Accession Number : ADA524143


Title :   Strategy's Relevance to the War in Afghanistan


Descriptive Note : Master's thesis


Corporate Author : ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS


Personal Author(s) : Prieve, Thomas A


Full Text : https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a524143.pdf


Report Date : 11 Jun 2010


Pagination or Media Count : 80


Abstract : This thesis identifies the policy and associated strategy that were in place during the initial period of the Afghanistan war (2001-2002) and compares them to the policy and associated strategy that are in place in the current period of the war (2006-2009). These periods encapsulate the breadth of the war from inception to present and permit explanation of the environmental changes during the intervening years. These changes include the initial defeat of the Taliban government, al-Qaeda disruptions, force growth, commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom, establishment of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), an administration change, a recent change of U.S. military command in Afghanistan, and Afghanistan national elections. The end point for strategy comparison is 1 December 2009. Exploration of material published after the president's 1 December 2009 strategy announcement is relevant only if it pertains directly to the strategy implementation or illustrates the importance of strategic study or formation. In addition, the thesis does not attempt to define or establish the strategies from either period as a grand strategy. Describing the different approaches in effect for the periods examined as national strategies is conducive to the thesis. The study finds two distinct policies and two distinct strategies. The first strategy used the military instrument of national power, whereas the current strategy attempts to use all instruments of national power. However, both periods of policy and strategy address the same core United States interest: protecting and pursuing American security. Recommendations for additional research include identifying how historical U.S. strategies link to policy and whether or not the operational environment shapes strategy.


Descriptors :   *FOREIGN POLICY , *EVOLUTION(GENERAL) , *AFGHANISTAN CONFLICT , *COUNTERINSURGENCY , *COUNTERTERRORISM , *STRATEGY , *UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT , THESES , IRAQI WAR , MILITARY FORCE LEVELS , MILITARY COMMANDERS , PAKISTAN , SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES , ELECTIONS , NATIONAL SECURITY , MILITARY STRATEGY , GOVERNMENT(FOREIGN)


Subject Categories : Government and Political Science
      Unconventional Warfare


Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE