Accession Number : ADA486935


Title :   Project CHECO Southeast Asia Report. The Fourth Offensive


Corporate Author : PACIFIC AIR FORCES HICKAM AFB HI CHECO DIV


Personal Author(s) : Aton, Bert B ; Montagliani, E S


Full Text : https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a486935.pdf


Report Date : 01 Oct 1969


Pagination or Media Count : 124


Abstract : On the night of 22-23 February 1969, the Communist forces in South Vietnam launched a major offensive. The ensuing action was variously called The Post-Tet Offensive of 1969 and The Winter-Spring Offensive of 1969. Since the enemy initiative was the fourth in a series of offensives beginning with the infamous Tet Campaign of 1968, this report is titled: The Fourth Offensive Concerned with air response to the Fourth Offensive, the opening chapter establishes the enemy in South Vietnam, explains his goals, and describes his weaknesses and strengths. The second chapter provides an overview of the Fourth Offensive and the continuing Allied operations to deny the enemy the benefits of the initiative. It also compares the Fourth Offensive to its three predecessors, and then briefly analyzes the broad employment of airpower during the period of enemy attacks. The third, fourth, and fifth chapters describe the air and ground activity that occurred in the various geographical areas known as Corps Tactical Zones (CTZs). The concluding chapter reflects on the military lessons to be learned by a study of the Fourth Offensive. During the period of this report, the Allied forces in Vietnam were forbidden to take offensive action on a strategic scale. Offensive air operations were prohibited over Cambodia and North Vietnam and Allied ground forces were restricted to within the borders of South Vietnam. Although air interdiction continued in Laos, most of the air activity in South Vietnam was directly related to the fire and maneuver of the forces on the ground. Therefore, for the most part, the air response to the enemy offensive must be explained in concert with the scheme of ground operations. Clearly, the concept of the Allies was one of vigorous tactical offense within the imposed bounds of a strategic defense. The enemy did not assault a static systems of defense; the Allies moved out to meet the enemy in an effort to spoil his attack and preempt the initiative.


Descriptors :   *SOUTH VIETNAM , *ENEMY , *ATTACK , MILITARY FORCES(FOREIGN) , INTERDICTION , POLITICAL ALLIANCES , AIR POWER , SOUTHEAST ASIA , AIR FORCE OPERATIONS , CORPS LEVEL ORGANIZATIONS , CAMBODIA , COMMUNISTS , LAOS , NORTH VIETNAM , LESSONS LEARNED , VIETNAM WAR , AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE , MILITARY HISTORY


Subject Categories : Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics


Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE