Accession Number : ADA518450


Title :   Conventional Deterrence and the Falkland Islands Conflict


Descriptive Note : Master's thesis


Corporate Author : NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA


Personal Author(s) : Beattie, Troy J


Full Text : https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a518450.pdf


Report Date : Mar 2010


Pagination or Media Count : 124


Abstract : Conventional deterrence failed to prevent open warfare between Britain and Argentina over the Falkland Islands sovereignty issue. This thesis investigates the basic principles underlying conventional deterrence, and then applies those principles to the case study of the Falkland Islands conflict in order to discover why. This is accomplished by examining British political and military planning for the South Atlantic region from 1965-1982 for its ability to leverage effective deterrent threats against Argentina. Psychological factors concerning the rational actor model and their impact upon Britain's capacity to issue deterrent threats against Argentina are also discussed. These two factors are then used to analyze Britain's credibility and reputation in the South Atlantic Region and their effects upon Britain's deterrence posture. All these factors are then taken into account when analyzing the cost/benefit calculus of both Britain and Argentina. Thus, Britain's political and military planning, combined with severe psychological limitations, decreased its regional credibility and reputation, which severely undercut its ability to affect Argentina's cost/benefit analysis. This is why conventional deterrence failed in the Falkland Islands conflict.


Descriptors :   *DETERRENCE , POLITICAL SCIENCE , THREATS , THESES , CONFLICT , UNITED KINGDOM , PSYCHOLOGY , ARGENTINA , FALKLAND ISLANDS , FOREIGN POLICY , MILITARY PLANNING


Subject Categories : Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics


Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE