Accession Number : ADA545578


Title :   The Russian Military and the Georgia War: Lessons and Implications


Descriptive Note : Monograph


Corporate Author : ARMY WAR COLL STRATEGIC STUDIES INST CARLISLE BARRACKS PA


Personal Author(s) : Cohen, Ariel ; Hamilton, Robert E


Full Text : https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a545578.pdf


Report Date : Jun 2011


Pagination or Media Count : 114


Abstract : Russia launched the war against Georgia in August 2008 for highly valued strategic and geopolitical objectives, which included de facto annexation of Abkhazia, weakening or toppling the Mikheil Saakashvili regime, and preventing North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) enlargement. The Russian politico-military elites had focused on Georgia since the days of the presidency of Eduard Shevardnadze, whom they blamed, together with Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev and Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (USSR) Communist Party Central Committee Secretary Alexander Yakovlev, for the dissolution of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe and the dismantlement of the Soviet Union itself.


Descriptors :   *MILITARY OPERATIONS , STRATEGY , GEORGIA , GEOPOLITICS , RUSSIA , POWER , WARFARE , LEADERSHIP


Subject Categories : Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics


Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE