Accession Number : ADA547558


Title :   We Have Not Learned How to Wage War There: The Soviet Approach in Afghanistan 1979-1989 (Occasional Paper, Number 36)


Descriptive Note : Monograph


Corporate Author : ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS COMBAT STUDIES INST


Personal Author(s) : Matthews, Matt M


Full Text : https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a547558.pdf


Report Date : Jul 2011


Pagination or Media Count : 87


Abstract : Chapter 1 of this study provides a concise history of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan. The rationale behind the Soviet foray into Afghanistan is examined as well as the planning concept for the military occupation. This chapter will also address the initial problems encountered by the Soviet army as anti-government forces began to conduct guerrilla operations against it. Chapter 2 focuses on the beginning of active operations against the Mujahideen, as well as the Soviet recognition of initial problems related to the conduct of counterinsurgency operations. The chapter further includes an overview of operations from 1980 to 1984 and Soviet army modifications to its tactical doctrine, as well as its flawed counterinsurgency operations (COIN) approach. Chapter 3 of this study explores the Soviet quest for a way out of the quagmire. This discussion also considers Soviet military operations under General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, and his decision to give the Soviet army one year of free rein in carrying out the war. Additionally, Gorbachev's exceedingly successful withdrawal from Afghanistan will be addressed, as will the failure of the Soviet military to respond to national reconciliation efforts and the challenges of COIN.


Descriptors :   *AFGHANISTAN , *MILITARY HISTORY , *USSR , COUNTERINSURGENCY , MILITARY FORCES(FOREIGN) , MILITARY OPERATIONS , MILITARY PLANNING , MILITARY TACTICS


Subject Categories : Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics


Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE