Accession Number : AD1001239

Title :   Campaign Assessment in Counterinsurgency: Reinventing the Wheel

Descriptive Note : Technical Report,01 Jun 2014,01 May 2015

Corporate Author : US Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth United States

Personal Author(s) : Bithorn, James C

Full Text :

Report Date : 22 Apr 2015

Pagination or Media Count : 51

Abstract : Strategic and political leaders have determined that the US and ISAF campaign assessments were neither useful nor accurate. The DOD 1230 biannual report titled the Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan provides comprehensive information to strategic and political leaders regarding the progress of the United States' strategy in Afghanistan. The report, however, has largely provided indicators of progress based off a single variableenemy initiated ambushes. As attention drew to the failure of ISAF to provide accurate reporting, a degree of mistrust grew between strategic and political leaders and the military leaders in Afghanistan. In turn, strategic leaders made only partially informed decisions that did not reflect accurately the progress on the ground. The July 2013 DOD 1230 report touted a change in metrics, placing a greater emphasis on variables such as security force development and economic growth. The announcement of new metrics raised an obvious question, were the new measures of performance in Afghanistan actually better, and why had change taken so long? Answering this research question required four steps.

Descriptors :   counterinsurgency , Afghanistan , Vietnam , planning , metrics , MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS , strategy

Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE