Accession Number : AD1045435


Title :   2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War: a Fight of Operational Synchronization


Descriptive Note : Technical Report


Corporate Author : JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT NAVAL WAR COLLEGE NEWPORT United States


Personal Author(s) : VANCE,JAMES R


Full Text : https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1045435.pdf


Report Date : 13 May 2016


Pagination or Media Count : 26


Abstract : Over the course of 34 days in July 2006, the Shi'a-Muslim, paramilitary force of Hezbollah fought the Israel Defense Force (IDF) to a standstill and delivered the first Arab Victory over the IDF. Hezbollah armed, advised, and funded by Iran and Syria synchronized efforts of conventional and irregular forces employing nation-state capabilities and denied Israel its objectives. The Israeli Defense Force (IDF) failed to achieve its objectives during the 2006 war with Hezbollah due to ineffective operational synchronization relative to its adversary. The conditions and circumstances of the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah war make its study valuable for operational level planners and commanders as it demonstrates the complex problem of state-supported hybrid threats. This state-support enables the proliferation of high-end capabilities like armed drones, advanced anti-tank and anti-ship missiles, and sophisticated protection systems. To meet the unique challenges posed by increasingly capable hybrid-threats, operational planners and commanders must focus on synchronization of multiple punches from the right mix of domains and functions to achieve victory.


Descriptors :   iran , Syria , PARAMILITARY FORCES , military forces(foreign) , GUERRILLA WARFARE , Israel , military operations , military commanders , military planning , threats , drones , ANTITANK MISSILES , combat operations


Subject Categories : Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics


Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE