Accession Number : ADA262167


Title :   Through the Eyes of the Dragon: Vietnamese Communist Grand Strategy during the Second Indochina War


Descriptive Note : Research rept. Aug 1991-Apr 1992


Corporate Author : INDUSTRIAL COLL OF THE ARMED FORCES WASHINGTON DC


Personal Author(s) : Jackman, Galen B


Full Text : https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a262167.pdf


Report Date : Apr 1992


Pagination or Media Count : 115


Abstract : This research paper examines the elements of national power of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and their insurgents in South Vietnam, and the evolution of the DRV's grand strategy during the Second Indochina War (1954- 1975). Its thesis is that the Vietnamese Communist leaders were able to craft and execute a successful grand strategy from superior understanding and assessment of the relative elements of national power within the context of the strategic situation. The author first examines the elements of power within the framework suggested by Hans J. Morgenthau: National Character; National Will; Population; Geography; Natural Resources; Economic Strength; Science and Technology; Military Preparedness; Intelligence; Quality of Government; Quality of Diplomacy; Second, he surveys the evolution of the Vietnamese Communist grand strategy by focusing on seven critical decisions mad by the Communist leaders during the course of the war. Inherent in their strategy was the application of the stronger elements of power, the compensation for those that were weak, and the exploitation of their enemy's vulnerable power elements. Finally, the author concludes that in the realm of grand strategy, the Vietnamese Communist leaders were more effective national leaders than their U.S. and South Vietnamese opponents.


Descriptors :   *MILITARY STRATEGY , *NORTH VIETNAM , UNITED STATES , VIETNAM , COMMUNIST COUNTRIES , SOUTH VIETNAM


Subject Categories : Geography
      Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics


Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE