Accession Number : AD1038894


Title :   Unassailable Advantage: The British Use of Principles of Joint Operations from 1758-1762


Descriptive Note : Technical Report,05 Jul 2016,25 May 2017


Corporate Author : ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE FORT LEAVENWORTH KS FORT LEAVENWORTH United States


Personal Author(s) : Cahill,Matthew J


Full Text : https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1038894.pdf


Report Date : 25 May 2017


Pagination or Media Count : 51


Abstract : In the Seven Years War the British defeated the French and created the most powerful empire on earth. However, from 1755-1757 British joint operations were marred by defeats to outright disasters. This monograph investigates the British ability as a learning organization to reformulate doctrine, improve their unity of effort, mass, and understanding of objective. The British formulated specific command and control over amphibious operations to ensure both the British Army and Royal Navy understood their roles and responsibilities in getting land forces to the shore and sustaining them there. This monograph investigates what US military planners can learn from the study of historical joint operations. This monograph focuses on four joint operations during the Seven Years War: Rochefort, Louisbourg, Guadeloupe, and Havana. Rochefort, a failed operation, highlights the importance lessons learned by Britain to apply later in the war. Each one of these operations highlights the ability of the British to continually improve their joint operations. The ability of the British to conduct joint operations gave them an unassailable advantage over the French.


Descriptors :   military history , amphibious operations , military operations , warfare , combat operations , doctrine , Joint military Operations , Lessons learned , MILITARY PLANNING , Military commanders


Subject Categories : Government and Political Science
      Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics


Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE