Accession Number : ADP023711


Title :   Handling New Adversaries in Secure Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks


Descriptive Note : Conference paper with briefing charts


Corporate Author : MARYLAND UNIV COLLEGE PARK DEPT OF ELECTRICAL AND COMPUTER ENGINEERING


Personal Author(s) : Gligor, Virgil D


Full Text : https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/p023711.pdf


Report Date : Feb 2007


Pagination or Media Count : 10


Abstract : Invariably, new technologies introduce new vulnerabilities which often enable new attacks by increasingly potent adversaries. Yet new systems are more adapt at handling well-known attacks by old adversaries than anticipating new ones. Our adversary models seem to be perpetually out of date: often they do not capture adversary attacks and sometimes they address attacks rendered impractical by new technologies. An immediate consequence of using an out-of-date adversary model with a new technology is that security analysis methods and tools cannot possibly handle the new vulnerabilities thereby leaving users exposed to new attacks. An equally compelling reason for investigating new adversarial capabilities in Mobile Ad-hoc Networks (MANETS) is this: without a precise adversary definition the very notion of security becomes undefined. For instance, the fundamental question of what is the set of threats addressed by a given secure protocol cannot be answered without an adversary definition. In short, we need to provide (1) a new definition for the new adversary attacks made possible by Mobile Ad-hoc Networks (MANETS), (2) demonstrate that this new definition is more general than the traditional, formal network adversary models (including the classic Dolev-Yao and Byzantine models), (3) illustrate how this new adversary is countered with new practical protocols that operate under realistic performance and cost constraints. Interesting protocols to investigate using the new adversarial definition include those typically used in MANET management, distributed sensing and data fusion, as well as the more traditional authentication protocols for principal and node-to-node authentication.


Descriptors :   *VULNERABILITY , *ELECTRONIC SECURITY , *WIRELESS COMPUTER NETWORKS , CELLULAR COMMUNICATIONS , WORKSHOPS , SECURE COMMUNICATIONS , MOBILE , CODING


Subject Categories : Computer Programming and Software
      Computer Systems Management and Standards


Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE