Accession Number : ADA266583


Title :   OPDEC Planning: A Commander's Imperative


Descriptive Note : Final rept.,


Corporate Author : NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI DEPT OF OPERATIONS


Personal Author(s) : West, Carol


Full Text : https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a266583.pdf


Report Date : 17 May 1993


Pagination or Media Count : 33


Abstract : Successive generations of military commanders universally recognize as a principle of war that if surprise can be attained over the enemy, it may contribute to victory. To achieve surprise requires a stratagem, a means or tool to achieve ends. That tool is deception, recognized by commanders as a 'force multiplier' they must add to their operational art toolbox. The U.S. commander tasked to orchestrate joint and combined military operations and campaigns at the operational level of war must possess a solid understanding of what deception is and is not and can and cannot do for his campaign. This paper examines U.S. Joint Doctrine for Operational Deception (OPDEC), reviews and analyzes eight OPDEC planning considerations, provides historical analysis of OPDEC planning in conjunction with two Allied campaigns in World War II and the Persian Gulf War and reviews insights into the deception planning process from the commander's perspectives provided by General Eisenhower and General Schwarzkopf in their memoirs. It offers three conclusions which support vigorous attention to OPDEC planning by the operational commander.


Descriptors :   *JOINT MILITARY ACTIVITIES , *MILITARY COMMANDERS , *DECEPTION , MILITARY OPERATIONS , GULFS , PERSIAN GULF , DOCTRINE , ATTENTION , ENEMY , OPERATION , TOOLS , PLANNING


Subject Categories : Personnel Management and Labor Relations
      Military Forces and Organizations
      Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics
      Countermeasures


Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE