Accession Number : ADA530150


Title :   An Assessment of the 2006 Lebanon-Israeli War


Descriptive Note : Master's thesis


Corporate Author : NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIV NORFOLK VA JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL


Personal Author(s) : Mason, Douglas E


Full Text : https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a530150.pdf


Report Date : 29 May 2009


Pagination or Media Count : 71


Abstract : The 2006 Lebanon-Israeli War, also known as the July War, is popularly regarded as a Hezbollah victory. The conflict represented the fifth time in the past 30 years that Israeli forces have entered Lebanon with the intent of clearing the border area of terrorists. Israeli ineptitude combined with thorough Hezbollah preparation of the battlespace produced the perception of a Hezbollah victory. One likely result of the war is that opponents of the United States will attempt to replicate Hezbollah's successes. Careful study of the conflict by western military professionals will prepare them for the enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures that will likely appear on future battlefields. The 2006 conflict in Lebanon between Israel and the terrorist group Hezbollah serves as an example of what has been described Hybrid War. It offers lessons learned for American policy makers and joint commanders as the United States fights militant extremists in Afghanistan and Pakistan's tribal areas. These lessons include the imperative of strategy-policy match, the need for proper war preparation, and the importance of sanctuary for terrorist organizations.


Descriptors :   *ISRAEL , *PREPARATION , *PERCEPTION(PSYCHOLOGY) , *MILITARY TACTICS , *CONFLICT , *LEBANON , *MILITARY HISTORY , ISRAELIS , PARAMILITARY FORCES , THESES , MILITARY FORCES(FOREIGN) , ARABS , LESSONS LEARNED , PAKISTAN , AFGHANISTAN CONFLICT , TERRORISTS


Subject Categories : Humanities and History
      Psychology
      Unconventional Warfare


Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE