Accession Number : ADA168687

Title :   Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions.

Descriptive Note : Research rept.,

Corporate Author : STANFORD UNIV CA

Personal Author(s) : Tversky,Amos ; Kahneman,Daniel

Full Text :

Report Date : 29 May 1986

Pagination or Media Count : 258

Abstract : Alternative descriptions of a decision problem often give rise to different preferences, contrary to the principle of invariance that underlies the rational theory of choice. Violations of this theory are traced to the rules that govern the framing of decisions and the psychophysical principles of evaluation embodied in prospect theory. Invariance and dominance are obeyed when their application is transparent and often violated in other situations. Because these rules are normatively essential but descriptively invalid, no theory of choice can be both normatively adequate and descriptively accurate. (Author)


Subject Categories : Psychology

Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE