Accession Number : ADA611995


Title :   Reconstitution as a Guiding Principle to US Army Force Structure: High Risk or Prudent Hedge?


Descriptive Note : Monograph


Corporate Author : ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE FORT LEAVENWORTH KS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES


Personal Author(s) : Morgado, Andrew


Full Text : https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a611995.pdf


Report Date : 20 May 2014


Pagination or Media Count : 60


Abstract : Reconstitution is the creation of new military capability that either was once part of a military's force structure or represents completely new capabilities. It consists of three major subcomponents and these are: military force reconstitution, industrial reconstitution and mobilization. Reconstitution is a principle employed throughout US hi story in practice if not in name. The two most recent uses of the principle occurred following the Cold War in 1991 and 2012 was that, in the most recent evaluation, the United States faced more active and different threats and enemies. Where a possibly resurgent Soviet Union was the driver for reconstitution in 1991, the likelihood and nature of future wars were more diverse in 2012. The United States faced three problems: how to maintain readiness for the current fight and short-term contingencies, determining what threats for which to account and what resources to allocate for preservation as some capabilities were put at a lower condition of readiness. Policy-makers and force planners tackled the challenge of preserving capability while large swaths of the overall military superstructure were being removed. Reconstitution, if executed as a broad and integrated process, does offer the United States a means to mitigate these risks. The United States is uniquely postured to take advantage of reconstitution. Its materiel wealth and industrial and personnel resources are substantial. In order to convert these resources into actual capability when needed requires a disciplined approach that accounts for the doctrinal, organizational, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities and policy (DOTMLPF-P) requirements of force structure planning. US policy-makers and force planners must emphasize structural over operational readiness which sacrifices some readiness in the present for capability in the future. Army doctrine must focus on a broad mission range while organizationally it must invest in the reserve component. Tr


Descriptors :   *MILITARY FORCES(UNITED STATES) , ARMY , MILITARY CAPABILITIES , MILITARY DOCTRINE , MILITARY PLANNING , MOBILIZATION , OPERATIONAL READINESS , STRATEGY , TRAINING


Subject Categories : Military Forces and Organizations


Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE