Accession Number : AD1015755

Title :   Wartime Construction Project Outcomes as a Function of Contract Type

Descriptive Note : Journal Article

Corporate Author : 628th Civil Engineer Squadron Joint Base Charleston United States

Personal Author(s) : Hoff,Ryan ; Hammond,Gregory ; Feng,Peter ; White,Edward

Full Text :

Report Date : 01 Jul 2016

Pagination or Media Count : 29

Abstract : Contracts should allocate risk to the contracting party best able to manage the risk. According to McInnis (2001), risk in the construction industry has been categorized into two divisions: contractual risk and construction risk. Contractual risks include items such as miscommunication, lack of contract clarity, or poor contract administration. They are internal to the contract and occur because an imperfect owner and imperfect contractor have chosen to work together. Construction risk includes items such as weather, resource availability, and acts of God. In contrast to contractual risk, construction risk is external to the contracting parties and would exist even if the parties were perfect (McInnis, 2001). Risk allocation is especially important in a wartime construction environment. Contractors working on behalf of the U.S. mission in Afghanistan faced a host of risks, including security threats, long logistical chains, extreme weather, and alack of qualified personnel (Recurring Problems in Afghan Construction, 2011). As the owner, the U.S. Government managed and allocated the risk through contract type choices. Using the lens of contract types employed in Afghanistan, namely fixed-price and cost-reimbursable contracts, this article seeks to understand better the differences in contractor behaviors across contract types in a wartime construction environment.

Descriptors :   Afghanistan , contracts , risk management , construction , incentive contracts , military acquisition , project management , quality assurance , procurement

Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE