Accession Number : ADA558176


Title :   Building State Capacity to Achieve Government Victory during Civil War


Descriptive Note : Monograph


Corporate Author : ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES


Personal Author(s) : Ingels, Christopher A


Full Text : https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a558176.pdf


Report Date : 01 Dec 2011


Pagination or Media Count : 78


Abstract : Focusing efforts on building security force capability without increasing state capacity is an ineffective way to achieve government victory in civil war. The purpose of this monograph is to advance the hypothesis that simultaneously building state capacity while expanding military capability is a more effective strategy for achieving government victory in civil war. Developing state capacity to sustain Security Sector Reform (SSR) is important to the current U.S. strategy for increasing the likelihood of an Afghan government victory over Taliban rebels in Operation Enduring Freedom. Current U.S. Army doctrine -- Field Manual (FM) 3-07 Stability Operations and FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency Operations -- attempts to address both state capacity and security force development by providing useful methods for combating insurgents while addressing all aspects of state capacity building. However, flaws in this doctrine steer leaders toward focusing resources on troubled regions of conflict, thereby ignoring peaceful areas under government control. Since conflicted regions lack continuous peace, efforts to implement a stability strategy amount to little more than humanitarian relief and fail to add the capacity that strengthens a state's ability to achieve victory and maintain peace. This monograph contends that a simultaneous effort to combat rebels and provide humanitarian relief in conflict zones, while building state capacity in peaceful regions is an effective strategy for achieving government victory in civil war. In addition, only when a state strengthens its institutions and achieves a prosperous economy is it able to move beyond self-sufficiency and stand a greater chance of achieving victory in civil war. The monograph uses two case studies to demonstrate how simultaneously building state capacity and security force capability can lead to government victory in civil war (Colombia), and failing to do so can lead to defeat (Vietnam).


Descriptors :   *COLOMBIA , *COUNTERINSURGENCY , *GOVERNMENT(FOREIGN) , *MILITARY ASSISTANCE , *MILITARY CAPABILITIES , *MILITARY FORCES(FOREIGN) , *SOUTH VIETNAM , AFGHANISTAN CONFLICT , ARMY , CASE STUDIES , HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE , MILITARY DOCTRINE , MILITARY HISTORY , STABILITY , VIETNAM WAR


Subject Categories : Government and Political Science
      Humanities and History
      Unconventional Warfare


Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE