Accession Number : ADA493817


Title :   Integrating Monetary and Non-monetary Reenlistment Incentives Utilizing the Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM)


Descriptive Note : Master's thesis


Corporate Author : NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA


Personal Author(s) : Zimmerman, Brooke


Full Text : https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a493817.pdf


Report Date : Dec 2008


Pagination or Media Count : 199


Abstract : This research addressed the potential retention and cost impacts of providing an optimal individualized portfolio of non-monetary and monetary incentives to influence reenlistment and retention behavior in enlisted Sailors by exploring three mechanisms for administrating enlisted retention: a purely monetary auction, a Universal Incentive Package (UIP) auction, and the Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM). The mechanisms were simulated, their outcomes compared and their respective strengths and weaknesses were explored. CRAM clearly outperformed the monetary and UIP auctions. Cost savings to the Navy ranged from 25 to 80% over monetary incentives alone. Additionally, this research addressed the force-diversifying potential of CRAM. It was shown, for the sample used, that offering certain non-monetary incentives changed the demographic mix of Sailors retained. By allowing Sailors to choose only those benefits which suit them, the Navy can eliminate the waste associated with unwanted benefits while at the same time empowering its members.


Descriptors :   *REENLISTMENT , *NAVAL PERSONNEL , *PERSONNEL RETENTION , INCENTIVE CONTRACTS , MONEY , NAVAL RESEARCH , THESES , BENEFITS


Subject Categories : Personnel Management and Labor Relations
      Military Forces and Organizations


Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE