Accession Number : ADA600196
Title : Home and Away: Did the UK Address Counterinsurgency in Basra Substantially Differently to How it Addressed it in Northern Ireland?
Descriptive Note : Master's thesis
Corporate Author : NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIV NORFOLK VA JOINT FORCES STAFF COLLEGE
Personal Author(s) : Woolmer, John M
Report Date : 09 Apr 2014
Pagination or Media Count : 90
Abstract : Great Britain has a long history in counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare. In the summer of2003, as the Coalition in Iraq began post-conflict operations, many in Britain were keen to present the British experience (particularly recent experience in Northern Ireland) as a model for success in stability operations. However, 4 years later, as the British pulled back to Basra Airport, it was clear that reality had not matched expectation. The question remains as to whether the British experience in other COIN operations was so different that it was not relevant in Basra, or whether the British did not learn and apply the right lessons from other COIN campaigns. Intuitively, the operation in Basra felt different to that in Northern Ireland; the differences in force numbers, weapon systems used, and approaches to detention in Basra and Belfast were all examples that encourage this view. One can explain these away as different responses to different problems. Whether it is fair to do so is the subject of this thesis. This thesis will examine whether the different approaches in Northern Ireland and Southern Iraq were symptoms of a more fundamental difference in the way the British approached domestic and foreign COIN operations. If so, did the seeds of contemporary UK failure in overseas COIN operations lie in this differing approach?
Descriptors : *COUNTERINSURGENCY , *IRAQ , *IRELAND , *MILITARY FORCES(FOREIGN) , *UNITED KINGDOM , COHERENCE , GOVERNMENT(FOREIGN) , HISTORY
Subject Categories : Government and Political Science
Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE