India and Pakistan Civil-Military Relations

A Monograph

by

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Abstract

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This monograph develops a theory that explains civil-military relationships throughout a wide range of interactions between a society and the society's military. The monograph uses this theory to explain the civil-military relationships in India and Pakistan. Both countries achieved their independence from Great Britain. They had culturally similar militaries and both countries faced tremendous stresses during their independence. However, in Pakistan the military became involved in civil governance, while in India, the military remained under civilian control. The case of India and Pakistan provides a comparative case study to examine why a military does or does not control a state and why a military remains in control or returns power to civilians.

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Introduction

In 1968, Samuel Huntington wrote *Political Order in Changing Societies*, a work that analyzed the changing political structures in weak states. In it, he was critical of Walt Rostow's modernization theory, which saw a linear and straight path to state development. Huntington argued that order is the primary objective of states and declared:

The causes which produce military intervention in politics... lie not in the nature of the group but in the structure of society. In particular, they lie in the absence or weakness of effective political institutions in the society.¹

While *Political Order in Changing Societies* had significantly less influence on future literature on civil-military relations than Huntington's *A Soldier and the State*, it does highlight the underlying theme of the importance of legitimacy.² Namely, those in power give up power or are forcefully removed from power based on their inability to maintain order in a society. Order itself is dependent on legitimacy or coercion. This is particularly important to modern practitioners of operational art who deal with complex problems in societies that lack order. Both US Army and US Marine Corps doctrine on counterinsurgency states that, "legitimacy, the acceptance of an authority by a society, and control are the central issues in insurgencies and counterinsurgencies."³ The importance of maintaining control of a population has broader implications beyond an insurgency. The need for a government to attain legitimacy and provide effective control is an essential element for maintaining power within a state.

Studying the recent history of India and Pakistan reinforces the importance of legitimacy and coercion in the relationships of their militaries and their societies. Current literature on civil-military relations does not explain the full spectrum of the interactions between societies and their militaries. Much of the available literature focuses on the relationship of a military and its government in a

¹ Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 198.

² Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1957), 1-534.

³ Field Manual (FM) 3-24, *Insurgencies and Counter Insurgencies* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Officer, 2014) 1-8.

democratic society. Most of the remaining literature focuses on a certain event, such as a coup. This monograph develops a theory that explains civil-military relationships throughout a wider range of activities. The monograph uses this theory to explain the civil-military relationships in India and Pakistan after these countries achieved their independence. India and Pakistan have many similarities. Both countries achieved their independence from Great Britain. Both countries had culturally similar militaries, and both countries faced tremendous stresses during their early years after independence. However, in Pakistan the military would become involved in civil governance, while in India, the civilians firmly control the military.

Civil-Military Relations Literature Review

Current literature on civil-military relations is generally normative. Most current literature lacks descriptive research that looks holistically at civil-military relations. It does provide insights into how a military acts in a democratic society or under other types of civilian control, and it provides insights into certain events within civil-military relations, such as a coup. What current literature does not do is provide a holistic theory explaining how militaries act under various levels of civilian control or when the military controls the government. What motivates a military to both take control over a society and return control to a society? What policy goals and motivations do militaries have when they do seize power? Current literature lacks a theory that helps to explain a wider range of behaviors along a wider spectrum of the civil-military relationship.

Much of the current literature still shows the influence of Samuel Huntington's 1957 book, *The Soldier and the State*. Huntington presented a values-based view of civil-military relations in which the military remained separate from the political system and focused on the development of its profession.⁴ The problem with Huntington's view is that it is normative. While Huntington may have described an

⁴ For example, see Huntington's discussion on the professionalism on the military mind. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, 59-80.

ideal that is relevant to a specific military that holds a certain apolitical value system, it does not help to describe a military that is working in a completely different governing structure.

There are several alternative models to Huntington that study the military in other structures, but these too are incomplete. For example, a number of theories helped to explain civil-military relations in the former Soviet Union. Soviet analyst Roman Kolkowicz, writing in the 1970s, thought Soviet professionalism and communist ideology were incompatible. However, Soviet leaders needed more military power and military professionalism. They therefore had to give increasing autonomy to the military to advance professionalism.⁵ Kolkowicz's theory has many similarities to Huntington's theory, in that he saw a society that would give the military increased autonomy. Another analyst who developed a theory to example the civil-military relationship within the Soviet framework was Timothy Colton, who wrote in the 1980s and 1990s. Colton argued that the Soviet government kept control by providing the military with its resources. This control mechanism avoided disagreements, and it helped to explain the lack of conflict in civil-military relations.⁶ Finally, Lieutenant General William Odom, former head of the National Security Agency, offered a congruence model to help explain civil-military relations in the Soviet Union. He stated that, "the congruence between the party's ideology and the military's own philosophy of war as well as the commonality between the sociological ethos of a Leninist party and a modern professional officer"⁷ helped to bind the state and the officer corps together. However, all of these theories only help to explain the civil-military relationship within a certain framework, and not in a modern democratic society or other governing structure.

⁵ Roman Kolkowicz, *The Soviet Army and the Communist Party* (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1966), 1-446.

⁶ Timothy Colton, *Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian Authority* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), 1-365.

⁷ William Odom, *The Collapse of the Soviet Military* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 219.

One important body of literature that attempts to describe civil-military relationships beyond a specific framework is the work done by political scientist Peter Feaver. He used the principal agent framework to provide an example of the civil-military relationship. Relations between civilians and the military are normally strategic interactions carried out within a hierarchical setting. Feaver adopts the principal-agent relationship from economic literature. Principal-agent explains problems where the principal has delegated authority to another agent to do something on his or her behalf.⁸ In other words, the principal contracts with another person or organization to perform an activity. Feaver argued that the civilian principal contracts with the military agent to develop the ability to use force in defense of the civilian's interests. Once the society establishes the contract with the military, the civilian principal seeks to ensure that the military fulfills its end of the contract, while minimizing the dangers associated with a delegation of power."⁹ Civilians have a choice of a mixture of monitoring and control mechanisms to ensure compliance and the military has a choice between doing exactly what the civilian wants or performing its assigned duties how the military would prefer. If the civilians ask the military to do something the military already wants to do, there is little reason for the military to shirk. If the military does shirk, civilians will not always catch the military. If caught, the civilian leaders have to decide whether to punish the military. Civilians will not always punish the military because of the military's role in maintaining the civilian's political power or for other considerations.¹⁰

Feaver is able to provide a more detailed and descriptive view of civil-military relations. However, while he is able to move past how civil-military relations are in certain contextual frameworks, he still describes the relationship in a paradigm that assumes civilian control of the military. Both the principal and agent are predetermined with the civilian as the principal and the military as the agent. This does not explain the dynamics of civil-military relations when the military seizes control of a government.

⁸ Peter Feaver, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press), 54.

⁹ Ibid, 57.

¹⁰ Ibid, 103.

However, much of the research into civil-military relations that does move past the relationship in a democracy will only focus on one event. One important example is the literature on coups. Three factors, the strength of civil society, the legitimacy of the regime, and the impact of recent coup, can help explain a specific military coup. For example, former Harvard and Massachusetts Institute of Technology professor Douglas Hibbs, performing a large-N quantitative study between 1948 and 1967, concludes, “Institutionalization alone has a negative impact on coups... Weakly institutionalized societies, then, are far more likely than those with highly developed institutions to suffer... political interventions by the military.”¹¹ Other research focuses on the concept of legitimacy. Legitimacy is the consensus of a society about the right of a government to rule. For example, Staffan Wiking of Uppsala University advanced the view that the decision for the military to intervene or not was simply a matter of its ability to justify its action as legitimate. The ability of the military to justify its actions among the public and the elite predicts a coup. Legitimacy or public acceptance of the coup is an essential predictor for the event.¹² Another important indicator of the possibility of a coup is the occurrence of a past coup.¹³ Political scientist Aaron Belkin and Evan Schoffer constructed an overall structural understanding of the risk of a coup using these three factors.¹⁴ Much of this literature focuses on regions where there is a high prevalence of coups, and it attempts to prevent a coup by following certain policies or “coup proofing.”¹⁵ Another area

¹¹ Douglas A. Hibbs, *Mass Political Violence: A Cross-National Causal Analysis* (New York: Wiley-Interscience Publication, 1973), 102.

¹² Staffan Wiking, *Military Coups in Sub-Saharan Africa: How to Justify Illegal Assumptions of Power* (Uppsala, Sweden: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1983), 1-142.

¹³ Ekkart Zimmermann, *Political Violence, Crises, and Revolutions: Theories and Research* (New York: Schenkman Publishing, 1983), 276.

¹⁴ Aaron Belkin and Evan Schoffer, "Toward a Structural Understanding of Coup Risk," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 47 (2003): 594-620.

¹⁵ See Belkin and Eva Schoffer for a study on coup risk. For a look at a global study in “coup-proofing,” see Jonathan Powell, “Determinants of Attempting and Outcome of Coups d’état,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 56(2012), 1017-1040; Eric R. Rittinger and Matthew R. Cleary, “Confronting Coup Risk in the Latin American Left,” *Studies in Comparative International Development* 48 (2013): 403-431, for coup risk and coup-proofing in Latin America. For a regional study on African Coups, see Wiking.

of study is why a military refuses to assist its government in suppressing civilian uprisings.¹⁶ Beyond these various studies that focus on specific issues with civil-military relations, several states have literature on their civil-military relationships.¹⁷

This literature provides theories for why one event, a coup, happens. While certainly important, it leaves open questions about why militaries evolve in other ways. For example, Turkey's military has routinely played a role in forming policy or has taken full control.¹⁸ However, there is evidence that the military is under increasingly strong civilian control.¹⁹ Why does a military give up power once it executes a coup and gains power? Why does a military move from being politically powerful to having less political power? Little research that provides answers to these questions. The problem with the current literature is that it only provides a view of civil-military relations within the framework of democracy or it provides an explanation for why particular one event occurs. It does not provide a descriptive view of how a military becomes more or less involved in civil governance.

The literature on civil-military relations helps either to explain the relationship under the assumption of civil control of the military or to explain certain events, such as a coup. There is no well-developed theory to explain why a military becomes more or less involved in governance. The Soviet and American research studies are the most prominent but they assume civilian control. These studies do not provide information about why civilian control sometimes does not remain supreme. The research that

¹⁶ David Pion Berlin, Diego Esparza, and Kevin Grisham, "Staying Quartered: Civilian Uprisings and Military Disobedience in the Twenty-First Century," *Comparative Political Studies* 47 (2014): 230-259.

¹⁷ Examples include; For India, see Ayesha Ray, *The Soldier and the State in India: Nuclear Weapons, Counterinsurgency, and the Transformation of Indian Civil-Military Relations* (New Delhi: Sage Publications India, 2013), 1-170. For Pakistan, see Mazhar Aziz, *Military Control in Pakistan: The Parallel State* (London: Routledge, 2008), 1-101. For Turkey, see Zeki Sarigil, "The Turkish Military: Principal or Agent," *Armed Forces and Society* 40(2014), 168-190.

¹⁸ Muge Aknur, *Civil-Military Relations in Turkey: An Analysis of Civilian Leaders* (Istanbul: VDM Publishing, 1983), 1-228.

¹⁹ Zeki Sarigil, "The Turkish Military: Principal or Agent," *Armed Forces & Society* 40 (2012): 168-190.

does not assume civilian control over the military focuses primarily on only one event. This research does not provide a holistic means to examine the civil-military relationship.

India and Pakistan Comparison

The divergent political cultures of India and Pakistan defy many expectations. Before developing some general hypothesis, this section will compare and contrast India and Pakistan, including their militaries. India and Pakistan both had secular elites in their governments and militaries after independence. However, the sizes and the levels of acceptance of the secular elites by their respective populations varied. In India, the population perceived the Congress Party leaders as legitimate. This group of elites represented enough of the whole population that respect for democratic values and institutions diffused from the elites into the population as a whole. On the other hand, a smaller group of elites governed Pakistan. While many elites, including Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the leader of the Muslim league, had secular values, this group did not represent the totality of Pakistani's society. Many of the leaders of the new state were immigrants from India, who immigrated after the partition of British-India at the independence of India and Pakistan. This group took a leading role in the institution of the state. While many members of this group were secular and liberal, they did not represent the

Figure 1. Maps of British-India's Religious Groups

From Top Left and going Clockwise: prevailing religions in India in 1909, percentage of Hindus in India in 1909 by area, percentage of Muslims in India in 1909, percentage of Buddhists, Sikhs, and Jains in India in 1909.

In 1947, the British granted Independence from both India and Pakistan. Pakistan was to be based on Muslim majority areas and India was based on Hindu majority areas. This is represented in the map on prevailing religions. However, every area of the British Raj was religiously diverse. This resulted in a population movement of Hindus and Sikhs into India and Muslims into Pakistan. Today, Muslims represent 15 to 20 percent of the population in India while Hindus represent 2 percent of the population in Pakistan and 10 percent of the population in Bangladesh, formally East Pakistan.

²⁰ Maps from William W. Hunter, James S. Cotton, Richard Burn and William S. Meyer, eds. *Imperial Gazetteer of India, Atlas, 1909 edition* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1909).

different ethnic and tribal groups of West Pakistan, nor did they represent the Bengalis of East Pakistan.

Unlike the elites in India, they formed an elite that the population did not identify with, and therefore the elites' values did not diffuse to the population.

Both India and Pakistan faced tremendous challenges when they achieved independence. India was able to maintain its democratic institutions, despite facing significant challenges. These included low literacy, high poverty rates and societal divisions in culture, language, religion and caste. Various studies link economic development and education level to democracy.²¹ In this sense, India defied the odds. India's literacy rate in 1951, four years after independence, was 23.54 percent for males and 7.62 percent for females. In the 1970s, 38 per cent of the rural population of India and nearly 50 per cent of the urban population lived in extreme poverty.²² Moreover, India is a nation of divisions in culture, language, caste, and religion. Culturally, there are major divisions between north India and south India. There are also unique pockets of distinct cultural groups throughout the country. One example is the Naga people in northeast India.²³ The languages of India are also extremely diverse. Again, there is a major divide between the north and south. In the North, the major languages come from the Indo-European language family, with Standard Hindi being one example. In the South, Dravidian languages are dominant. However, that divide is only the surface of the complexity of the linguistic environment in India. The 1951 census listed 845 languages, including dialects, 60 of which had 100,000 speakers.²⁴ Religion, along

²¹ S. M. Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," *American Political Review*, 53 (1959), 69-105; Robert A Dahl, *Democracy and its Critics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989); Ross E. Burkhardt and Michael Lewis-Beck, "Comparative Democracy: The Economic Development Thesis," *American Political Science Review*, 60 (1995), 966-82; J.B. Londregan and K. T. Poole, 'Does High Income Promote Democracy?' *World Politics*, 49 (1996), 162-177; Yi Feng and Paul J. Zak, 'The Determinants of Democratic Transitions', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 43 (1999), 162-77.

²² Judith M. Brown, *Modern India: The Origins of an Asian Democracy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 352.

²³ S. C. Bhatt and Gopal K. Bhargava, *Of Indian States and Union Territories* (Delhi: Kalpaz Publications, 2006), 13-26.

²⁴ B. P. Mahapatra, "A Demographic Appraisal of Multilingualism in India," in *Multilingualism*

with the caste system, also creates a point of tension, and communal violence is a common feature of Indian politics. Despite these odds, India created and maintained democratic institutions.

Pakistan had many of the same problems as India. Basic poverty indicators, such as life expectancy, were very similar in India and Pakistan.²⁵ Language and culture were also a similar problem in Pakistan as in India. However, unlike India, geography was also an issue. India geographically divided East and West Pakistan. The Bengali people, who had a different language and culture than West Pakistan, demographically dominated East Pakistan. Moreover, West Pakistan was highly divided between different ethnic and linguistic groups and new immigrants from India. Religion was less of an issue, with Islam being the majority religion of the population after partition. However, there was still a significant Hindu minority in East Pakistan.²⁶

Both sets of elites in India and Pakistan were secular. This secularization was largely the result of prior British influence in India. For example, the Indian National Congress was an elite, secular organization, as the British created this class of secular elites to administer British authority. Most of the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League came from these secular elite. In India, the British created a class of people who were largely detached from their traditional society and accepted Western secular values. While accepting that the British educational system was superior, these elites began to see themselves as the natural leaders of their society. Most of the members of these new elite were lawyers, and they found use for their talents in Western institutions that infused western values into this class of people. Secularism was the foundation that built Indian independence movement.²⁷

For India, this created small group of elites with secular values. While these elites did not represent the values of their society, they formed the core of the independence movement. They

in India, edited by Debi Prasanna (Clevedon: Multilingual Matters, 1990), 1-14.

²⁵ Mahmood Hasan Khan, "Rural Poverty in Bangladesh, India and Pakistan: Profiles and Policies," *The Pakistan Development Review*, 3 (1987), 309-336.

²⁶ *Ibid*, 309-336.

²⁷ For a further discussion on the formation of the Indian National Congress, see W. Travis Hanes III, 'On the Origins of the Indian National Congress: A Case Study of Cross-Cultural Synthesis', *Journal of World History*, 3(1) (Spring 1993), 69-98.

dominated the debate and the direction of the government. More importantly, those who did not have these values would understand the secular elite by their own value set. In other words, even though the secular elites did not share the same values as the population, the elites still had legitimacy with the population. One understands the relationship between the independence movement and secular values by focusing on more than leaders such as Jawaharlal Nehru, the future Prime Minister of India. Different elites represented different sections of Indian society. The case of Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar is an important example because it shows an elite that represented India's Dalit or untouchable population.²⁸

Ambedkar defied many odds to attain an education, receiving a degree in economics and political science from the University of Bombay, a MA in Economics from Columbia and a PhD in Economics from the London School of Economics. He then practiced law in India.²⁹ He spent much of the rest of his life becoming an advocate for the Dalit community within India. However, Dr. Ambedkar was an advocate within the system of the Indian secular elites. He worked to overthrow British authority, but also worked within the new system. He helped to create the political system after independence and lead the effort to draft a new Constitution. Once complete, he defended the Constitution and the secular system it established, stating:

If we wish to maintain democracy not merely in form, but also in fact, what must we do? The first thing in my judgment we must do is to hold fast to constitutional methods of achieving our social and economic objectives. It means we must abandon the bloody methods of revolution. It means that we must abandon the method of civil disobedience, non-cooperation and satyagraha. When there was no way left for constitutional methods for achieving economic and social objectives, there was a great deal of justification for unconstitutional methods. But where constitutional methods are open, there can be no justification for these unconstitutional methods.³⁰

The Dalit population saw Ambedkar in terms that made sense in their cultural understanding. An

²⁸ The Indian caste system is made up of Brahmins, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas, and Shudras. Certain groups were traditionally excluded from the caste system and ostracized as untouchables. The word most people in this group prefers to describe the group is *Dalits*.

²⁹ Dhananjay Keer, *Dr. Ambedkar: Life and Mission* (Mumbai: Popular Prakashan, 1990), 8-51.

³⁰ B. R. Ambedkar, speech given to the Indian Constitutional Convention, accessed on April 1, 2015, <http://indialawyers.wordpress.com/2010/01/24/speech-of-bharat-ratna-dr-bhim-rao-ambedkar-detailing-the-accomplishments-of-the-constituent-assembly-of-india/>.

analysis of the songs that the Dalit people created regarding Ambedkar is revealing. While Ambedkar had secular values, songs by the Dalit population saw someone that was all-powerful and godlike. In 1977, researchers recorded songs that Dalits sang in Neri, a small town of 900 people. While certainly years after independence, the songs capture the degree to which the Dalit people saw Ambedkar in non-secular terms. To them, he was a godlike liberator.³¹

Congress Party members repeatedly showed the secularism of Ambedkar. Both Nehru and Sardar Patel were lawyers and highly educated and successful in India. While they may have disagreed on certain issues, they had a deep respect for the institutions of liberal government and the values that they impart. Mahatma Gandhi was also a lawyer. While he certainly used methods and took beliefs that were a fusion of liberal and Indian thought, he did have a deep understanding of the liberal system. More importantly, than these top leaders, the core elites of Congress were almost entirely members that had some influence with liberal and secular thought. Abul Kalam Azad was a Muslim who studied Western Philosophy and history. Another Muslim leader, Saifuddin Kitchlew went to Cambridge University. Bhulabhai Desai was a famous lawyer with connections to the Congress Party.³² Repeatedly, the leadership of Congress had a liberal and secular belief system in common. Wherever they came from, that was one of the things they had in common. With this diverse group of elites, respect for secular values and liberal institutions were diffused into the population.

Pakistan's elites were also secular. There, as in India, the Muslim League was largely secular and had liberal values. In a speech given by Muhammad Jinnah, the leader of the Muslim League and the founder of Pakistan, on Independence of Pakistan, he stated that:

Now I think we should keep that in front of us as our ideal and you will find that in course of time, Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the

³¹ Indira Y. Junghare, "Dr. Ambedkar: The Hero of the Mahars, Ex-Untouchables of India," *Asian Folklore Studies*, 47(1), (1988), 93-121.

³² D.A. Low, editor, *Congress and the Raj: Facets of the Indian Struggle 1877-47* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State.³³

Jinnah had secular values and he wanted a state that protected Muslims from the Hindu majority, not a state ruled by Islam. This belief in liberalism was not shallow. Commenting on his time in London studying for the Bar in 1892 he would state that:

I happened to meet several important English liberals with whose help I came to understand the doctrine of liberalism. The liberalism of Lord Morley was then in full sway. I grasped that liberalism, which became part of my life and thrilled me very much.³⁴

Jinnah would spend much of his career defending liberal rights, such as freedom of speech and showed a strong commitment to liberal values until his death.³⁵ The problem that faced Pakistan was that while the ruling element were secular and liberal, they did not have the broad appeal to all of the populations in Pakistan. They were almost entirely Urdu speaking elites who had little connections to the traditional society of Pakistan. More importantly, the traditional society did not come to view them with deference, as was the case in India. Only Jinnah himself achieved any sort of national appeal.

Upon the death of Jinnah in 1948, Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan assumed the leadership of the state. At this point, Pakistan was still functioning under the rules set forth in the pre-independence Government of India Act of 1935. Unlike India, which had a vigorous debate before independence and enacted the constitution in 1950, Pakistan was not able to develop a constitution until 1956. The process that India had is in stark contrast to the long process that Pakistan was involved in. Moreover, the basic divide in the Constitution is telling because the debate was over the role of religion. The Partition produced a West Pakistan that was religiously homogenous but East Pakistan still had a sizable Hindu population. Moreover, the elites that emigrated from India wanted a secular approach to religion.³⁶

³³ Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Speech given on Pakistan's independence, accessed on April 1, 2015, http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/legislation/constituent_address_11aug1947.html.

³⁴ Hector Bolitho, *Jinnah: Creator of Pakistan* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 9.

³⁵ A. G. Noorani, "Jinnah's Commitment to Liberalism," *Economic and Political Weekly*, 25(2), (1990), 71-73.

³⁶ Shahid Javed Burki, *Pakistan: A Nation in the Making* (London: Oxford University Press), 1986), 47.

The actual political system that developed was one with two centers of power with different sets of elites. One center of power comprised the political members of the state and the business community and dominated by Urdu-speaking migrants from India, called ‘mohajirs’. It also included some Punjabis and Parthians. This class of people defined Pakistan’s institutions and states. However, they had distrust for elections because elections would bring tribal and landed elites to power. They were socially progressive but politically conservative.³⁷ This source of power had to contend with a population that did not have the progressive mind-set of the elites of the state. Instead, they represented the tribal and the landed elite. In essence, in India the middle class maintained key institutions while Pakistan contained divided elites and population.

This was the result of how the Muslim League mobilized the population during the independence movement. The League was never representative of the population of what would become Pakistan. It was representative of Muslims living in Hindu majority areas. For example, the members of the Muslim League Planning Committee were intellectuals from Aligarh, Osmania, Delhi and Lucknow Universities.³⁸ All the Universities are in present day India. Before independence, the only means that the Muslim League could get any real traction with the population was to appeal to fear of disunity in the *Qaum* and present Pakistan as a symbol of Muslim unity in its campaigns.³⁹ Muslim League popularity in the portions of the country that would become Pakistan would only come later in the process of Independence. As late as 1937, the Muslim League only performed well in Muslim minority provinces.⁴⁰ This was in stark contrast to the Congress whose leaders made an effort to rally the masses based on economic and secular arguments.

³⁷ Mohammad Wessem, “Constitutionalism in Pakistan: The Changing Patterns of Dyarchy,” *Diogenes*, (2006), 2-15.

³⁸ Ian Talbot, “Planning for Pakistan: The Planning Committee of the All-India Muslim League 1943-46,” *Modern Asian Studies*, (1994), 875-889.

³⁹ Venkat Dhulipali, “Rallying the Qaum: The Muslim League in the United Provinces, 1937-1939,” *Modern Asian Studies*, (2010), 603-640.

⁴⁰ Sumit Ganguly & C. Christine Fair “The structural origins of authoritarianism in Pakistan,” *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, 51:1, (2013) 122-142.

By turning to a communal argument for political benefit, the secular leadership of the Muslim League were using a non-secular argument on the population. They did not diffuse their secular values nor did they gain the type of appeal that Congress leaders had. The power dynamic in Pakistan would change. The independence of Bangladesh after 1971 would eliminate the Bengali majority in the country and gradually the Punjabi population would assert more influence at the expense of the mohajirs population.⁴¹ However, while the system changed, it quickly became unstable because of frictions between secular elites and tribal and traditional forces. While the bureaucracy and the military contained elements of secular liberalism, the population, as a whole never embraced the value system.

Both states would inherit former parts of the British-Indian Army. Understanding the army is important in understanding both State's civil-military relationship. The divided British-Indian Army would follow two very different paths. In India, this military would remain under civilian control. In Pakistan, the military would remain involved in domestic governance. In examining the civil-military relationship of India and Pakistan, it is important to consider the culture of both militaries and their relationship with civilian elites and the rest of the societies. The culture of the British-Indian Army before independence from Great Britain and structure of the state helped to shape the army in both India and Pakistan. Both internal forces and external forces shape an institution and both India and Pakistan would shape the former British-Indian Army.

Esprit de corps was a core value the British-Indian Army. In other words, the military was an institution that valued maintaining itself as a unit. A threat to the institution could result in a response to prevent damage or destruction of the institution. This is not something that was inherent to the portion of the army that became the Pakistani Army. For example, the division of the army so troubled General Kodandera Madappa Cariappa, the first native commander and chief of the post-independence Indian Army, that he suggested that the British-Indian Army, with either Nehru or Jinnah as commander-in-chief,

⁴¹ Theodore P. Wright Jr., "Center-Periphery Relations and Ethnic Conflict in Pakistan: Sindhis, Muhajirs, and Punjabis," *Comparative Politics*, 23(3), (1991), 299-312.

should take power over British India when the British left. He argued to fellow officers that it was better for the army to take charge of both Dominions than be divided. He wanted to prevent the partition of India and Pakistan because it would divide the army.⁴²

Both World War II and the instability of partition shaped the Indian and Pakistani Armies. India's involvement in World War II was massive in scale. At the beginning of WWII, the British-Indian Army numbered 189,000 men. These men were a mixture of British forces and units manned by native Indians. There were eighty-two British Indian battalions in India, two battalions in Hong Kong, and two in Singapore.⁴³ The British-Indian Army rapidly expanded, numbering over two million by the end of the war and suffering over 36,000 killed or missing in action.⁴⁴ The military would see combat from the Middle East and Africa to South-East Asia and were an essential part of the Burma Campaign.

The army mirrored western military values, at least in its leadership. British leadership and culture were firmly a part of the army. British officers primarily made up the officer corps after World War II. In 1939, the officer corps was composed of 500 Indian officers and 3,000 British officers. In 1945, the officer corps was composed of 8,300 Indian and 34,500 British officers.⁴⁵ The officer corps was about 14 percent Indian before the war and came out of the war at 19 percent Indian. Despite the increase in size, the army came out of World War II as a British-led institution.

The decision to partition India was made with little planning by the British. The division of the army was especially fast. The first formal discussions begin in March of 1947, only six months before formal partition. During a British Cabinet meeting, Admiral of the Fleet Louis Francis Albert Victor Nicholas Mountbatten, 1st Earl Mountbatten of Burma, the last Viceroy of India, “emphasized once again

⁴² Shuja Nawaz, *Crossed Swords: Pakistan Its Army, and the Wars Within* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 234.

⁴³ Byron Farwell, *Armies of the Raj: From the Mutiny to Independence, 1958-1947* (New York: Norton & Company, 1989), 304.

⁴⁴ Ibid, 316.

⁴⁵ Roger Beaumont, *Sword of the Raj: The British Army in India 1747-1947* (New York: Bobbs-Merill Company, 1977), 174.

the extreme inadvisability of dividing the armed forces of India.”⁴⁶ It was not until 3 June 1947, the date the British announced partition that Mountbatten directed the division of the armed forces and the British made general plan of division on 11 June. Both the division of the army and the division of the nation were decided with extreme haste.

While a fundamentally British institution in leadership, one aspect that did change was that the Indian Army did become more representative of Indian society. At the end of the war, it had regiments from more ethnic groups and castes than ever before.⁴⁷ While the institution was still British led, the sheer size of the army gave some leadership experience to Indian officers, including by 1945 three brigadier generals. The British undertook reforms to eliminate discriminatory practices affecting the chain of command, court-martials, and pay.⁴⁸ An inherently British force went through the process of increasing leadership from Indians.

In India, the Indian Army had a long history of integrating ethnic groups into its military, while keeping ethnically based units. This integration is especially important when integrating groups that have conflicts with the state. One example is the Sikh population. The Sikh population is a minority religious group that was a significant minority in Punjab. Sikh's had a strong presence in the British-Indian Army.⁴⁹ However, a Sikh insurgency aimed to achieve an independent Sikh homeland in Punjab. Even after Operation Blue Star in 1987, an army raid on the Golden Temple, an important Sikh Gurdwara, and the assassination of Indira Gandhi in response, Sikh's maintain a strong presence in the military. Another example is the Naga ethnic group. The Naga fought a long insurgency for independence of Nagaland. The Indian military integrated many from Nagaland, even former insurgents, into the army. In 1999, a unit

⁴⁶Meeting of Ministers on 18 March 1947, found in Nicholas Mansergh (editor), *The Transfer of Power 1942-47 Volume IX* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1980), 982-985.

⁴⁷John Gaylor, *Sons of John: Indian and Pakistan Armies from 1903-1991* (London: Tunbridge Wells, 1992).

⁴⁸Daniel P. Marston, “The Indian Army, Partition, and the Punjab Boundary Force, 1945-1947.” *War in History* 16 (2009), 471.

⁴⁹Ibid, 471.

from Nagaland received Indian's highest award for valor for actions in Kargil.⁵⁰ The story of the Indian Army was one of integration of various groups. This continued under a democratic regime that represented a pluralistic society.

India's integration is in contrast to Pakistan's military. In Pakistan, after independence, a military that was "dominated by Punjabis and representing the landed and industrial interests, the military regards its dominance of Pakistani politics not only as a right but as a duty based on the need to safeguard the territorial integrity of the country in the face of lingering ethnic and religious fissures."⁵¹ The army was a local one as Pakistan recruited most of its officers and men from a 100-mile radius of Rawalpindi.⁵² Pakistan's military was not a force of integration.

At the partition of India, one of the few institutions that remained relatively intact in both successor states was the military. While divided between India and Pakistan, each military became a coherent unit. The path of the Indian's and Pakistan's Army may have been different, but at partition, both militaries remained a professional force. For example, even in dealing with communal violence, the army would maintain professional behavior. The Indian Army would try to bring order to Calcutta, which was suffering from violence following the partition of British-India, in both February and in August of 1946. The army was operating as a non-political, non-communal, and professional force.⁵³ Even during difficult communal violence, the military remained professional institutions.

In India, the civil authorities quickly established civilian control. One early decision that provided civilian control over the military was the decision to abolish the position of Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Military by the Prime Minister. The Indian government abolished this position on Independence Day, August 15, 1947. Abolishing this title removed a symbolic and prestigious position, thus reducing

⁵⁰ Ramachandra Guha, *India After Gandhi: The History of the World's Largest Democracy* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2003), 667.

⁵¹ Mahmood Monshipouri and Amjad Samuel, "Development and Democracy in Pakistan: Tenuous or Plausible Nexus?" *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXXV, No. 11, November 1995.

⁵² Nawaz, *Crossed Swords: Pakistan Its Army, and the Wars Within*, 193-200.

⁵³ *Ibid*, 476.

the possibility of a threat to civil control. In addition to this change, the new government also strengthened the power and control of the Ministry of Defence. This strengthening provided control over the military.⁵⁴ However, the increased level of control resulted in micromanagement. The Ministry of Defense involved itself in decisions that were once the pure domain of military under the British. Another symbolic change was changes made to the Warrant of Precedence, which set the position of precedence for individuals in a ceremony. Here, high-ranking military leadership went down in precedence relative to civilian leadership.⁵⁵

The new Indian military responded to such changes by strengthening its commitment to remain apolitical. The military followed the government fully in taking a subordinate position in society. For example, the Indian military instructed junior officers to be politically illiterate and to concentrate purely on professional matters. The profession perceived overt political statements or activities as dishonorable.⁵⁶ The Indian military interacted with the new cultural leadership and it reinforced the value of civil control. Military professionalism, founded on secular values, interacted with strong secular elites to create the foundation of civil-military relations in India. This control was in contrast with the Pakistan military, which saw its role not as subordinate to the state but as protection of the state.

Pakistan's military quickly became involved in civil governance. The early years of Pakistan were chaotic and lacked the development of stable state institutions. Jinnah died shortly after independence and Pakistan's first Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan was unable to build a nation, as provincialism became a major driver in the new state.⁵⁷ In 1951, the first coup attempt in Pakistan failed and Saad Akbar Babrak, a Pashtun nationalist, assassinated Liaquat. Also, in January of 1951, Ayub Khan, who would perform the first successful military takeover of the country became Army Chief of Staff. He issued an order of the

⁵⁴ Stephen P. Cohen, *The Indian Army: Its Contribution to the Development of a Nation*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971) 171.

⁵⁵ Ibid, 172-173.

⁵⁶ Ibid, 173.

⁵⁷ Nawaz, *Crossed Swords: Pakistan Its Army, and the Wars Within*, 77.

day to “keep out of politics... you must avoid taking any active part in party politics and propagation of any such views... we are the servants of Pakistan and as such servants of any party that the people put in power.”⁵⁸ However, he seized power on October 27, 1958 from President Mirza after multiple prime ministers. This was the first, but not the last time Pakistan military would be come directly involved in politics.

Throughout Pakistani’s history, there has been a mixture of democracy and military governance. Periods of military rule in Pakistan include Ayub Khan’s rule from 1958-69, Yahya Khan’s rule from 1969-1971, Zia-ul-Haq’s rule from 1977-88, and Nawaz Sharif’s rule from 1999-2008. However, even in the periods of civilian rule, the military was a direct player in domestic governance. An example of this is the Kargil War. In the 1999 Kargil War, American intelligence assessments were pointing towards the use of nuclear weapons. Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, in a meeting with President Bill Clinton, did not seem to know the Pakistan military was repositioning its nuclear weapons.⁵⁹

India and Pakistan provide two cases of civil-military relations with some similarities, but that went in two radically different directions. As such, this provides two case studies to examine the civil-military relationship. The former British-Indian military was very homogenous in culture and values. However, Pakistan’s military became involved in civil governance while India’s military did not. Two militaries, which originated from the same source and entered two states with many similarities, provide a relevant and important case study for civil military relations.

Theory and Hypothesis

This research will build some basic hypothesis and test them by looking at events within the timeline of India and Pakistan. Much as Huntington argued, the primary function of a state is to provide order. The rulers of a state having legitimacy and using coercion do this. Feaver’s formal game is a

⁵⁸ Hasan Askari Rizvi, *The Military and Politics in Pakistan, 1947-86* (Delhi: Progressive Publishers, 1988), 56.

⁵⁹ Bruce Riedel, *American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 130-143.

starting point for building a theory for why a military might take power or return power. Feaver correctly observes that civil society created the military for protecting the society from external threat. However, the military also expects civil government to maintain order. While the military provides society with external defense, the military depends on civil governance for a certain degree of order within the state. The military will prefer a state that can maintain its territory, a government that can make collective decisions, provide some level of public services, and interact with other states.⁶⁰ A certain degree of instability in those areas will provide an incentive for the military to take control of the governance for the society. Moreover, the military has the possibility of private gains by replacing civil authorities in actually governing. These private gains are both institutional, in more autonomy in dealing with external threats, and individual. Often a military's leadership enrich themselves when they take control of a society.

While the concept of private personal gains is straightforward, private institutional gains are essential in this model. Feaver points that economic agent will not care how many widgets he produces. However, a military members will likely care about policy. Feaver takes these from current civil military relations literature. For Feaver, the military prefers their leadership to pursue a policy they wish to pursue. In dealing with external threats, it wishes to deal with threats from a position of advantage and control the tempo of operations. This is often translates into a want of offensive operations. The military will also desire a position of honor and respect within a society. Finally, it will desire to do whatever it civilians ask with minimum civilian interference and oversight.⁶¹ If the military is controlling itself, it can pursue policies that allow for Feaver's preferences, at least in terms of external threats. This is an important institutional incentive for the military. Beyond private gains, a military also has an interest in a society not collapsing from internal forces. In other words, it needs the civil government to maintain control of a society. Moreover, the society has some basic need for a legitimate government that provides some level of services and stability. When this is not accomplished, a society becomes dysfunctional. For the military, this creates a threat to the state that the military may perceive as stronger than an external threat.

⁶⁰ See fragile state Index, accessed on April 1, 2015, <http://ffp.statesindex.org/>.

⁶¹ Feaver, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-military Relations*, 63-64.

This leads to two basic hypothesis

H1: A military is more likely to commit a coup if the current government cannot maintain its territory, make collective decisions, provide some level of public services, and interact with other states.

H2: A military is more likely to commit a coup if the military can receive private gains, both institutional and individual.

A military that attains full control of a government also may return power to civil authorities. The other half of the relationship is trying to explain why a military removes itself or another actor forces the military from control of the state. In other words, why does a military dictatorship give power back to civilians or how does another actor force a military to give power back to civilians? Here, the concept of order and legitimacy are important. Again, a society will still prefer some form of governance that does basic functions.

A military that seizes control over the domestic governance still has to maintain external security. If they control the domestic governance, a military can maximize their preferences with regard to external threats. The military will be able to pursue whatever policy they wish and deal with external threats from a position of advantage and control the tempo of operations. However, they have two basic problems. One, in dealing with external threats, domestic responsibilities can remove them from their core function. An organization that has to focus on multiple tasks that do not relate to its central responsibility can lose organizational focus. When a government uses a military as a means to maintain internal stability while simultaneously defending against external threat, there is no division of labor and less focus on any particular task. Division of labor is a basic reason that one would delegate responsible for external defense to the military and the action of the military would destroy that division of labor.

The military may face similar problems as the previous government. Simply because the military takes control of a government does not mean it can solve the problems that caused the coup in the first place. Society might not view a military government as legitimate. An event can also reduce the legitimacy of a military. For example, a defeat in a war can cause a military dictatorship to lose

legitimacy. This can cause instability in society. At some point, the society might resist the military's rule. The resistance might take the form of armed resistance or protest actions. In either case, this will create more instability and create further problems for maintaining control. A military can be a powerful weapon for coercive control of a society as it can forcibly suppress protests, for example. This will increase the cost of remaining in power and could force a military from power.

A military does not control a society in a vacuum in the international community. The act of replacing a government has international consequences. Use of violence to control a society can also receive an international punishment. A military that seizes control over domestic government must also manage the state's relation to the international community. The same preferences that the military favors in acting in the world may have negative consequences. Returning power back to the civil rule might allow the state to gain power within the international community. This incentive can lead to a reward for giving up power and a punishment for using coercive force to keep power. This in turn, could stabilize or destabilize the society, respectively.

The military has two basic choices. One is giving up power freely and the other is to try to maintain control. The society also has choices in relation to the military's choice. If the military maintains its power, the society can resist or not resist. This resistance can take several different forms, ranging from a non-violent program of civil disobedience to an insurgency. Also, even if the military decides to return power, the new government can try to punish the military. This punishment can take a wide range of activities but normally involves some type of legal condemnation of the military coup. If the effort is not successful or if the government offers no punishment for the military, the military can retain some domestic power. As much of the coup literature points out, a previous coup is a good indicator of another coup. A new government wants to maximize its control over the military. Successfully punishing a military is a means to do this. However, if the punishment fails, this can maximize the chance of a future influence by the military.

As an incentive for action, institutional, private rewards are still relevant. A military still wants

freedom of action in dealing with problems of external defense. Feaver's enumeration of the institutional preferences of a military are still relevant to a military's incentive. However, the military wants also wants to maximize the state's power internationally and maintain internal stability. Punishment by the international community and resistance from a society can hurt the goal of maximizing either. The society wishes to either view the current government as legitimate or maximize control over the military and establish a legitimate government. This produces the following three hypothesis:

H3: A military government that cannot maintain its territory, make collective decisions, provide some level of public services, and interact with other states is more likely to be forced from power or return power to a civilian government.

H4: If the international community punishes a military government with sanctions or other punishments, a military government is more likely to return power to a civilian government

H5: Once the military returns power to civilians, if a civilian government does not effectively punish a military government, another military coup is more likely.

The case of India and Pakistan offers a test case for understanding civil-military relations along a broader spectrum than most civil-military relations theories explain. First, much of the civil-military literature does not discuss the two cases. Second, one has the former British-Indian military taking two very different paths. The British divided the British-Indian between Pakistan and India. In the case of Pakistan, the military has alternated with civilians in controlling the government. In the case of India, the military has remained under civilian control. The divergent path of the two militaries in two states with many cultural similarities provides a unique means to test the hypothesis developed above.

Hypothesis Testing

This section looks at points along the timeline in the history of India and Pakistan that the military either took power or gave up power. In India, it will look at periods of opportunity that the military might have taken power but did not initiate a coup. It will test the developed hypothesis to see if

the cases of India and Pakistan support their conclusions. India's military has been under civilian control during the totality of its independence. The monograph tests these hypotheses by looking at events in which one might expect the military to become involved in civil governance. The events tested are:

<u>State</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>Date of Power Change or Timeframe</u>
Pakistan	General Ayub Khan deposing President Mirza	October 27, 1956
Pakistan	General Yahya Khan deposing President Ayub Khan	March 26, 1969
Pakistan	Zulfikar Ali Bhutto replacing President Yahya Khan	December 20, 1971
Pakistan	General Zia-ul-Haq deposing Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto	July 5, 1977
India	Sino-Indian War	20 October – 21 November 1962
India	Prime Minister Indira Gandhi declares Emergency Rule	June 25, 1975 – March 21, 1977

Figure 2. Chart of Events

General Ayub Khan deposing President Mirza

General Ayub Khan, the army's commander-in-chief, seized power on October 7, 1958, when he removed the prime minister and cabinet, dismissed the National Assembly, abrogated the constitution, dissolved all political parties, and banned all political activities. President Iskandar Mirza invited General Khan to declare himself the chief martial law administrator. On October 27, General Khan removed President Mirza. This event supports both hypotheses for why a military may seize power. A military is more likely to commit a coup if the current government cannot maintain its territory, make collective

decisions, provide some level of public services, and interact with other states. Also, a military is more likely to commit a coup if the military can receive private gains, both intuitional and individual. The case of Ayub Khan taking power largely supports these hypotheses.

Two factors, provincialism and internal divisions within the civilian government, undermined the legitimacy of the civilian government. Key events included local disputes in provinces and political disunity within the Muslim League. These events showed a government unable to control a population and provide a capable legitimate government. In Punjab in 1948, a dispute between local leaders and the governor general resulted in imposing governor's rule.⁶² Moreover, other provinces had similar problems. In the North West Frontier Province, clashes were between the Muslim League, which had a strong position in the province, and groups supporting separatist leader Khan Abdul Ghaffer Khan.⁶³ Moreover, the Muslim League was coming apart as a political organization. Local forces were coming into conflict with a state that only had buy-in from divided elites. As Chaudhry Muhammad Ali, the fourth Prime Minister of Pakistan stated:

The pillars of society, the landlords, the well-to-do lawyers, the rich businessmen, and the titled gentry, were its main support. With some exceptions, they were not men noted for their total commitment to any cause. Their willingness to sacrifice their personal interests or comfort for the sake of the nation was often in doubt, and not unjustly.⁶⁴

During this early period, Pakistan had did not have a coherent ideology to keep it together. Islam was an important means to galvanize the population for the creation of the State of Pakistan. It was not a cohesive force to hold the state together nor did it give lasting legitimacy to the elites that help create Pakistan.

The early civilian leadership were muhajir (refugees) from India. Normally secular, they clashed with the Punjab and Sindhi landed aristocracy. This landed aristocracy approached problems from highly

⁶² Nawaz, *Crossed Swords: Pakistan Its Army, and the Wars Within*, 77.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan* (Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan University of the Punjab, 2009), 371.

paternalistic manner with little concern for a broader secular viewpoint.⁶⁵ In this environment of conflict, the first military conspiracy occurred, known as the Rawalpindi Conspiracy. In it, Major General Akbar Khan led an effort to replace the government with a military-style nationalistic government. The primary cause was unhappiness over the ceasefire in the first Kashmir conflict. Many felt that British officers, who remained in both the Indian and Pakistani Army in senior positions, hindered nationalist goals and if the conflict continued, the army could liberate Kashmir.⁶⁶ The government did not allow Pakistan's Army to follow its basic policy desires in defeating an opponent. In March 1951, the government discovered the Rawalpindi Conspiracy. However, those sentenced to jail terms had those sentences commuted in 1955 and Akbar would later serve in government again. Shortly after the Rawalpindi conspiracy, the Saad Akbar Babrak, a Pashtun nationalist, assassinated the first Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan. The government conducted an investigation of the assassination but never released the results.

The Rawalpindi Conspiracy is an important indicator that the military had institutional desires separate from the civilian leadership. Moreover, the army started to develop legitimacy with the local population. Khawaja Nizamuddin assumed the position of Prime Minister after the death of Prime Minister Liaquat. He faced unrest in the provinces and a challenge to his election as Muslim League president. In Punjab, there was serious civil unrest over the status of the Ahmadis population, who were a sect of Muslims rejected as legitimate by some religious leaders. In this chaos, the government called upon Major General Muhammad Azam Khan to establish martial law. In doing so, he endeared himself to the local population who used slogans like "Long Live General Azam Khan" and "Long Live the Pakistan Army."⁶⁷

In East Pakistan, the United Front defeated the Muslim League in provisional elections. In the provincial Parliament, the Muslim League only won 10 seats out of 309. The new Prime Minister for

⁶⁵ Burki, *Pakistan: A Nation in the Making*, 45.

⁶⁶ Nawaz, *Crossed Swords: Pakistan Its Army, and the Wars Within*, 83.

⁶⁷ *Ibid*, 87.

Bengal started to make comments that challenged the very logic of Pakistan. He stated he wished to work with India “to remove the artificial barriers that had been created between the two Bengals” and that Bengalis were “bound by a common language and heritage and they have had age-long traditions.”⁶⁸ In May 1954, the national government appointed a government to administer East Pakistan and the appointed governor was Major General Iskander.

Actual power over the government went to the President of Pakistan, Iskander Mirza. Pakistan had six Prime Minister’s between the assassination of Prime Minister Liaquat in 1951 and the military coup in 1958. Actual power, however, evolved to the President who increasingly used to military to maintain control of the country. The military would control West Pakistan with coercion after May of 1954. In 1956, President Mirza abrogated the Constitution and declared Martial Law. President Mirza and General Ayub were in effect the two most powerful voices in Pakistan after 1954 and until General Ayub took control of the government in 1958.⁶⁹

This chain of events seems to support two hypotheses. First, Pakistan could not maintain its territory or make collective decisions. The state had elites divided by its regional concerns. In East Pakistan, for example, Pakistan faced significant concerns about losing over half of the state’s territory and population as East Pakistan started to move towards a long path towards independence. Moreover, regional concerns in West Pakistan the central government faced instability and could not control the populations who identified with regional and traditional leaders. The military was the one institution that could bring stability and make decisions. Also, the military had clear policy concerns. As the Rawalpindi Conspiracy showed, the military was dissatisfied with the policy choices of the civilian government. A successful coup allowed the military to follow its preferred security policies. Moreover, as would be demonstrated under the rule of General Khan, the military would gain a significant amount of private benefits in land and money. A number of senior officers acquired large tracts of land. Khan allowed his

⁶⁸ Sayeed, *Politics in Pakistan* (New York: Praeger Publications, 1980), 41.

⁶⁹ Ibid, 45.

sons to leave the army and enter industry, becoming rich.⁷⁰

General Yahya Khan deposing President Ayub Khan

A military coup by General Yahya Khan forced Ayub Khan from office on March 25, 1969. The successive coups provide an opportunity to explain why a military might replace a government. This case differs from a classic case of a military overthrow of a civilian government because the government of Ayub Khan was itself the product of a military coup. However, by the time of General Yahya Khan's coup, the government had changed and incorporated other parts of the society. The reforms put in place by Ayub Khan moved the political system towards more representation, even if the system was not democratic. However, as was the case when Ayub Khan seized power, the state could not perform some basic functions. Moreover, the seizure occurs when there is a policy disagreement over another war with India. This case again supports the hypothesis for why a military seizes power from a civil government.

After General Ayub Khan's coup, he quickly integrated the civil service into his apparatus for controlling the society. As the successor to the Indian Civil Service under the British Raj, the modern civil service were the specially selected elite who ran the institutions of government. Once Ayub Khan declared martial law, he named the senior-most civil servant, Aziz Ahmed, his deputy.⁷¹ The government would begin with a fusion between two institutions left over from the British Raj, the military and the civil service. Khan's government was, in many respects, dominated by secular liberals and it would attempt to reform Pakistan based on those beliefs. To Khan, martial law was "not an instrument of tyranny or punishment; it was an arrangement under which government had acquired certain unusual powers to implement a program of basic reforms."⁷²

His system of reforms tried to incorporate the political realities of Pakistan and to move the country towards reforms based on his values. The first reform enacted was a system of "Basic

⁷⁰ Burki, *Pakistan: A Nation in the Making*, 57.

⁷¹ Nawaz, *Crossed Swords: Pakistan Its Army, and the Wars Within*, 171.

⁷² Mohammad Ayub Khan, *Friends not Masters: A Political Autobiography* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 82.

Democracies,” which launched in 1960. It was a system of local government meant to appeal to the small landlords of Punjab and the Northwest Frontier. It consisted of local union councils that represented 10,000 people and had a membership of 10. The Union councils would elect members to the Tehsil council, who would in turn elect members to the provincial councils, and so on. The lower councils would be made up of elected members, while the higher councils would be made up of elected and appointed members, usually from the civil service serving in that area.⁷³ The system served to connect the civil service to the society. It gave a voice to the grassroots of society, but also allowed the civil service to form an apparatus for maintaining law and order.

Shortly following the program of Basic Democracies, Khan put in place a new constitution on March 23, 1962. The constitution would be a presidential system and the presidency would dominate the political system. The 80,000 basic democrats, a system of councils with appointed and directly elected members, elected the president indirectly. The population indirectly elected the legislative branch and legislative branch could not enact laws without the agreement of the president. The president could ignore the legislature and the President could enact certain legislation not approved by the legislature.⁷⁴ He was creating a system that was attempting to fuse the state institutions that worked, the army and the civil service, with the local power structures. While not a democracy, it did create a hybrid type of civil control. Khan called the system “a blending of a democracy with discipline-the two prerequisite to running a free society with stable government and sound administration.”⁷⁵

Khan returned some power. Khan’s motivation seemed to be finding a working and sustainable political system but offers little support for the hypothesis developed. First, there was no punishment from the United States or the international community for seizing power. After the seizure of power, the United States continued to portray itself as a partner in growth and working to develop Pakistan’s military. There

⁷³ Shahid Javed Burki, *Pakistan: A Nation in the Making* (London: Oxford University Press, 1987), 55.

⁷⁴ Ibid, 56-57.

⁷⁵ Khan, *Friends not Masters: A Political Autobiography*, 216.

was no private condemnation of Khan's actions and military aid continued.⁷⁶ From the American perspective, the rationale for questioning military aid was not Khan's coup. It was the fact that Pakistan was using the military aid to build a force against India, not the Soviet Union. In reality, the United States mainly needed the air bases in Pakistan, not to build a capable Pakistani Army focused on India.⁷⁷ Moreover, the Kennedy Administration further questioned the relationship, seeing India as a better possible partner, given it was a democracy, a counterweight to China, and a possible market for US goods.⁷⁸ However, none of these developments directly related to the original seizure of power.

This case does support that a military is likely to become involved in civil governance if their policy wants are not satisfied and if the government loses legitimacy. By the 1960, Pakistan's Army was a quarter of a million men and it believed itself to be a capable counter of Indian forces. The army was a functioning and powerful institution, but it was still an institution that represented a secular worldview that was aggressive towards India. It did not represent the values of Pakistan.

In January 1965, Khan faced reelection under his new system. The challenge to his re-election was Fatima Jinnah, the sister of Pakistan's founder Mohammad Ali Jinnah. Her rallies drew large crowds from the various opponents of the government. While he was able to use the civil service to rally the support of the Local Basic Democrats, who elected the President under the new Constitution, winning 49,951 to 38,691. The small margin of victory still demonstrated a general lack of legitimacy.⁷⁹ In the context of a more powerful military and a President facing a domestic political challenge, Zulfikar Bhutto, Minister of Foreign Affairs, began to lobby for a more aggressive policy against India with generals and other members of the foreign ministry. Kashmir was already becoming an issue. A relic, believed to be the hair of the Prophet Muhammad, was stolen from the shrine in Kashmir. This inflamed

⁷⁶ Nawaz, *Crossed Swords: Pakistan Its Army, and the Wars Within*, 175-176.

⁷⁷ Ibid, 188.

⁷⁸ Ibid, 193.

⁷⁹ Ibid, 203.

the populations in both Kashmir and Pakistan.⁸⁰

While Fatima Jinnah challenged Khan, the 1965 war with India started with an attempt by Pakistan to fuel an insurgency in Kashmir by infiltrating forces. India responded by attacking West Pakistan. The results were mostly non-conclusive with India having a slight military advantage. During the peace negotiations, Bhutto was driving towards an aggressive stance while Khan was willing to accept the ceasefire line of 1949. He took an aggressive stance against Khan. This broke Khan's coalition, as the army became disillusioned with his leadership and the population started to understand the military failures of the war. This resulted in Bhutto formally breaking with Khan and forming the Pakistan People's Party.⁸¹ Khan's government was attempting to control a military that was dissatisfied with its defense policies and a domestic population it was losing control over.

Bhutto went on a national tour, calling for more equality in the benefits of economic growth. The government campaign of a "decade of development" provided a backdrop for Bhutto to remind the population of how little they had benefited. Bhutto's campaign also prompted the Bengali leadership to articulate demands for autonomy. The Awami League supported a six-point program limiting the powers of the central government.⁸² By 1969, Khan tried to reach an agreement with Bhutto, favoring a more representative system. However, Bhutto refused to cooperate. This refusal caused the military to replace Khan, who resigned on March 25, 1969. General Yahya Khan replaced him as President.

Once again, this chain of events seems to support the two hypotheses for why a military may seize power. Khan had lost legitimacy after the 1965 war. This war allowed for political leaders in both East and West Pakistan to challenge the status quo. Moreover, the military was not satisfied with the conclusion of the 1965 war. This institutional dissatisfaction divided the military and President Khan. The military took control again during a period that the central government was losing its ability to control the

⁸⁰ Ibid, 202.

⁸¹ Nawaz, *Crossed Swords: Pakistan Its Army, and the Wars Within*, 241.

⁸² Burki, *Pakistan: A Nation in the Making*, 61.

population and during a time, the government was ignoring the preferred policies of the military. Here again, Yahya Khan's government would also enrich individuals in the military and expanded the practices started under Ayub Khan's government.⁸³ Private benefits again played a role in motivating the military.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto replacing President Yahya Khan

The return of control to civil authorities after General Yahya provides strong support that another actor will remove a military government that cannot maintain its territory from power or return power to a civilian government. A military government also faces a certain demand for legitimacy. The loss of East Pakistan in the 1971 destroyed the legitimacy of Yahya's government and caused power to transfer to Bhutto and his Pakistan People's Party.

Yahya's government undid the reforms of Khan's government. Whereas Khan had allowed politicians to work within the system he created, Yahya would keep all power in the state with the military. He would purge the civil service and make them a second tier player in running Pakistan. However, he would also make some changes that would allow the first election in Pakistan's history based on democratic representation of the population. This meant that East Pakistan would have more representation in the National Assembly, having 162 seats compared to 138 by West Pakistan. Moreover, the ethnic divisions divided the population of West Pakistan. The Government held the 1970 elections for the National Assembly under a legal framework order from Yahya. Once the government conducted elections, the new Assembly, under the legal framework, would conduct a 120-day period in which a new constitution was to be developed. These elections resulted in the Awami League winning 160 of the 162 seats in East Pakistan. There was a clear mandate for the Awami League's leader, Mujib-ur-Rahman to negotiate for autonomy. In West Pakistan, Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party won 81 of the 138 seats. His mandate was restructuring the economy and providing basic needs such as food, health, education, and

⁸³ Nawaz, *Crossed Swords: Pakistan Its Army, and the Wars Within*, 253.

shelter.⁸⁴ The two programs had nothing in common. Moreover, neither side was interested in drafting a new constitution.

This friction came when there were also significant economic problems for both East and West Pakistan. The 1965 war caused external assistance to decline by 25 percent. Moreover, East Pakistan saw growth national product decline 4 percent from 1965 to 1970 while East Pakistan grew because it received a heavier share of external investment and resources. This resulted in a widening economic gap between East and West Pakistan.⁸⁵ The 1965 war reduced external assistance and what little assistance there was went to West Pakistan. This intensified the sentiment of East Pakistan being a junior partner and Bhutto represented a push for further resources going to East Pakistan.

The Pakistan military proved incompetent in handling the political dynamics of Pakistan, especially in the context of elections and civil discord. The army responded harshly to civil unrest, would see the influence of India everywhere, and defined opposition to the government as treason. The Inter-Services Intelligence, better known as the ISI, was responsible for understanding what would happen in the elections. They proved unable or unwilling to understand what was actually happening on the ground. The military estimate for the election results were 46-70 seats for the Awami League and 20 to 30 seats for the Pakistani Peoples Party.⁸⁶

The results of the election came as a shock to Yahya. He went to East Pakistan to meet with Mujib, and referred to him as the “future Prime Minister” at the airport. However, he also started to explore other means to keep the country together. Moreover, Bhutto urged him not to turn the country over to Mujib. Bhutto was able to further inflame the situation by meeting with Kashmir militants who had hijacked an Indian plane in demand for the release of Kashmiri militants. He met with them and

⁸⁴ Burki, *Pakistan: A Nation in the Making*, 65.

⁸⁵ Hasan Zaheer, *The Separation of East Pakistan* (London: Oxford University Press, 1997), 91-92.

⁸⁶ Nawaz, *Crossed Swords: Pakistan Its Army, and the Wars Within*, 259-260.

called them” heroes,” which caused the Indian government to ban flights over India. This caused a long detour for any flight going between West and East Pakistan.⁸⁷

The situation was at a stalemate. On March 6, 1971 Yahya made a speech that he “will not allow a handful of people to destroy the homeland of millions of innocent Pakistanis. It is the duty of the Pakistan Armed Forces to ensure the integrity, solidarity, and security of Pakistan.”⁸⁸ The Commander in East Pakistan, LTG Sahibzada Yaqub wrote a plan to authorize the military to take charge of the administration of East Pakistan four days after the National assembly elections. By March 23, discussions with Mujib fell apart and his supporters raised Bangladesh flags over East Pakistan. The army seized control of East Pakistan on March 25, 1971 capturing Mujib. However, his supporters fled to India and created a government in exile.⁸⁹

These actions started an insurgency in East Pakistan for independence led by the Mukti Bahini, the armed group that quickly formed to fight for independence. The group would have support from India and the government in exile. The conflict resulted in mass killings of civilians.⁹⁰ On November 20, 1971, India invaded East Pakistan. India’s aim in the east was to use the Mukti Bahini to engage their lines of communication and defeat their forces with a conventional attack. A counterattack into India from West Pakistan proved unable to achieve the effect of bring pressure on India to ending the war. By December 16, less than a month after India launched its invasion of East Pakistan, India forced Pakistan’s forces in East Pakistan to surrender, and 90,000 soldiers became prisoners of war in India.⁹¹

⁸⁷ Nawaz, *Crossed Swords: Pakistan Its Army, and the Wars Within*, 261-263.

⁸⁸ Ibid, 264.

⁸⁹ Ibid, 267.

⁹⁰ Estimates range from 26,000 to 3,000,000 for the number killed. See Danald W. Beachler, *The Genocide Debate: Politicians, Academics, and Victims* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).

⁹¹ Nawaz, *Crossed Swords: Pakistan Its Army, and the Wars Within*, 282-307.

Yahya made Bhutto deputy Prime Minister shortly before the surrender and Yahya sent Bhutto to the United Nations to negotiate a solution to the crisis in East Pakistan. A day before the army's surrender, he had stormed out of a meeting of the Security Council and promised, "a thousand years war" with India. This, along with other previous actions, had won him the admiration of the army and the population in the context of a national humiliation. Young officers staged a grassroots movement against senior officers and forced Yahya Khan resigned the presidency. Upon Bhutto's return from New York, Bhutto became President of Pakistan.⁹²

Lack of legitimacy caused Yahya Khan to fall. As the above hypothesis suggests, a military government that cannot maintain its territory, make collective decisions, provide some level of public services, and interact with other states is more likely to be forced from power or return power to a civilian government. However, there are a few points. One, the military returns of power to civilians. It is more of a grass roots movement within the military than a society that forces Yahya Khan from power. Despite the defeat, the military was still one of the only working institutions in the country. Moreover, Bhutto and his government provided no punishment for the military. Both Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan died as private citizens in 1974 and 1980 respectively.

General Zia-ul-Haq deposing Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto

Bhutto's government would last for five and a half years, before another military coup. Bhutto's government attempted to centralize power that resulted in a loss of support from the population and finally the military. Bhutto did attempt to establish civilian dominance over the military. Bhutto punished for the military and began a campaign to discredit the military. This would indicate that he believed he needed to provide some control over the military. He started a campaign to publicize the military's surrender ceremony in Dacca. He kept many of the discredited generals, but removed many of those who had opposed military action in East Pakistan. He also forced the retirement of five leading officers who

⁹² Burki, *Pakistan: A Nation in the Making*, 69.

had forced Yahya Khan to resign, charging them with a conspiracy to remove a lawful government. This resulted in a contentious relationship with the Army Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen Gul Hassan Khan. However, he continued to replace key leadership in the army with people who he thought would be loyal to him.⁹³

Bhutto's government provided the third constitution to Pakistan, but in doing so, he alienated his opposition and started an armed insurgency in Baluchistan. The Punjab population dominated Pakistan with nearly 60 percent of the population, a large representation in the armed forces, and represented over half of the GNP. Sind, second in size and wealth to Punjab, was dominated by Muhajirs in the cities and traditional cultural of large landholders in the rural areas. The Punjab and Parthians populations divided the Northwest Frontier Province. Finally, Baluchistan, which was smallest in population but largest in land size, contained a population that had resisted the British Raj. The smaller provinces feared Punjabi control, but the new constitution reassured the Baluchi population because it created a Senate that provided equal representation by province. Moreover, Bhutto assured the smaller provinces that he would not interfere in areas that did not have a majority rule from the Pakistan People's Party. Once adopted, however, it became evident that Bhutto planned to control the various provincial governments. He dismissed the Baluchistan government in 1974 and the government in the Northwest Frontier quickly resigned in protest.⁹⁴ Bhutto would send the army into Baluchistan for the purpose of "constructing roads, providing electricity and water" but the force would fight an insurgency in Baluchistan.⁹⁵ Minor Baluchistan leaders started an insurgency while the government arrested major leaders. Bhutto used the military to establish civil control once again.

Young officers in the military again showed their dissatisfaction with what they saw as an oncoming civilian dictatorship in the Attock conspiracy, which was a failed coup attempt. In it, junior

⁹³ Nawaz, *Crossed Swords: Pakistan Its Army, and the Wars Within*, 323.

⁹⁴ Burki, *Pakistan: A Nation in the Making*, 73.

⁹⁵ Rafi Raza, *Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Pakistan 1967-1977* (London: Oxford University Press, 1997), 271.

officers were both upset that Bhutto failed to remove the top level of military leadership and they felt Bhutto was moving towards a dictatorship.⁹⁶ Moreover, he created the Federal Security Force, which was a paramilitary organization under his direct control. He was also continuing to gain further and further control over the press. Bhutto alienated significant parts of the population and the armed forces were starting to show dissatisfaction with his government.

The elections occurred in this environment in 1977. Opposition unified under the banner of the Pakistan National Alliance. It was able to appeal too many and appeared in a position to draw a significant number of seats. However, it only won 36 out of 192 seats. This started a wide spread protests as the opposition saw the election as fixed.⁹⁷ Moreover, Bhutto's own Pakistan's People's Party began to break in unity as several members of the government resigned.⁹⁸ The army would launch "Operation Fair Play" and removed Bhutto.

Here, we again see the primary role that legitimacy has to play in the decision of the military to commit a coup. The government was unable to control the population and the military became the instrument of control. Perhaps one of the more interesting aspects of the fall of Bhutto is that he tried to punish the military and attempts to place them under firm civilian control. This does suggest that Bhutto saw that as an important goal in maintaining control, even if he did failed in doing so. He attempts to do so that focuses on the leadership and rewards leadership that was disgraced in the view of Pakistan's military. The effort to remove him was because of widespread disconnect. While his attempt does support the importance of civil authorities gaining supremacy, it may also offer some lessons civilians could achieve supremacy.

Sino-Indian War

While Pakistan was going into and out of military full military control, in India the military

⁹⁶ Nawaz, *Crossed Swords: Pakistan Its Army, and the Wars Within*, 337.

⁹⁷ Burki, *Pakistan: A Nation in the Making* 74.

⁹⁸ Nawaz, *Crossed Swords: Pakistan Its Army, and the Wars Within*, 348.

remained under civil control. As noted in the comparison of India and Pakistan, India faced many of the same structural conditions that India faced. The following two sections will examine two historical events in which one might assume that the army would be tempted to become involved in civil governance, but did not. The first section will start with the Sino-Indian War of 1962.

The dispute that caused the Sino-Indian war revolved around China recovering what it perceived as its territory. In 1959, the Dalai Lama left China for India. This was because China was tightening its control of Tibet leading to an insurgency that China defeated. While Nehru encouraged the Dalai Lama to negotiate, the crossing happened at a time when India and China were also disputing territory currently held by India. In 1958, China started to print maps that showed a significant part of Indian territory that bordered Tibet as part of China. The Indian government protested this and Jawaharlal Nehru and Chou En-lai, China's Premier, exchanged correspondence that became heated. This border dispute eventually resulted in armed engagements in 1959 and China seizing an Indian outpost at Loughu⁹⁹

This happened in the context of disputes between India's civilian leadership and the army's leadership. Vengalil Krishnan Krishna Menon was a close friend to Nehru and Nehru appointed him as defense minister. He came into conflict with his Chief of Staff, General K.S. Thimayya. General Thimayya believed that China was a threat and wanted to move forces to counter China. Thimayya was also concerned that the Indian military was not equipped with modern arms. He argued that the Indian Army should purchase the Belgian FN FAL rifle. Menon argued that the actual threat was from Pakistan and he angered at move towards NATO arms.¹⁰⁰ The promotion of B.M. Kaul to the rank of lieutenant general finally caused Thimayya to resign. Nehru promoted Kaul over twelve other Generals who had more experience and lacked combat experience. However, he did have a relationship with Nehru. When the resignation leaked to the press, it divided the public. Most of the communist and left wing press sided with Menon. While most of the non-ideological press sided with Thimayya. This included the *Hindustan*

⁹⁹ Guha, *India After Gandhi: The History of the World's Largest Democracy*, 309-310.

¹⁰⁰ Arthur Lall, *The Emergence of Modern India* (New York: Columbia University, 1981), 119.

Times that supported the resignation of Menon. Nehru brought Thimmayya into his office and directly lobbied him to withdraw his resignation, which he finally did.¹⁰¹

Chou complained about the political activities of Tibetan dissidents and suggest that China and India should simple recognize the status quo. Nehru argued that India had provided China with legitimacy on the world stage and the current status quo allowed China to keep land it had taken by force. Talks broke down and by October 1960, Chou accused India of wanting to “turn China’s Tibet region into a ‘buffer zone.’”¹⁰² In India, there was increasing calls for taking a more aggressive stance. Disputes and armed conflict continued and on September 8, 1962, China emplaced an outpost that overlooked the Indian town of Dhola. On October 3, 1962, General Umrao Singh, who argued for prudence, was replaced by General B.M. Kaul. To dislodge the Chinese, he moved two battalions to over watch the Chinese position but they had no mortars and only three days of supplies. The Chinese attacked the force and started the war. On November 15, China launched a major offensive gaining territory before declaring a unilateral ceasefire on November 22. The failure resulted in the resignation of Menon and General Kaul.¹⁰³

From an institutional preference perspective, civilians largely ignored Indian military preferences. Not only did Nehru ignore the threat of China but also Nehru and Menon exercised an extreme level of micromanagement. In the war, V. K. Krishna Menon, the Defense Minister, and Nehru directly supervised the tactical placement of units as small as platoons.¹⁰⁴ Moreover, the defeat weakened Nehru politically India continued to have problems maintaining stability in all of its territory. However, there is not any recorded of an attempted coup or an increased involvement in civil governance.

India, unlike Pakistan, did not have an extensive history of using the army to maintain domestic order. While it the Government used the army to maintain stability, it was not routine. Moreover, Indian leaders were seen as legitimate to a larger segment of the population. Congress had legitimacy because of

¹⁰¹ Guha, *India After Gandhi: The History of the World’s Largest Democracy*, 309-310.

¹⁰² Edgar Snow, *The Other Side of the River: Red China Today* (New York: Random House, 1963), 762-763.

¹⁰³ Guha, *India After Gandhi: The History of the World’s Largest Democracy*, 334-339.

¹⁰⁴ Cohen, *The Indian Army: Its Contribution to the Development of a Nation*, 176.

the struggle for Independence and because it was supported by a wider number. The Congress could perform the functions of government and had legitimacy. The military did not have any legitimacy to govern. Thus, even when the institutional preferences of the military were ignored and disregarded, civilian control was dominant.

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi declares Emergency Rule

The same basic factors prevented the military from taking any action even when the civil government took actions that were of questionable legitimacy in the society. The Emergency was an almost two-year period in which Prime Minister Indira Gandhi declared a state of emergency, allowing her to rule by decree. By 1974, politics polarized between Indira Gandhi's Congress Party and a reformed movement led by Jayaprakash Narayan, known generally as JP. JP was a nationalist who was aligning with the Jana Sangh, a conservative party. He was leading protests criticizing the government for being corrupt. In 1974 and 1975, he led protests throughout India. On March 6, 1975, JP led a protest of 750,000 in New Delhi.¹⁰⁵

This was happening in the context of legal challenges to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. She faced corruption charges in her election from Allahabad and became the first Prime Minister to testify in a criminal proceeding. Also, in Gujarat, Morarji Desai, started a fast to protest against President's rule, which Gandhi declared earlier. This resulted in protest and new elections in the state. Opposition was quickly unifying against Congress. On June 12, the Janata Front won state elections and the election in Allahabad was overturned.¹⁰⁶

The court decision caused large protest and counter protest. With her election overturned, the Supreme Court ordered that she could not vote in Parliament. Many advised her to step down and wait for the Indian Supreme Court to hear the appeal. They started to hear the appeal on 23 June. Most were confident the appeal would overturn the decision. Instead, on June 26, she declared a State of Emergency.

¹⁰⁵ Guha, *India After Gandhi: The History of the World's Largest Democracy*, 485.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid, 487.

The police arrested opposition leaders, including JP. On June 27, Gandhi announced the decision to India and civil rights were suspended¹⁰⁷

She ruled by decree for 21 month until she dissolved parliament and held elections in January 1977. She lost the election in a landslide, before she again won in the national elections of 1980. However, when democracy was suspended, there is again no record in the military planning or becoming involved in civil government. The government could still maintain its territory and make collective decisions. It faced a challenge, but the crisis was not to a level that compelled the military to become involved. Moreover, the military had won a major victory in 1972 under Gandhi against Pakistan. This also could have influenced how India's military saw civil-military relations.

Conclusion

Pakistan's government came under military rule at various periods after independence while India's government did not. Comparing these events to the hypothesis provides insights into civil-military relationships. To keep control of a state, one must first control the population of that state. This is very similar to Huntington's primary purpose of a state, order. The ability to maintain order is the primary driver in civil military relations. Whichever authorities are controlling the state, the ability to maintain control is dependent on their ability to maintain order in a society. The threats to maintaining order can be both external and internal. Moreover, how one maintains order can vary. However, providing order is the primary driver for maintaining control of a state, whether civilians or the military are controlling that state's government.

Hypothesis one and three are similar and only differ in who the governing authority is at the time. They both are testing that a change in government may happen if the current government "cannot maintain its territory, make collective decisions, provide some level of public services, and interact with other states." This comparative case study supports these two hypothesis. In the case of Pakistan, we see these factors contributed to a change in who governed the state. The 1971 war with India highlighted a

¹⁰⁷ Guha, *India After Gandhi: The History of the World's Largest Democracy*, 489.

case in which a military overthrew a government after losing territory. After the 1965 war with India, the decline in economic aid slowed economic development. The first coup with Ayub Khan was in a period in which the state was dysfunctional with many factions. Each change of power in Pakistan was in a period in which the government was under stress and faced conditions similar to both hypothesizes. By contrast, while there was instability in India, the central government in New Delhi maintained control because it had legitimacy within the society. While the period before the emergency was a period of domestic dispute, the declaration of emergency rule, while not popular, did not produce chaos and disorder. It allowed the state to control the population again. The leaders in India had the needed legitimacy and the ability to apply coercion to achieve order. This was not true in Pakistan.

Hypothesis two stated, “a military is more likely to commit a coup if the military can receive private gains, both intuitional and individual.” Here we also find evidence to support this in Pakistan, while the case of India’s war with China does not support this hypothesis. First, in Pakistan, each period of military rule also meant individual gains by the leaders of the military. For example, Ayub Khan gave military officers estates in Sindh. However, the institutional gains may be more of a driver. Each military coup happened in the context of the military being institutionally unhappy with the security policy of the state. This unhappiness comes early after the formation of Pakistan and is seen in the Rawalpindi Conspiracy and continues to Bhutto coming to power after the 1971 war with India. The only change of power that did not follow this pattern is General Zia-ul-Haq seizing power from Bhutto. In India, the Sino-India War was a disaster and the military was micromanaged by the government. However, they never threatened the civil authorities. The reason for this might be that in India, the government could maintain order.

Hypothesis four stated, “if the international community punishes a military government with sanctions or other type’s punishments, a military government is more likely to return power to a civilian government.” Unfortunately, the period tested provides little help in testing this hypothesis. After the 1965 war, there was a downturn in aid for Pakistan. However, this had little to do with international condemnation for a coup. Theoretically, a decrease in aid or another type of punishment could degrade a

state's ability to maintain order. This could allow for the replacement of a military government. While this may be theoretically consistent, the time and two cases of India and Pakistan offer little evidence to either support or not support hypothesis four.

Finally, hypothesis five stated, "once power is returned, if a civilian government does not effectively punish a military government, another military coup is more likely." There is some limited support that Bhutto saw this as important. He begins a public campaign against the military once he takes power and he attempts to find ways to punish officers who sees as threats. However, his efforts fail. He rewards leadership that failed in the 1971 war and punishes leadership that proved right about Pakistan's policy before the war. Perhaps this was seen as illegitimate and allowed the army to act again and replace Bhutto with General Zia-ul-Haq. While not successful, this does provide evidence that Bhutto and the government viewed it as important. Again, the time frame of this comparative case study does not allow many insights. However, Bhutto's actions were consistent with the "coup-proofing" literature.

In the end, the primary driver of who controls a state is the ability to maintain order. In the case of Pakistan, the ruling elites never gained widespread legitimacy among the population. In the case of India, the ruling elites did. Army and Marine Corps doctrine states:

A population that has grievances does not necessarily cause an insurgency. Grievances are necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for an insurgency. Poverty, unemployment, economic inequality, in adequate essential services, political marginalization, and repression are commonplace. These conditions exist in many places where an insurgency does not. It takes established or emerging leaders to build a compelling narrative that links grievances to a political agenda and mobilizes the population to support a violent social movement.¹⁰⁸

Poverty, unemployment, economic inequality all existed in both India and Pakistan. However, in India the government was able to tell a compelling narrative that gave it enough legitimacy with the population to govern and maintain order. In Pakistan, civilian governments were not able to do the same. This allowed the government to be replaced, not with an insurgency, but with successive military governments.

¹⁰⁸ Department of the Army, *FM 3-24 Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies*, 4-3.

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