Accession Number : ADA168687


Title :   Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions.


Descriptive Note : Research rept.,


Corporate Author : STANFORD UNIV CA


Personal Author(s) : Tversky,Amos ; Kahneman,Daniel


Full Text : https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a168687.pdf


Report Date : 29 May 1986


Pagination or Media Count : 258


Abstract : Alternative descriptions of a decision problem often give rise to different preferences, contrary to the principle of invariance that underlies the rational theory of choice. Violations of this theory are traced to the rules that govern the framing of decisions and the psychophysical principles of evaluation embodied in prospect theory. Invariance and dominance are obeyed when their application is transparent and often violated in other situations. Because these rules are normatively essential but descriptively invalid, no theory of choice can be both normatively adequate and descriptively accurate. (Author)


Descriptors :   *DECISION MAKING , *REASONING , THEORY , INVARIANCE


Subject Categories : Psychology


Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE