Accession Number : AD1033699

Title :   Hide and Seek: Exploiting and Hardening Leakage-Resilient Code Randomization

Descriptive Note : Technical Report

Corporate Author : MIT Lincoln Laboratory Lexington United States

Personal Author(s) : Dedhia,Veer S ; Sadeghi,Ahmad-Reza ; Skowyra,Richard W ; Bigelow,David ; Rudd,Robert A ; Okhravi,Hamed ; Hobson,Thomas ; Crane,Stephen ; Liebchen,Christopher ; Larsen,Per ; Davi,Lucas ; Franz,Michael

Full Text :

Report Date : 30 May 2016

Pagination or Media Count : 18

Abstract : Information leakage vulnerabilities can allow adversaries to bypass mitigations based on code randomization. This discovery motivates numerous techniques that diminish direct and indirect information leakage: (i) execute-only permissions on memory accesses, (ii) code pointer hiding (e.g., indirection or encryption), and (iii) decoys (e.g., booby traps). Among the proposed leakage-resilient defenses, Readactor is the most comprehensive solution that combines all these techniques. In this paper, we conduct a systematic analysis of recently proposed execute only randomization solutions including Readactor, and demonstrate a new class of attacks that bypasses them generically, highlighting their limitations. We analyze the prevalence of opportunities for such attacks in popular code bases and build three real-world exploits to demonstrate their practicality. We then implement and evaluate a new defense against our attacks. Our evaluation shows that our new technique is practical and adds little additional performance overhead (9.7% vs. 6.4%).

Descriptors :   computer programming , computer programs , cryptography , coding , vulnerability

Subject Categories : Computer Programming and Software

Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE