Accession Number : AD1021919


Title :   Deficiencies in Indian Joint Operations


Descriptive Note : Technical Report,05 Jul 2015,26 May 2016


Corporate Author : ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE FORT LEAVENWORTH KS FORT LEAVENWORTH United States


Personal Author(s) : Cartagena, Henry


Full Text : https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1021919.pdf


Report Date : 26 May 2016


Pagination or Media Count : 52


Abstract : India's influence as a global power is increasing and this trend is likely to continue for the foreseeable future. For all of its great potential, India faces serious impediments to its military modernization and joint operations capabilities because of the way its military is structured. Evaluation of India's doctrine and recent operational experience assessed with respect to their adherence to the Indian principles of war illustrates India's limited capability to conduct joint operations. Specifically, India demonstrated critical planning deficiencies in joint operations during the 1987-90 Indian Peacekeeping Operation in Sri Lanka and the 1999 Kargil War because it failed to adhere to the Indian principles of cooperation, flexibility, security, and intelligence in both case studies. These deficiencies limited India's military effectiveness during the joint operations analyzed; further, evidence indicates that the Indian military has not taken appropriate steps to resolve these deficiencies. The study concludes with identification of means by which India's government could improve its military's joint warfare capability. These findings offer insight to future planners responsible for monitoring India's regional posture and developing campaign plans to deal with potential contingencies involving the Indian military.


Descriptors :   Military capabilities , Military planning , Military modernization , military operations , joint military activities , military doctrine , military forces (foreign) , PEACEKEEPING , GOVERNMENT (FOREIGN)


Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE