Accession Number : ADA541955


Title :   Strategic Insights. Volume 10, Issue 1, Spring 2011


Descriptive Note : Journal


Corporate Author : NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA DEPT OF NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS


Full Text : https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a541955.pdf


Report Date : Jan 2011


Pagination or Media Count : 77


Abstract : Despite these bureaucratic efforts in the White House and in the interagency process, this article argues that there remains a lack of consensus in Washington, particularly within the Department of Defense, on threat assessment in cyberspace and its military implications. A stark intellectual rift between alarmists and skeptics still prevails. As a result, this elementary battle has led to dysfunction in the institutional response to cyber-threats and jeopardizes the implementation of an effective military posture in cyberspace. Consequently, we need to reassess the relevance of cyberspace as a distinct military domain. To that end, this article aims for a middle ground between these opposing views, supporting the idea that cyberattacks are more than just a technical nuisance, but less than an existential threat to US national security. As of today, they remain a valuable, but not decisive, tool of military action. At the operational level, it means that cyberspace is not an independent domain. In other words, while warfare in the air is different from warfare on the sea, it is possible to have one without the other. But warfare in cyberspace must be accompanied by warfare in one of these other domains to lead to physical effects. As a result, this paper recommends a comprehensive integration of cyberattacks (which are precisely not autonomous cyberwarfare) into a joint analysis of military battles. Because pundits have been focusing on the broad geopolitical implications of cyberattacks, the strategic literature lacks a systematic and detailed campaign analysis of these acts. This joint analysis would frame cyberattacks as offensive or defensive military engagements in the process of a larger naval, air, or land campaign. Based on the findings of this research, cyberattacks should be considered a subset of an offensive, a means of denial rather than a means of punishment. They aim at attaining an intermediate goal for the attacker.


Descriptors :   *SECURITY , *INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS , *CYBERWARFARE , COMBAT READINESS , TAIWAN , SITUATIONAL AWARENESS , CHINA , STRATEGY , DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE , MILITARY OPERATIONS


Subject Categories : Computer Systems Management and Standards
      Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics


Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE