Accession Number:

ADA363910

Title:

The Battle of Dien Bien Phu: Strategic, Operational and Tactical Failure

Descriptive Note:

Strategy research project

Corporate Author:

ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA

Personal Author(s):

• Shull, Patrick W.

Report Date:

1999-04-07

Pagination or Media Count:

47.0

Abstract:

This strategy research project is a case-study examination of the battle of Dien Bien Phu during the French-Indochina War of 1946 to 1954. This battle was the decisive event of the war. The paper focuses on French failure to craft a viable strategy for winning the war or this battle against their enemy, the Vietnamese communists or Viet Minh French operational errors that helped ensure their defeat at Dien Bien Phu and the most important tactical mistake that the French made fighting the battle. Studying the lessons learned from this battle and French failure at each level of war - strategic, operational, and tactical, will add to the professional understanding of future United States Army War College students and other interested military officers.

Descriptors:

• *MILITARY OPERATIONS
• *MILITARY STRATEGY
• *MILITARY FORCES(FOREIGN)
• *FRANCE
• *MILITARY TACTICS
• LESSONS LEARNED
• FAILURE
• CASE STUDIES
• ERRORS
• MILITARY PLANNING

Subject Categories:

• Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE