Accession Number : AD1001239


Title :   Campaign Assessment in Counterinsurgency: Reinventing the Wheel


Descriptive Note : Technical Report,01 Jun 2014,01 May 2015


Corporate Author : US Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth United States


Personal Author(s) : Bithorn, James C


Full Text : https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1001239.pdf


Report Date : 22 Apr 2015


Pagination or Media Count : 51


Abstract : Strategic and political leaders have determined that the US and ISAF campaign assessments were neither useful nor accurate. The DOD 1230 biannual report titled the Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan provides comprehensive information to strategic and political leaders regarding the progress of the United States' strategy in Afghanistan. The report, however, has largely provided indicators of progress based off a single variableenemy initiated ambushes. As attention drew to the failure of ISAF to provide accurate reporting, a degree of mistrust grew between strategic and political leaders and the military leaders in Afghanistan. In turn, strategic leaders made only partially informed decisions that did not reflect accurately the progress on the ground. The July 2013 DOD 1230 report touted a change in metrics, placing a greater emphasis on variables such as security force development and economic growth. The announcement of new metrics raised an obvious question, were the new measures of performance in Afghanistan actually better, and why had change taken so long? Answering this research question required four steps.


Descriptors :   counterinsurgency , Afghanistan , Vietnam , planning , metrics , MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS , strategy


Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE