Learning to Win When Fighting Outnumbered: Operational Risk in the U.S. Army, 1973-1982, and the influence of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War
Technical Report,10 Aug 2015,10 Jun 2016
ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE FORT LEAVENWORTH KS FORT LEAVENWORTH United States
Pagination or Media Count:
In October 1973, Israel fought and won a ferocious three-week war against a large, capable, highly motivated, and well-equipped Arab coalition, illuminating key lessons about the evolving nature of modern, mid-intensity combat. The Israel Defense Force IDF overcame the seemingly unprecedented lethality, intensity, and density of the modern battlefield through bold operational maneuver and risk-taking on both fronts. This thesis seeks to explore how Israels performance in the war influenced an evolved conceptualization of, preparation for, and response to operational risk within the U.S. Army between 1973 and 1982. It defines and applies a more neutral definition of risk the effects of uncertainty upon ones objectives. It argues that the U.S. Army learned a great deal about operational risk from the IDF. Although it largely succeeded in integrating those insights into its capstone doctrine and concepts, it failed to operationalize them fully within its warfighting elements because of a number of cultural and institutional differences between the two armies.
- Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics
- Government and Political Science