Accession Number : AD1015736


Title :   The Learning Curve: MACVs Grasp of Intelligence, PSYOP, and Their Coordination, 1965-1971


Descriptive Note : Technical Report


Corporate Author : AIR UNIV MAXWELL AFB AL MAXWELL AFB United States


Personal Author(s) : Whiskeyman,Andrew D


Full Text : https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1015736.pdf


Report Date : 01 Jun 2015


Pagination or Media Count : 579


Abstract : This dissertation examines military intelligence, psychological operations (PSYOP), and the coordination between the two at Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) from 1965 to 1971 in order to determine the extent to which MACV demonstrated the attributes of a learning organization. The analysis is divided into three phases. The first, from 1965-1967, covers the buildup of US forces in Vietnam. The second examines the years 1968-1969, which include the Tet Offensive and the peak of US military involvement in Vietnam. The third encompasses the years 1970-1971, the period of Vietnamization and the point at which the last US PSYOP forces departed Vietnam. The study analyzes MACVs implementation of intelligence, PSYOP, and their coordination and identifies both successes and failures in MACVs approach to the war in Vietnam.


Descriptors :   VIETNAM WAR , psychological operations , intelligence collection , MILITARY INTELLIGENCE , lessons learned


Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE