Accession Number : ADA495381


Title :   Hunting Leadership Targets in Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorist Operations: Selected Perspectives and Experience


Descriptive Note : Monograph


Corporate Author : JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNIV HURLBURT FIELD FL


Personal Author(s) : Turbiville, Jr, Graham H


Full Text : https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a495381.pdf


Report Date : Jun 2007


Pagination or Media Count : 115


Abstract : In this monograph, the author discusses the critical topic of targeting leadership to defeat an opponent in a counterterrorism or counterinsurgency campaign. Dr. Turbiville approaches the topic from a historical perspective by discussing numerous cases in which government forces have targeted the enemy's leadership. His paper culminates in a more lengthy review of Mexico's targeting of insurgent leadership in the Guerrero Province in the late 1960s, and Russia's more recent targeting campaigns in Chechnya. Targeting leadership can be a difficult endeavor, and the role of intelligence is critical in any effective leadership targeting plan. Equally important is the ability to share the intelligence amongst the various interested parties through effective fusion cells and intelligence centers. This last issue is especially critical as terrorist organizations can morph into global enterprises and present a transnational threat. The relative efficacy of leadership targeting spans a broad spectrum from being highly successful in the case of Peru and the Sendero Luminoso in the 1990s to the less successful campaigns in Rhodesia in the 1970s. It is important to note that in evaluating success, one must be careful to define the goals desired. A successful operation to target an opponent's leadership may be a tactical, or even operational, success, but ultimately lead to a strategic failure. Therefore, tying the tactical and operational activities to a broad, national counterinsurgency or combating-terrorism strategy is a critical component to success. Ultimately, targeting leadership must take into account the enemy organization and its motivations. If an organization is driven by a charismatic leadership, as in the case of Guzman and the Sendero Luminoso, then effectively targeting the leadership can be decisive. In other cases where ideology for a cause is more important than leadership, removing leaders will have less strategic impact.


Descriptors :   *TARGETING , *LEADERSHIP , *ASSASSINATION , *COUNTERTERRORISM , *COUNTERINSURGENCY , *HISTORY , *ENEMY , CASE STUDIES , RUSSIA , SPAIN , PERU , SOUTH AMERICA , COLOMBIA , MEXICO , RHODESIA , INSURGENCY , SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES , TARGETS , GOVERNMENT(FOREIGN) , INFORMATION EXCHANGE , ORGANIZATIONS , UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT , VIETNAM WAR , INDIA , INTELLIGENCE


Subject Categories : Government and Political Science
      Military Forces and Organizations
      Unconventional Warfare


Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE