Accession Number : ADA550584


Title :   Exploitation of Unintentional Information Leakage from Integrated Circuits


Descriptive Note : Doctoral thesis


Corporate Author : AIR FORCE INST OF TECH WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB OH SCHOOL OF ENGINEERING AND MANAGEMENT


Personal Author(s) : Cobb, William E


Full Text : https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a550584.pdf


Report Date : Dec 2011


Pagination or Media Count : 220


Abstract : Unintentional electromagnetic emissions are used to recognize or verify the identity of a unique integrated circuit (IC) based on fabrication process-induced variations in a manner analogous to biometric human identification. The effectiveness of the technique is demonstrated through an extensive empirical study, with results presented indicating correct device identification success rates of greater than 99:5%, and average verification equal error rates (EERs) of less than 0:05% for 40 near-identical devices. The proposed approach is suitable for security applications involving commodity commercial ICs, with substantial cost and scalability advantages over existing approaches. A systematic leakage mapping methodology is also proposed to comprehensively assess the information leakage of arbitrary block cipher implementations, and to quantitatively bound an arbitrary implementation's resistance to the general class of differential side channel analysis techniques. The framework is demonstrated using the well-known Hamming Weight and Hamming Distance leakage models, and approach's effectiveness is demonstrated through the empirical assessment of two typical unprotected implementations of the Advanced Encryption Standard. The assessment results are empirically validated against correlation-based differential power and electromagnetic analysis attacks.


Descriptors :   *INTEGRATED CIRCUITS , *LEAKAGE(ELECTRICAL) , ATTACK , BIOMETRY , CHANNELS , COMMERCE , COMMODITIES , COSTS , CRYPTOGRAPHY , ELECTROMAGNETIC RADIATION , ELECTROMAGNETISM , EMISSION , ERRORS , HUMANS , IDENTIFICATION , INDICATORS , MAPPING , METHODOLOGY , MODELS , PROTECTION , RANGE(DISTANCE) , RATES , RESISTANCE , SECURITY , SIDES , VALIDATION , VERIFICATION , WEIGHT


Subject Categories : Information Science
      Cybernetics
      Defense Systems


Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE