Accession Number : ADA456065


Title :   Massachusetts Institute of Technology Defense & Arms Control Studies Program


Descriptive Note : Annual rept.


Corporate Author : MASSACHUSETTS INST OF TECH CAMBRIDGE CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES


Full Text : https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a456065.pdf


Report Date : Jan 1996


Pagination or Media Count : 36


Abstract : My colleagues and I are often asked to identify the strategy the United States should adopt now that the Cold War has become a fast fading memory. What guidance can we offer those in government who formulate national policy? For what wans should American forces prepare? How should defense forms think about their futures? Will Russia reemerge soon as a threat to international stability? What about China's growing power? Will we be involved in more Bosnias and Haitis or was our withdrawal from Somalia the start of a trend toward isolationism? How big should the defense budget be and what should be its strategic and technological focus? We each have cogent answers for all of these questions and occasionally even agree among ourselves. Of course, in providing our answers we often resort to the standard academic hedge on the one hand 4%is this possible and on the other that. As%d the record on our ability to predict the future is slightly marred by our collective inability to foresee the happy end of the Cold War, the public's rejection of George Bush so soon after his Gulf War triumph and the deployment of American ground forces to Bosnia. What I believe we are especially good at is framing issues, not prescribing policies, when the security future is the subject. Life is full of the unexpected - favorable and trying events that both tempt and test us. How we react to the temptations and challenges should be without surprise. By mapping the options, the frameworks we offer help decision makers avoid the confusion that surprise events often produce. Barry Posen in several excellent publications has outlined well America's grand strategy options. They are what he calls Primacy Cooperative Security Selective Engagement and Restraint. Among us are articulate late advocates for all of these strategies save perhaps Primacy, and even then such advocates are not more than one or two subway stops away.


Descriptors :   *WARFARE , *DEFENSE SYSTEMS , *ARMS CONTROL , MILITARY FORCES(UNITED STATES) , DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE , UNITED STATES , INFANTRY , POWER , SOMALIA , BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA , CHINA , MILITARY BUDGETS , INTERNATIONAL , RUSSIA , COLD WAR , THREATS , POLICIES , UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT , DECISION MAKING


Subject Categories : Government and Political Science
      Defense Systems
      Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics


Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE