Accession Number : ADA596084


Title :   The Post-Cold War Force-Sizing Debate: Paradigms, Metaphors, and Disconnects


Corporate Author : RAND NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INST SANTA MONICA CA


Personal Author(s) : Winnefeld, James A


Full Text : https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a596084.pdf


Report Date : Jan 1992


Pagination or Media Count : 105


Abstract : RAND is examining new security concepts as part of a research project for the Strategy Division of the Joint Staff (J-5). This examination is taking place against the backdrop of a vigorous force-sizing debate between the Department of Defense and the Congress in the aftermath of the Cold War. The changed security environment and pressing domestic concerns are combining to subject the U.S. force structure to new scrutiny. Outside of the Department of Defense, there has been less emphasis on the strategy antecedents of any new force posture. This report presents supporting analysis and commentary for use by the participants in the dialog on strategy and force sizing. Its purpose is to critique the various schools of thought on appropriate strategies and forces and to present some different perspectives for identifying the relevant issues and the needed analysis. In format the report is a series of four strategy and force-structure essays that form a commentary on the debate that took shape between Chairman Les Aspin of the House Armed Services Committee and Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney as they presented position papers, posture statements, and various forms of related analysis in pubic forums during the period January through June 1992. While the positions of each have been adjusted in the succeeding months to reflect changed circumstances and new analysis, the fundamentals remain unchanged: Congress believes fewer forces are justified, and the Bush administration has said, in effect, Not so fast. The essays, set out in the first four sections of the report, can be read as stand-alone pieces. But they are related in their common focus on the importance of objectives and strategy as a basis for force rationale, what history has to tell us about force-sizing assumptions, and the need to challenge the conventional wisdom in such matters-particularly during a period of change and major uncertainty about the future.


Descriptors :   *MILITARY FORCE LEVELS , CONGRESS , DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE , MILITARY DOWNSIZING , MILITARY STRATEGY , NATIONAL SECURITY , SCENARIOS


Subject Categories : Military Forces and Organizations


Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE