Accession Number : ADA266793


Title :   The Gettysburg Campaign - Lee's Failure to Define Intent


Descriptive Note : Final rept.,


Corporate Author : NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI DEPT OF OPERATIONS


Personal Author(s) : Funck, Steven S


Full Text : https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a266793.pdf


Report Date : 17 May 1993


Pagination or Media Count : 23


Abstract : This paper examines the extent to which General Robert E. Lee adequately delineated and conveyed his intent for the campaign into Pennsylvania in the Summer of 1863. The argument is made and defended that General Lee did not have the overall intent of the campaign firmly defined in his own mind. Failure to convey commander's intent caused his subordinates to operate without unity of effort. This led to confusion throughout the campaign and ultimately disaster at the Battle of Gettysburg. The paper discusses General Lee's correspondence and conversations which provide contradictory views of his intent for the campaign. The paper then reviews the execution of the march into Pennsylvania and demonstrates various instances in which Lee's Corps Commanders were confused by the lack of well defined commander's intent. The actual battle at Gettysburg is discussed only briefly and is used only to demonstrate the end result of the confusion which is evident throughout the operation. The paper concludes by discussing the applicability of the lessons learned to a modem day joint commander.


Descriptors :   *LESSONS LEARNED , *PENNSYLVANIA , MILITARY STRATEGY , FAILURE , BATTLES , STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS , SUMMER , OPERATION , DISASTERS


Subject Categories : Humanities and History
      Geography


Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE