Accession Number : ADA611788


Title :   Operational Intelligence Failures of the Korean War


Descriptive Note : Master's thesis


Corporate Author : ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE FORT LEAVENWORTH KS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES


Personal Author(s) : Azotea, Charles M


Full Text : https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a611788.pdf


Report Date : 22 May 2014


Pagination or Media Count : 80


Abstract : This monograph addresses the failures of United States military operational intelligence regarding the invasion of South Korea by the North Korean Peoples' Army and the subsequent intervention by the Chinese Communist forces. These operational intelligence failures were a result of post-World War II policies that reduced the size of the military, cut systems and training, and reorganized intelligence services responsible for those failures. Reorganization of intelligence structures and training cutbacks produced ineffectual intelligence soldiers deployed to Far East Command and Korea. Personnel shortages in intelligence analysis, communications, signals and photographic intelligence, and linguistics further reduced intelligence collection and production. Poorly trained analysts, were unable to determine North Korean and Chinese intentions at both the strategic and operational level, which contributed to poor predictive analysis. United States strategic policy's focus on the threat posed by the Soviet Union to Western Europe further exacerbated intelligence failures in the Far East. General MacArthur's assessments, as Far East Commander and Commander of United Nations Forces in Korea, proved decisive in shaping political and military strategies. Major General Willoughby, MacArthur's senior intelligence officer (G-2), shared MacArthur's views and propagated them throughout the intelligence communities of both the Far East Command and Washington, DC. Analysts at all levels underestimated the Peoples' Republic of China, largely as a result of cultural bias and a lack of understanding of Chinese operational art and tactics. Operational intelligence failures, created by post-World War II policies, led to poor readiness and lack of capability. This operational unpreparedness produced an inability to determine appropriate indicators and warnings of both North Korean and Chinese intentions. The results of these failures carry on to this day more than 60 years later.


Descriptors :   *KOREAN WAR , *MILITARY INTELLIGENCE , ANALYSTS , ARMY , ARMY PERSONNEL , CHINA , COMMUNIST COUNTRIES , DATA ACQUISITION , DEPLOYMENT , EUROPE , FAILURE , FAR EAST , INDICATORS , INTERVENTION , KOREA , LINGUISTICS , MILITARY FORCES(FOREIGN) , OFFICER PERSONNEL , OPERATIONAL READINESS , PERSONNEL , PHOTOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE , POLICIES , POLITICAL SCIENCE , REDUCTION , SECOND WORLD WAR , USSR , WARFARE , WARNING SYSTEMS


Subject Categories : Military Intelligence


Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE