Accession Number : ADA264171


Title :   The Operational Impact and Implications of United States Strategic Command


Descriptive Note : Final rept.,


Corporate Author : NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI


Personal Author(s) : Carter, Worth


Full Text : https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a264171.pdf


Report Date : 18 Jun 1993


Pagination or Media Count : 33


Abstract : As the Cold War drew to a close, a new unified command was born, that was originally conceived at the height of the Cold War in the late fifties and sixties. However, the environment of the time, specifically interservice rivalry and a fear of losing turf or mission responsibility, thwarted all efforts to implement this new command. Ironically, following the end of the epic struggle with the Soviet Union, this new command with responsibility for all strategic nuclear weapons stood up on on June 1, 1992, nearly six months after the formal demise of the Soviet Union. Is this new command needed and what can it provided? The United States Strategic Command, although conceived in a period fundamentally different from today provided the tools that are imperative to maintain a stable world in the nuclear arena. The command organization adds many advantage, including the clear separation of nuclear deterrence from conventional war fighting at the CinC level. Placing all strategic forces under a single commander offer many advantages including: producing a clearer more direct chain of command, providing unified effort to nuclear planning and execution, clearly separating the responsibilities of nuclear deterrence and conventional war fighting, and creating a single voice for all matter relating to nuclear forces. Each of these areas is vital in the near term, and the dedication of a single CinC with ultimate responsibility for these interrelated areas will increase the efficiency of forces at the operational level. While the threat of the global nuclear war has been greatly reduced, the challenges in the nuclear arena are more varied and complex than ever before, and CINCSTRAT can have a fundamental role in the shaping of this current morass


Descriptors :   *NUCLEAR WEAPONS , *MILITARY STRATEGY , MILITARY FORCES(UNITED STATES) , CONVENTIONAL WARFARE , DETERRENCE , COLD WAR , MILITARY FORCES(FOREIGN) , USSR


Subject Categories : Nuclear Warfare


Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE