Accession Number : ADA266901


Title :   Readiness of the Army National Guard: A Case Study of the 26th Infantry Division


Descriptive Note : Master's thesis,


Corporate Author : HARVARD UNIV BOSTON MA


Personal Author(s) : Wakim, Christopher


Full Text : https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a266901.pdf


Report Date : Jun 1991


Pagination or Media Count : 79


Abstract : The hypothesis tested in this study is that the 26th Infantry Division cannot reach an acceptable level of training readiness in accordance with the Army's standards to mobilize, deploy, and conduct combat operations. The 26th Infantry Division is an Army National Guard combat unit with elements based primarily in Massachusetts, but with smaller units throughout the New England states. With the active Army force being reduced due to budget constraints and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, it is likely that Army National Guard units will assume more responsibility for the national defense interests of the United States and its allies. The research method used in this study is based upon an approach to the hypothesis from two directions. First, the 26th Infantry Division's actual performance of critical tasks essential to reach combat readiness was measured against the Army's published expectations in its training manuals. Secondly, personal experience and the expertise of other active duty Army trainers who have observed the unit in training were called upon to test the hypothesis. Both approaches verified that the 26th Infantry Division cannot obtain wartime readiness due to resource constraints, poor leadership, and organizational weaknesses. I conclude that the combat units in the Army National Guard have lost their focus as to why they exist and that they should be disbanded


Descriptors :   *MILITARY RESERVES , NATIONAL GUARD , DEPLOYMENT , MOBILIZATION , NATIONAL DEFENSE


Subject Categories : Military Forces and Organizations
      Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics


Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE