Accession Number : ADA516524


Title :   Decisionmaking in Operation Iraqi Freedom: Removing Saddam Hussein by Force


Descriptive Note : Monograph


Corporate Author : ARMY WAR COLL STRATEGIC STUDIES INST CARLISLE BARRACKS PA


Personal Author(s) : Metz, Steven ; Martin, John R


Full Text : https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a516524.pdf


Report Date : Feb 2010


Pagination or Media Count : 89


Abstract : The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is pleased to initiate its latest monograph series, Operation IRAQI FREEDOM Key Decisions. SSI started this project in an effort to give leaders of the U.S. Armed Forces some important insights into how military advice was provided to the Nation's civilian leadership during the many years -- including the months before the invasion -- of the war in Iraq. Understanding the ways that military leaders advise those who exercise civilian control over the military is important for the continuing prosecution of that war, but also for the inevitable next time that the United States considers embarking on such an endeavor. A second objective of this series is to provide military and civilian leaders a clearer picture of what they must do to ensure that U.S. Armed Forces are properly prepared -- with strategy, doctrine, force structure, equipment, training, and leadership -- for future operations. Dr. Steven Metz has done a superb job with the first monograph in the OIF key decisions series with his study of the 2003 decision to go to war. Forcibly removing Saddam Hussein from power was arguably the most momentous act of the Bush administration, its effects profound and far-reaching. For much of the previous decade, the low-level conflict with Iraq had demonstrated how difficult it is for the United States to synchronize force and diplomacy and to apply force in precise, measured doses. It raised questions about whether and when it was necessary or effective to use overwhelming military force -- and how to convince the American public and Congress of the need to do this. And it demonstrated the persisting strengths and weaknesses of the American method for strategic decision making, particularly the interplay between crisis and normal decision making, and the role of the uniformed military in the process.


Descriptors :   *INTERVENTION , *MILITARY COMMANDERS , *IRAQI WAR , *LEADERSHIP , *DECISION MAKING , *CIVILIAN PERSONNEL , *DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE , MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS , PRESIDENT(UNITED STATES) , UNITED NATIONS , PERSONALITY , TERRORISM , MILITARY ADVISORS , RISK ANALYSIS , DEPARTMENT OF STATE , DIPLOMACY , INSPECTION , CONTAINMENT(GENERAL) , THREATS , POLICIES , IRAQ , ECONOMIC SANCTIONS , NUCLEAR WEAPONS , MILITARY FORCES(UNITED STATES)


Subject Categories : Administration and Management
      Government and Political Science
      Military Forces and Organizations
      Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics


Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE