Accession Number : ADA250718


Title :   The Secret of Future Victories


Descriptive Note : Final rept. Jun 1991-Jan 1992


Corporate Author : INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES ALEXANDRIA VA


Personal Author(s) : Gorman, Paul F


Full Text : https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a250718.pdf


Report Date : Feb 1992


Pagination or Media Count : 227


Abstract : The Army of DESERT STORM owed much to three past trainers of the Army. For much of his career, George C. Marshall argued for field exercises to supplement institutional training; once raised to high command, he ordered large-scale maneuvers. World War II was won by cogent strategy, equipment good enough and plentiful, generally sound tactical doctrine, and the methodical training devised by Lesley J. McNair, who equated Realism in training to large maneuvers and live-fire exercises. McNair's methodical plan for producing divisions faltered in 1944 under the strain of battle losses, but remained the basis for Army training for Korea and Vietnam. In 1973, William E. Depuy's TRADOC undertook to insure that the Army could train not only leaders at the strategic and operational levels who could draw arrows on the map to discomfit any enemy, but also units capable of advancing those arrows. Future victories depend on both superb professional schools, and maneuver units trained and commanded well enough that battle-seasoning outpaces battle losses.


Descriptors :   *MILITARY DOCTRINE , *COMBAT READINESS , *ARMY TRAINING , HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING , UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY , MILITARY EXERCISES , BATTLEFIELDS , EDUCATION , SIMULATION , MILITARY OPERATIONS


Subject Categories : Military Forces and Organizations
      Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics


Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE