable of responding to Paraguayan national threats, interdicting illicit mechanisms within Paraguay that support or could support transnational terrorists posing a threat to the United States.

Composition
Staff
Tactical Company
Support Company
Destacamento Conjunto de Empleo Inmediato (DCEI) Paraguay
Seis “narcos” ligados al PCC caen en Pedro Juan

Bajo arresto. Los cinco brasileños y un paraguayo formarían parte del grupo de detenidos.

Por Marciano Candía
PEDRO JUAN CABALLERO

Agentes de la Senad efectuaron un allanamiento en la estancia “Jerico”, propiedad de Carlos Antonio Caballero alias Kapilo, detenido el sábado último en Bolivia con un cargamento de 200 kilos de cocaína evaluado en 600 mil dólares en el citado país.

La estancia se encuentra en la colonia Cerro Cora I, a pocos kilómetros de Pedro Juan Caballero, donde fueron sorprendidos cinco brasileños y un paraguayo, entre ellos el caporraloso Kapilo, identificado como Wanderley José dos Nacimientos (30), quien contaba con una orden de captura internacional por tráfico de drogas.

Además, cayeron Leandro Reis dos Nacimientos (22), Olavo Cavalcante da Silva (39), Jorge Luiz Gomes Durante (27), Amalio Lobo Viana de Rezende (26), y el paraguayo Ramón Jiménez Delgado (38), administrador del establecimiento ganadero.

Los brasileños detenidos serían parte del PCC (Primer Comando Capital) brazo armado de tráfico de drogas y estarían a la espera del cargamento decomisado el sábado pasado por los antidrogas bolivianos, que si llegaba a aterrizar en la estancia, el traslado sería en cantidades menores, según dijeron los investigadores.

Del lugar también se incautaron una camioneta L-200 y otra camioneta Fiat Strada, además de una escopeta calibre 20 con varios cartuchos.
President Lugo with Admiral Benitez, FFMM, visiting the DCEI on Campo Grande. November 20th, 2008.
Sésamo y ka'a he'ê en vez de marihuana

El presidente Fernando Lugo sobrevoló ayer en Capitán Bado, en compañía de la embajadora de EEUU, Liliana Ayalde (atrás, de chaqueta blanca) y el gobernador de Amambay, Bartolomé Ramírez, la franja fronteriza donde se cultiva marihuana. Allí firmaron un convenio con productores para reemplazar la droga por cultivos de sésamo, ka'a he'ê, entre otros.

Martes 21 de octubre del 2008

La Nación
Building Partner Nation Capacity
... a Campaign of Prevention

Deter, Disrupt, Dissuade

Trafficking in Persons
Money Laundering
Narco-trafficking
Police Corruption
Arms Smuggling
Document Forgery
Contraband
International Access
Safehaven
$1.2B out - $0 in annually

Overall Classification:
UNCLAS
February '09
SOC(FWD)-PAK commands and controls all SOCCENT forces in Pakistan and synchronizes the US security development efforts with the PAK MIL and Civil Armed Forces in order to meet USCENTCOM operational and strategic objectives.
Current Disposition of Forces

Peshawar (11)
- SOCCE (5)
- CMSE (2)
- MIST (2)
- ODB 3120 (2)

Tarbela (5)
- ODB 3120

Qasim (0)
- 6th SOS OAD

Islamabad (39)
- SOC-FWD (PAK) (23)
- MIST (5)
- CA Planner (1)
- ODB 3120 (10)

Warsak
- ODB 3120 (4)

TOTAL: 59
Security Development Plan

- USCENTCOM tasked SOCCENT as the lead command for execution of the SDP
- SDP is the security aspect of the larger, overarching FATA Development Strategy
  - Supports US/UK Embassy socio-economic development, governance and institutional capacity building programs which are aligned with GoP strategies
  - Provides a flexible framework to allocate funding towards designated security assistance programs
  - Compatible with the Afghan National Development Strategy and ISAF efforts
- Enhance Frontier Corps capabilities to provide local security for tribal leadership
  - Enable the distribution of economic aid and development
  - Indigenous populations are the main effort
FC Master Training (Abbottabad)

- PAKMIL School of Physical Fitness served as interim training site
- Ten Week program to create training cadre for future courses
- Personnel will transition to Warsak during Feb 09
Frontier Corps Training Center (FCTC)

- FCTC located at Swat Scout Training Area in Warsak, 30KM N. of Peshawar, on FATA border
- FCTC will have four courses:
  - **Wing Development Course (WDC)** to train and equip newly raised cohort Wings (600 students per course, 10 weeks duration)
  - **Leader Development Course (LDC)** to train junior leaders in COIN doctrine; troop leading
  - **Intelligence Development Course (IDC)** to improve FC intel processes; 5 week duration
  - **Sniper Course**; 6 Week sniper skills course
SOCCENT Partnership With PAKSOF
Special Service Group

- Six training events executed in FY08; units trained include the 3rd, 4th, 5th and 7th CDO
- Equipment issued as part of training (Glock pistols, radios, body armor, etc)
- Future expansion may include training the Karrar Company
21st Quick Reaction Squadron

- Continual trainer presence since Apr 07
- All 15 MI-17s have been upgraded for NVG operations
- Currently executing plan ($32M) to overhaul nine a/c in FY09
**Special Service Group-Navy (SSG-N)**

- Naval Special Warfare Unit – Three is the primary training partner
- Mission sets include littoral direct action and special reconnaissance
- Anti-Terrorist Team responsible for maritime CT missions; total strength of approx 120
- SEAL Delivery Team: responsible for VBSS, maritime patrol, intercept and SEAL delivery

![Diagram of SSGN, SEAL GRP, SDT, and ATT connections]
Questions?
Central Command AOR

650 million people
- 11% illiterate
- 40% are males ages 15-29
- Outpacing global population growth 2-1
Pakistan Strategic Environment

- Civilian vs. Military Government
- Economic instability
- Ungoverned areas / sanctuary
- Conventional / WMD Threats
- Irregular Threats
  - AQ / AQAM
  - National insurgency
- Narcotics / smuggling
Meeting the Challenges

- Reinforce balance of power
  - Army is preeminent institution
  - Civilian leadership in place and working

- Collaborative approach
  - All aspects of Nat'l power
  - Inter-agency

- Enduring presence
  - Comfort built over time
  - Continuity of relationships

- Accountability
Role of Technology

- Expectation management
- **U.S. Forces**
  - Low signature / non-intrusive
  - Commercially sustainable
- **Pakistani Forces**
  - Easily releasable
  - Training support
  - Low maintenance
Special Operations Command Pacific
Persistent Engagement for Persistent Conflict
US PACOM Area of Responsibility (AOR)

Characteristics of the Pacific AOR
- > 50% of earth’s surface
- 60% of world’s population
- World’s six largest armed forces
- Four of the world’s largest economies
- World’s largest Muslim, Hindu, and Buddhist populations
- Five Mutual Defense Relationships

Relative Size Comparison of USA to Asia Pacific Region

Northeast Asia

South Asia

Southeast Asia

Australia & Oceania
US PACOM Area of Responsibility (AOR)

Challenges
- Chinese Influence
- nKorea – unstable regime / nuclear
- India – Pakistan
  - Extremists (Mumbai)
  - Kashmir
- Insurgencies
  - Thai-Malay Border
  - Southern Philippines
- Islamic Extremists
- Natural Disasters
- Taiwan Status

Relative Size Comparison of USA to Asia Pacific Region
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM – Philippines

- 90 + million
- 90% Christian
- “Moro” Separatists
- Threats
  - Abu Sayaaaf (ASG)
  - Jemaah Islamiyah
  - NPA / Communists
  - Ungoverned spaces
“Indirect Approach” & Persistent Engagement

• **Campaign**
  – **Philippines = Counterinsurgency** or COIN - address underlying causes of insurgency, immunizing at risk communities from exploitation by militant Islamic extremists (AQ)
  – **United States = Foreign Internal Defense** in support of Philippines COIN (main effort) and Philippines Counterterror operations (CT) (supporting effort)

• **Persistent Engagement**
  – Seven years of sustained, persistent engagement in Southern Philippines
  – SOF led mission

• **Constraints.** Recognizes the constrained environment of (1) Sovereign Host Nations, (2) Counter-productivity of heavy US presence, (3) Limited resources to apply to the problem set

• **Division of Labor:** Recognizes DoD is one of many stakeholders. Attempts to scope the role of DoD in general, and SOF in particular, within a broader Host Nation and Inter-Agency environment

• **Patience:** Indirect Approach strategies & tactics are “by, with, through.” This inherently requires a long-term view accepting of measured developments and quiet results.
Questions?
US Special Operations Command

Equipping America’s Quiet Professionals

Col Jim Geurts
Program Executive Officer
Fixed Wing Programs
Feb 09
PEO-Fixed Wing
“Acquisition Truths”

FAST does not equal UNDISCIPLINED

MORE BUREACRACY does not ensure a BETTER PRODUCT

RISK must be MANAGED NOT AVOIDED

FASTER does not have to increase COST/RISK

COMPETITION can be done QUICKLY

UNCONVENTIONAL THINKING is an ENABLER

CREDIBILITY enables FREEDOM OF ACTION

TIME TO FIELD IS A PEO-FW ACQUISITION KPP
What is Different at SOCOM

- Culture of success and identification with the mission
  - Enterprise wide——supporting the deployed SOF warrior is job 1

- Capability approach to acquisition
  - Start from capability delivery and work backwards
  - Appreciation for the way acquisition can pace/enable operations

- Rapid decision making and access to the decision maker
  - Short chain of command -- empowered teams and program leaders
  - Most issues solvable within the command

- Drive for rapid solutions over perfect solutions
  - Effective expectation mgmt takes more than a document

- Comfort level with risk management

- Joint approaches to enable rather than impede acquisition
Supporting SOCOM Acquisition

• We set necessarily high expectations and expect you to meet your commitments
• We are not afraid to take and manage risks but need to understand them at the start of a program
• We need rapid business processes across the entire supply chain to deal with changing SOCOM needs
• We don’t shy away from competition, unconventional approaches, or walking away from a failing program
• Product quality in the SOF environment can cause a mission to succeed or fail – lives depend on it
• Performance, not promises, defines your reputation
Technology in Persistent Conflict: Threat Focused Solutions

Mr. Richard T. Higgins
Evolution of Conflict

Past
- The People
- The Military
- The State

Present
- Private Militaries and Militias
- Super Empowered Individuals
- International Community
- The Military
- Private Sector
- NGOs
- The Internet
- The State
- The People

Future

State

Technical Development

Individual
# Technology in War

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goliath</th>
<th>vs.</th>
<th>David</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>(Physics/Chemistry)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>(Sociology/Psychology)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Designed to impose will <strong>upon</strong> an environment, not operate within it</td>
<td></td>
<td>Operates <strong>within</strong> the environment not upon it</td>
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<tr>
<td>Side with the most mass wins (traditional conflict)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Does not require sustained mass (war of the flea)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Cost, Difficult to Sustain</td>
<td></td>
<td>Efficient, Sustainable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Episodic, Technical, Reactive (CT)</td>
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<td>Protracted, Human, Proactive</td>
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“This is another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origin—war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins, war by ambush instead of by combat; by infiltration, instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him.”

- John F. Kennedy, Commencement at West Point, 1962
### Capability Development

**Historical Method:**
- Tech Based, Reactive
- Metrics based on Design
- Single-Purpose
- Operations Orders with Information Annexes
- Technology Supports Material Solutions

**Required Method:**
- Threat Based, Anticipatory
- Metrics based on Influence
- Multi-Purpose
- Information Orders with Operations Annexes
- Non-Material Solutions to Enable Technology

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"A secret organization...which has scattered its members in small groups over the whole of the Empire, but is nevertheless inspired by a common goal, a common aim...an organization that acts according to a common plan..."

-Mikhael Bakunin, 1870
Thoughts and Observations

• Information Age = Exponential Creation of New Data
  • Contributions from LE, Academia, Private Sector
  • Required skill sets reside outside USG talent pool

• RDT&E as a Learning Tool
  • Failure is accepted, success anticipated
  • Innovation is required, not just encouraged
  • Not all requirements will come from edge users

• Non-Material Solutions enable Technology

“The speed of technical response will never match the speed with which an enemy can change his mind.” – Townley
Take Aways

Avoid:
Risk Aversion, Institutional Protectionism, Intellectual Complacence, Capabilities Focus

Encourage:
Innovation, Communication, Multi-Purpose Solutions, Threat Focus

Remember:
Our current understanding of the engagement zone is different from that of our adversary’s.

“The striking of terror into the enemies is not only a means, it is the end in itself. It is the point where the means and the end meet and merge. Once a condition of terror into the opponent’s heart is obtained, half the war is won. It is the decision we want to impose upon him.”

- S.K. Malik, The Quranic Concept of War
All Gone

Col J.D. Clem
HQ AFSOC Dep A5/A8/A9
10 Feb 09
**POM 10 Guidance**

**Key Tenets**

- Employ the force to provide the full spectrum of AFSOC air power capabilities
- Modernize the force to sustain operational readiness and future relevance

**Priorities**

1. Recapitalize the MC-130 fleet
2. Accelerate the CV-22 program
3. Acquire the AC-XX gunship
4. Accelerate Nonstandard Aircraft
5. Fully develop ISR/PED capability
6. Battlefield Airmen transformation
7. Improve institutional training

---

*Buy the Platform, Perfect it Continuously*
What’s Changed in Past Year
(no particular order)

- Air Force Special Operations Training Center (AFSOTC) Standup
- MH-53 Pave Low Retirement (Heavy Lift Helo Mission to USASOC)
- TAC-P now part of AFSOC
- 3 SOS Move to Cannon / 2 SOS Authorization
- NSA mission standup
- CV-22 IOC (Pending)
- AC-XX and 30/40mm Gun development
- PED / ISR Expansion
- Battlefield Airman
- 27 SOW/Cannon Maturation
- MC-130W IOC
- AvFID QDR directed growth
- SUAS & SOPGM
- Special Operations restablished as an AF Core Mission
AFSOC’s priority for the 2010 QDR is to balance our warfighting capability portfolio to provide full-spectrum specialized airpower to combatant commanders.

Specifically, we aim to enhance capability and increase capacity to conduct irregular warfare activities, including building partnership capacity (aviation security force assistance / foreign internal defense), counterinsurgency, and information operations while preserving our capability to operate at high end of spectrum.

“The defining principle of the Pentagon's new National Defense Strategy is balance” …SECDEF Gates (Jan 09)

Develop a balanced warfighting capabilities portfolio in sync with USAF and USSOCOM priorities …responsive, smart, and sufficient
AC-XX Risk Reduction Platform*

*AC-”XXX” Risk Reduction Platform at HRT awaiting paint
AC-27 vs AC-130U Access
Thank You!
Special
Reconnaissance/Unconventional Warfare---
How about an UxV for a Teammate?
…Collaborative Unmanned Operations for Maritime Security…

Dr. Miles Libbey
Dr. Robby Harris
Lockheed Martin MS2
Overview

- **ECCHO: Edge C2 and Hybrid Operations**
  - Autonomous Operations...will take decades to achieve
    - Instead: Think about levels of autonomy
    - Don’t you really want teams, not autonomy?
    - Or better: machine teams working with human teams
- **Today: Control, i.e. fly & drive**
- **Tomorrow: Command sensors and missions**
- **Working to skip a generation in edge & unmanned C2**
- **Heterogeneous Ops UxVs= UAV, USV, UGV, UUV**
  - + unattended sensors, e.g. ground= UGS
- **Small footprint, powerful info sharing and**
  - Teams of warriors USV / UAVs / Unattended Sensors
ECCHO Program Priorities

- **Face fire first** to reduce human vulnerability;
- **Work collaboratively with other machines** to reduce humans “driving/flying” platforms & relieve humans from simple non-lethal problem/mission execution/logistics solving;
- **Work collaboratively with humans** provide persistent, meaningful ISR, tailored to dismounted SO/LIC warriors needs;
- **Provide timely, geo-marked, fused info** to team & higher echelons in open format like Google earth;
- **Reduce Edge & TOC footprint** for people & equipment

UxVs May Gradually Replace/Empower Squad Members
Program Goals

- **Autonomous Operations**
  - Operate with only safety riders
  - Multiple vehicles, single commander
  - Automated recommended tasking & retasking
  - Evaluate optionally manned vehicle value
- **Operations with unmanned air & surface vehicles**
- **Command environment = 1 laptop**
  - Dismounts = PDA
- **Perform combat edge ops maximizing ISR/Tactical coverage & minimizing staff**
  - Collaboration between USV / UAVs / Unattended Sensors
Enable Ability To Pass Command & Control Across Network

**Edge Command and Control/Hybrid Operations (ECC/HO)**

**Tactical Operations Center**
- Dist. UxV Cntrl
- Full S/A & Imagery
- VoIP & Chat

**Reachback**
- Full S/A & Imagery
- Vehicle Status
- Configurable S/A Alerts

**USV**
- SSR
- PTZ Camera
- IMU & Full Nav Suite

**UAV**
- PTZ Camera
- GPS

**Mobile C2 Vehicle**
- Dist. UxV Cntrl
- Full S/A & Imagery
- VoIP & Chat

**Afloat TOC**
- Dist. UxV Cntrl
- Full S/A & Imagery
- VoIP & Chat

**Dismounts**
- UxV ISR Imagery
- UxV Tasking
- Full S/A

C3 to the Tactical Edge
Autonomous Operations

- USV following mission paths
- Maneuvering and adjusting velocity based on conditions
- Testing in Riverine Operations
Desert Hawk UAV

- Small electric UAV
- Normally run with a single laptop control environment
- Integrated with collaborative environment
- Opportunity for many UAVs to be commanded by single warrior
Mobile Command Center for Experiments

- Command easily passed between fixed, mobile, & dismounts
- Used similar networking equipment for testing
Command Environment: Graphical User Interface
Command – Vehicle Shared Models

• Key: share mission plan between ops command dismounts & UxVs
  – Permanent network communications not required
  – Mesh network concept borrowed from SO/LIC
  – Allows multiple UxVs tasking

• Retasking: command center or directly with UXV

• Automatic replanning flexible: individual vehicle level, team, or group level.
  – Compensates for: fuel, sensor performance on failures, completion of other tasks……..

Flexibility: LCS or ashore TOC; Concept adapts to TTPs
Operations Outside Normal Comm. Range; Mesh Network Allows Daisy Chaining
Flexible Ops: Boarding Party Support

- USV / (UAVs) provide SA while Edge forces board suspect ship
- Commanded from environment on shore or manned boat
- Coordinated through local boarding party interested in “different views”
ECCHO Summary

- **Multiple missions run using collaborative resources**
  - Automatic retasking based on sensors/info, not data
  - Not just riverine: SO, HA/DR, first responder
  - Persistent Tactical Surveillance

- **Multiple users can command assets temporarily**

- **Increases commander’s influence range & coverage**

- **Allows battlefield resource sharing: e.g., LCS squadron**

- **COTS Hardware maximizes cost, reuse & flexibility**

Goal: Make UxV Squads Powerful SO/LIC Teammates
Questions?

Dr. Miles Libbey
Lockheed Martin
Advanced Solutions MS2
202.863.3444
Purpose

To provide the panel talking points to appreciate the degradation of Human Capital in sustained persistent conflict in the context of low density, high demand.

SOF Surgeon’s Mission

Sustain and preserve the Commanders Combat Power.
CHAPTER I
DOCTRINAL OVERVIEW OF JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS

"We need a greater ability to deal with guerrilla forces, insurrection, and subversion . . . We must be ready now to deal with any size force, including small externally supported bands of men; and we must help train local forces to be equally effective."

President John F. Kennedy, Message to Congress, 1961

1. Special Operations Forces

Special operations forces (SOF) are small, specially organized units manned by people carefully selected and trained to operate under physically demanding and psychologically stressful conditions to accomplish missions using modified equipment and unconventional applications of tactics against strategic and operational objectives.

2. Special Operations

The successful conduct of special operations (SO) relies on individual and small unit

d. SOF limitations stem from their few numbers and the time needed to develop and replace highly trained people and units. Additionally, focused efforts are essential to preserve the force in the face of occupational injury and illness and to rapidly recover and recondition people to the demanding standards required for return to duty and mission capable status. Austere SOF logistic support systems require extensive support from conventional force structures supplemented by host nation (HN) and/or contracted support. SOF are organized and trained for employment against targets of strategic and operational relevance. SOF are not used as a substitute for conventional forces. SOF truths stem from the capabilities and limitations associated with SOF and are depicted in Figure I-1.
Provide fully capable Special Operations Forces to defend the United States and its interests. Plan and synchronize operations against terrorist networks.
What is relevant Human Performance?
Detailed Human Performance Mission

- Define and implement a Human Capital Preservation strategy that addresses all aspects of the Human Dimension.
- Validate, and force acceptance that the Human Weapon System is a fiscal and relevant equal to all other Programs of Record.
- Urge J3s and Command Groups to allocate full time resources to this mission.
- Implied Tasks from Title 10:
  - Train, Organize and Equip; Determine interoperability
  - Integrated Project Teams; SOF Medical Aquisitions
  - Execute DOTLMPF process as necessary, as required
  - Engage, identify and gain Title 10 resources from DOD and medical bureaus.
- Synchronize relevant S & T topics with both the directed and implied mission.
Professional Sports Model
MIL Variant Capabilities

- Trains – Organizes & Equips
- **Maintains and Increases Operator Performance thresholds**
- Repair and Restore
- Performs Pre Habilitation and Re Habilitates
- Tests for Function and Capacity
- Supports Physiology – identifies pathology ~ etiology
- Applies emerging Technology
- Enforces standards – reports declines and progressions
- It can optimize, enhance and modify when necessary
- NOT responsible or utilized for Health and Wellness!
WRPC Approved at 74M over FYDP.

WARFIGHTER REHABILITATION PERFORMANCE CENTER (WRPC)

Asset Allocation to Capital Geographic areas

Model of 9 or Model of 3

A specific Resource Model has been approved and delineated by the CDR. WARCOM N8 was the proponent. This is defined in the AD appendices from BOD ramp up.

SG tasked to institutionalize, oversight and assist with limited implementation.
MIL Variant Contains eight not including the Program Director who is classified as Core Critical but may exist in a different Task ORG

Core - Critical
- Performance Director - Strength and Conditioning
- Athletic Trainers
- Medical Director

Attendant – Essential, possibly enhancing
- Performance Dietician (not RD)
- Therapists – not just PT. More succinctly therapeutic services
- Exercise Physiologists

Supporting – Enhancing
- Physical Sciences staff (E.G. Term Research, Kinematics)
- Logistics or OPS
- MIL Occupational Safety – FHP
- Sports Psychologists
- Chiropractic and / or Physiatry
5 YR STRATEGIC END STATE

- Performance Centers and optimal Staff at every Capital SOF Unit based on the best Professional Sports Models
- Accessions to Discharge HP methodology (playbook)
- Improve Operator Performance Thresholds by 20% HMITH
- Improve Return to Duty Times by 20% HMITH
- PROC and O&M fund sites established
- Centralized point of Qualification and Education to teach HP curriculum
- J7 – J9 – J10 Permanent Party staff for HP
- Defined and functional strategic sports science partnerships with academic centers of excellence
- Integration of NANO – TECH and BIOMTX - BIOMEDICAL into functional HP Programs
- Abolish reliance or necessary compliance with Service based “FITNESS” tests – establish tests based on occupational relevance.
Challenges of Recruiting

CDR A. R. Kubera
SOCS-J1
Date: 11 Feb 09

The overall classification of this briefing is:
SOCS-J1
UNCLASSIFIED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Obesity Trends: 1991
(BMI ≥ 30, for 18 – 34 Year Olds)


UNCLASSIFIED // FOUO
Obesity Trends: 2007
(BMI ≥ 30, for 18 – 34 Year Olds)

Foreign-Born Population and Foreign Born as Percentage of the Total US Population, 1850 to 2007

Source: Migration Population Institute
Expanding Recruiting for SOF

U.S. Citizens and Green Card holders

- Identify and code for SOF community
- Leverage Special Immigrant Visa Programs and/or Parole
- U.S. based non-immigrants under “MAVNI”

09Ls, SOF, Enablers

Foreign National Interpreters

Culture, Language, Local Knowledge

Ease of Enlistment

HIGH
US Special Operations Command

USSOCOM Care Coalition

Briefer: Jim Lorraine
USSOCOM Care Coalition
Date: 11 Feb 09

The overall classification of this briefing is:
UNCLASSIFIED
USSOCOM Care Coalition
Overview

Mission:

- Provide Special Operations Warriors And Their Families A Model Advocacy Program In Order To Enhance Their Quality Of Life And Strengthen Special Operations Readiness.

  - Support The Entire SOF Family – Everyone Qualifies
    - Active, Guard, Reserve, Retired, Separated
    - Wounded, Ill, or Injured And Their Family – Our Primary Focus
    - Family
    - Survivors
  - Advocacy For Life
  - All Encompassing – Pay, Benefits, VA, TRICARE, etc.
  - Leverage Existing Programs – Government or Non-Government
  - Unite SOF and Non-SOF Benevolent Organizations
  - Tenacious Follow-up
  - Biased Toward Action

Knowing What’s Out There and What’s Not – Getting Both
USSOCOM Care Coalition
Overview

Our Model

- Focus On The Mission. Return As Many Wounded, Ill, Or Injured To Duty As Quickly As Possible - Operationally Fit And Mentally Prepared

- Family Security, Safety, And Well-Being Are Critical To Mission Success

- Partner With Other Organizations (Government/Non-Government) Who Are Chartered To Provide A Service – And Ensure They Provide The Best Service To Our Forces

- Keeping Our Wounded, Ill, And Injured And Their Families Informed To Ensure They Can Make Informed Decisions

- Don’t Exclude Anyone From The Program. Help Anyone Who’s In Need

- Solve The Immediate Problem By Any Means, Then Change The System To Resolve It For All

If there is one phone number SOF and their families need to remember for life – it’s 877-672-3039 – the USSOCOM Care Coalition
USSOCOM Care Coalition

Commander, USSOCOM

Chief Of Staff

Director
USSOCOM Care Coalition

Care Coalition Hospital Liaisons

Strategic Enablers
Veteran’s Affairs, Army, USMC, Military Family Life Consultant

Care Coalition Advocates
Advocate For All Inpatient Casualties/Families

Advocate For All Return To Duty, Retired, Separated, Surviving Families

Staff Section
Benevolent Organization Link, Policy, Computer Programmer

If there is one phone number SOF and their families need to remember for life – it’s 877-672-3039 – the USSOCOM Care Coalition
USSOCOM Care Coalition

What it’s all about….taking care of those who are taking care of us!
VIGNETTES
Chuck – Night Stalker

- Only surviving crew member in helo crash
  Feb 07 – wheelchair bound
- Fabulous rehab at Tampa Poly-Trauma
- Sentinels of Freedom Scholarship
- Transferred to Military MTF for IVF Services
  - MTF Funded Out-of-Pocket Expenses
  - Too Early In Recovery Process
  - Unsuccessfully Tried Again 6 Months Later
  - Medically Retired – No MTF Funding
- Homes For Our Troops Built Home
Colin-USASOC

- Blinded By GSW To Head
  - Lost Central Vision & Severe Seizure Disorder
- Care Coalition Secured His 100% Retirement
- Can Only See Peripheral Vision
- Benevolent Organization Support
  - Received Guide Dog
  - Highly Mobile With His Best Friend
- Continued Problem With Seizures and Pain Management
  - Referred to Mayo Clinic – Wife Says Has Her Husband From 6 Years Ago Back
- Most Complicated Patient For Coordination of Benefits Purposes
Ryan - SEAL

- Blinded In Combat
- Motivated and Dynamic
- Benevolent Organization Support
  - Immediate Cash/Lodging/Vehicle For Family
  - Tandem Bike
  - Weekend Retreat
  - Dork Watch
  - Sentinels of Freedom
- Married 6 months after injury
- Surgery issues 2 years post injury
Joe – Ranger

- Severe Leg Wound
- Long Term Treatment And Rehabilitation
- Benevolent Organization Support
  - Sports Outings
  - Adaptive Wheelchair
  - Advise And Visitors During Next Step Of Care Far From Ranger Regiment
- Elective amputation 2 years post injury
- Now serving as Squad Leader in RGR RGT – Currently Deployed
Family – Green Beret

- Father/Husband Was Deployed To Iraq
- North Carolina Endured Torrential Rains
- Foundation Of Home Dissolved – Home Collapsed
- Benevolent Organization Support:
  - Placed Family In Temporary Housing
  - Replaced Foundation
  - Repaired Basement Family Room
  - Repair Lawn And Driveway
- Green Beret Refocused On Combat Operations
Tom – Civil Affairs

- Shattered Pelvis and Sacrum
- Long Rehabilitation – Face Down 5 months
- Family All Over The Country
- Benevolent Organization Support:
  - Numerous Flights
  - Lodging/Transportation
  - Immediate Finances
- Ran Army 10 Miler In Oct 08
- CRSC Received = $0 Due to Offset
1st Special Warfare Training Group (Airborne)
Agenda

- USAJ FKSWCS Commanding General’s Vision
- What has Changed at the USAJ FKSWCS?
- Mission
- Footprint
- Task Organization
- Special Forces Qualification Course
- Special Forces Advanced Skills Training
- Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Qualification Course
- Conclusion
Commanding General,
USAJ FKSWCS Vision

We will remain a world-class Special Operations Training Center and School with an integrated Unconventional Warfare Center of Excellence that produces agile, adaptive, warrior-focused Soldiers. We will lead change based upon today’s lessons learned, while focusing on tomorrow’s challenges. We will develop innovative doctrine and never lose sight of the fact that we are the only source that provides a highly trained force with the intuitive abilities to work by, with, and through our indigenous partners. We will provide our operational force with the most relevant advanced skills necessary to make us an irreplaceable force.
What Has Changed at the USAJFKSWCS?

- **Mindset:** We are training ARSOF warriors to go into combat... how can we improve?

- **Quality of training dramatically increased**
  - Is it relevant to the GWOT. If not, don’t do it.
  - Rapid integration of new and revised training into courses
  - More live fire than ever before for all MOSs

- **Graduation rates higher; standards maintained/ increased**
  - Instructors; teach, coach, train, and mentor
  - Completely changed SFQC, CA, and PSYOP pipelines
  - One model for AC & RC CA and PSYOP pipelines

- **Agility to meet wartime requirements**
  - Quality of instructors/ cadre has never been better
  - We will meet future growth requirements of SF, CA, and PO

- **We are well postured to meet QDR growth**
  - Achieved ADE recruiting goal for FY08
  - Exceeded 750 ADE SFQC Goal for FY08
1st Special Warfare Training Group (A) Mission Statement

1st SWTG(A) trains Soldiers to standard, as entry-level ARSOF warriors, at Fort Bragg, NC; Camp MacKall, NC; Key West, FL; Fort Lewis, WA; and Yuma Proving Ground, AZ in order to fill current and future ARSOF requirements.

On order - 1st SWTG(A) trains select DoD, inter-agency, and foreign personnel.
The 1st SWTG(A) Footprint
(Coast to Coast)

- Fort Lewis, WA
  ASOT-W
- Uwharrie National Forest
  Robin Sage
- Yuma Proving Ground, AZ
  MFF
  SOTACC
- Key West, FL
  Combat Diver
- Fort Bragg, NC
  SFQC
  CAQC
  POQC
- Camp Mackall, NC

1st SWTG(A)  11 FEB 09  6 of 17
Task Organization

1st SWTG(A)

HHD

1st Battalion
SF Field Training

B Co:
-SUT
C Co:
-SERE
D Co:
-UW CULEX
(Robin Sage)

2nd Battalion
Advanced Skills

A Co:
-ASOT
-SFISC (18F)
B Co:
-MFF
-SOTACC
(Yuma Proving Ground)
C Co:
-UWO
(Key West)
D Co:
-SFARTAETC
-SFSC

3rd Battalion
CA/PSYOP

A Co:
-37F AIT
-38B AIT
B Co:
-POQC
-CAQC
-MOS

4th Battalion
MOS 18 Tng

A Co: -18A
B Co: -18B
C Co: -18C
E Co: -18E

SPT Battalion

A Co: -ADMIN
B Co: -TRANS
C Co: -MAINT/RIGGER
D Co: -STUDENT COMPANY
ISFTC

1,195 Personnel Assigned
Special Forces Qualification Course
**SOF TRUTHS**

- Humans are more important than hardware
- Quality is better than Quantity
- Special Operations Forces cannot be mass produced
- Competent Special Operations Forces cannot be created after emergencies occur
Special Forces Qualification Course Pipeline

**Phase I (DSOP)**
- Special Forces Assessment and Selection
- 3 Weeks
  - SF Assessment & Selection
  - Language Survey & Personal Interview
  - Language Head Start
  - Soldier receives language and MOS assignment

**Phase II (DSOE)**
- Language
- 18-24 Weeks
  - CAT I/II – 18 Wks
    - Spanish, French and Indonesian
  - CAT III/IV – 24 Wks
    - Arabic, Chinese Mandarin, Tagalog, Russian, Persian Farsi, Korean and Thai

**Phase III**
- Small Unit Tactics
- 12 Weeks
  - Small Unit Tactics (4wks)
  - SF Tactics (2wks)
  - Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) Training (3wks)
  - SF Common Skills Training (2wks)
  - Land Navigation (1wk)

**Phase IV**
- MOS Training
- 15 Weeks
  - MOS:
    - 18A-Off., 18B-Wpn SGT, 18C-Eng SGT, 18E-Commio SGT – (13wks)
    - 18D-Med SGT – (46wks)
  - MOS-specific Functional Language Terms/Tasks - (2wks)

**Phase V**
- UW CULEX ROBIN SAGE
- 4 Weeks
  - Unconventional Warfare Culmination Exercise
  - *Language Reinforcement

**Phase VI**
- Graduation
- 1 Week
  - ARSOF for life (OPD/NCOPD & counseling)
  - Regimental Indoctrination
  - Graduate
  - Outprocess

~ 52-58 weeks once PCS’ed to SWCS
SFQC Active Duty Enlisted Graduates
1995 - 2008

1st Special Warfare Training Group (Airborne)
Special Forces Qualification Course
Pipeline Production in FY 08

• **Phase I: Special Forces Selection and Assessment**
  - 1,224 of 3,184 Soldiers Selected for SFQC attendance (38%)

• **Special Forces Qualification Course**
  - 1,119 Officers and Noncommissioned Officers earned the Green Beret

• **1st SWTG(A) has exceeded the annual 750 AD Enlisted production goal by an average of 124 SF graduates for FYs 06, 07, and 08**
SF Advanced Skills Training
Conducted by 2d Battalion, 1st SWTG(A)

• Advanced Special Operations Techniques Course
• Special Forces Intelligence Sergeants Course

• Military Free Fall Course
• Military Free Fall Jumpmaster Course
• Special Operations Terminal Attack Controller Course

• Combat Diver Qualification Course
• Dive Supervisor Course
• Dive Medical Technician Course

• Special Forces Sniper Course
• Special Forces Advanced Reconnaissance, Target Analysis and Exploitation Techniques Course

➢ 1,621 Advanced Skills Graduates in FY 08
Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Qualification Course
1st Special Warfare Training Group (Airborne)

Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Pipeline

BASIC AIRBORNE TRAINING

Phase I
Introductory Courses
2 Weeks
» Introduction to Civil Affairs
» Introduction to Psychological Operations

Phase II (DSOE)
Language
18-24 Weeks
» CAT I/II - 18 Wks
  Spanish, French and Indonesian
» CAT III/IV - 24 wks
  Arabic, Chinese Mandarin, Tagalog, Russian, Persian Farsi, Korean and Thai

Phase III
MOS Specific Courses
11 Weeks
» PSYOP Core
» CA Core
» Cultural Analysis
» Adaptive thinking & leadership

Phase IV
CULEX
3 Weeks
» Culmination Exercise:
  - Warrior Tasks / Battle Drills
  - Urban Operations
  - Soldiers Urban Reaction Facility (SURF)

Phase V
Graduation
1 Week
» Graduate
» Outprocess

~ 35-41 weeks after PCS
Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations
Pipeline Production in FY 08

• Civil Affairs
  - 87 Officers and 42 Noncommissioned Officers Graduated
  - 284 Soldiers graduated CA Advanced Individual Training (AIT)

• Psychological Operations
  - 83 Officers and 193 Noncommissioned Officers Graduated
  - 272 Soldiers graduated PSYOP Advanced Individual Training (AIT)

➢ 961 CA/PO graduates in FY 08
Conclusion

1st SWTG(A) is:

- One of the largest and most complex brigade-level training units in the Army
  - 4 Training Battalions and 1 Support Battalion
  - 2,735 Students currently in training

- The most professional brigade-level training unit in the U.S. Army
  - Methodology of Teach, Coach, Train and Mentor (TCTM)

- Focused on training high quality ARSOF Warriors to survive and win on the battlefield
NDIA – 20th Annual SO-LIC Symposium and Exhibition

Panel #4 - Persistent Conflict and the Human Dimension

-Private Sector Efforts to Relieve the Burden on SOF Forces -
Private Sector Opportunities
- To Relieve Burden on SOF -

• *How do Industry and the NGO community believe they can assist SOF with the challenges of high OPTEMPO?*
  – Untapped resources to accomplish tasks
  – Relieve SOF of tasks to conduct appropriate ‘military’ duties [SOF Support]
  – What are these tasks?
  – What are cost considerations?
Growing Challenges

• *Numerical increase of ‘failing/recovering’ states & regions . . .*
  
  – Challenges are increasingly complex
  – Demand effective *achievable* solutions
  – Planning, preparation, execution, *sustainment*, End State realization
  – National and COCOM level objectives
  – Non-symmetrical warfare environment.
Industry and NGOs Resources
- Present and Available -

• A deep reservoir of subject matter experts [SME] exists and are available
  – Industry human and material resources in technology, sociology, economy, health, disaster preparedness, multi-national
  – Mission compatible NGO structures have long term task orientation and invaluable area knowledge
  – Deployable and sustainable beyond historical personnel and unit rotations
  – Cadre of former SOF personnel with key SME skills.
Support Augmentation

• SME enhancements and augmentations into SOF organizations—US and Coalition
  – Individual SMEs and scalable organizations to fit SOF support planning, sustainment, coordination
  – Structure individuals and teams to provide sustainment to compensate personnel/unit rotation realities
  – SME and team capacity focus on path to End State

‘Work yourself out of a job’!
How to Support?

• *Optimal and agile support resource structure[s] to enable, enhance and sustain SOF support*
  
  – Embed SMEs & scalable teams to perform SOF support tasks
  
  – US, Coalition, International Organizations and other NGO coordination and implementation
  
  – Foreign internal defense, civil affairs, information operations, humanitarian assistance, high-impact economic development, healthcare, food and water
  
  – Site/mobility security augmentation.
Augmentation Opportunities

- **SOF support opportunities include:**
  - SMEs with discreet knowledge, skills and abilities [KSAs] to build and implement USG Interagency and Coalition coordination within irregular/ad-hoc architecture to meet *concurrent* host nation/regional imperatives
  - Training/mentoring and project implementation in security, rule-of-law, mitigate criminal activities, economic development projects, public health, food production, water, transportation, telecommunications and energy.
Augmentation Opportunities
- Continued -

• *SOF support opportunities include:*
  – Use of small teams to execute focused supporting tasks to expand and enhance high impact tasks in *agile* response capacity in previous task categories
  – Teams to address emergent needs concurrent with recurring dynamics of security and stability factors
  – Fully resourced [SOF support] groups capable of integration into host nation/regional governance and management structure as advisors/mentors to enhance path to ownership of a civil, stable society.
Planning and Procurement

- Careful scripting of RFP/RFQ/POs that detail SOF support needs and requirements—enabled by:
  - Interagency/International Organizations’ \([as\ may\ be\ required]\) MOA/MOU/TORs that enable and enhance the SME/team fit and function into respective SOF and SOF support organizational structure
  - Include essentials of life/environment support, security, safety, transportation, period of performance, scope of work
  - Total transparency and accountability in procurement process
  - Utilization of Professional Services Contracts/Industry contracting structures and performance measures that meet the stated requirements.
Procurement Considerations

• Comparative industry/NGO procurement costs are scenario dependent and are measured against the operating costs of deploying active/reserve units/individuals—capacity and sustainment tradeoffs exist
  – Sustainment: industry/NGOs provide costs packages containing labor, travel, material, admin, extended/open ended time on station, emergent needs
  – Site specific: security, life/environmental support, transportation
  – Project specific support materials/outfitting
  – Flexible team composition
  – Considerations of total operating costs over time.
Summary

• Industry and NGOs including former SOF personnel are in a unique position and have a clear opportunity to assist SOF in meeting high OPTEMPO challenges.

• Resources – individuals and groups – can be scaled to fit specific roles and functions that do not specifically require uniformed personnel.

• Added benefits accrue because of viability of SMEs and NGOs to remain on site for extended periods to enable sustainment and facilitate transition to the Host Nation/Regional End State.
Questions

Thank You For Your Service!

Sam Miess
Concurrent Technologies Corporation
800-262-4392
Intelligence Strategies for Persistent Conflict

Konrad Trautman
Director of Intelligence
U.S. Special Operations Command
Agenda

• Intelligence strategy must be intertwined and supporting the operational strategy
• Extrapolate the current intelligence lessons learned
• Two models for providing intelligence support to partner nations under persistent conditions
• Challenges
• Key Factor: Evolving the DoD Intel workforce to Irregular Warfare
Intelligence strategy must be intertwined and supporting the operational strategy

• Enabling partner nations
  – “When possible, U.S. strategy is to employ indirect approaches – primarily through building the capacity of partner governments and their security force – to prevent festering problems from turning into crises...and building their capacity is arguably as important as, if not more so than, the fighting the United States does itself.”
    » Robert Gates, Secretary of Defense, December 2008
  – “If this war on terrorism is a global effort, and we rely absolutely on the efforts of our global partners, capacity building for our partners becomes an extremely important – if not the most important – part of the equation.”
    » Robert Grenier, former director CIA Counterterrorism Center, March 2008
Extrapolate the Current Intelligence Lessons Learned

• Constant Collaboration
  – Interagency: CIA, NSA, DIA, DOS, FBI, others
    • From the beginning of planning through mission execution
    • Occurs better overseas than in Washington
  – Operations and Intelligence
  – Forward and Reachback
• “Making Intelligence” – classic recon with modern tools
  – Making vs. Producing
  – The Last 20 Yards
• Persistent Surveillance
  – Aircraft, but also SIGINT and other technical intelligence
• For Irregular Warfare, the need to truly understand the environment
  – History, society, economics, local/regional politics, tribes and clans
Two Models for Providing Intelligence Support to Partner Nations

• US ISR modules provided to enable partner nation operations
  – But, we need to develop the force structure (teams, units) to support this; i.e. airborne ISR, SIGINT

• US Security Force Assistance to train, advise, and equip partner nations with their own ISR activities
  – Today’s efforts are too episodic; need permanent advisors who tailor the necessary training events
Putting Both Approaches Together

• Within the 60-70 high priority or priority countries for Irregular Warfare, assign a US SOF leader with the Country Team

• Within perhaps 6-8 contingency areas, employ small advisory efforts with organic ISR, and embed them Partner Nation forces

• In both cases, establish a reachback network for intelligence and support
  – Need to minimize the US footprint
  – Harness joint intel operations centers and the interagency; i.e. IMINT and SIGINT
  – Build a network of partner nation efforts
Challenges

- Intelligence sharing with partner nations
- Intelligence technology releases
- Force structure to support intelligence train, equip, and advise missions
- Disparate funding mechanisms (1206, 1207, 1208; multi-year efforts)
- Establishing a network of multi-intelligence sources with multiple partner nations
- Evolving the DoD intelligence workforce to Irregular Warfare
Key: Evolving the DoD Intel workforce to Irregular Warfare

- What is intelligence?
- “Lawrence of Wherever”
  - Build Lawrences with career paths that immerse personnel in foreign environments
  - Training in foreign languages and cultures can occur in the U.S., but expertise in a foreign land occurs only from immersion
- Recruit foreigners
  - Foreign Scouts: i.e. Indian scouts, Filipino scouts
  - Recent Immigrants as U.S. intelligence officers
    - Manage the counterintelligence concerns
- Greater use of the internet, open source, academics, and commercial activities
  - Move from information/data to knowledge to understanding
Summary

- Intelligence strategy must be intertwined and supporting the operational strategy
- Extrapolate the current lessons learned
- Two models for providing intelligence support
- Challenges
- Key Factor: Evolving the DoD Intel workforce to Irregular Warfare

“Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them. Actually, also, under the very odd conditions in Arabia, your practical work will not be as good as, perhaps, you think it is.”

--T.E. Lawrence, August 1917
Panel 6: Meeting the Challenge of Persistent Conflict Through Education

NDIA SOLIC Symposium

This Briefing is: UNCLASSIFIED

11 February 2009
Captain Chuck Lockett
Organizational Concept

**Mission**
Develop SOF for **strategic** and **operational** leadership
Educate in a joint, interagency, and multinational environment
Research and publish on national security issues

**Strategic Studies**
- Research & Publication
- Strategic Symposia
- Interagency Curriculum
- International (CbT) Curriculum
- Senior Courses & PME

**Operational Studies**
- Operational Curriculum
- Joint Staff Courses
- Intermediate Level PME
- Advanced Studies Programs
- Irregular Warfare Curriculum

**Dean of Academics**
- Curriculum Development/ISD
- Faculty Development
- Evaluation & Assessment
- Academic Standards
- Education Technology
- Accreditation

**Associate Fellows**

**Associate Faculty**
Education Engagement

Lines of Operation

- SOF / SOF Enablers
  - Resident Courses & Certificates
  - Mobile Education Teams
  - Component School Support
- Interagency Education
  - Focused Courses & Seminars
- International Partners
  - CT Fellowship Program (CTFP)
  - Open Courses to Int’l Students
  - TPMR Engagement
- Conventional Forces
  - Joint/Service PME
  - Topical Symposiums
- Interaction w/ Academia
  - Command-wide Research
  - Periodic Publications
  - Symposiums & Workshops

Current

- Resident Courses & Certificates
- Mobile Education Teams
- Component School Support
- Focused Courses & Seminars
- CT Fellowship Program (CTFP)
- Open Courses to Int’l Students
- TPMR Engagement
- Joint/Service PME
- Topical Symposiums
- Command-wide Research
- Periodic Publications
- Symposiums & Workshops

Planned

- SOF Fellowships
- Advanced Degree Programs
- Technology Assisted Learning
- Increased PME Support
- JSOU-to-IA Schoolhouses
- SOF Chairs in IA Schools
- Engage DoD Regional Centers
- Increase Regional Workshops
- International PME Support
- Theater/Regional Liaisons
- Increase SOF Chairs to all PME
- Greater Collaboration w/Key Universities & Think Tanks
- Qtly Journal & SOF Press
## Education Engagement

### Lines of Operation

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**UNCLASSIFIED**
ODNI And the Strategic Environment

LTG Ronald L. Burgess, Jr.
Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence (Acting)
AGENDA

- Introduction to ODNI
- Emerging Security Environment/ Enduring Global Realities
- Global Trends: Future Strategic Environment
- Terrorism
- The Terrorist Threat to the Homeland
- Closing Thoughts
Emerging Security Environment

- Dynamic and complex; even less predictable
- Nontraditional struggles, environments and adversaries
Enduring Global Realities – A Strategic View

- Reactions to Western power
- Regional military powers
- Globalization
- Uneven demographic and economic growth
- Technology proliferation
- Bad governance
Global Trends: Future Strategic Environment

- Changing Demographics
  - Most increase in developing world
  - “Youth Bulge”
  - Increased demand on resources and stress on governance

- Resources – Competition and Conflict
  - Energy and Water
  - Stress on economies and governance
Global Trends: Future Strategic Environment

- Globalization
  - Haves and Have-Nots
  - Absorption Rates
  - Cultural Backlash

- Governance
  - Failed States
  - Ungoverned Spaces

- Ideological & religious extremism
  - Education and Development
  - Is “Moderation” Possible?
Global Trends: Future Strategic Environment

- Health
  - Public Health – AIDS
  - Pandemic

- Crime/Narcotics Trafficking
  - Nexus with Terrorism
  - Alternate Economies – Colombia & Afghanistan
“Gentlemen, I notice that there are always three courses [of action] open to an enemy, and that he usually takes the fourth.”

Field Marshall General
Helmuth von Moltke
NDIA ASD/SOLIC Symposium

Thursday, February 12
USG COUNTERTERRORISM MODEL

KILL/CAPTURE

- Kinetic, intelligence

DISRUPT

- Training, Recruiting, Logistics, Travel, Finances, Leadership, Ideology, Communication, Implement CT Legislation

CONDITIONS EXPLOITED BY TERRORISTS

- Social Injustice, Lack of Political Integration
- Economic Inequality, Religious Persecution, Ideological Extremism

Terrorists think globally, organize regionally, act locally
National Security Reform

James R. Locher III
Executive Director
Project on National Security Reform

National Defense Industrial Association
SO/LIC Symposium
February 12, 2009
“We, all 22 members of the Guiding Coalition of the Project on National Security Reform, affirm unanimously that the national security of the United States of America is fundamentally at risk. The U.S. position of world leadership, our country’s prosperity and priceless freedoms, and the literal safety of our people are challenged not only by a profusion of new and unpredictable threats, but by the unavoidable fact that the national security system of the United States is increasingly misaligned with a rapidly changing global security environment.”

James R. Locher III  Wesley K. Clark  John McLaughlin
David M. Abshire  Ruth A. David  Joseph S. Nye, Jr.
Norman R. Augustine  Leon Fuerth  Carlos Pascual
Joel Bagnal  Edmund P. Giambastiani  Thomas R. Pickering
Robert D. Blackwill  Newt Gingrich  Brent Scowcroft
Dennis C. Blair  James M. Loy  Jeffrey H. Smith
Charles G. Boyd  Jessica Tuchman Mathews  Ken Weinstein
Daniel W. Christman
PNSR Report: Forging a New Shield

• Mandated by Congress
• 2-year study
  – Goldwater-Nichols methodology
• Formally submitted -- November 26
  – President, President-elect, Congressional leadership
• Publicly released – December 3
  – Beginning of a whole-of-government collaborative effort on national security reform
National Security Reform – Why?

• Interagency system misaligned with 21st Century threats and opportunities
  – Cannot handle complex, rapidly-paced challenges

• Dominated by outmoded, stove-piped, bureaucratic, competitive departments and agencies
  – Cannot work as a horizontal team to rapidly integrate diverse expertise and capabilities

• Policy formulation, planning, and execution have suffered
  – Sometimes catastrophically

• Newt Gingrich:
  – “We have met the enemy – and it’s our bureaucracy.”
Recent Compelling Evidence

- Terrorist attacks of September 11
- Troubled stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
- Poor response to Hurricane Katrina
- Setbacks are not coincidental
  - Evidence of a system failure
- But long-standing problems
  - Defied solution for decades
    - Inadequacy of National Security Act of 1947
    - Magnified recently by increased complexity and rapidity of change
    - Growing gap between demands and system capacities and speed
Overarching Problems

• Grossly imbalanced -- strong departmental capabilities; weak integrating mechanisms
  – Horizontal problems; vertical organizations
• Components of national security not managed as a system
  – Lack of strategic direction – denies unity of purpose
• System’s inabilities forces an overburdened White House to centralize issue management
• Resources are not aligned with strategic objectives
• Congress is focused on the parts, cannot provide a whole-of-government approach
  – Reinforces divisions in executive branch
Other Problems

- No effective means of delegating president’s authority
- No means for effective multi-department execution
- No government-wide visioning or strategic planning
- No interagency culture
- Lack of trust creates enormous friction
- Limited detailed integrated planning
- Lack of interagency planning, coordination, execution, and oversight at the regional level
- Government of specialists; not leaders
- No interagency human capital plan
- Poor information sharing
National Security Reform -- Why Now?

- Reform supporters
  - Vice President Biden
  - National Security Advisor, Gen Jones (PNSR)
  - SecState Clinton (PNSR lead in Senate)
  - Secretary of Defense Gates
  - JCS Chairman, ADM Mullen
  - DNI ADM Blair (PNSR)
  - Deputy SecState Steinberg (PNSR)
  - Under SecDef (Policy) Michele Flournoy (PNSR)
  - Congressional leaders and diverse range of members
    - Support of 30-35 congressmen and 12-15 senators
Project on National Security Reform

• Goal
  – Approval of a new interagency system early in the Obama Administration

• Two reform phases
  – (1) interagency system and (2) departmental and agency

• Independent, nonprofit, nonpartisan organization
  – Private-public partnership
  – Coalition of think tanks, universities, businesses, consulting and law firms, and government personnel
  – 13 working groups – 300+ participants

• Guiding Coalition – 21 experienced leaders

• FY2009 cooperative agreement – DoD and ODNI
Three Sets of Reforms

- Executive order and presidential directives to immediately initiate a reformed system

- Amendments to Senate and House rules to support and oversee interagency

- New national security act
Seven Broad Recommendations

- Focus on national missions and outcomes
- Create unity of purpose
- Achieve unity of effort
- Link resources to goals
- Align personnel incentives with strategic incentives
- Improve the flow of knowledge and information
- Build a legislative branch-executive branch partnership
Scoring the Long War

Andrew Boyden, Phillip Menard, Robert Ramirez

The score for the Long War can look very different depending on which scorecard is used. Emphasis is currently placed on historically-based, quantifiable, state-versus-state measures which attempt to correlate what we are doing with how we are doing. But the current fight against al-Qaeda is not a state-versus-state war and requires a different metrics that more accurately depict who is winning and who is losing.

Introduction

The score for the Long War can look very different depending on which scorecard is used. Each side has its own set of metrics – measures of effectiveness (MOE) – for keeping score, metrics that often paint a self-serving picture of the realities on the war’s various battlefields. Even within each side, different groups can, and do, have scorecards that look very different from one another. One needs look no further than the United States’ (US) political arena, especially in this past election year, to find a broad spectrum of views on the US performance in the war.

In media headlines and decision making circles throughout the US government and military, great emphasis is placed on quantifiable measures like body counts, troop surge numbers, weapons expended, enemy leadership targeted, etc. US decision makers routinely use and advertise these MOE; MOE derived from traditional, state versus state, third-generation warfare. These measures attempt to correlate what we are doing with how we are doing. But traditional MOE do not address the reality that we are not fighting a third-generation war. The current fight against al-Qaeda is a fourth-generation war and requires a different set of MOE that more accurately depict who is winning and who is losing.

While judging US performance in this fourth-generation war using third-generation metrics seems to be an obviously inappropriate way to score the Long War, we suggest the problem with this approach hides a larger, more troubling issue. By focusing on the wrong US measures of success, we completely miss the point that the enemy – al-Qaeda – is busy achieving its goals. To the degree that al-Qaeda is succeeding, the US is losing the Long War.

Andrew Boyden and Phillip Menard are U.S. Navy intelligence officers and Robert Ramirez is a U.S. Navy SEAL. They submitted this paper while stationed at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. They are currently enrolled in the Defense Analysis, Special Operations curriculum.
Given the proposed inadequacy of the current MOE, perhaps an enemy-centric approach can better illuminate the current battlefield reality. Proceeding from an enemy-centric point of view, judging al-Qaeda success in the Long War may reveal some insight on how the US can better prosecute the Long War. We argue that by comparing al-Qaeda’s stated goals to their ability to prosecute these strategies, we can quickly determine the state of the Long War.

In order to determine the state of the Long War, we will first list the al-Qaeda goals – their MOE – then explore al-Qaeda’s ability to operate in accordance with these stated goals. In order to yield insight into possible US counter-strategy, a brief case study from Iraq will be used to articulate what losing looks like for the enemy, paying particular attention to those measures that could potentially put al-Qaeda squarely in the ‘loss’ column.

**Al-Qaida Measures of Effectiveness**

While the number of al-Qaeda statements and fatwas spans the strategic, operational and tactical arenas, we have chosen to focus on five strategic goals espoused by al-Qaeda’s senior leadership. Four of the five goals predate the Long War. All five have been articulated by al Qaida senior leadership. These strategic goals come from the 1996 and 1998 fatwas issued against the US and Israel, as well as various press statements issued by Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri. In short, al-Qaeda demands:

1. US forces leave the Islamic Holy Land – specifically Saudi Arabia – the “land of the Two Holy Places”,
2. US forces no longer present in the Middle East;
3. US and Zionist (Israeli) forces cease to interfere in Islamic business;
4. Establishment of an Islamic Caliphate ruled by Shari’a Law. This presupposes the overthrow of ‘illegitimate sovereigns’ currently in power in the Middle East (e.g. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, etc);
5. Destruction of the US by attacking economic centers. “[B]leeding America to the point of bankruptcy” and “plundering their [the US] money” by utilization of the provocation effect to start the Long War and the demonstration effect throughout Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom (OIF and OEF).

**How successful is al-Qaeda in its current strategies?**

As Henry Kissinger ruefully noted regarding US strategic struggles in Vietnam, “In the process, we lost sight of one of the cardinal maxims of guerrilla war: the guerrilla
wins if he does not lose. The conventional army loses if it does not win.” In the case of the Long War, al-Qaeda has the luxury of operating as guerrillas. Thus, while al-Qaeda may appear to be losing by conventional US MOE, an honest assessment of the Long War must keep in mind that in not losing, al-Qaeda can continue to spread its virulent version of Islam while the US must win in order to stop this spread.

As noted earlier, al-Qaeda’s strategic goals can be used as MOE for an enemy-centric scorecard for the Long War. Thus, an examination of al-Qaeda’s ability to operate according to preferred strategies is warranted. If the US is truly winning the Long War, then al-Qaeda will be unable to further the group’s strategic aims. If, on the other hand, al-Qaeda is able to further their strategic aims, we argue the US is likely not following a winning strategy and should alter course in order to maximize success.

Perhaps the best indicator of al-Qaeda success is its ability to prosecute the strategy of ‘bleeding America dry.’ From the start of the Long War in 2001 through early FY 2009, the total cost of OIF and OEF (comprised of operations throughout the world, including not only Afghanistan, but also the Philippines, Africa, and SE Asia) is roughly $864 billion USD. Projected costs, assuming the conflict continues through 2018, range from over $1 trillion USD to as much as $3 trillion USD when all costs of the Long War, including equipment recapitalization and veteran’s benefits.

The indirect economic impact of the Long War is more difficult to measure, but just as important, including economic friction imposed by more onerous restrictions on the transport of people, goods and capital. The creation of the Department of Homeland Security alone has led to an increase in public and private homeland security cost increases of approximately $34 billion USD from 2001 through 2005.

One way to put the above statistics in perspective is to examine total cost relative to other major conflicts in our history and to compare these costs as both absolute values and percentages relative to GDP for the duration of the respective conflicts. In order to limit the scope of this analysis, we compare the most expensive war in US history, World War II, with the current conflict. In absolute terms, World War II cost approximately $5 trillion USD, adjusted for inflation. This represents approximately 38% of GDP for the period 1941-1945. The corresponding outlays for the Long War are approximately 1% of GDP. When expanded to include all defense spending, this figure rises to 4% of GDP through 2005.

Thus, while the economic cost is undoubtedly high, and climbing by $9-12 billion USD per month, the current conflict is not radically out of line with historical comparisons. However, the al-Qaeda strategy has one important feature that World War II lacked: the Long War has no clear end. Even according to conventional MOE, the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan are still contentious with no clear winner and
significant al-Qaeda presence in both theaters. The duration of the conflict is thus unknown and using pure cost as a benchmark may only serve to reassure conventional thinkers that the current US strategy is neither unusually costly, nor is the cost of the war a key feature of al-Qaeda’s most recently adopted line of operation.

Put another way, with each dollar spent in World War II, some measurable progress against the enemy could be charted. In the current conflict, each dollar spent appears to have some impact tactically and operationally with the kill or capture of targeted individuals. At the strategic level, however, that correlation becomes far less clear. The ideological draw of al-Qaeda has not been stemmed; in fact, the Council on Foreign Relations asserts the Iraqi component of the Long War has become a powerful recruiting tool for al-Qaeda. Thus, funding for the Long War may actually be counterproductive at the strategic level while seductively providing continued hope at the tactical level.

Turning to another stratagem, al-Qaeda has insisted on the removal of US forces from Saudi Arabia and the greater Islamic world. These are related to the demand that the US and Israel must cease interference with the affairs of the Muslim world. Interestingly, the US has actually made some significant steps toward al-Qaeda accommodation in this demand. For example, the April 2003 announcement of the removal of US military personnel from Saudi Arabia to Qatar essentially removed one of the major points of contention for al-Qaeda – a perceived US (infidel) occupation of the most holy lands in all of Islam. Though most major news outlets carried the announcement, this message was lost just two weeks later when the bombings of three American residential compounds signaled a profound statement by al-Qaeda reasserting its demand for all US citizens – military and civilian – leave the entire Muslim world.

The withdrawal of forces and subsequent targeting of American citizens reveals two critical points. First, the apparent lack of a strategic communications plan focused on shaping perceptions in the Muslim world ceded important ground to al-Qaeda in the information war. This phenomenon can be seen anecdotally in the rate with which the US falls behind in the information war with al-Qaeda’s media branch – as-Shahab. A focused effort communicating the US effort to partially accommodate al-Qaeda demands – regardless of intent – would reap dividends with the target audience. The lack of communication sensitive to the cultural norms in the Muslim world merely reinforced al-Qaeda ideology of the US as ‘crusaders’ with ‘Zionist’ conspirators.

The second point is the attack, which followed the removal of military forces, targeting American citizens and other western civilians. Al-Qaeda’s choice of targets should not be surprising given bin Ladin’s 1998 fatwa, which specifically directed
targeting civilians and key economic targets to expand the modern jihad. Al-Qaeda sees ‘the enemy’ in very different relief than does the US. That al-Qaeda targeted civilians in response to an apparent military accommodation is indicative of a philosophy of jihadi ‘Total War.’

Additionally, these points are not separable. The US response to the May 2003 bombings was predictable in its lack of strategic coherence. The reaction of US leaders was, essentially, to do more of the same: kill or capture al-Qaeda operatives in an effort to bring them to justice. Al-Qaeda will continue to conduct these kinds of attacks until the support infrastructure that enables them is removed. Furthermore, until the US incorporates weapons in the war of ideas, with resonance in the Muslim world to destroy the ideology of al-Qaeda, the support base for al-Qaeda will remain largely intact.

The final goal of al-Qaeda under consideration is the formation of a new Islamic caliphate governed by Shari’a law (see Fig 1).

![Al-Qaeda's failure to establish such a form of governance speaks to the group's inability to effectively organize to hold ground and create the bureaucratic institutions required to govern the amount of territory envisioned in the caliphate. This is the most 'conventional' al-Qaeda goal and, as such, puts the group in an environment for which it is fundamentally unprepared to operate. Ironically, this goal of the al-Qaeda](image_url)

**Figure 1. Insurgencies, Terrorism and the Caliphate.**
subordinate, al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQIZ), was one significant factor in the US ability to effectively target and reduce AQIZ operational capability. AQIZ' worst mistake appears to have been a dramatic overreach in ambitions which were not well received by the Sunni population which for so many months provided critical support to AQIZ. This phenomenon will be analyzed in greater detail in the next section, but we conclude with the irony that al-Qaeda's only real 'loss' in this war of ideas came when it tried to operate conventionally.

This is an important lesson in how to effectively engage al-Qaeda. To the degree that each side loses when engaging in strategic asymmetry, the US should rapidly analyze and assume a mirror imaging of the current enemy to significantly improve its chances of victory in a conflict that for over seven years has been decidedly one-sided.xxvi

What Does Losing Look Like for al-Qaeda?

Al-Qaeda must be perceived as the inferior option in the eyes of their constituency. In order to discredit the movement strategically, it must be defeated tactically until the non-hardcore followers are disillusioned with al-Qaeda's message. This disillusionment has begun in Iraq where the US military has been able to take advantage of AQIZ miscalculations of indiscriminate targeting of Shi’a and Sunni Muslims.

Prior to September 2006, however, US military units in Ramadi had:
...inconsistently and excessively applied force, focused operations on killing and capturing insurgents, reduced support to local security forces before they were capable of controlling and protecting the population independently, attempted to gain intelligence through detain and release tactics, and conducted operations from consolidated Forward Operating Bases located outside of the city.xxvii

In short, these actions were focused on traditional US MOE, which served to isolate the Iraqi population and forced it to reluctantly align with AQIZ. Emboldened by its successes in al-Anbar Province, AQIZ publicly “declared Ramadi the future capital of its ‘caliphate’ in Iraq.”xxviii By early 2006, Ramadi was considered by many observers effectively under AQIZ control. The US military was relegated to operating out of Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) in north-central and north-west Ramadi, “…coalition operations in Ramadi had originated from large FOBs on the outskirts of town, with most forces conducting ‘drive-by COIN’ (or combat) – they exited the FOB, drove to an objective or patrolled, were attacked, exchanged fire, and returned to base.”xxix This
tactic forced the population to choose between overbearing American occupiers or extreme Islamic ideologues.

With a lack of US or Iraqi police presence in Ramadi, AQIZ gained the support of the city through intimidation and coercion. By the end of the summer 2006, US military commanders in Ramadi realized the local tribes were isolated, under duress, and being manipulated by AQIZ. The US commanders then sought to remedy the situation.

In September 2006, a young visionary Sunni Sheik, Sittar Albu-Risha, began the al-Anbar Awakening Movement – with the support of other influential Sheiks – in order to rid Ramadi of AQIZ influence. With the help and partnership of the al-Anbar Awakening, the US military began implementing urban-centric counter insurgency techniques by moving company-sized units outside of the FOBs to engage AQIZ strongholds in the city, while also establishing hardened and permanent Combat Outposts. This enabled the Iraqi Police to establish a footprint at the Ramadi neighborhood level and drive AQIZ out. Once areas were secured, the US military began implementing discriminate ‘soft hits’ when raiding houses in and around the city. This technique enabled the US to be viewed as protectors rather than overbearing occupiers.

The Iraqi Police now conducts all operations in Ramadi with US troops supporting. The fact that, in most cases, the Iraqi Police work in their own neighborhoods significantly increases their tactical and operational knowledge of the criminal and insurgent elements in those neighborhoods. Once neighborhoods were secured, US troops constructed Civil Military Operations Centers to begin rebuilding the neighborhood through local contractors. In addition, influential Sheiks, vital to al-Anbar’s security, were given funding through US Provincial Reconstruction Teams in order to rebuild their tribal areas and were made “…conduits for humanitarian aid efforts, such as free fuel disbursements.” This combination of aid to aligned Sheiks greatly strengthened their ‘wasta’ with their constituency.

Through a series of tactical changes, an aggressive counterinsurgency campaign, and partnership with the Awakening Movement, the population turned against AQIZ in al-Anbar and elsewhere in Iraq (Baghdad, al-Diyala Province, etc.). This hindered al-Qaeda’s ability to influence and control the population, reducing recruitment. Without the protection of the population, AQIZ lost its ability to blend in with the locals.

“Tactical victory became a strategic turning point when farsighted senior leaders, both Iraqi and American, replicated the Ramadi model throughout Anbar province, in Baghdad, and other parts of the country, dramatically changing the Iraq security situation in the process.” Ultimately, the pathway to an al-Qaeda ‘loss’ must go
through the discrediting of al-Qaeda ideology and a reduction of the appeal of the
movement at the local level of non-hard core followers who perceive no alternative.

Conclusion

While the US has hampered al-Qaeda freedoms in both Iraq and Afghanistan, al-
Qaeda continues to dominate the information war. Al-Qaeda fights at a time, place and
method of its choosing. Often, this occurs in an economic sense or on the Internet.
The battlefield is rarely kinetic. As Kissinger noted with the Viet Cong, al-Qaeda doesn’t
need to win, they just need to avoid losing. The US must win, yet using conventional
MOE and strategies will not win a guerrilla war. It did not work in Viet Nam and it is not
working in the Long War.

Of the five MOE analyzed, the US is ‘winning’ only one. Yet even this MOE is
not the result of keen US insight, rather it is the result of strategic overreach by al-
Qaeda and its surrogate AQIZ. The US can do better. By seeing the conflict through
the enemy’s perspective, the US must shift its efforts to an integrated, information
centric approach to discredit the al-Qaeda message, highlight al-Qaeda mistakes and
erode the base of popular support so critical to al-Qaeda success. This approach
worked well in al-Anbar and is an approach which may enable the US to more broadly
engage and defeat al-Qaeda.

\[i\] For a discussion of the different generations of warfare, see John Robb’s *Brave New War* (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley
and Sons, Inc., 2007), 22-24. We mean third-generation warfare as the Wehrmacht’s development of Blitzkrieg
during World War II, whose objective is “to take down an enemy army and state through maneuver, deep penetration,
and disruption” (22).

\[ii\] See John Robb, *Brave New War*.

\[iii\] PBS, “Bin Laden’s Fatwa,” *Online NewsHour*, PBS.org,

\[iv\] Ibid.

\[v\] PBS, “Al Qaeda’s Fatwa,” *Online NewsHour*, PBS.org,

\[vi\] See PBS, “Bin Laden’s Fatwa.”


\[viii\] CNN, “Bin Laden: Goal is to Bankrupt U.S.,” *CNN.com*,

\[ix\] See PBS, “Al Qaeda’s Fatwa.”
Several news stories illuminate this point. The predictable response was the prescribed solution to al-Qaeda – if only the US had killed more al-Qaeda central leadership, the bombings in May 2003 would not have happened. We argue this response misses a key point, al-Qaeda’s objective for the attack and the lack of a coherent US plan for destroying the ideology of al-Qaeda, not its leaders, are intertwined. To the degree the US has no weapons in the war of ideas, al-Qaeda is free to pursue its plan to remove all US presence from the Muslim world. Official US reaction: http://edition.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/05/13/bush.day/index.html (accessed November 1, 2008) and http://edition.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/05/13/bombings.reax/index.html (accessed November 1, 2008).


xxix Ibid., 45.

xxx Ibid., 47-48.

xxi Ibid., 43-44.

xxii Ibid., 41.
Keeping COIN Simple: the Outhouse Strategy for Security Development

Herb Daniels

As US armed forces execute the Global War on Terror, varying strategies are required to facilitate victory within those sovereign states that are hesitant to permit a significant number of US personnel on their soil. The Philippines is an excellent example of how the US military can still achieve victory while under severe operational constraints imposed by a host government. US advisors working with the Armed Forces of the Philippines are developing creative and unconventional counter-insurgency (COIN) strategies to win the support of the local population and to sever their links to the indigenous Abu Sayyaf Group. The ‘outhouse strategy’ discussed herein is indicative of the peculiarities of unconventional warfare.

In March of 1906, a US military contingent led by Army Colonel J. W. Duncan assaulted the mountain stronghold of Bud Dajo and crushed the last significant holdout of Moro insurrectionists on the tiny island of Jolo in the southern Philippines.¹ 100 years later, at the village of Kabanatuan Tiis near the site of the famous battle, the commander of an Armed Force of the Philippines (AFP) infantry battalion observed the commemorative ceremonies marking the Moro defeat. Despite the “celebratory” nature of the festivities, it was a somber occasion. He was quietly reminded by local civic leaders (who’s forbearers had done battle with Colonel Duncan’s unit), of the indiscriminate slaughter perpetuated by the US forces. Accompanying the AFP commander was a recently arrived team of US Army advisors. These men would become the first US personnel to live in the municipality of Talipao (population of 75,000)² since the end of the Moro insurrection nearly 100 years earlier. The AFP and US commanders were confronted by a new insurgency on Jolo by the indigenous Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and their
international supporters, the Al Qaeda-affiliated group Jemaah Islamiah (JI). As both commanders discussed their options, neither could have guessed that a simple public building in common use since the days of the Roman Empire – the lowly outhouse – would serve as an unusual starting point, and ultimately as a vital tool for earning the trust and support of the local citizenry in their sector of terrorist-plagued Jolo.

The False Promise of Building Schools

The Joint Special Operations Task Force – Philippines (JSOTF-P), first established in 2002, was responsible for providing resources and manpower to assist the government of the Philippines in its fight against the ASG and JI in the Sulu Archipelago, with initial focus on the island of Basilan. In 2005, after largely routing the ASG on Basilan, the JSOTF-P moved specialized teams of American personnel to advise and assist the AFP military units assigned to the nearby island of Jolo. One such team was assigned to an AFP battalion with an area of responsibility encompassing the Municipality of Talipao. Talipao is Jolo Island’s largest municipality in terms of square kilometers and second largest population. It consists of 53 villages scattered across 165 square kilometers. The team of US advisors provided several capabilities to assist the AFP Battalion to include increased intelligence support, improved communications and tactical and technical training for combat operations.

Because US forces were strictly prohibited by the Philippine government from engaging in direct combat operations, their greatest weapon became humanitarian resources designed to improve the livelihood of the people on Jolo while at the same time giving the AFP/US military personnel access to the local community. On Jolo humanitarian resources would be used with varying degrees of success depending upon the targeted population and the type of project. Since the ASG and JI on Jolo were illusive and combat engagements infrequent, humanitarian projects quickly became the preferred method to engage the local population and to sever their links to the insurgents and terrorists.

The high demand for humanitarian assistance on Jolo and limited funds created a competitive environment amongst the US advisory teams to acquire and execute a finite amount of development
projects. This “resource gap” was further influenced by perceptions in higher headquarters of which locales should receive the greatest allocation of humanitarian assistance. Jolo City as the only densely populated urban center on the island (and headquarters of the JSOTF-P Forward) was judged to be the center of gravity for the COIN campaign. As a result, it and the surrounding villages received a greater proportion of humanitarian assistance.

Humanitarian projects varied in size and cost but most often they focused on education or health care. The highest-profile projects were full-blown community centers, complexes equipped with meeting halls, his-and-her restrooms, and well apportioned open-air pavilions. There were also a few high-impact projects coordinated through Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs), the most prominent in 2006 being computer labs that included satellite internet access. At first glance, all these projects appeared to be ideal for the island of Jolo, but after a few months it was clear they had contributed very little to severing the links between the populace and the insurgents.

The false promise of building schools is a prime example. Schools already existed in abundance on Jolo. Nearly every village had a school, and almost every child on the island was no more than a 30 minute walk to a classroom. While at first glance the construction-style of the average school house on Jolo may pale with Western brick and mortar buildings, the modest structures on Jolo were more than adequate for basic education. The common form of local construction consisted of a clay or concrete floor with bamboo walls and palm branch roofs, the exception being schools located in any of the island’s ten municipal centers and Jolo City. Although seemingly rudimentary, this local construction approach was ideal in a tropical jungle setting, with the bamboo walls and palm roofs allowing air to circulate through classrooms. Either could be easily repaired or replaced using local resources, with minimal expense and labor. This local style of construction does not require technical experts for repairs, and no additional costs are required to maintain the schoolhouse. Probably the greatest deficiencies in the local schools were the poor condition of the locally constructed desks and chairs, the moldering textbooks, and crumbling chalkboards.
However, in 2005-2006, Philippine and US authorities decided that building new schools was critical to winning hearts and minds. All new schools are larger, usually between three and five rooms and the floors and walls are made from steel reinforced concrete. Compared to a standard village school, the new project schools are impressive but their functional value to students and teachers is actually less. This construction type required experts from off-island to build the school, and thus provided minimal benefit to the local labor force through job opportunities. The materials used were all imported from off-island and provided no benefit to local industries or merchants. Once built, the classrooms often became ovens during the hot humid afternoons because the concrete walls stifled the movement of air, and the small windows were covered in glass. Worst yet were the tin roofs that either radiated heat throughout the classroom when the sun was shining, or which deafened the students during the rain.

Unfortunately, some of the impressive new classrooms went unused because new teachers were not allocated by the number of classrooms, but by the size of the student population. Within a very short time, the community began to incur a fiscal burden to maintain the new schools. Windows were quickly broken or vandalized, (no doubt to the relief of the students and teachers who appreciated the ventilation). Painted walls both inside and out began to peel in the humidity, and the exposed concrete rapidly deteriorated, crumbling away, bit by bit. Tin roofs were damaged by falling trees and coconuts and could not be replaced without hiring outside experts at greater expense. Saddest of all, the very real distractions to learning were never addressed; within the big new schools, the students remained seated in locally fashioned chairs and desks, and used the same moldy and outdated textbooks.

However, the completion of every school was a major media and political event, with dignitaries from the US and Philippine governments often flying to the island from as far as Manila for the dedication. Despite the fanfare, in truth, most of the new schools were a civil-military failure. Because they were located primarily in the more densely populated areas, these construction projects did not increase military access to the rural populations where the insurgents operated. These school projects
required no protracted involvement of the AFP/US forces in the area, and therefore provided no ongoing opportunity to influence the population and target the population’s linkages to the insurgents.

**An Alternative COIN Approach - Outhouses**

Focusing the bulk of humanitarian assistance on the urban center of Jolo City did expose a large number of people to government relief efforts. Regrettably, doing so also failed to target the population that was most closely linked to the insurgency. Insurgent groups in the Philippines do not operate routinely within or around the population centers. Insurgents mainly use the hinterland; the sparsely populated and underdeveloped rural regions for their freedom of movement, for quartering, and for re-supply. Support for the insurgents comes from those populations that have little or no interaction with the Philippine government or its security forces. Generally, Philippine forces are concentrated near population centers where the extended government presence is also strongest. Insurgents, strongest in less-dense rural areas, are at greater risk when they enter population centers. As a result, to be effective in defeating any insurgency, economic development projects must be targeted at those specific populations which provide support for insurgents within the rural regions most frequented by them. Maimbung, a small village of about 1000 residents in the Municipality of Talipao, provided an excellent opportunity to target such a population through humanitarian projects.

In early 2006, the first goal of AFP/US forces in Talipao was to deny the insurgents’ access to the municipality by targeting the key movement routes. Jolo Island’s primary East-West highway ran directly through the middle of Talipao and was linked to many tertiary roads that connected all of the large towns and villages throughout the island. Certain restrictive natural terrain features, combined with the location of population centers, made insurgent movement corridors very predictable. The initial assessment made by AFP/US commanders about the insurgent activity in these corridors was soon confirmed by intelligence gathered from the local police, residents, and Talipao government officials. Targeting the insurgents’ movement corridors would help isolate rural villages from ASG’s influence and would deny the terrorists basic logistic supply from within Talipao.
The combination of topographic and demographic factors suggested that a AFP/US military presence in just a few “choke-point” locations would significantly diminish insurgent access to (and thereby their influence over) the local population. After limiting insurgent access, AFP/US military personnel could then proceed to implement a variety of basic development projects. Building these projects gave military personnel access throughout Talipao, but any projects had to satisfy a legitimate need of the population.

The AFP/US commanders believed a unique project was necessary to achieve all the effects that the “modern” school projects had failed to provide. The project had to involve the village leadership in its planning and execution as well as the local AFP commander, who served as the Philippine central government’s representative to the locality. The project needed to encourage community participation and be resourced by materials that could be secured locally. The complexity of the project had to be minimal so that all expertise could be obtained from the village or from villagers working in tandem with soldiers in the AFP/US units. Most important, after the project’s completion, the AFP/US personnel needed to maintain continuous access to the village in order to ensure local support and to deter insurgent activity over time. Large projects, such as new school complexes, were inappropriate since the small villages had no use for large structures (nor the ability to maintain them). After due consideration, and after long discussion between the Philippine commander and his US partner, the final project, the one that was determined to provide the greatest benefits at the least cost to the local populace, was a re-creation of ancient Rome’s lowly commode, known to generations of Americans as the outhouse.

Outhouses were not common on Jolo. The norm for locals in the rural villages of the Talipao municipality is to use the woods or streams. Apparently, “modern” alternatives have never been considered (nor adopted), and the hygienic benefits of outhouses had never been explained to the locals. Of course, it was understood by the villagers that feces and urine were dirty and malodorous, but the severe health risks incurred from routine exposure to human waste were not clearly understood. The villager leaders, with a healthy dose of skepticism, agreed that an innovative adaptation might be
explored. Cautiously, with memories of 1906 in the back of their collective minds, they agreed to accommodate a new “development project” as proposed by the US and AFP military personnel.

Once the village leadership was convinced that a civil-military project was perhaps in their interest, the AFP/US commanders presented village leaders with the idea of the outhouse. The initial distrust of the AFP/US military personnel by the local villagers began to dissipate as members of the community increasingly believed in the genuine concern expressed by the soldiers for the welfare of the village. In short order, a positive relationship started to form; with the village leadership embracing the plan to improve village hygiene that would be of the greatest benefit to the children. The outhouse was the “carrot” to win village support in lieu of the “stick.”

Very few of the villagers routinely used toilets except those who had frequented Jolo City and had experienced the delights (comparatively) of this “modern” convenience. Toilets, being an artifact of the “city folk” were an uncommon luxury in rural Philippine villages such as Maimbung, and they existed nowhere in Talipao (except for the Municipal office compound, which few villagers ever ventured to set foot in).

To the Maimbung village leadership, an outhouse was deemed a symbol of status as well as a means of improving village hygiene, and the village as a whole quickly accepted the idea of an outhouse. In nearly all Philippine villages, schools are located near the village center, and adjacent to the roads. Since it was decided that children would benefit most from the outhouse, the outhouse would be built near the schools. While this was most beneficial to the village, the strategic location was also critical to AFP/US success in the village. Since the outhouse was near the road, all who passed through the village would see it, including any individuals who’s natural affiliation might be with insurgents. This was “free advertising” for the AFP/US forces and placed them squarely in the epicenter of daily villager activity.

Military vehicles are foreign to the Jolo jungle. Any military vehicle is easily spotted by all who pass nearby, and word of the AFP/US presence in the village spread immediately. Not only did this presence deter enemy activity around the village, it also clearly indicated the possibility for the village’s support of the AFP/US forces. This began the process of isolating the insurgents from the villagers, and
the insurgents, before risking future engagement with the village’s inhabitants, had to carefully consider who within the village might have become agents for the AFP/US.

**Inside the Outhouse: the local COIN Strategy**

To maximize the benefits of the outhouse for the village, everything was done locally, with no exceptions. The outhouse was not treated as a gift but rather as a project for unifying the village with the AFP/US units. Together, all parties built the outhouse using local volunteers from the village and AFP/US soldiers. Working side-by-side relationships quickly developed between the villagers and the soldiers; barriers dissolved and trust emerged. Soon, villagers were bringing their children to the US medical clinic located on the AFP camp; social events were organized; and official business was routinely discussed between the AFP commander and the village leadership, permitting a channel for villagers to peacefully voice their grievances.

As the deep hole for the outhouse neared completion, it was necessary to plan for materials to complete the surface construction. Committed to empowering local involvement, the AFP commander solicited support from the Talipao municipality leadership. Within a day, the Mayor of Talipao arranged for the purchase and delivery of cinder blocks to line the outhouse pit, cement, and reinforcing steel for the floor. Encouraged by the mayor’s generosity, the village leaders collected bamboo and palm branches for the walls and roof. Finally, the AFP/US donated pressure treated lumber, left over from earlier projects, to frame the structure and, most importantly, squat commodes were contributed by a Muslim Medical NGO.

The entirety of the project took nearly a month and cost the AFP/US nothing but time - time spent developing bonds between the villagers and the AFP, opening means of communication to share information on enemy activity. Local support of the AFP/US provided benefits to the village that years of interaction with ASG had failed to achieve. Through the lowly outhouse, village hygiene was greatly improved and opportunities for future projects could be discussed, thus establishing a stronger
relationship between the village and the AFP/US. The outhouse strategy (keeping development projects simple) was undeniably a success in Maimbung.

The first outhouse was built next to a highly trafficked road that gained the attention of all persons passing by. As the AFP/US were planning the next outhouse location, several nearby village leaders had approached the AFP camp expressing their desire to construct one for their village. In some cases, villages demonstrated their sincerity by coordinating for volunteers and materials in advance. The AFP commander decided that multiple outhouse projects would be executed simultaneously to increase the spread of AFP influence, and to also keep the insurgents guessing at the AFP priorities. Four projects were initiated, with one AFP infantry squad assigned to each project site, augmented with an AFP human intelligence specialist. The squad lived, ate and worked with the villagers from the start of the project to its completion, and the AFP/US leadership made routine visits to each site, developing stronger bonds with each village’s leadership.

As the number of projects increased, growing support from the population was evident through the sharing of information on insurgent activity. The AFP battalion commander estimated that credible human intelligence on insurgent activity in Talipao was submitted to the battalion on a daily basis. Only a few months prior, the AFP had no sources in Talipao, but initial intelligence estimated that active members of ASG and JI passed through the municipality daily. Within the first month of the outhouse projects, AFP sources indicated that routine ASG and JI routes of movement were restricted to areas outside of the quickly expanding AFP influence in Talipao. After three months of AFP-village interaction, the ASG and JI were being denied access to Talipao and were forced to transit the rugged mountains of northern Jolo, which were heavily patrolled by AFP Marines. While reports of enemy activity in Talipao diminished, reports of enemy contact north of Talipao by the AFP Marines increased. The AFP’s continued presence signaled the government’s intentions to secure Talipao.

Conclusion
The outhouse was a simple tool that was appropriate for the jungle villages of Jolo where the insurgents thrived. The outhouse is not the answer to every insurgency, nor will it win the fight on Jolo by itself, but it demonstrates the theory that hearts and minds can be won with small projects and at a very minimal cost. Ironically, the reality of highly constrained resources encouraged ingenuity on the part of AFP/US personnel to develop a project which opened doors for continued military engagement. As the civil-military bonds strengthened, insurgent support diminished in a zero sum relationship – as the government got stronger, the insurgency got weaker. Identifying the needs of the population that could be satisfied by the AFP/US forces was the first critical step to destroying the links between the populace and the ASG and JI in Talipao. In the larger war on terror, thinking globally is important for policy makers, but acting locally will always be the greatest challenge for front line soldiers.

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v The Official Website of the Provincial Government of Sulu,


vii David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice

viii Colonel Eric P. Wendt, “Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling,”

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The Road to Peace, One Person at a Time: 
Sister Cities International and Its Role in Persistent Conflict 

a paper submitted to ASD-SOLIC&IC’s Symposium on Persistent Conflict  
by Patrick Madden and Christopher P. Dufour

The vicious attacks of September 11, 2001, placed the spotlight on the need for 
a heightened world consciousness, in light of increased globalization; whereby 
people, resources and ideologies are transported across national borders. This 
need takes the form of a global requirement for engagement: for debate and open 
discourse between cultures. While our response to 9/11 took the form of a 
conventional military approach, the subsequent eight years have mandated a new 
approach to persistent conflict. This approach, called Citizen Diplomacy, is best 
exemplified by the non-governmental organization Sister Cities International (SCI).

Citizen Diplomacy can be defined as the role and ability of individuals in one 
country to reach out to those in another and cement the bonds of friendship that 
lead to dialogue, not violence, during times of crisis. In our ever-shrinking world, 
globalization brings all peoples of the world closer together, informationally, 
economically, and ideologically. However, it is in between the seams of these 
interactions where our connecting world at the same time creates many of the 
same conflicts that resulted in disasters like 9/11.

Sister Cities International is a nonprofit Citizen Diplomacy network founded in 
1956 by President Dwight D. Eisenhower that creates and strengthens partnerships 
between U.S. and international communities. Sister Cities strives to build global 
cooperation at the municipal level, promote cultural understanding and stimulate 
economic development with the mission of promoting peace through mutual 
respect, understanding and cooperation - one individual, one community at a 
time.

SCI is a leader for local community development and volunteer action. SCI 
motivates and empowers private citizens, municipal officials and business leaders 
to conduct long-term sister city programs. SCI has long advocated the requirement 
and effectiveness of Citizen Diplomacy to address differences between cultures. 
SCI's goals include:

• Developing long-term municipal partnerships between U.S. cities, counties, 
  and states and similar jurisdictions in other nations.
• Promoting U.S. and international communities working together on 
  exchange programs as equal partners.
• Providing opportunities for city officials and citizens to experience and 
  explore other cultures through long-term community partnerships.
• Creating an atmosphere in which economic and community development 
  can be implemented and strengthened.
• Stimulating environments through which communities will creatively learn, 
  work, and solve problems together through reciprocal cultural,
educational, municipal, business, professional and technical exchanges and projects.

• Collaborating with organizations in the United States and other countries which share similar goals.

In the human dimension of persistent conflict, where special operators have recently been calling upon the skills and expertise of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to assist in their efforts abroad, Sister Cities has been engaged for far longer. What special operators describe as persistent conflict can be seen merely as business as usual for Sister Cities. With hundreds of cities in the U.S. and beyond participating in inter-cultural exchanges on a daily basis, the network for Citizen Diplomacy already exists and is in full swing. We shall now take a look at some of the programs SCI conducts.

**Muslim World Partnership Initiative Program**

It should come as no surprise that an increasingly popular anti-American sentiment exists across the globe. A Pew Research Center poll shows that more Americans feel that the international community has a depreciating respect for the United States: an observation noticed by 65% of Americans in August 2006, now held by 71% of Americans as of June 16, 2008. Of those polled by the Pew Research Center, negative sentiments of the United States are concentrated in the Muslim nations of the Middle East and in Central Asia. A large contributing factor to this is the poor public image of the United States abroad and disagreements with US foreign policy. It also should be noted that Americans, especially post-9/11, have negative impressions of Arabs and the Muslim world. According to a *Washington Post* poll, 46% of Americans have a negative view of Islam, 7% higher than in the months directly following September 11.

The negative impressions of both the United States and the Muslim world are often fueled by stereotypes, ignorance, miscommunication, and an “us versus them” mentality that instills fear and alienation of “the other.” In an effort to engage the Muslim world, to combat these negative perceptions, and to create the space for tolerance, mutual understanding and respect, Sister Cities International developed the **Muslim World Partnership Initiative.** The initiative's goals include:

• Strengthening the existing Sister Cities partnerships between U.S. communities and communities in Muslim majority countries and forming new partnerships.
• Demonstrating through these partnerships that mutual respect and understanding can be built and sustained through the United States and Muslim world
• Articulating the remarkable stories of these partnerships and programs to help inform and educate the American public about the positive impact from citizen diplomacy.
Currently there are 97 relationships between US and Muslim world communities, with the goal of reaching 100 by the end of 2008. In its short existence, the Muslim World Partnership Initiative has already begun to make a difference and bridge the gap between the peoples of the U.S. and Islamic communities. SCI likes to think of these relationships as outbound exchanges, but one example of inbound support was in the small Iowa city of Elkader.

Following the 2008 flood of Elkader, one of its Sister Cities - Mascara, Algeria - fundraised and donated $145,000 for emergency services, medical aid, reconstruction, and humanitarian support. Mascara, itself a perpetual victim of violence due to the French occupation of northern Algeria, still found the goodwill within its citizens to reach out and help their Sister City despite the imbalances in wealth and ideology between them and Elkader. This is a concrete example of what Citizen Diplomacy can achieve. To commemorate this relationship a “peace pole” has been erected in Elkader and a similar one has been sent to Mascara.

To further the objectives of the Muslim World Partnership Initiative, Sister Cities is currently creating partnerships in Muslim majority countries with no current American relationships such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Libya. In July of 2008, Sister Cities also hosted a group of Palestinian mayors representing different cities in the West Bank. Most of the mayors expressed an interest in forming relationships with U.S. communities and promptly posted their city profiles on the “Cities Seeking Cities” portion of the Sister Cities website. Sister Cities is currently working on identifying potential cities for partnerships with these Palestinian cities and helping to cultivate and foster the relationship.

The Iraqi Young Leaders Exchange Program

Within the Middle East, the United States’ occupation of Iraq has been an issue of great tension and concern to peace-builders. Among a variety of strategies to repair the relationship between Iraqis and Americans, individuals from both nations hope that the use of Citizen Diplomacy will engender more mutual understanding. A 2008 study conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau finds that almost half of Iraq’s population is below the age of 19. By engaging youth in Citizen Diplomacy, Sister Cities intends to develop a new rapport between new generations of young leaders with the hope of deep respectful cultural exchanges between our peoples in the future..

In an effort to foster the development of youth exchanges between the United States and communities in conflict, Sister Cities collaborated with the Department of State, AMIDEAST, the Gainesville Sister Cities program, and Legacy International to develop the Iraqi Young Leaders Exchange Program (IYLEP). The program consisted of various segments like a youth conference, home hosting of exchangees, a Global Youth Village, and Civics Week. All of these elements were designed to bring Iraqi students to the United States for a month to learn leadership skills, explore U.S. government and civil society, foster a sense of
community service, and build relationships between U.S. students and their families.

Through this highly important program and in close coordination with the US government, Sister Cities was able to create a lasting Citizen Diplomacy network of youth, all of whom advocate for peace and open dialogue as a viable alternative to violence and extremism. This is especially important to note given recent articles and data that show that youth, in communities of conflict, are often the ones who are vulnerable and therefore targeted for radicalization under the varying motivators for violence in Iraq. Imagine the possibilities for similar such youth deradicalization programs in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Sudan, and other areas of persistent conflict.

The Transformation of Ramadi - The Search for a Sister City

After the invasion of Iraq in 2003, al-Anbar Province became the center for violent insurgent activity. In 2006, Abu Musab Al Zarqawi, then al-Qaeda's leader in Iraq declared Ramadi the capital of his "Islamic State of Iraq." Once AQ took over, local government ceased to exist, businesses closed, and public utilities did not operate. AQ also committed horrific atrocities against the citizens of Ramadi.

Shortly after the AQ takeover and massacre of the city, local tribes and citizens began to rise up and fight with U.S. forces to rid their city of al-Qaeda's presence. Their city was destroyed in the process. This was the birth of “al-Anbar Awakening," a movement that vowed to transform Ramadi from one of the most dangerous places in Iraq into one of the safest.

In April 2007, the local government in Ramadi was reestablished. In May 2008, the Mayor of Ramadi, Mr. Latif Obaid Ayadah, pledged to “give back to the citizens the services they need and deserve so we can bring this city back to the beautiful city it once was.” In an effort to do this, Mayor Latif reviewed and approved Ramadi’s entrance into the Sister Cities International program. Sister Cities will match Ramadi with a U.S. community with the goal of promoting peace through mutual respect, understanding and cooperation. In an effort to nurture this idea into fruition, Sister Cities is partnering with the embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team in Ramadi to facilitate partnership development.

Currently a U.S. partner city, St. Paul, Minnesota, has been identified as a likely and interested match for Ramadi. Both cities are in the exploration phase of developing a Sister City relationship. St. Paul business owners are organizing economic outreach and training to assist Ramadi citizens in reestablishing their own businesses and growing them into new enterprises. Americans from St. Paul will also determine to what extent a Youth Exchange may be supportable and how they can help the PRT in reconstructing Ramadi’s school system. Due to the unique situation of communities in Iraq, both cities recognize that finalizing this relationship may take longer than other Sister City relationships, but both committed to pursuing the partnership.
Conclusion

More than 30 U.S. Government reports have shown that exchanges between the U.S. and international communities are effective and have measurable impact in promoting understanding, tolerance and peace. It is a powerful message when people band together regardless of politics, religion, gender, or race. Ultimately, Citizen Diplomacy is about people and the human connection. At the end of the day, troops can go home and even diplomats rotate out at some point. But there will always be the people. What is more “sustainable” than memories formed and experiences undertaken in these communities to bridge the gaps of cultural and religious differences?

Sister Cities International has built and perfected a model and a membership to continue promoting international cooperation and exchange. Conventional warfare may exist as a mechanism for global influence, but it is a far smoother and more precise skill to wield the tools of Citizen Diplomacy. This is the true human dimension of persistent conflict, and special operators must remember that networks like Sister Cities have existed and will exist long before and long after they are gone from a conflict zone. Next time before they deploy, perhaps they should call their local Sister City first and see what they can do to support the operations in peace already ongoing in the community of interest.

World peace is attainable, one person, one community at a time.

For more information about Sister Cities International, to find a Sister City near you, or to donate or volunteer, go to http://www.sister-cities.org/ or call at 202.347.8630.

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“Special Reconnaissance/Unconventional Warfare---
How about an UxV for a Teammate?”

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One of the core national security/defense lessons learned during the first decade of the 21st century is the critical need for reconnaissance-enabled intelligence that is orders of magnitude different, faster, and more accurate than previously anticipated. Examples of the need include the difficulty coalition forces experienced in countering IEDs in Iraq and the challenges Israeli forces experienced in countering Katyusha rockets in Beirut during the summer of 2006. This trend is expected to continue, thereby placing strains on already taxed environments. It is believed that the use of unmanned system “teammates” will provide the next level of disruptive technology in reconnaissance-enabled intelligence.

Fast forward to 2008--significant improvements in stability have been achieved in Iraq with concomitant reductions in violence. Indeed, Army Brig. Gen. John Campbell, Deputy Director for regional operations for the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, told reporters at a Pentagon news conference this past summer that May 2008 marked the fewest attacks in Iraq in four years, “…the number of bombing attacks involving deadly, armor-piercing charges and homemade explosives decreased in May and continues to fall.”

Much of this improvement has been attributed to improved reconnaissance and intelligence derived there from. Bob Woodward, in his latest book, The War Within, notes that “the surge” worked, but at least three non-surge factors were as important as, or even more important than the surge. Woodward notes that beginning in the late spring of 2007, the U.S. military and intelligence agencies launched a series of top-secret operations that enabled them to locate, target and kill key individuals in groups such as al-Qaeda in Iraq, the Sunni insurgency, and renegade Shia militias, or so-called “special groups.” Woodward notes that covert activities had a far-reaching effect on the violence and were very possibly the biggest factor in reducing it. Indeed, he reports that 85 to 90 percent of the successful operations and "actionable intelligence" had come from the new sources, methods and operations. Lt. Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the Commander of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) responsible for hunting al-Qaeda in Iraq, employed what he called "collaborative warfare," using every
tool available simultaneously, from signal intercepts to human intelligence and other methods, that allowed lightning-quick and sometimes concurrent operations. Asked in an interview about the intelligence breakthroughs in Iraq, President Bush offered a simple answer: "JSOC is awesome."¹

The notable improvements in reconnaissance and intelligence in Iraq have been largely terrestrial in nature. Regrettably, it is probably only a matter of time before the focus of irregular warfare turns to the maritime environment vice the terrestrial environment. How will SO/LIC forces deal with those changes? Will the same level and quality of reconnaissance-enabled intelligence that has been achieved on the ground in Baghdad be available on the waterways, e.g., in the riverine environment? Lockheed Martin and its teammates believe the answer is, yes, and to that end they conducted a series of experiments and demonstrations featuring the use of unmanned terrestrial and maritime sensors, autonomous unmanned air and sea surface vehicles, and a collaborative command and control architecture that ensures optimum reconnaissance-enabled intelligence for faster OODA loop operations.

The Lockheed Martin team anchored its tack on first principles with pre-planning spirals for warrior supplied improvements while relying on expected technology advancements like Moore’s law to ensure and accelerate future capability growth for the “edge”² warrior. Additionally, it seemed only to make sense to use an open architecture baseline and a Service Oriented Approach (SOA) to ensure software adaptability and flexibility to avoid stovepipe proprietary systems and to preclude massive future interoperability adaption costs. Finally, leveraging the success of Lockheed Martin’s “open business model” experience in providing year-to-year submarine combat system upgrades to meet changing threats, the Lockheed Martin team adapted an incremental improvement—or spiral development approach. This translates into a “UxV SO/LIC Rapid Development Activity Rule Set” something like the following: Stick with the art of the possible, and every four months or so make the solution both easier and more realistic for the warrior at the leading edge of combat.

“Edge of combat” operations are characterized by lethality, confusion, lack of connectivity (comms), and difficulty to command pieces in a very fluid situation. Certainly this is not the desired tableau, nor does it have to be inevitable. It is possible to skip a generation of command and control

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¹ The introductory section of this paper draws heavily from Bob Woodward, The War Within, Simon and Schuster, 2008.
² “Edge” refers to “edge of combat operations.”
(C2) for unmanned vehicles (UxVs)\(^3\) and start using UxVs as teammates rather than manpower intensive tools. Our system, designed to help this generational skip from flying and driving UxVs to commanding organic UxV sensors while demanding ever better intra-machine and inter-human collaboration was designated “Edge Command and Control and Hybrid Operations” (ECCHO). Thus, the Lockheed Martin team envisioned an ECCHO capability that could allow UxVs to:

- **face fire first** and therefore reduce human vulnerability;

- **work collaboratively with each other** to reduce humans “driving/flying” platforms and relieve humans from simple non-lethal problem/mission execution/logistics solving;

- **work collaboratively with humans**—act as a teammate—to provide persistent, meaningful ISR, tailored to the needs of dismounted SO/LIC warriors;

- **provide timely, geo-marked, fused info to higher echelons** in common Google earth or similar open format; and,

- **reduce edge and TOC footprint** (people and equipment).

With these first principles in mind, an eleven-month spiral development plan was executed with a feasibility assessment Spiral One experiment in coastal waters in December 2007. Spiral One included several USVs, a hand-launched UAV linked to a fixed land-based Tactical Operations Center (TOC), a mobile TOC on a coastal patrol craft, and dismounted ‘warriors’ in the area placing ISR demands on the unmanned assets. Several communications approaches were used adapting a robust “mesh” network to provide “beyond LOS” capability. This first experiment, Spiral One, validated the team’s general CONOPS. Indeed, military observers noted benefits to include reduced manning and the ability to keep all in the AOR level-set with tactical information/sensor video.

Spiral Two was conducted with the U.S. Navy’s Network Warfare Command (NETWARCOM) as part of the Navy’s annual Trident Warrior 08 battle experiment—a formal four-day Navy experiment conducted in coastal waters with USVs and UAVs with dismounted warriors as the “customer.” The Spiral Two of ECCHO was labeled to suit the Trident Warrior series and was called Littoral

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\(^3\) We are agnostic among land (UGV), sea surface (USV), air (UAV)...etc.: hence the term UxV with x standing for any domain.
Collaborative Tactical network (LCTN) and the experiment was designed to evaluate an expeditionary SO/LIC-like, scalable, UxV C2 concept that provides tactical ISR at the individual manned and unmanned vehicle, watercraft, and dismounted soldier level. The experiment consisted of a Tactical Operations Center (TOC) working in conjunction with a Mobile C2 unit and dismounted soldiers equipped with a networked C2 handheld computer known as Small Unit Situational Awareness (SUSA). The Lockheed Martin/ONR-developed ICARUS-based software package was integrated with other functional C2 and control software on PC computers in the TOC and the C2 vehicle to provide control authority for both the unmanned vehicles and organic sensors. The unmanned vehicles used were the Lockheed Martin-developed Desert Hawk Unmanned Air Vehicle (UAV) and Lockheed Martin-modified Unmanned Sea Surface Vehicle (USV) based on an 18 ft. Sea Doo pleasure craft based on previous algorithm work done on UGVs in the DARPA Urban Grand Challenge. The small hand-launched UAV featured GPS and a color pan/tilt video camera as well as a wing mounted forward black/white camera. The USV was equipped with Furuno commercial radar, a color pan/tilt/zoom video camera, GPS/IMU navigation, radios, and an Automatic Identification System (AIS) receiver. Communications and data transfer among these units were provided by an 802.11x radio network with antennas at the TOC and onboard the C2 vehicle. The network linked the manned nodes and the SUSA operators to provide control of the unmanned vehicles, their sensors, and to receive video and track data. Using the ICARUS software package, the network provided a shared tactical Common Operational Picture (COP). The Littoral Collaborative Tactical Network (LCTN) live data stream was made available to a list of (IP address controlled) subscribers at remote locations using a DARPA and LM-developed Google Earth-based C2 display tool known as FastC2AP (“Fastcap”). This capability provides unclassified access to the system-generated tracks as well as in some cases, live streaming video and snapshots. The LCTN/ECCHO assets are depicted in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Assets used in LCTN/ECCHO experiment, TW’08

The high level objectives were to increase situational awareness, reduce risk, and to provide warriors at the edge with integrated unmanned systems with user-friendly interfaces. Additional goals included the provision of a network at the tactical level between manned and unmanned nodes and to higher command nodes from the TOC. Finally, the experiment provided a venue to develop initial CONOPS and Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP’s) that will be required successfully to integrate collaborative unmanned assets into tactical SO/LIC missions.

Figure 2, below, gives the operational view of the LCTN/ECCHO experiment. The location offered a variety of targets for ISR imagery on land and offshore where various small boats were employed as targets.
The Spiral Two experiment plan consisted of five SO/LIC vignettes designed to measure the sensor performance (cameras, radar, AIS) and software features in the UAV and USV control software. Another vignette was used to allow the Mobile C2 vehicle and dismounted soldier to test and evaluate the features built into the software. One example of this is the UxV control being passed from the TOC to the Mobile C2 vehicle, and then down to the dismounted soldier. And, a final scenario evaluated a Vessel Boarding combined with a man overboard scenario where the UAV orbited above the “boarded” vessel to provide security and check for weapons, and then was used to search for a simulated man overboard using a USCG provided mannequin.

The Spiral Two experiment successfully demonstrated the ability of ECCHO system to provide access (including timeliness) to information and provide sufficient situational awareness “around the bend” to decision makers in SO/LIC-like environments by networking unmanned vehicles and their
sensors. User interfaces were found to be intuitive for tasking, C2, and the display of sensor data. Ease of mission planning also was demonstrated. The experiment was selected by a Navy board as one of only a few commercial systems nominated for continued development and assessment under military user assessment (MUA) process.

In October 2008, Spiral Three was conducted under circumstances similar to Spiral Two, but with the added goals of demonstrating UxV collaborative activity and integration with unattended ground sensors (UGS). Also, Spiral Three was dedicated partially to working with the technical team for the OSD-approved 09 JCTD (Joint Capability Tech Demo) which, at the end of three years, should lead to approval for a Program of Record. Spiral Three scenario involved two USV (boats) at Ft. Eustis, Virginia. On cueing from combat tested ground sensors integrated into the system in less than two weeks, the USVs “decided” between “themselves” which boat should investigate and then transit to the active area and subsequently sent ISR video to an operator without any human intervention. Combined between Spirals Two and Three, over a hundred military associated staff saw the Lockheed Martin concept of operations in operation in and an operationally significant scenario.
In summary, the three Lockheed Martin ECCHO spiral experiments demonstrated:

- Simultaneous command (much more than mere control) of multiple heterogeneous unmanned craft (UAV, USV) by a single operator
- Single operator Mission Manager setting tasks for multiple vehicles during the execution of changing missions
- Validation of an Open Architecture/Service Oriented Architecture Command and Control (C2) system for autonomous control of diverse unmanned systems in dynamically changing environments
- Shared Situational Awareness with a Common Operating Picture and imagery throughout the network, publishable in Goggle earth format to the GIG, land TOC, mobile TOC, dismounts (web-formatted and unattended ground sensors integrated into the ECCHO system as sentinels to cue tailored ISR vehicle response in an expeditionary/edge warrior scalable UxV C2 concept that provides tactical ISR compatible reach-back)
- On screen cursor “select/click” for collaborative UxV sensor operation shared among land TOC, mobile TOC, and dismounts;
- Vehicles able collaboratively to “decide” which unit will respond to internal or human generated commands
- ECCHO is Vehicle Agnostic, i.e., compatible with legacy or new unmanned systems (UxVs), including recently integrated unattended ground and water sensors

Conclusion

Reconnaissance-enabled terrestrial intelligence greatly enhanced SO/LIC operations in Iraq during 2007-8. These authors believe the riverine experiments conducted by Lockheed Martin and its partners during the same period (2007-8) show that similar benefits can be obtained in the riverine/littoral environment with the employment of increasingly autonomous unmanned vehicles connected on an ECCHO network and working on ever more sophisticated collaborative tactical problems.

4 By contrast, whereas the Israeli Protector USV requires three operators to operate a single USV, with the LM CONCOPS one operator can command 3+ UxVs.
TRANSFORMING AMERICA’S COLLABORATIVE CRISIS RESPONSE CAPABILITY:
The Executive Education Dimension

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Ambassador Litt served for 34 years as a career U.S. diplomat, specializing in the Middle East and Southwest Asia. In 2005-2006 he was the third-ranking officer at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, Iraq, with the title of Political-Military Counselor, providing policy advice to the U.S. Ambassador, and serving as liaison between the Embassy and the Multi-National Forces – Iraq. His final assignment as a Foreign Service Officer, prior to retirement in 2008, was as the Associate Director for International Liaison at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. Ambassador Litt entered the Foreign Service in 1974. He served as the U.S. Ambassador to the United Arab Emirates (1995-1998) and as Consul General in Dubai ten years prior. Ambassador Litt was Political Advisor to U.S. Central Command and U.S. Special Operations Command at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida (1998-2004). While at the Department of State, Ambassador Litt served as the Director of the Office of Northern Gulf Affairs (Iran and Iraq), and also as Desk Officer for Saudi Arabia. In addition to a tour as economic/commercial officer in Kabul, Afghanistan, in the late 1970s, he served twice as political officer in Damascus, Syria. Just prior to his recent service in Baghdad, he was the State Department’s Diplomat-in-Residence at Duke University in Durham, North Carolina.

Other assignments included Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Niamey, Niger, and as a consular officer in Palermo, Italy. Among several other languages, he speaks Italian, French, Arabic, and Afghan-Persian (Dari).

Ambassador Litt received the Secretary of Defense Meritorious Civilian Service Award in 2004 and USSOCOM’s Civilian Award for Outstanding Service in 2002. He also received the State Department's Superior Honor Award in 2002 and 2004 for his work with the U.S. military and in 2000 for his proposals to improve strategic planning at the Department of State. In addition, he earned a Superior Honor Award for his service as Ambassador to the UAE, and the Meritorious Honor Award as DCM in Niger.

Ambassador Litt was born on Dec. 27, 1949, in Pittsburgh, PA, and grew up in Miami, FL. He received a bachelor's degree with majors in history and French from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in 1971, and a master's degree in International Relations from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in Washington, D.C. in 1973. At SAIS, he specialized in European affairs and international economics. He attended Harvard University's Program for Senior Executives in National and International Security at the John F. Kennedy School of Government in 2000.

He is married to the former Beatrice Ilardi, and has two children, Barbara and Giorgio.
Summary

The United States should rapidly develop and expand executive education and training for collaborative, non-kinetic crisis response capability. The three “cultures” that traditionally are present on the scene in post-conflict and post-disaster environments – military, civilian government agency, and private sector – do not collaborate very effectively. Training for most civilian agencies – with the possible exceptions of the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) – is less than satisfactory or non-existent. State, USAID, the military, and the private sector receive education and training in their own areas of expertise, but not necessarily in collaboration with each other. Few, if any, opportunities exist currently to bring all three cultures together in impartial, non-threatening, executive education environments in which they can break down cultural barriers, and arrive at workable solutions. Developing and resourcing executive education for crisis response will be all the more urgent if the U.S. government successfully restructures its institutions and hires thousands more practitioners in the next year or two.
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1. Introduction

Given today’s globalized economy, stabilizing and revitalizing societies emerging from conflicts and disasters should be much more effective than it is. On one hand, the information technologies and logistical capabilities associated with the planet’s most powerful governments, and the rehabilitative potential of today’s global corporations should be able to put even the most devastated nations back on the road to healing much more quickly than is the case today. On the other hand, the complexities of insurgency and asymmetrical threats complicate international and interagency planning; organizations on the ground must be more agile and adaptable, and less risk-averse. Identifying solutions, and who is responsible for implementing them, is not always obvious; conflict can decrease in intensity and scope, yet not come to a definitive end, simmer for years and flare up at any moment. To maximize global capability in a post-conflict scenario multiple agencies and organizations must act in concert as the transition occurs from major military involvement towards stabilization, rehabilitation and reconstruction, the non-kinetic aspects of crisis response. These are our challenges, and we are not yet measuring up to them.

This paper is not designed to propose broader institutional reform of our crisis response capability. Rather it is to urge immediate attention to educating teams of crisis responders, public and private sector, whether or not institutional reform occurs. The requirement will be all the more pressing whenever reform does take place.

2. The Military-Civilian Imbalance in Crisis Response

Many Americans understand the urgency of transforming our international civilian-military crisis response capabilities. A severe imbalance has developed over the past decade in which, for a variety of reasons, civilian organizations have been unable to perform the missions for which they should be in the lead during stabilization and reconstruction, and the military has stepped in to do the job. Certainly the U.S. military retains specific critical roles in these crisis environments, especially to stabilize insecure locations (principally through traditional military operations), to train host-nation security forces, and to provide much of the logistical requirements for relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction. Over the last several years, however, our military forces, for lack of other actors on the scene, have assumed responsibility for other essential operations that they were not trained or designed to perform. At the same time, the civilian agencies of government that have the requisite skills and established networks lack the authorities and resources – human and financial – to accomplish these missions. An additional, critical defect of this system is an inability to coordinate effectively with both not-for-profit non-governmental organizations and for-profit corporations (herein referred to collectively as “the private sector”). The private sector generally bears the lion’s share of the burden of providing essential goods and services in crisis environments, but collaboration between public and private sectors currently is less than optimal.

Several merit-worthy efforts are already underway to redress this situation at the strategic level. A few serious proposals to restructure our national security apparatus and enhance our crisis response cadres are making their way to Congress and the contenders for the White House. These contain key elements that would shift the center of gravity of our efforts in favor of appropriate civilian agencies. Some even emphasize actions to improve public-private sector
collaboration; however, the focus seems to be on hiring new personnel, reorganizing the bureaucracy, and developing new processes for devising strategies and resourcing policies.

In any event, the effectiveness of these projects will depend in large part on our ability to educate and train American personnel quickly to apply their skills in international crisis environments, and more importantly, in effective collaboration with each other on the ground. In the last few decades in which Congress and the White House shrank some civilian agencies, most of our resident expertise has been lost, especially in USAID, and must be regained. Some education and training programs have been underway for a handful of years; more are planned. If we will acquire the thousands of additional personnel necessary to perform effectively, according to most of the reform plans, we will need much more training and education. Tellingly, we do not see enough success thus far in breaking down the barriers among different bureaucratic cultures – especially military and civilian, public and private. Many of these barriers have arisen from the prejudices, misperceptions, and miscommunications that have built up over the years, and we must strive to eliminate them.

In addition to improving “cross-cultural” communications, education and training programs must create opportunities for both public and private sector organizations to: (1) discuss frankly the impediments to on-the-ground collaboration, in an impartial, non-threatening environment; (2) identify operational-level solutions to strategic problems; and (3) train, plan and exercise together before crises arise.

3. Why is the Imbalance a Problem?

The U.S. depends excessively on the Department of Defense and our military forces to plan, resource, staff, and execute post-conflict and post-disaster stabilization and reconstruction. Lead agencies of government for crisis management, especially the State Department and USAID have suffered from downsizing and consolidation over the past twenty-five years. Other agencies, e.g., Treasury, Commerce, Agriculture, Energy, Justice and Homeland Security, whose skill sets should contribute enormously to rehabilitation and revitalization of crisis-stricken societies have not benefited from funding or mandates to step up to the challenges of 21st century crises.

Over-reliance on the uniformed services for civilian tasks has many deleterious effects: it undermines military readiness, risks producing inefficient and counterproductive “development” projects whose outcomes actually subvert long-term development strategies, jeopardizes the impartiality and security of NGOs and corporations trying to work in the same space, and tends to validate attempts to paint America as a militaristic hegemon.

On the ground, at the tactical level, the military’s attempts to collaborate with non-military actors often founder because the military will overwhelm the civilian presence. The military will show up at a planning meeting in full force, both vertically (the principal military representative will have a complete staff in attendance three levels deep) and horizontally (different military units having different competencies will be present, even including individual liaison officers representing military agencies at remote locations). Many of these personnel will have some experience in crisis management, some will have had a modicum of training, and all can bring
more resources to the table than their civilian agency counterparts could ever dream of. The military personnel are well staffed to identify tasks, issue instructions, and execute them on time.

As for the civilian actors on the ground, seats at the table reserved for them are often empty, sometimes because the few civilian representatives available are torn among several such meetings. Humanitarian-based NGOs rarely participate in such gatherings, in part to preserve their “neutrality” and independence; however, they take strong exception to military personnel performing development tasks, especially out of uniform. As a result, civilian representatives, both governmental and private sector, feel resentful and besieged when the military are able to perform tasks that civilians should do.

The meager resourcing of civilian capacity has other harmful consequences as well. In the 1970s and 1980s, civilian agencies, particularly USAID, had developed cadres of Foreign Service personnel highly experienced and trained in key aspects of international economic development, notably health, agriculture and education. This capacity has all but dried up; few of these precious human resource assets are left. All too often USAID resorts to hiring contractors to execute projects. Adding to the vicious circle, the gross understaffing of these agencies reduces training and readiness so that staffs are thin, rotated frequently, over utilized, and in some cases “burned out”. At best, government personnel collaborating with private sector counterparts pay insufficient attention to policy content and relevance, and more of their time on contracting, security, supplies, and other logistical issues. They must have the opportunity to reach a better balance between substance and process.

Among the most wasteful of these sins of omission is the under-utilization of private sector capacity to fulfill national interests in crisis scenarios. As noted above, administrative issues tend to dominate and crowd out proper attention to substantive issues, especially the delivery of essential goods and services. Unfortunately, our crisis response procedures have acquired quite a negative reputation, and many private sector players just refuse to participate – including those who have exactly the right skill sets or products to deliver. Most of the time, the “usual suspects” in the corporate world will show up: those large corporations that have years of experience working with the U.S. government and the military in one form or another.

Invariably, organizations from all three of these cultures – military, civilian government, and private sector – arrive on the scene, or in a neighboring country, when conflicts and disasters peak. They arrive ready to deliver goods and services, but stovepiped – each with its own decision cycles, resource base, analytical skills, database management, goals and priorities, logistical requirements and capabilities, and most importantly, a yearning to receive “credit” for what must get done in order to satisfy its own stakeholders. Rarely do they collaborate on the basis of a consensus on common goals, information, and priorities. Cooperation and sharing lose their value. The result is equally predictable: unnecessary gaps and redundancies, with the victim populations paying the price of the lack of cooperation.

4. How to Transform our Capabilities

The good news is that the problems above are well known. Many efforts in and out of government are working on institutional transformation, including the “Project on National

Similarly, some educational and training opportunities have sprung up, usually with connections to the Defense or State Departments, for example at the National Defense University, the Army War College, the Naval Postgraduate School, Joint Forces Command, the Foreign Service Institute, and at a limited number of U.S. universities.

As usual, the military is out front and leading the way in training and education, but their programs fall short of adequate preparation for effective civil-military collaboration. It is true that military officers and NCOs by the score receive relevant training in political-military affairs, economics, civil affairs, and stabilization operations/economic reconstruction issues. They attend courses at military institutions and civilian universities, but usually in the absence of a full spectrum of their civilian counterparts. Moreover, only recently have civilian institutions like the State Department and USAID placed emphasis on training and education; but welcome though it is, even that is hampered by the lack of sufficient personnel to attend training (the “training float”). The staffing and resource situation is even worse for other civilian agencies relevant to stabilization and reconstruction operations, such as the Departments of Treasury, Justice, Commerce, Agriculture, Energy, and Homeland Security.

Thus, most of the training and education opportunities are military-based and likely to be heavily laden with military perspectives, language, and, of course, participation. Private sector training in collaborative crisis management is limited and usually associated with courses run by and for the military. Many companies and NGOs decline to be associated with the military environment of these training centers. They assume that the courses will be intimidating and co-opting, as the military predominance will try to constrain their independence and stifle their perceptions of how reconstruction should proceed. Participants that do show up tend to be those representatives of corporations most comfortable with military, often their business development personnel, but not necessarily the units that produce the goods or services that victim populations require.

Therefore, if/when the abovementioned reform efforts produce vastly larger numbers of civilian government actors for crisis response; those new cadres of responders will require significant amounts of training and education. This executive education, in the form of workshops and seminars, must include participants from the core organizational cultures involved in crisis preparedness, management and resolution: civilian agencies, the private sector, and the military. The civilian participants, especially those from NGOs and reluctant corporations, must perceive the training environment as impartial, non-threatening, and conducive to open debate and discussion. Most of the participants should be non-military. Additional stakeholders, such as congressional staffers, Office of Management and Budget employees, and representatives of media organizations (corporate executives as well as senior journalists) should also participate periodically in relevant programs.

If thousands need immediate education and training over the next few years, the U.S. will require a diverse choice of educational institutions that can effectively shift the psychological center of gravity away from military predominance toward that of civilian actors – especially private
sector – with emphases on all levels of interaction, strategic, operational, and tactical. The venue should be a setting that is open, unbiased, and stimulating.

Executive education curricula should center on targeted issues according to specific geographic/cultural environments – the responses to African crises will be different from those in East Asia, with important differences even within those regions. Educational institutions should select faculty that can address the issues that practitioners will face, focusing on latest research, best practices, and viable theoretical constructs. One must keep in mind that often the classroom participants will be better informed than the lecturers. At a minimum, they will challenge the lecturers with hard questions and relevant personal anecdotes that contradict the theory.

Participating organizations from the private sector, civilian government and military must help the educational process by building, maintaining, and most of all, utilizing archives of lessons-learned from past crises. Educational institutions should be able to access these archives.

After breaking down cultural barriers and miscommunications, much of the content in the classroom will involve finding solutions to impediments among the three cultures to smooth collaboration. This will include overcoming legal or regulatory constraints; security, communications, transportation, and supply requirements; the sharing of information and databases; creative management of scarce resources to achieve common goals; and most importantly, establishing trust. Each of the organizations will no doubt have its own “bill of particulars” that will improve cooperation and achieve results. Of course a large part of the solution is also cooperation to agree on overall goals and priorities.

5. What is the Way Ahead?

➢ Increase agency human resources

The next administration and the next Congress must act quickly on the various proposals to reorganize and resource our international and domestic crisis response capabilities, especially the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). Identification and hiring of its civilian reserve corps should proceed without delay. Restructuring should also encompass congressional committees and OMB. The administration, with authorization and sufficient appropriation from Congress, should immediately increase the human resource capacity of relevant civilian agencies and re-tool in-house long-term education and training to provide appropriate skills.

➢ Identify and fund existing education and training opportunities

At the same time, agencies must receive appropriations that permit outsourced education and training in crisis management. Relevant offices within newly restructured government agencies should seek out available courses that invite government officials, military personnel and civilian private sector counterparts. When necessary, the government should also task educational institutions to develop curricula and areas of expertise in emerging disciplines that are not readily available. To help the government identify relevant institutions and their capabilities, the DOD has organized a Consortium for Complex Operations and has hired USIP to develop a database.
of those organizations from which to draw for rapid training and education of newly reorganized and recruited crisis response personnel.

- Diversify and fund executive education across the U.S.

Some of this training will take place within agencies and military institutions. Other executive education programs – particularly those that focus on private sector collaboration – should occur in diverse locations around the U.S. Not only does this diversity help appeal to a broader range of private sector participants, but it helps take government and military officials away from the pull of their daily routines. Getting away from Washington or the military base helps cleanse the mind and “level the playing field.” Diversity also helps to broaden the spectrum of lecturers and experts to prevent the “speaker fatigue” that materializes whenever the same experts are called on time and again to speak at conferences. While government agencies, through appropriations from Congress, should bear the lion’s share of the funding requirements – per the paragraph above, the private sector, especially foundations and corporations, should also contribute to the creation and sustainment of such programs at educational institutions and non-profit organizations. The corporate world will no doubt benefit from these programs as much as the public sector.

6. Conclusion

Without collaborative education and training of military, governmental, and private sector actors, improvements in our crisis response infrastructure and staffing will continue to suffer from unnecessary gaps, redundancies, and inefficiencies. Congress, the Executive Branch, and the private sector must contribute to funding executive education programs from which all will benefit. These programs should target specific obstacles to cooperation with an eye toward improving operations on the ground. The programs should also be geographically diverse in order to enrich the content of America’s contribution to stabilization and reconstruction.

The Center for Stabilization and Economic Reconstruction, a part of the non-profit Institute for Defense and Business, based in Chapel Hill, NC, and affiliated with the University of North Carolina, is proud to be a pioneer in the field of public-private sector executive education. We intend to continue to contribute to the ability of our nation to excel in assisting crisis-affected nations in the most effective way possible.
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<tr>
<th>Source</th>
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<tr>
<td>Cabe, Delia K.</td>
<td>“Shedding its isolationist stance, the United States begins reaching</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>[<a href="http://www.hks.harvard.edu/ksgpress/bulletin/spring2002/features/nation_building.html">http://www.hks.harvard.edu/ksgpress/bulletin/spring2002/features/nation_building.html</a>]</td>
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<td>out to its global neighbors” Nation Building: Kennedy School Bulletin.</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Budget Trends, and Issues for Congress” CRS Report for Congress. May</td>
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<td>Reconstruction Operations” United States Institute of Peace Stabilization and Reconstruction Series. No.6, April 2007:12, 15, United States Institute of Peace: Washington, D.C.</td>
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<td>Reconstruction Operations” United States Institute of Peace Stabilization and Reconstruction Series. No.6, April 2007:12, United States Institute of Peace: Washington, D.C.</td>
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<td>DeYoung, Karen.</td>
<td>“U.S. to Cut 10 Percent of Diplomatic Posts Next Year” Washington Post. 13 December 2007; A 26.</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>USAID U.S. Direct hires</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Percentage Change</td>
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<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total number</td>
<td>3,163</td>
<td>2,349</td>
<td>(26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number Assigned overseas</td>
<td>1,082</td>
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<td>(26)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Number of countries receiving USAID assistance with U.S. direct-hire presence</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>237</td>
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<tr>
<td>Number of countries receiving USAID assistance with no U.S. direct-hire presence</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>450</td>
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</table>

*Primary Source: endnote 9


http://www.interaction.org/files.cgi/6309_MD_July08.pdf


19 Refer to the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. <http://www.state.gov/s/crs/>


Transition to Power:
Challenges Facing the New Administration

Presentation to:
National Defense Industrial Association’s
Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict 20th Annual Symposium & Exhibition

February 12, 2009

BARRY R. McCAFFREY
GENERAL, USA (RETIRED)
Adjunct Professor of International Affairs
Department of Social Sciences
United States Military Academy
SIX INSIGHTS -- THE WAR ON TERROR

• The terrorist organizations threatening the U.S. have been intimidated and badly damaged -- but remain a danger to the American people.

• Global animosity toward US foreign policy and the Bush Administration was intense -- but reduced by the leadership of Secretary of Defense Bob Gates – and the new Administration of President Obama and Secretary of State Clinton.

• Homeland security has improved immeasurably since 9/11 (not withstanding Katrina) but is grossly under-resourced and not well organized by Congress.

• The proliferation of WMD nation states and technology remains the principal threat to the American people and our allies.

• The war in Iraq has taken a dramatic turn for the better -- we will largely withdraw in the coming 36 months.

• The war in Afghanistan is badly supported by our NATO Allies and threatened by an ineffective Afghan government and instability in Pakistan.

GEN (R) Barry R. McCaffrey
February 12, 2009
US TOOLS TO SHAPE THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

- Diplomacy is under-resourced and poorly organized.
- International Development Assistance lacks money and leadership.
- Arms Control is more effective than air attacks.
- International Law Enforcement Cooperation is a major success. (FBI and DEA)
- Nonproliferation Initiatives lack a modern framework and international leadership.
- Shaping World Opinion is a function of sound policy and collective diplomacy -- not slick PR.
- Covert Action and Collection has improved enormously with new resources and courageous dedication by the US intelligence community. (CIA, NSA, and DIA)
- US Military Intervention must be the tool of last resort. When employed it must be violent, focused on clear objectives, and fully integrated with other elements of national power.

GEN (R) Barry R. McCaffrey
February 12, 2009
• Protecting America’s critical infrastructure and key assets is a formidable challenge. Our open and technologically complex society presents a huge array of targets.

• The macro numbers are enormous: 87,000 communities; 1,800 federal reservoirs; 2,800 power plants and 104 commercial nuclear power plants; 5,000 airports; 120,000 miles of railroads; 590,000 bridges; 2 million miles of pipeline; 80,000 dams.

• 85% of our critical infrastructure is privately held. Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) must be a public-private enterprise. Owner-operators must protect their resources.

• It is impossible to defend everything against every conceivable threat. We must move beyond gates, guards, and guns. We need to design security features into new infrastructure. We need new technology to protect potentially high-casualty targets.

• Federal Government support is vital in the transportation sector. Transportation choke points are a particular concern. We must develop a coordinated mechanism for assessing vulnerabilities and evaluating risk mitigation activities.
• The US economy will bounce back in the coming 24 months despite the ongoing recession caused by:
  – The credit market meltdown.
  – The collapse of the housing bubble.
  – Trade export-import balance deficits.
  – Tax revenue vs. expenditure shortfalls.
  – A grossly weakened US currency.
  – Oil price fluctuations.
  – Incompetence in US economic regulatory mechanisms.
  – Corruption in senior financial community leadership.
  – Massive loss of jobs particularly in the industrial base.
2007 global GDP was $56 trillion +
  - US contributed 25% ($14 trillion)
  - China only contributed ($3 trillion+)

US tops the World Economic Forum global competitiveness report.

(UK – Hong Kong – France next top three each @ $1 trillion)

US has manufacturing lead in pharmaceuticals and aerospace.
  - 25% of the world’s total output.

Giant US GDP:
  - Brazil GDP = Florida + Illinois GDP
  - Russia GDP = Texas GDP
  - India GDP = ½ of California GDP

Leading global exporters -- US, China, and Germany all export over $1 trillion each.
LOOKING TOWARD THE FUTURE

• Relations with Europe will dramatically improve with the President Obama Administration.

• US-Russia relations will grow more hostile – Prime Minister Putin has re-established authoritarian control of the state and its mechanisms.

• Political and economic relations with China will continue to remain strong even as the PRC emerges as a major Pacific naval and air force military power.

• The crisis in Iraq will stabilize and US forces will largely withdraw in the coming 36 months. (35,000 US killed and wounded -- $687 billion total).

• The next five years in Afghanistan will be complex. The political and economic situation may improve with massive new US resources. ($184 billion expended). Our Allies will not step up to the military challenge. The country is in misery.

• North Korea will come apart. We must facilitate a soft landing for this dangerous regional nuclear power.

• The situation in Pakistan is unstable. Our position in Afghanistan would be untenable without Pakistani support. Democracy is at peril.

GEN (R) Barry R. McCaffrey
February 12, 2009
• Political and economic relations with India are now immeasurably better than pre-9/11.

• Iran (Persian/Shia) will go nuclear and create instability in the Persian Gulf. The Sunni Arabs will create a nuclear-military coalition.

• US – Japanese economic, military, and political cooperation will grow even more intense.

• Saudi Arabia will continue to modernize, maintain stability, and greatly improve the capabilities of their Armed Forces and internal security.

• Mexico in desperate need of serious US political and economic support to confront violent criminal drug cartels. US must act in deference to Mexican sovereignty.

• The death of Castro -- meltdown of repression – 250,000 refugees within 36 months.

• Confrontation with Chavez -- instability and oil. We have no US Latin-America regional strategy.

• Terrorists will strike at America during the next Administration’s first term.

• The President Obama Administration must urgently address the strategic challenges we face: immigration, social security/Medicare, health care, education, transportation infrastructure, and national security.
NDIA SO/LIC Membership White Paper: Private Sector Efforts to Relieve the Burden on SOF Forces

How do Industry and NGOs believe that they can assist SOF with the challenge of a high OPTEMPO? Are there untapped resources to relieve SOF of duties that will allow SOF to focus on the tasks appropriate for uniformed military personnel? If so, what are they? What are the cost comparisons that SOCOM and its components should consider?

Private Sector Opportunities to Relieve Burden on SOF Forces

The growing challenges represented by the numerical increase to the list of ‘failing states/recovering states’ are increasingly complex; these challenges demand effective, achievable SOF mission employment planning, preparation, execution, sustainment, and End State realization in support of National and COCOM objectives to include operating in the non-symmetrical warfare environment.

Industry and the NGO community as well as other US Federal, State and Local organizations are in a unique position and have a clear opportunity to assist SOF in meeting the challenge of a high OPTEMPO through the use of individual and groups/organizational resources tailored to meet operational and planning needs that do not specifically require uniformed military personnel.

Simply put, there is a deep reservoir of subject matter experts [SME’s] resident in Industry [private sector], the NGO community, other professionals who may be detailed from other US Federal, State and Local [FSL] government agencies, as well as former SOF personnel who possess key SME skills. Together, the private and public sector represent a viable resource that can be sourced to voluntarily augment any size of US-based or deployed SOF organization from the national level down to forward operating bases [FOB’s] and intermediate support bases [ISB’s].

The scope of this opportunity may extend to functioning as embedded SME enhancements of SOCOM and subordinate organizations and interoperability with coalition forces as well. Here again, these resources could be detailed from industry, NGOs and selected FSL organizations as well as individual SME augmentees under professional services contracts.

Specifically, the opportune areas include one or more SOF core activities of non-military support roles such as may exist in foreign internal defense, civil affairs, physical site security augmentation, movement security escorts, and information and psychological operations activities that may impact the full range of traditional nation building tasks, economic development, humanitarian assistance, broader NGO coordination and integration, and international community coordination and cooperation. The construct of many untapped Industry/NGO/FSL/SME resources options will enable SOF to pursue uniformed military tasks inappropriate for non-military organizations/personnel.
**SOF Augmentation Opportunities May Include:**

- Industry/NGO and FSL and SME sourcing for assignments as individual augmentees with discreet knowledge, skills and abilities [KSAs] to execute [USG interagency/coalition coordinated] high impact tasks within an irregular architecture that meet concurrent host nation/regional imperatives [and capacity] for training/mentoring in security, rule of law, mitigating criminal activities, economic development, public health, food production, transportation, telecommunications and energy;

- Use of small teams from Industry/NGO/FSL/SME to execute focused tasks, to expand/enhance activities in the above categories as well as agile response capacity to meet emergent needs/crisis situations above;

- Fully resourced Industry/NGO/FSL/SME utilization of larger groups capable of integration into a host nation [HN] governance organization[s] as mentors/advisors to maximize the potential of that nation’s capacity to not only respond to change and but more significantly to enhance the basis for HN ownership of the path to an end state [e.g., work yourself out of a job by training a host nation counterpart organization/individual to assume your role!].

Use of Industry/NGO/FSL/SME resources offers the opportunity to develop, manage and execute scalable cost packages in terms of scope and Statement of Work [SOW], duration of the assignment [Period of Performance—POP], to execute the above nation building, humanitarian assistance, and economic development tasks. Procurement cost package constructs nominally would include labor costs, site life/environmental support, relevant site security options, and transportation. Cost packages shall include all provisions for assignment to remote sites/hazardous duty in accordance with US Department of State criteria.

**Execution of SOF Augmentation and Assignment/Procurement Protocol**

- Careful interagency [FSL] MOA/MOU/TOR tasking that address the detailed component’s fit and function into the SOF organizational structure. MOA/MOU/TOR must address all life and environmental support, security, safety, transportation and period of performance;

- Suitable MOA/MOU/TOR documents that address the full range of cooperation, role and function with SOF organizations. MOA/MOU/TOR must address all life and environmental support, security, safety, transportation and period of performance;

- Agile contracting/procurement protocols that fully meet SOF augmentation needs in regard to Industry organizations as well as individual Professional Services Contracts. Procurement documents must address all life and environmental support, security, safety, transportation and period of performance.
• Comparative cost packages for SOF augmentees from Industry organizations, NGOs, FSLs and individual Professional Services SME contracts are ‘scenario dependent’ when measured against the operating cost profiles of the deployment of active/reserve organizations or individual augmentees.

Summary

Industry and the NGO community as well as other US Federal, State and Local organizations to include selected former SOF personnel are in a unique position and have a clear opportunity to assist SOF in meeting the challenge of high OPTEMPO through carefully managed assignment of individuals and groups/organizational resources tailored to meet operational and planning needs that do not specifically require uniformed military personnel.

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